

**ICANN**

**Moderator: Gisella Gruber-White  
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4:00 pm CT**

Operator: I would like to inform all parties that today's call is being recorded. If you have any objections you may disconnect. Thank you.

Jordan Carter: Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, everyone and wherever you are, welcome along to this call, to the Working Party 1 Call Number 4 of the CCWG Accountability.

I notice we've got a reasonably small turnout on the call moment, but we will press on because we have some work to get through. And the first question I'd like to ask whether anyone has any items that they need to add to the agenda. And are there any hands up to add any items to the agenda?

We do have an "any other business" item at the end so if it's just a small thing we can deal with it then.

Okay, don't see any hands up so we'll click into the next item, which is the report back from the CCWG meeting. This as usual isn't a long item and there were a whole bunch of action (points) listed in the summary of the meeting that I am going to assume maybe cheekily that you've reviewed.

From my point of view the interesting process point from that call was the discussion about what we do with the meeting in Istanbul. And that's an item that's on our agenda as well. A point (unintelligible) sense in (unintelligible) chairs and the co-chairs is that we need to be sure that any controversial or difficult issues that are going to be on the table at Istanbul have been socialized on a call before.

So if it hasn't already been done, we need to make sure any tricky issues from our working party are discussed on the call next Tuesday. That's just a point to note. Does anyone on the call have any other items from the CCWG that they want to raise to our attention? If you do could you pop your hand up and then let us know? No hands up.

Okay, so I would urge you to go and look at the e-mail that will come out with the notes, recordings, transcripts, links for meeting number 16 if you're interested in those.

And we will carry on to the next agenda item, which is - oh yes, discussion of work items in progress. So if you look at the chart in front of you in the middle of the screen, this gives you a summary of where we are at as to the best of our knowledge at this point.

And Berry Cobb from the ICANN staff team has helped to array us. Is this document set so that everyone - we don't actually need scroll control do we? However (unintelligible) for making on the call.

So as you look through that - oh yeah, everyone should have scroll control now so you can move through this page if you like. This is going to be a new Google Doc. It's available. It's a modification of what we had before.

And we've had a first viewing of some of the items - ones in green. And we've had some discussions about the ones in yellow, so discussions proceeding on those.

The ones in red I'm hoping that we can discuss those items on this call today - at least find out where they are. But we don't need to deal with 6A and 6B beyond this one because those are Work Stream 2. And we don't need to deal with 4A on planning GAC consensus because we're waiting on a discussion between the co-chairs and the GAC and reps.

So basically what I'd like us to work through -- if Fiona or Matthew are on the call -- I can't remember whether we had discussed Item 2D on requiring the OC implementation and on the OAC (unintelligible) bylaws. The reason I can't remember is just I get confused between what we've discussed here and what we've discussed at the CCWG.

So Matthew or Fiona if you're on the call, if you - I see that Matthew is - could you put your hand up and just give us a little briefing on where those two pieces of work are at and whether they're ready to do on today's call? Matthew is that all right?

Matthew Shears: Yes, Jordan can you hear me?

Jordan Carter: Yes. You are coming through quietly but clearly.

Matthew Shears: Okay. So just in terms of the agenda, so the first point I'm not sure that I can speak to I'm afraid to say. On 2D I don't think we've actually gotten around - unless it's been discussed or addressed somewhere else - I actually haven't

discussed this with Fiona. So I'm afraid I can't help on that particular issue and we'll have to get to it obviously.

Jordan Carter: Okay so let me - can I just clarify (Matthew)? That's the 2D one requiring (OSC) implementation.

Matthew Shears: Yes.

Jordan Carter: You haven't worked with it on Fiona, okay. Could we note that as an action point for you and Fiona to follow up on that one? Could that be in the notes please staff? Thanks. Okay, how about the other (unintelligible) Matthew?

Matthew Shears: Okay so when you're referring in the agenda to other AOC and to bylaws matters and crossovers with WP 2, I did - I'm assuming that you're referring to the document that I circulated on the list probably about a week ago now where I went and looked at those affirmation of commitments articles that had not been addressed by (Steve) from the kind of review perspective.

So I looked at articles that had a relevant element in them that we might want to consider using or crossing over to the bylaws. And that includes Articles 3, 4, 7 and 8. And that (unintelligible).

Jordan Carter: Do we have the ability to put this on the screen? Sorry - staff, would that be possible?

Matthew Shears: I'm not sure that staff have it although it was circulated on the list.

Jordan Carter: Okay. In that case why don't you just keep talking us through? Sorry for interrupting.

Matthew Shears: So it was looked at and got comments by a couple of people including (Steve) and (Robin) and a couple of others. So in Article 3 there are some issues that we can consider, but for example in Article 3 which really talks about the commitments the Department of Commerce and ICANN make.

And they make commitments to - for example - ensuring that decisions made related to double technical coordination of (VMS) are made in the public interest and are accountable and transparent.

When one considers this alongside what's in for example the bylaws and particularly the core values it becomes apparent that, you know, when you're referring to the public interest in the core values it only refers to the public interest in the context of promoting competition in domain name registration and not with regards to ICANN's broader actions.

So the suggestion that was made there was that some of that language that's in that particular commitment - in the affirmation of commitments - could be integrated or inserted within the core values in the by-laws.

So basically going through - what I've done is I've gone through that article - Article 4 as well in the affirmation of commitments has also an element that might be interesting to bring over into the bylaws as well in some place.

And though it's not quite as clear - it's an accountability issue -- but the affirmation of commitments state that ICANN and the Department of Commerce recognize that there's a need to do what I would call effectively impact assessments of decision making.

And while I'm not fully apprised of the totality of the accountability mechanisms that exist within ICANN's bylaws and articles of incorporation,

etcetera, it seems to be that impact assessments might be an issue that we might want to see also taken over. That was the main points from Article 4.

Article 7 makes commitments to transparent and accountable budgeting processes and a whole host of other accountability issues. And again they should not - if they're not already accounted for - be incorporated into Section 1 of the bylaws under transparency.

And there's a similar reference that ICANN has to provide thorough and reasoned explanation of date the decision is taken that could also be - language could also be taken into Section 1 of the bylaw on accountability.

So you can see - okay so the document is on the screen. Thank you very much. So I'm actually just skipped - if you can move - I'd like to move it. If you have scrolling ability if you can just go down to the top of the next page you'll see I've just been referring to Article 7 there where it talks about possibly inserting language into Section 1 of the article on transparency in the bylaws and into the bylaw article on accountability.

And then just moving on to Article 8, here there is the - there are two things that are interesting here. Well, there are three. There's one which is obviously a bit controversial, and that's the issue of jurisdiction.

As the first commitment is basically to maintain the capacity and ability to coordinate Internet DNS at the overall level and to work for maintenance of a single interoperable Internet.

My only comment there is you'll see in parentheses, you know, there's a considerable amount of phrasing within the affirmation of commitment and

bylaws that is written in a manner that assumes that ICANN is the coordinator of the DNS through the IANA contract.

Now again I think that some of that may need to be addressed depending on what the model is or what the relationship is between ICANN and the IANA functions in the future.

But Point B on there is that it will remain a not-for-profit corporation headquartered in the United States of America with offices around the world to meet the needs of the global community.

One point there is that by-laws do not specify that ICANN should remain a not-for-profit corporation, whether or not that would once be taken over as well is an important question.

Then of course you have the issue of where ICANN should be headquartered. We've heard about that throughout the past year and most recently in the hearing that was held about from Fadi's taking his commitment to maintain ICANN headquarters in the United States. I note that Steve in his response to this work felt that we certainly should bring 8B into the bylaws.

And then the last one which is again language there may already exist but the import of 8C is quite key I think and it's to operate as a model stakeholder private sector led organization with input from the public for whose benefit ICANN shall in order then to act.

This language again does not really find itself in the bylaws. And the phrasing is important - in particular the operating of the model stakeholder organizations for the benefit of the public. It's not explicit in the core values

or the mission. And I think it's important enough to be integrated into one or other areas of the bylaws if it does not already exist.

That's it. So the other articles - 9 and 10 - have already been addressed within the group by Steve's work. And my read of the other articles, most of them aren't asking any specific commitments of ICANN. So there you have the two pages.

Just so it's completely clear as you read through it, what I've done is I've listed them by article clearly. And the indent is my suggestion or note on that particular article and what we should do with it.

Jordan Carter: Okay thank you Matthew. That's a nice presentation, easy to read, easy to see. There will be some crossover I think between this work and the work that Becky's group - Working Party 2 - are doing in respect of the community compact. So I think that if you are able to keep abreast of that my personal view is that we shouldn't be theological where this ends up.

I think some of this will wind up in that, which will be essentially putting them into the bylaws. Others might not through that process, but if our view is these all should be, then the job is to keep watching (unintelligible) to make sure that those that aren't picked up by the compact Working Party 2 do actually feed through into the bylaws in the end through our own work.

And so why don't we have some thoughts/discussions? There have been a couple of points made in the chat and that - do you want to speak audibly in the audio? Are there any hands up?

Just for the audio record, the stuff that's in the chat is the question has been raised, someone is not supporting the location of ICANN's headquarters in the

bylaws. This isn't the right place for it. And because it is an American corporation the bylaws - as we suggested - it's implicit that it would be best in the United States. Avri, fire away. We can't hear you Avri, just so you know.

Avri Doria: Sorry I was double muted. Speaking because you asked that it be verbal. I have - you know, the opposition to doing it wasn't my issue. It's sort of in the bylaws of an American corporation to say that the headquarters will stay here. Seems like there's sort of a de facto situation.

I understand that it's a critical issue that we need to solve for the accountability. I'm just wondering whether the bylaws is the place. Even though we are putting the AOC content in there, this may be one piece of AOC content that needs to be dealt with outside. Thanks.

Jordan Carter: Thanks Avri. And (Edward). We also can't hear you (Edward). You may also be double muted. Still no sound from (Edward). And still nothing. (Edward) if you don't mind we'll go on to Keith Drazek while you sort out your audio issues. And so leave your hand up. We'll come back to you. And I'll hand the floor over to Keith Drazek.

Keith Drazek: Thank you Jordan. Can you hear me?

Jordan Carter: Loud and clear.

Keith Drazek: All right, very good, thank you. You know on this topic, you know I think there was an e-mail exchange that took place on - and it may have been the bigger sort of account of a CCWG accountability e-mail list last week on Wednesday sort of discussing this topic, you know, about the location, you know, about in terms of, you know, ICANN's headquarters, where it's going to be and all that.

And I think it's important to note - and it's included in the text of the e-mail that I sent in response to Tjani. But it was a question of - you know Fadi at the hearing - the most recent Senate hearing - actually went on record and basically said that - and I'm paraphrasing but -- that, you know, that ICANN was committed to staying in the United States and that the affirmation of commitments were, you know, in the process of, you know, being reviewed by the community and were in a sense, you know, that he believed it was a good idea that the affirmation commitments be incorporated into the ICANN bylaws.

And he was responding specifically - really going out of his way to respond specifically - to a letter that had been sent to Steve Crocker back a year ago July from Senators Thune and Rubio where they called for the affirmation of commitments to be incorporated into the bylaws and specifically on the topic of ICANN's jurisdiction.

So I think it's just important to note that - I think there's been an expectation set. And if what we produce does not include that I think there's a risk of it becoming a political football. I just wanted to go on record as noting that, and I'd be more than happy to forward or re-forward the e-mail that I sent sort of pointing this out. Thanks.

Jordan Carter: Thanks Keith. Just for the record, that e-mail went to the whole accountability CCWG...

Keith Drazek: Yes.

Jordan Carter: On the 5th of March. And shouldn't it go to Working Party 1? So I'll just forward it there to give them - just to make sure the context is there for people (unintelligible)...

Keith Drazek: Very good.

Jordan Carter: ...have it.

Keith Drazek: Thanks so much Jordan.

Jordan Carter: Thanks Keith. Okay are there any other speakers on this point? What I've written down as a note is to ask the team - sorry just a noise here - to ask the co-chairs how they'd like us to deal with the specific issue of jurisdiction which crops up in a range of things, and to use the location of the head office as a specific example of why it's an issue.

We do need to decide how to deal with at least. And I'm sure it'll be a point of discussion in Istanbul.

So if there are no other speakers on this one I think the best thing is to say thank you (Matthew) for doing this work. And why don't we set this one aside as having been reviewed?

And certainly my view for the record is that it's a good piece of work and that most of the things identified should be incorporated somewhere in the areas that are not just maybe your 60-day disposal option, which is what the AoC framework kind of is, that are actually embedded in our founding documents. So...

Right. In that case the next item that's on the agenda here is the AoC document access. Now (Matthew), out of (Steve), (Matthew) and Fiona, you're the only one who's here on the call. This is Work Item 2E on talking about access for AoC reviews. Is this something that you've been part of considering?

Matthew Shears: Jordan I have not. I apologize. I cannot speak to it. I don't know if any work has been done by anybody else.

Jordan Carter: Okay, that's all right. We can set that one aside. I also realize in the agenda that I've used the same number twice. I've used 2E twice. I'm sure that's wrong. Steve DelBianco is not on this call, so that means that there was a work item about making sure that Work Stream 2 items can be implemented in respect to these AOCs after the transition.

I'm not aware actually what's gone into that but I'm not sure it's the right thing to fill out one of our templates for anyway. I think it's something that we should put up as a topic for discussion at the meeting in Istanbul because we need to be confident of that.

So if we could set that one aside like that document access to check with Steve to see if (unintelligible) work. And the ability to ensure Work Stream 2 accountability stuff is done to check in with Steve as well.

The next one there is Keith Drazek on the table again. Getting some feedback on his initial thinking which he described to us on work inside B1 and 2. (Unintelligible) hand it. Fire away Keith.

Keith Drazek: All right thanks Jordan and I'll be completely up front about this. I have started thinking about this but I haven't started drafting anything because I

found myself getting confused about exactly what it is we were trying to capture here. So I would very much welcome some discussion about this so I can have some guidance.

And then in short order I will take that away and come back in the next day or so with an initial draft for review. So I understand that what we're looking for is, you know, to make sure that ICANN is limited in its ability to - as I understand it - impose obligations. And then there's two different mechanisms that we're looking at - one, a golden by-law and one I guess a community compact or contract.

But is it specific to obligations on contracted parties? Is it more broad than that? Can we just have some conversation about what it is exactly that we're trying to capture?

Jordan Carter: Well I'm going to put my own hand up. I've posted into the chat the original wording that we had, which was pointed out at the (inventory) of the accountability mechanisms. And the first one is to create an accountability contract between ICANN and registries, registrars, and registrants.

Contracts lets ICANN impose rules on others only when supported by consensus of affected parties and necessary to protect the operations of the (DNS). And disputes go to independent (unintelligible). So that was one of them.

And the second was to describe this limitation it falls in bylaws. And so that text is pasted out of the, out of powers and mechanisms document, which I can fire a link into the chat as well. Does that give you any more context to be starting off with Keith?

Keith Drazek: Yes thanks Jordan. It does, and I apologize for not having found that reference earlier. So yes that definitely helps a lot. I guess the distinction between the golden bylaw or articles that cannot be amended I think makes sense. Yes, this gives me what I'm looking for.

I guess since we have the time right now, is there anybody who would like to sort of weigh in with thoughts or suggestions or recommendations for me as I come up with the initial drafts?

Jordan Carter: If anyone does have those, put your hand up and we'll take your queue in order. And while hands are appearing I'll just say that in terms of - I mean I don't have a view Keith about whether an accountability contract or something in the bylaws is more useful. Maybe one of the first things you could usually think about is that question.

And I think it would be fine if you only developed the one that you think is the credible way of achieving this. You can just explain at the end of the template why you think the other one isn't the preferable way, and just to avoid double working it.

Also though you may find it's really easy to run through and do twice. So is there anyone who wants to contribute to the discussion on this?

Keith Drazek: Yes thanks for that guidance Jordan and I agree. I'll take a look at this and I will circulate something through you back to this group by COB tomorrow.

Jordan Carter: Thanks Keith. That's brilliant. In the chat (unintelligible) and the ombudsman has suggested that rather than (causing) (unintelligible) amendment we need a founding document or a constitution for ICANN.

(Chris) - A, I agree with you. B - I do think it's a bit off topic. C - I think it's a bit out of scope for this working party. And D - I think it is probably something that the whole CCWG should be thinking about, and it relates to the work that (Becky)'s doing on the contact and so on. And probably questions for legal advisors about various different ways to constitute ICANN.

At the moment we've got articles of incorporation and by-laws and there are a wide array of other documents. If this is a constitutional moment for ICANN then we just need to think about how to do that very broadly and what kind of document it is and so on would be questions of detail.

But because it's off topic let's move on. Sorry (unintelligible). The next item on the agenda I think was my item on the removal of ICANN directors. So if that template could go on there - sorry, (Keith) your hand is up. Your hand is down.

Keith Drazek: Yes thanks Jordan. Sorry, I didn't want to jump in before necessary, but I just wanted to note that the item that was at the bottom -- that (Matthew) and I had responsibility for -- it's now been transitioned to the other work party on the question of limiting ICANN scope and mission is - the documents that we worked up have been sent to Becky Burr.

And you know so I'll be engaging with her in that work party to make sure that that loops forward appropriately and accordingly. So I just wanted to note that the thing that has been transitioned on a previous call has been shepherded to the other group and I'm going to continue working on that in that other group.

Jordan Carter: That's fantastic. Thanks Keith. That's a good update. I should have asked.

Right so on your screen now is a template that took a lot longer to write than I thought it would. It was only about 12 hours ago. So I will set you through it. The thing I'd like to note first of all is that it was - back to our decision about powers and mechanisms. The power that's involved here is removing the whole ICANN board.

There was clear feedback from our call and from the CCWG that they didn't want us to go down the track of removing one or two directors. That they key power we needed to focus on now is the whole board and so this template deals exclusively removing all ICANN board of directors.

The second point is that and while it is a new community power clearly it is a triggered mechanism. And so according to our old split up it needed to go in (Becky's) working party but we are both agreed that it's fine to stay where it is.

And the third point is into the substance that to exercise this power we had to have a body to do it. So I didn't think I would be contributing very much if I just said all this was and removing the ICANN board of directors.

So I've gone the whole way in creating what I've called in bright yellow and (unintelligible) things for a holding title, a community council as the mechanism that would exercise this power.

And I'm going to suggest that we might be able to use this mechanism with different funding strengths as the way to and implement to other powers but we'll come back to that.

And so if I just run through it, it's the power to remove the whole board of directors. I think it's about the check and balance in the sense that it just

provides a bit of a reminder for board members that the community can (unintelligible) required by removing them from office.

And it does provide a redress mechanism that they have done something that the community wants to reverse. And it's triggered and the outcomes of the process in the end are that there is a new board elected if and if the ruling succeeds and if it fails nothing happens.

So the standing for this have suggested that the community council there wouldn't be any other body and that the trigger to start it moving well who has standing.

I'm not sure if I've used that box exactly right in the nomenclature but is that it would be to support a organizations two advisory councils or one SO and one AC.

So the point of that is that it shouldn't be up to one ICANN and community body to trigger this process that it needs at least two. And given there is high thresholds to actually exercise in the mechanism it didn't need to be a super duper high threshold like three SO's, which there are only three I think. And that the two felt about right and that they would have to make the petitions do their normal democratic processes.

If you scroll down to the top of Page 2, which is the next point the standards of the decision. And what I've proposed is that as we develop the community compact in working part two, that's going to set how ICANN wants to behaving and the high level standards and so on.

And it's going to be the basis of the way that (Becky's) party is asked in terms of independent review and redress. So for a holding point and I thought you'd

need to sort of be able to argue that board had enacted a way with that action that was inconsistent with the obligations in the context.

And as I said last time we discussed this otherwise these ruling mechanisms tend to not have objectives standards you can measure conduct against. And in any case there's already a board of directors code of conducts that they can be removed again.

So that kind of thing is already covered. This is a political mechanism and in that way the purpose is the accountability that says all of the four, which is the same as last time.

And in terms of the composition of the body I've suggested that it would be a standing body in ICANN and that removing the board of directors is one of the powers that it would have.

And then so they would need, these people who are appointed would need understanding of the context, understanding of the expectations of the ICANN community and understanding of ICANN's environment and context as key criteria but they wouldn't need to be lawyers or technical experts because what they're doing in this power anyway is at the, probably at the direction of the new stakeholder groups.

So if we scroll down in terms of diversity requirements and that's not as interesting I think as the next box the number of persons. And I'm personally very much in two minds about this and organizationally I don't have and we don't have a position yet.

But the first option I thought through was a quite small group, which would be two (unintelligible) of the SO's and AC's and one that could reach the other - sorry too from the GAC and one from the smaller AC, the SSAC and ISSAC.

And that it was, so those are the two it would require and a different gender of people (unintelligible) and balance.

The second one that one of the co-chairs, (Matthew) had been doing some brainstorming work on, which is really helpful and he had suggested five and from each of the main - it impacts just all the SO's and AC's.

And in that last regional balance and you can have a gender balance as well and in that five. So that's what I've suggested an option to, have five reps in the CSG, ASO, ALAC and GAC and two from the (unintelligible) security and (ASAC) and advisory committee.

And the logic behind it at making this smaller is it seems to be it seems to that you could argue that those are more specialized and at communities where a lot of the participation is from across the other communities.

And so it would be okay to have smaller numbers there but this is all for discussion so, you know. And we'll come down to that through our presentation here.

The independence requirements there's two models right, one is the one that (Matthew) mentioned in the chat and to just have the chairs of SS and AC's and so on filling this role.

And I proposed a different way, which is that ICANN staff, ICANN directors or ICANN staff (unintelligible) committee members of any of your redress

institution and the office holder and an SO and AC and staff eventually if they're commercially dependent on ICANN should not be eligible.

And the reason is that it would be, this should be a little bit more remote from the day-to-day activities of ICANN while still connected with it in my view. And if we're creating a new institution and broadening these out, broadening out those (cadre) and separating the people who need to hold the organization to account in this way from those as deeply as possible in this day-to-day working seems to be a use approach.

And, you know, because I had in the chat this avoids capture by (unintelligible) it probably also contributes to avoiding voluntary exhaustion and on the other hand, you know, leaders are leaders for a good reason as (Matthew) suggested in the chat.

So this is something we will have discussed at some length. The other thing I suggested independence requirements is that no more than two members of the council could be from any single company or group of related companies or from one national government or other particular governmental innovation.

And that's just to avoid too much power being vested in people who are in the end under the control of one boss and kind of obvious.

Now the model that I proposed for their election and appointment is that they are, that the members of this council be appointed by their SO's and AC's according to usual processes for a term of one year that starts the first of January and they could be eligible for reelection for three terms, three consecutive terms and for five terms in total.

And the reason for that is that the short-term and the frequent election the barring of long terms is that it keeps a certain (dynamous) in the accountability side of the community and it doesn't allow for a set of long hand.

I've looked personally at the UN's lot stakeholder advisory for the UN IGS and different people that have had consecutive three-year terms and it hasn't provided institutional continuity but it hasn't necessarily made it the most dynamic group in the world in my entirely personal subjective opinion.

And so the other point is that we just have to make sure that no one can sabotage a governing body or a body like this. And so my suggestion is that if someone isn't appointed by the SO and AC the former rep carries on and because we don't want to have this council rendered in our (unintelligible) by a kind of political fight between SO's and AC's.

And I can, I keep going and if I'm in too much detail let me know I realize this is out late. I think there should be a power of recall and for the appointing bodies on this council and but that it just come after notice.

So they should be able to give someone a formal learning they're not happy with their conduct and if they continue to be unhappy and they would be able to remove them after 30 days. And the way that they remove them is by appointing a new one. So it's again to make sure that the council can't be stymied by shrinking it.

And going down to the top of Page 6 and I personally had a real difficult thinking through whether it was preferable for this to be a mandate decision or a decision based on personal assessment.

And my personal instinct I think is a little bit more towards the personal assessment thing but the option I presented there as Option A is that generally this I think this group could be that kind of body because the members are appointed, they're easily controlled by this so is an AC and they can be removed if they're not doing what they need to do.

And but that they would force their participation in admitting of their appointing bodies, peak bodies so the ccNSO council and they go through the cc reps before using this power so that they had to have a conversation and had to have become aware of the views of their SO's or AC's leadership.

The alternative is that it's a mandated decision and I've sketched that option out in Option B and that can be a mandated decision and it has to be made by the body and it has to be made in the timeframe that is clear.

It has to follow the usual processes and it has to direct all (unintelligible) so very few members. We don't want a situation I think where some people are directed and some people aren't.

It has to be a super majority decision and it's got to be done in writing and can't be a kind of (draggle) direction given that it has to be able to disclosed later.

And then of course the question that came to mind immediately in a mandated situation is what if the SO or AC fails to direct its members, what happens there?

So I see a big debate going on in the chat, which is really interesting. I hope that it can be done verbally once the presentation is finished. The decision we've made by vote you obviously can't have a consensus hijacking.

And I've suggested thresholds for the majority that mean that one SO or AC cannot block a (result) of the board but that everyone else would need to be in favor of it. So 10 out of 12 members for the smaller type person council, 24 out of 29 for the larger council.

That may be too stringent it may mean this is what we have to do with this threshold is get it right so it's a high threshold and a difficult one but that it isn't impossible, you know, that's a really important principle.

And so it may be much more appropriate to have a sort of 2/3 threshold and a 82, 83% threshold but that's also for discussion.

We have some costs here and go to the last page there are some timeframe requirements I think that needs to be said it's got to be reasonably quick and then it can be amended, it can be credited in the bylaws as minus a proposal.

Obviously we would need legal advice on that point and a couple of other considerations on the bottom. And the way that ICANN (unintelligible) with the President and CEO is a member of the board and we certainly I think don't want the situation where if this (powers) exercise but the board and the CEO are removed so the employment conditions need to be clear that even if they are no longer the President of the corporation and a member of this board, the CEO remains the CEO.

Now there is of course also in (unintelligible) what happens when you've (unintelligible) the board you can't really have a boardless corporation and so with the proposal there is that once this trigger reviews this mechanism removes the board.

What it is essentially doing is serving them into a caretaker mode where they can do nothing other than carry on normal business; no significant decisions can be made in terms of expenditure or policy.

And the election or appointment process takes off in an expedited way to appoint new directors. But that's something relatively quick date after the decision is made and one that is quick in the sense of not dragging it out but not quick in the sense of making it impossible for new directors to be appointed.

The old (unintelligible) resigns and so there's a related question there is that do we need to provide for a way for SO's and AC's who do want to reappoint their directors to have a quick way to do that and that's something for discussion.

It might need to be spelled out in this mechanism it might be something that's already available because I haven't had time to review the electoral this is for the SO's and AC's.

So sorry for ranting at you that long, that's the presentation and I see an interesting chat going on about whether you just have the leaders of the SO's and AC's or not filling these roles and there is some advantages and disadvantages of that. There is an important design question.

And who would like to chip in, would anyone like to do that? Roelof you're first up.

Roelof Meijer: Okay thanks, yes well just interrupt me if you think it's too much in wording and if it's more efficient or effective if I write it down because I've got yes lots of comments to be honest.

And if you call it a community council I saw when you emailed it and you suggested it could be also another structure. So do you, is your intention that it also can work if we opt for a permanent cross community working group or a membership structure or a delicate structure or supervisory boards we could then design it roughly the same way?

Jordan Carter: I think aspects of it would be the same but also I think that some of the point (unintelligible) decision thresholds or and, you know, what happens in the caretaker situation and so on that would be similar.

To me this is the downside of designing our mechanisms and our powers at the same time. But certainly the power to remove the board would be the exercise of whatever mechanism we come up with.

Roelof Meijer: Okay, and I can understand members having multiple votes but the question that I have about the compilation of the community council is first of all it was in the (unintelligible) as well. Why don't we just open the chairs of the SO's and AC's in it and give them multiple votes and maybe even differentiate because I think it's very useful to have multiple members for the same structure if those members anyway have to get their mandate for a decision to remove the board from their community.

If they have to do this then there cannot be a different opinion between the five members because they all have to get the mandate from their community and there will be a single mandate coming from the community to either remove or not remove the board or support or not support their proposal.

So I don't think, I don't see how having five members for an SO would in any way improve things or make things different or better because they will have to authorize as a kind of a well in conjunction.

So how do...

((Crosstalk))

Jordan Carter: The reason I didn't go down that route was because I was assuming there would be if we used this vehicle for other powers there would be other (unintelligible) warrants mandated vote.

And if everything that we want to give to the community is going to be mandated by the SO's and AC's then it makes absolutely no sense to have a big - it makes every sense to have one person carrying whatever the weight of votes is that we decide.

And so it was to allow it to be generalized to a situation where there weren't binding votes.

Roelof Meijer: Yes okay, I think this is something we could discuss further. So it's up to you Jordan if you want me to stop here and get some other opinions in before I carry on on different subjects because I think this is something that I feel makes it very complicated.

You get a very large body and while I think that if you get the chairs from the SO's and the AC's you get people who are already elected. I don't think they are elected because they belong to elite, I don't think that they become members of elite after they have been elected as our AC chair.

I think the communities do that because they think these people can actually do their job properly. In my opinion we should use them in this kind of situation or in this kind of a group as well.

It's much easier and if we don't like them we appoint somebody else. But I'm interested to hear the opinion of others so I think I'll stop here I can still get back on the other subjects.

Jordan Carter: Okay yes thanks we've got time for this one so you don't need to get everything out at once. Let's move down the speaking list and take Chris LaHatte is next. And could I ask anyone who isn't speaking to mute their microphone and that would be great, thank you. (Chris) we can't hear you it may be (unintelligible).

(Chris) we still can't hear you, you may still be double muted. I'm going to suggest that we hold you don't put your hand down, sort out your audio issues and in the meantime we'll hear from (Olivier), (Olivier) please go ahead.

Olivier Muron: Hello.

Jordan Carter: Hello we can hear you.

Olivier Muron: Can you hear me?

Jordan Carter: Yes.

Olivier Muron: Can you hear me?

Jordan Carter: Yes we can hear you.

Olivier Muron: Okay, so I just want to say something.

Chris LaHatte: I'm on line now.

Jordan Carter: Yes (Chris) we'll come to you after we hear from Olivier he started now.

Olivier Muron: Okay I'm not clear, I'm not really convinced that we need a new body to do that because this body will not be, it will meet very seldom. So I think maybe it will be enough to have a process allowing SO and AC using their own existing issues and making process to take the decision about the board.

Why are we doing it to have a new body? New body we create problem of accountability of this new body with presentation of the new body and for what we need we do not really need a new body with new people.

I agree with Roelof you can take a good share of the SO initiative for example. I mean that will be enough.

And one other point I wanted to make is that maybe all the supporting organizations who have the same weight in the decision that they can write, if you can write to me about it.

Jordan Carter: Okay thanks Olivier and to clarify again the reason that I suggested a body was because we've got a number of powers that we are thinking of and giving to the community.

And it isn't just removal of directors there are things like community approving the bylaw changes, community challenges actions against the bylaws community whose budget, whose strategic plan.

So there are a range of other things that need to be done and I think a fundamental design question we will need to answer is whether we want all of those decisions to be made just by processes of that the individual SO's and AC's or whether we want there to be a body that comes together to consider those.

Now my strong preference is a body to come together and consider those. And the reason for that is this, a whole lot of ICANN SO and AC decision making is made utterly buried in the silos of those SO's and AC's.

And if we're talking about whole of ICANN powers if we just have a set of disaggregated conversations where there is no consideration given to the whole of ICANN perspective then actually I think we're breaking ICANN.

I think we would be doing a terrible thing to ICANN and to its ability to be a viable organization into the future. There is a reason there is an ICANN board of directors and not I'd see as people just sending emails around the world.

There is a reason that we come together at the meetings. So my instinct and my personal view and maybe this is a question we could ask the advisors to the CCWG to consider, that's why my instinct first of all leans towards the body that exercises these powers not just the autonomous processes...

((Crosstalk))

Olivier Muron: You mean also create new, you mean also create new problem of accountability and representation.

Jordan Carter: I don't think you do create that on the basis of what I set out, the accountability is at least dealt with and so was the representation. But we would have to settle those debates.

So the second point I was just going to make in response was that that's why also if they have a situation where it isn't mandated but is currently say for a situation where there isn't dialogue and discussion because it's in the sharing of the different perspectives and interests of the SO's and AC's that hopefully sensible decisions will be made.

And but I, it's not my job to respond to each point and I, this is the discussion that we need to have here and in (Istanbul). So it's great that we're starting. Chris LaHatte could I call you?

Chris LaHatte: Yes my view is that this community council becomes a little bit like a sort of senate, which is seeing members of the community but slightly detached from the regular leadership and board.

And the reason for that is as I've said in the chat is that you want to avoid any (prediction) that this group who are making a pretty major decision doesn't actually have any link to the board members or the leadership.

And I think you need that detachment to give it more credibility. I mean let's face it the likelihood of needing to remove the whole board is actually in reality pretty remote.

So therefore anybody we set up is likely to meet I think probably very infrequently maybe once or twice a year at the very most probably incorporated at ICANN meetings.

But it would be likely to be I think quite senior and experienced members of the community, a few gray haired individuals who know all the history and background. So that's my view of what it should look like.

Jordan Carter: Thanks (Chris) for that perspective. (Malcolm Hutty) is the next person with his hand up.

Malcolm Hutty: Thank you and first Jordan I'd like to thank you for the work that you put into this proposal, which I think opens up a number of interesting and important questions and does so in quite a usefully structured manner.

So I think you'll be a great contribution to driving the discussion forward. The first question that I would like to put on the table is what purpose we really think there is in a board spill power?

And I'm looking here at the description given in your second row labeled category where you describe it as being something that increases the focus on the board and meeting the communities and needs is in the ultimate case it would know it could be removed from (unintelligible) to do so.

Now I don't think anybody would have the idea that the board spill would be something that will be used lightly or frivolously. But that said, I think that there remains a spectrum of when we might consider using such a power and what purpose was seen for it.

One end of the spectrum would lie - we have basically just completely lost confidence in the organization. And that would see the Board spill as being something that was really a nuclear option. It was essentially a replacement for what some people might have thought we could do before times they

should in going to the U.S. Government and saying actually we're - we don't believe in ICANN anymore. Can you give us something else instead?

And then at the other end of the spectrum there's something where actually it's not considered to be really that threatening to the organization as a whole. If you just say actually, you know what, we don't like this Board. We don't think they're doing the best job they could. We would like a new Board. We don't like the way it's approaching this issue. Let's just get a new Board and move on.

And there's a spectrum between those two extremes. But I think they do describe without moving to the point to taking it frivolously. Very different approaches to what this would be used for. And that would then suggest differences in how it might be implemented.

So the standing here that you've described is a very high bar of standing because realistically speaking I wouldn't expect SSAC or RSSAC ever to feel that it was appropriate for themselves to initiate that - this process.

I think it would be - personally I would expect the SO (effort) or very rarely to feel that it - ICANN issues had impacted it given the relationship between the numbering community and ICANN. That it impacted enough to want to trigger this. So realistically I think this standing that you described is really two out of the GAC, the GNSO and the ccNSO. And that is already a very high bar for me.

And so that suggests to me that what we've got here is a version of this that isn't so much about focusing the Board on meeting the communities' needs and more about ensuring that there is an ultimate last recourse to push a reset

button if a community's completely lost confidence, which is a perfectly valid and viable suggestion.

But I'm pointing out that there are alternatives that we might want to consider exactly which variance of this we might want. Thank you.

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Jordan, I am not (unintelligible).

Jordan Carter: Thanks (Malcolm). Could I just - could I ask a clarifying...

((Crosstalk))

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Yeah. No, no, Tijani. Can you please put me on the queue please?

Jordan Carter: Tijani.

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Yeah.

Jordan Carter: Yeah. We'll put you on the queue.

Tijani Ben Jemaa: (Thanks).

Jordan Carter: And you'll come after (Edward) (unintelligible). And can I ask a quick question (Malcolm) just to clarify? So you're saying the high standing required means that this is only in the ultimate event type mechanism and that we could design differently.

I think that we do need to get that right in the spectrum of measures. So what I'm trying to work out is do you think that would be rolling the Board is rolling the Board? So how do you think it would practically affect these? Are

you suggesting these are a lower set of standings, an easier way to trigger this?

Malcolm Hutty: Well, I think that depending on what you view the purpose of this is. I think you could, yes. I think if you could have this - view this as a nuclear option in which case a high standing to initiate it is appropriate.

But you could also have it as more an option where the signals - and element of the community has lost confidence in the Board and wishes to raise its serious and grave concerns about things for discussion amongst the rest of the community. That could have a lower standard - a lower standing to get in. Maybe, you know, three constituencies within the GNSO for example, something like that.

And then your - the community council would then consider that point and it would give an opportunity for those issues to be raised and aired and considered. But there'd be a higher - but then the community council would be a very different thing as to whether actually it chose to spill the Board. Yes.

Whereas as things stand at the moment, the standing is so high to even initiate a process that you're probably going to spill (as is over) triggers. But, you know, so the community council isn't making the great of decision because in order to trigger this in the first place you've got to have a very high level of dissatisfaction in the first place.

Jordan Carter: Thank you for that contribution, that clarification. That's helpful. Thanks. Good for us to know (Malcolm). And the next person is (Edward Morris) and Tijani is next.

Edward Morris: Thank you Jordan. You mentioned in the chat and also earlier in a (real) sense that you felt the scene was compatible with membership. It's not. Under membership under California law removing the Board of Directors is a statutory issue. It's not one that we can do with what we want.

Under 5222 any and all Board members can be removed by a threshold set by Section 5310 of the California Corporations Code, which sets the threshold depending upon the number of members. So this may - you might be able to use this with the other mechanisms but you can't use it with the membership (scheme).

Jordan Carter: Thanks for that clarification. But what I kind of meant was that it would look entirely different because the membership (options) are set up by statute. But it's very clear that membership could spill the Board. It would just be - it would be a different way of doing it. So thank you for that clarification. It's very helpful. And the next speaker is Tijani.

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Thank you Jordan. I am - first I am sorry to join late because I couldn't open the Adobe Connect. That's why I joined by telephone but very late. I have to comment. The first is applied to what our colleague just said. He said that he didn't see the necessity to have the other AC on this committee council because he thinks that only the naming community needs to be there.

I want to remind that it is not about - only about the let's say domain names. And even about domain names the users community has always something to say and experience show that we raise a lot of problems. And it was - and those problems were really - and - were real and (unintelligible). So I don't think that the users must be eliminated from this composition.

The second remark is about the standard. You said in your first version and in this version that the standard would be subjective, not objective. I don't think that this is something that we have to treat lightly and to have subjective on this because I think in terms it is unpredictable and it can be something that is not realistic or something like this.

We have to think about any case that may lead to a decision to recall the Board. We have to think about everything. And we have to put all the (unintelligible) against which the decision can be - it can be done even if we do it at a high level. But not let it get (open) like this because the results - the consequence is very serious.

Recalling the Board is very serious. It's something that we - perhaps it will never happen. But we don't have to let it (open), as you said, subjective and (definitely banking) on the opinion of the committee - what is the opinion of the committee. Everything can be - it can happen from there. Thank you.

Jordan Carter: And thanks Tijani. I mean my point of view is just that if you want to try and write some examples of the kind of standards that we should apply, I would welcome that. And it would be great if you could draft them and send them (unintelligible) working party one less because it needs - because I struggle trying to write something. And that's just where I got to last night (unintelligible).

So if you've got specific proposals about what kind of (unintelligible) might be useful in this decision and it would be very useful to share them with the group. So if you are able to because I think (Malcolm) in the chat has clarified there if you can see it.

But he wasn't saying that the other SOs shouldn't be part of the decision. Rather that he thought it was unlikely they would ever try and trigger the use of this mechanism. And so that's the point he was making. I haven't heard anyone suggest that there's no role for the SOs and ACs.

But time is moving on. We've got 20 minutes left in the call. I think it's been a really helpful first sharing of perspectives. And there's a bunch of notes there (to take) and can shape that.

And I'm going to propose that we move on to the next item in the agenda if people are all right with that. There was a couple of other - I think a couple of other pieces of work that were going to be discussed. And they were the community veto, a (notion) that (Robin) had been doing some work on.

And the - I think (Edward) and (Roelof) had been doing some more work on there and IABC mechanisms. So and (Robin), do you - have you done - have you got community (unintelligible) go or have you shared it on the list or would you like to do that first and discussion it at the next...

Robin Gross: Are you talking about the community veto proposal?

Jordan Carter: Yes. Yes.

Robin Gross: Yes. Okay. So I did send that to the list and I'd be happy to discuss it at this point or if time is of - an issue, you know, I'm happy to wait. It's really up to you guys.

Jordan Carter: If people are okay (unintelligible).

Robin Gross: You've got me now so if there's any burning questions at least.

Jordan Carter: Yes. Well if you do just a short intro and if we see any feedback - if we could do that for that and the - with it and...

Robin Gross: Okay.

Jordan Carter: Roelof and (Edward) (have flushed out). So if we can - if we can finish that part of this in about five or six minutes if that's possible. So fire away (Robin).

Robin Gross: Oh, sure. So I took a stab at filling out in the template here what a possible community veto process could be. And what this is is basically a process to challenge certain Board decisions that are considered high impact decisions.

So they would be like amending the bylaws, adopting the budget, changes - adopting the strategic plan, a very discrete narrow set of pre-determined issues are the only ones that would be eligible for the community to challenge.

So basically the idea is if a certain number of - or a certain threshold within the community, maybe it's two SOs or, excuse me, SOs/ACs or, you know, I really - I'm not sure what the appropriate threshold would be and (what they) have to frame put on that.

But I put in this two SOs would basically trigger the challenge. And that would then call to question for the community to consider and decide whether or not it wants to veto a Board decision.

And so then once triggered properly, each one of the different SOs or ACs would then through their own internal existing decision making processes, whether its elections or perhaps consensus in the case of the GAC come to it's decision of reject or keep, you know, the thumbs up or the thumbs down.

And so those different SOs and ACs would all then be weighed against each other in a relative balance that matches the existing organizational framework. So, you know, not trying to change that in any way. And so then that would comprise an overall decision of the community whether or not it wanted to reject or accept certain Board decisions.

And then the Board would have an opportunity to accept the community's veto of its decision or if it's really sure it did the right thing the first time and it wants to stick to its guns to then have a subsequent vote either to accept the community's decision or to retain their original decision.

And this threshold for that subsequent vote would be set to be very high. So it would be a 3/4, 4/5 unanimous. So it would be very difficult for the Board to reject the will of the community, if you will, on these certain high impact issues.

And again, this would have to be done via the bylaws. Be creating a process in the bylaws that provides for this. And basically if a decision was essentially vetoed, it wouldn't change the decision. It would just send it back down to the community for further work.

It just basically wouldn't be considered approved by the organization, network, can't be adopted. It just has to continue to be worked on until appropriate consensus levels can be reached for the decision to be - to go forward and eventually be adopted by the community - by the organization, excuse me.

So that's sort of it in a nutshell there. And I know this is really complicated. So if you got any questions, please fire away.

Jordan Carter: Thank you for that presentation (Robin). And if there's anyone does have questions, put your hand up if you could or if you're only on the phone, let us know.

It strikes me that this is an equivalent mechanism to the community council I proposed in the sense you could use this process to implement a lot of those decisions that you've talked about in this template or you could use...

Robin Gross: Yes.

Jordan Carter: ...whatever that's...

Robin Gross: I think that's right.

Jordan Carter: ...looking like. So yes. So this is - it's good thinking. If there are - (so the tests are) on the list. So one of the sort of principle decisions we're going to talk through at the next CCWG call on Tuesday I think is whether there's a basis for preferring any one of these mechanisms in particular or not.

And so we might need some thought about that. I don't see any hands up. So I'd like to thank you (Robin) for doing this work. And it's good stuff.

Robin Gross: My pleasure.

Jordan Carter: And I'd like to just - I'd like to ask (Roelof) and (Edward) whether there's anything in the 1ABCs that you would like to present (or you) get back to us. We've got three or four or five minutes.

And I'll just note for the record that (Chris) had asked whether the ombudsman would be an entry point. Who could recommend the community - the council considered issue or the veto and consider the issue. That's just something to think about. And I see (Roelof)'s hand is up. (Roelof), fire away.

Roelof Meijer: Thank you Jordan. In reply to what you were asking, we haven't done any more work on 1A, B and C. As far as I am concerned I have edited all the changes that we agreed upon in a previous call.

What I did is I made drafts for the mechanisms and delegate structure and membership structure and sent those to (Edward) because he will look at the legal side for all those - on those two mechanisms.

And I don't know, I checked recently but I hadn't received anything yet. So (Edward), if you are on the call, maybe you can give us an update on that. Have I lost audio or everybody quiet?

Man: I think everybody was quiet.

Jordan Carter: And I had a great (experience) (unintelligible) crashing. So my whole window vanished. And look, (Edward) and (Roelof). I think we need to discussion this stuff properly and that we don't have time on this call. So I'd like to (just that) we defer the work that you've done over to our next call if that's all right.

And if anyone - we just - we don't have time to get through it. And thank you. It looks like several other people lost their Adobe at the same time. So it may have contributed to the quietness.

But in the interest of...

(Edward Morris): Hey, can you...

((Crosstalk))

(Edward Morris): I'm sorry Jordan. I just got my audio back on. I was disconnected. I've sent what I hopes going to be a final version to (Roelof) earlier today. So it's probably best to do this next week.

Jordan Carter: Yes. Let's do that. That would be great. And okay. So the next thing that was on our - we've done a lot of work here. And if I can just pace the Istanbul and next steps thing. I think it's clear we've got some discussions to go. We need to go through the work that's just been mentioned about other structures.

We need to see if we can come to a consensus about which one our preferred one is and why. All of that's going to require a little bit of work to do. And we have to deliver all of our written outputs for Istanbul no later than Friday the 20th.

And so the question really that I would like to make in highlighting Agenda Items 4 and 5 is whether we can have another meeting next week at the same time, same day, 21 hours UTC on Wednesday the 18th.

My question is whether we need another meeting between now and then to finish wrapping up this work or whether we need to schedule that meeting for a longer time period.

And I would welcome your thoughts there. And if anyone has got some, I have a slight apprehension about only leaving the one meeting scheduled for 19 minutes.

A compromise might be to schedule it for two hours and to keep it because we will of course have our next CCWG meeting on Tuesday. And then we'd have about 36 hours to react to that and then another, I don't know, 24, 36 hours after our working party meeting to deal with it.

So can we - can I just have a quick discussion about whether you are happy to have another meeting this time next week but make it two hours or whether you think we should do another meeting in which case we'll do a doodle poll to find something on Sunday or Monday? And a few have views about this. Ghostly silence.

I mean of course like all of you I prefer that we - prefer that we didn't have another meeting. But I just - if we need one we have to do it. And I've got a question in the chat, which is whether we have a set time for the meeting on Sunday in Istanbul.

And the feedback that we've had from staff is that they can't guarantee for us a meeting room with the amount of participation options on Sunday. And so we can have a meeting room, an office where we can get together those of us who are on the ground. And - but anything - it won't be one where we can have remote participation.

And so we can organize that and unfortunately I don't have a time yet. And there will also be a welcome cocktail on the Sunday night. So my suggestion is that we should plan to do too much work but that we should plan to get together and just swap notes and see how it's going about the meeting. And...

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Jordan. Jordan.

Jordan Carter: Tijani.

Tijani Ben Jemaa: Tijani, yes. Yes. Thank you Jordan. Yes. I do prefer having a meeting next week at the same time for two hours other than having another meeting perhaps on Sunday in Istanbul. I think it is a problem. Anything in Istanbul is a problem because you don't know when people will arrive. And some will not arrive on time to the meeting you are planning.

So it is better to finish the work before going to Istanbul so that in Istanbul we go directly to the meeting on Monday. This is my point of view. Thank you.

Jordan Carter: Thank you Tijani. To be very clear, we will not have a formal meeting in any circumstances on that Sunday in Istanbul. But we will have finished everything we need to do for the Istanbul meeting before we fly. So before the Friday 20th deadline that the co-Chairs have set.

And I've (unintelligible) personally drive on the Saturday afternoon so I'll be there. I think that those of us who are there and are present should meet just so we can swap notes on the discussion that will have happened on the list for example; that pre-material or to work out how we want to share the explanation of our material in the discussion or to be sure that we've hit the right things.

So I only see any gathering on that Sunday as being one that's going to help with our preparations to participate effectively in the Istanbul meeting. But not one where we're doing the kind of checking in or agreeing on content that was discussed.

And I've seen a few people say that they would rather have one extra meeting on Wednesday 2100 for two hours of one hour 30. That's almost my instinct at this point. And so does anyone radically disagree with that and with us trying

to organize an hour in the meeting before - preferably before maybe after the cocktail on the Sunday night? And noting that that's going to be an informal meeting.

And just to - we may have some more information after the call next Tuesday about what the shape of the (unintelligible) report is going to look like. That was discussed at the CCWG this week and I'll be discussed again next week along with the program for Istanbul.

So it may be that informally some of us could spend a time after Istanbul drafting that sort of (comment) report or doing other bits of work all of which will come back to the CCWG for discussion.

So I just want to be really clear that no matter what your travel plans are the only thing that you'll be missing out on if there's a meeting is the chance to do some extra work. You won't be missing out on any decisions or anything. No radical issues in the sense that no hands up, no revolution appearing in the chat. So I mean assume that's okay.

And I'll ask the staff to send out a notice for the Wednesday 18th at 2100 meeting for a two hour slot. And try and get some information out about what we need to cover at that meeting as soon as possible and maybe this afternoon - probably tomorrow just so that people can check their work over the Friday and the weekend and make sure we've got all the info that we will need.

And I think that means I've run out of agenda items. If there's any other business for this call to take note of. No? No hands up. No chats. And thank you very much for the work that's going on folks. And we will speak again in just under a week; well actually on the CCWG call on Tuesday.

And hopefully see many of you in Istanbul on the 22nd of March. And that looks like it's about it. So we can then - we can stop the recording and the call. Thanks everyone.

END