
DNS- based Internet filtering

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DNS Concepts

- Translates names to the numerical IP addresses
- Structuring the information hierarchically
- the use of multiple server replicas
- the caching of the responses obtained : In order to avoid overloading the DNS architecture.
- Improved routing for Email.
- A protocol for exchanging naming information.



Blocking domain names and IP mapping

- At the level of the registry by no longer publishing information which will therefore gradually disappear from caches,
- At the level of the **resolvers**.
 - Black Lists provided by governmental or judicial authorities.
 - Modifying the normal resolution of a name on a server to an IP address.
 - Blocking the response.
 - Returning the address of another server indicating that access to the website is prohibited.

Turkish Government Censorship

- March 2014
- the Turkish government ordered the censorship of Twitter and YouTube.
- IAP (Internet Access Providers), who typically provide a recursive DNS service to their users, configures these recursors to lie !!
- Providing false answers when queried about censored names of twitter and YouTube.

People reaction



Counter reaction

- Turkish Internet service providers (ISPs) hijacking the routes to public DNS servers such as those operated by Google or OpenDNS
- The Turkish routers are lying about how to get to the Google Public DNS service, and taking all the traffic to a different destination.

Youtube.com lookup at Google's 8.8.8.8 DNS server 8.8.8.8 from Turk Telekom

;; ANSWER SECTION (1 record) youtube.com. 86064 IΝ

195.175.254.2 A

~~~~~~

Not a real Youtube IP address

Youtube.com lookup at Google's 8.8.8.8 DNS server from The Netherlands

;; ANSWER SECTION:

74.125.136.93 youtube.com. 299 TN A 299 74.125.136.91 youtube.com. IN A youtube.com.

- 299 IN A 74.125.136.136
  - IN A 74.125.136.190 299

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Normal Youtube IP addresses

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youtube.com.

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DNS lookup at 8.8.8.8 using RIPE Atlas

Conclusion

- The DNS was not designed to filter content !!
- DNS Filtering is ineffective :
 - Use of public resolver
 - Use of VPN.
 - Use of anonymous proxy.
- Blocking expose the users to new threats.

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