ICANN

Moderator: Gisella Gruber-White
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11:00 am CT

Grace Abuhamad: Thank you. Everyone, this is the 23rd meeting of the CWG Stewardship on February 24 at 1703 UTC. Jonathan, I'll turn it over to you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks Grace. Welcome all members and participants. Just to note that we will record you as present, as Grace said a moment ago, by your presence and the Adobe Connect room. If anyone is not in the Adobe Connect room and we haven't already heard from you, please let us know by audio. All right, thank you.

So welcome again. You'll see the agenda in the top right of your screen. We've got a few different areas to deal with today. We want to make sure we confirm the working methods of the group going forward. We want to review the so-called integrated proposal and we want to initiate the first design teams as far as possible.

Moving then on to just a quick reminder, as I said, when we met previously, which was only Thursday last week, we are committed to a refreshed and refocused approach as we came out of the ICANN 52 meeting, and that means the need to continue to make progress and of course be seen to be making

progress which is about developing a functional, implementable and complete plan. Whether or not you believe that to be turnkey, it nevertheless needs to be functional, implementable and complete and also near (unintelligible) of the emergence of such a plan so that there's a perception of the plan emerging as well. It seems important.

We'll focus first on the functional requirements of any part of that plan and then work towards fleshing that out so in a kind of definitions requirement solutions type mode of operating.

The co-chairs, that's Lise Fuhr and myself, have asked Bernie from staff, who's been one of the key people at assisting us, to pull together a skeleton draft, what we might call version 2.0 of the proposal, in a format that we can start to utilize for really three purposes; one, in a format that will be ultimately able to be submitted to the ICG, and importantly can also be directly compared with the other already submitted proposals.

We feel this is important because it will not only assist us in guiding our work, it'll probably be a useful aid to the ICG when they ultimately receive the proposal but also to anyone trying to cross compare and make sure the work correlates as best as possible as we work on it.

It can also be used as a map for the future work of the CWG so that we can see what bits of the proposal need filling in and filling out and so it gives us a nice map as a path towards a final proposal. And thirdly, they can be used as a backbone on which to hang any incremental developments such as we envisage doing with the design teams.

So it feels that, notwithstanding any other discussions we're having, it'll be very useful to have this draft proposal in circulation. And I'm hoping we will

get something out to you very shortly that we can then all work with and have a continuous tangible proposal under which any other work can be (unintelligible) and integrated with.

So that was really what I wanted to say at the outset. And then I'll make a couple of remarks on, under Item 2 now, and of course happy to receive any comments, by all means raise your hand in the Adobe Connect room if you have anything you'd like to add and make known.

But essentially we propose from now on meet twice per week as a CWG on both Tuesdays and Thursdays. We will put as much substance into those meetings as possible and limit the discussion on process and procedure.

We have also created - and I'm not sure that we've yet circulated leave but we will shortly circulate three meetings lots which the design teams can use so there will be at least three meetings lots available for the design teams to use to meet on a weekly basis, likely Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

And we've published two documents one of which is - deals with the work methods post Singapore and one of which deals with the guidelines for design teams.

I'm not sure we need to review those in detail but if you do have any concerns or comments you're perfectly welcome to raise them now or a list. So let me pause and see if there's anything. I know there was at least one comment on the list which I think was from Seun, if I remember, saying what role do the chairs envisage themselves playing with the design teams?

I think that's going to depend a little. I mean, I think really what we want to do is make sure we coordinate and effectively manage the fact that we don't have

too many design teams running at once and we don't have too many people in one design team and none in another, that we commission design teams in a sensible sequence.

So I don't think we've got it all worked out. I think we've got a fairly good idea of how we hope to run these (unintelligible) obviously open to suggestions and there have been some sessions and we will come to dealing with those proposals. The critical thing to do is to get two or three design teams launched, running, and make sure we develop any - we sort of iron out any wrinkles in the working methods as we go.

I think the key to success of their will be to keep the tasks relatively small, what you might call bite size chunks so that we can rapidly do the work, return it to the group, ideally again, sign off, gain any critical adjustments to it and keep the process moving.

So I think that probably covers all I wanted to say right now on the finalization of work methods. Please go back to those documents. They were circulated by Lise earlier this week and make sure you are, A, knowledgeable about the (unintelligible) contained within them and, B, if you have constructive suggestions as to how they could be improved, by all means, do so.

But for the meantime, I think the key seems to be to get on, as I said, and essentially cut our teeth on starting to work with these effectively and then take it from there.

Having mentioned that substance was a key part of our meetings going forward, I think we can then, seeing no hands up in the room, take the opportunity to talk about the proposed integrated model whilst we are very

keen to get going with the process I talked about, which is having this backbone proposal, working with the design teams and building structure out on the back of that, which focuses on dealing with operational components of the proposal, it's quite clear that there is - there has been, and will remain, a strong interest in how we handle some of the overarching issues, which has what's occupied us a lot with topics such as separability, internal and external model.

And this integrated model attempts to deal with that in some form of holistic way and so it's a useful opportunity both prior to us getting going with the design teams and creating the opportunity for this to get a reasonable airing with the whole group.

So I think, Avri, you are prepared, as one of the key authors of that proposal, to present and discuss or lead the discussion on it. So why don't I hand over to you and give you the opportunity to do that and then we can move into a Q&A on the model.

Avri Doria: Okay thanks. This is Avri speaking. I've asked Grace to load the model document. But first you had mentioned wanting to give a little bit of why we're doing this and we've even noticed on the list - and I believe this should be able for you all to put it in sync, yeah, so people can look at it.

Part of this - the building of this integrated model started out over breakfast in Singapore and it started out with basically a concern that, you know, the three of us had - and this was Matthew, Brendan and I over breakfast - that we had kind of hit an impasse, and we had some very strong opinions with some very smart backup in two opposing camps.

We seem - camps is perhaps not the right word - we seem to be having a hope that the legal advice would somehow point the right way but I know personally speaking I'm skeptical about that happening. I think the legal advice will give us good clues as to how to adjust the various models but I think at the end of the day it won't solve some of the pressing issues between the internal and the external and also sort of the external views of people looking at it and saying is there continuity, is there accountability, is there stability in this.

So we took those, you know, we certainly did not go beyond any of the requirements that were preexisting, you know, we kept with separability, we certainly accepted the accountability. We also didn't touch things like the CSC, you know, that seems to figure in all the models and it does in this one.

There's also a reliance on an IAP. There may be some additional requirements on that IAP depending on how this model unfolds if it's taken further. But we didn't get into those much at all.

But what we did was sort of take some of those primary almost visceral requirements on stewardship and we wanted to make it simpler. I know there's been at least one comment that says this is not simpler and this is grossly complex. I would put that more down to our explanations perhaps than the model itself. It's sometimes very complex to describe something that you believe is simple.

So going there. So - and we wanted to also preserve what was most important about IANA as we know it and the continuity of the work being done by the IANA team. In some sense that continuity preserving that at this point since everybody admits it's doing a good job, that that's something that we want and we wanted to make as - we wanted to also rely as little as possible on any, you

know, revamping of ICANN or changes that the CCWG might come up. It's important work and we need to count on it but we did not necessarily want the model to rest on that.

Finally, we didn't really expect to build another model, we were just sort of looking for the compromise point in the various models. But in the end once we wrote it down on paper, it became a model.

It went through various changes along the way because we did it all in a Drive document. People could go back and look at the history of that. So from the internal model we took the need for ICANN to remain a strong part of the stewardship story. And in all the configurations of the model, and we did offer three possible example configurations at the end, but they really are examples and they're not fixed in any sort of way, they were just ways to sort of express the model, that that stewardship remains.

Now there's a degree of separability separation in all of them. Today we have a degree of separation, you know, we have mandated a functional separation. And to some degree, more or less, that functional separation exists.

You know, we had discussions here about whether the budget is sufficiently visible, transparent and separable or not. But essentially there is an IANA team and it is functionally separate though in terms of human resources and in terms of all those things it is integrated.

If we had gone just one step further in separation, separability, we would have something that was similar to the GDD, an internal division that's a little bit more separate than IANA is. We decided that as our first model to actually go one step further in separation than that and look at a wholly owned subsidiary.

Now, we took that wholly owned subsidiary and basically sort of said so that keeps it within ICANN most definitely and yet it has added a greater deal of structural separation than we've had before, something that, you know, many people have been arguing for.

And so in some (unintelligible) it's already trying to support the externality of the model with it still being internal. And part of the way to do that was we put in the notion of a community board that had members of the three multistakeholder communities represented.

Now that idea was really a development of an MRT plus in that, you know, we looked at the MRT as an existing construct within the discussions and said well how do we make it more accountable? How do we make it accountable to a greater part of the community? And that was to include all three multistakeholder groups in a sort of subsidiary way, let them figure out how it is they want to represented on that.

Now one of the asides on this is, you know, we've caught in the conversation that maybe those other operational communities don't want to participate in such a board and, you know, don't see any reason to share in that sort of oversight responsibility.

And the model does allow for people to opt out. If they opt you that community board really ends up nothing more than the MRT. So that's a notion there. But we've taken in the model the IANA team, the IANA group, and basically set it off as a wholly owned subsidiary in one of the configurations.

We then - now the one other thing on that community board it is a minimalist board. Its function is really just to make sure that the IANA team is

sustainable, has a sustainable budget and it's there to deal with any exception processing. If something went through the CSC and went to the IAP and I personally hope the IAP has binding arbitration capabilities but there needs to be someone to be representative in that discussion.

That's the kind of thing it gets involved in. There's no policy making, there's nothing other than budget finances and exceptions and making sure that the team is happy and well fed. So it's a minimalist board but it is indeed a board.

Now in a fully owned subsidiary that board obviously answers to ICANN and, you know, as in the way in most companies that have fully owned subsidiaries, you know, there are some bylaws defined, there is some charter defined method of things it needs to take back, for example, the budget would probably need to be approved by the mother company, in this case ICANN.

We then moved the separation one step further and sort of said what if all three of them that it was a partially owned subsidiary by ICANN, and it was jointly a joint service arrangement between the three operational communities and basically, you know, created that model where in addition to SLAs, oh yes, even in the - pardon me for going back a second - even in the ICANN subsidiary notion one of the things that the structural separation gave us was the ability to actually define SLAs between the policy part of ICANN and the implementation where the operational work of IANA.

So - and that notion remains throughout. It's in the second model, one also adds ownership by the other operational communities. And then the third model included as much to show that one could evolve a model and that it was consistent, we include a freestanding; in a freestanding the notion is that the operational community, and perhaps others, are indeed the investors, you know, the power behind this thing as it were.

Now we look at the three models and decided that that middle model, with the joint ownership, have the most on its side in terms of accountability because it was really firmly anchored in three multistakeholder communities. And that struck when having to argue is this new structure that you've built accountable. If that indeed was a very strong argument in our minds for accountability.

And yet, it was continuity in fact it was still the same team, it was still the same people and it was still very much, I mean, it doesn't even need to move out of its offices necessarily, it's just under a different sort of oversight. So as I say, so - so the external, we have the external notion in there and the support. I am focusing on registries and the operational communities.

Let me see, what haven't I covered. We can look at the pictures, so basically this first picture on the first page here was sort of the general idea that we were working on where we have the three communities in the sort of IANA ecosystem and the IANA function which is essentially the team and its responsibilities get transferred to the subsidiary.

We needed something - yeah, so the - I guess the last point I'd make before sort of opening up the questions - and I think Brendan and Matthew, though I'm not sure Matthew can talk - is - are on the line and can certainly add something. It was definitely a three person.

We also - it has the advantage of changes made based upon reading some of the issues that were on the list, better explanations, many of you know that we talked to you while we were in Singapore. We tried to grab as many people as we could to float the idea and so on to make sure that it wasn't just our own, you know, fantasy.

So, yeah, the models and basically - so there's discussion throughout the document - let me get my - where's my mouse? There it is. So basically we explain it, we go into some details about what is integrating, we tried to outline some of the benefits.

It does eliminate the Contract Co which seems to give so many people a great deal of (unintelligible) in that it was a new thing, what was its accountability structure, does it re-create ICANN in some sense and re-create all the same problems. We think we avoid that by keeping it tethered to ICANN and the other operational communities.

You know, look at the role of the board. In terms of the role of the board, one of the things that there's an extra two notes that just came out yesterday. One of them is sort of in with the accountability explanation, one of the new requirements from Larry, as we understood it is if you're creating a new structure or something that looks like a new structure then you better explain why it is as accountable as what there is now and is accountable.

And then also started on sort of trying to develop some of the ideas of how a post-transition IANA community board might be constructed, you know, how would ICANN do with portion of it and even started to sort of cast about for ideas on how we can pick it, and even starting to think about well let's say we do invite the other communities to participate if, you know, thinking a couple steps down the road, let's say this is accepted as something that the CWG wants to work on further, and I hope it is.

And we go along and we sort of say you know, we like the idea of inviting them to participate in the community board but, you know, it looks like they might not. To have a notion of them being able to opt out of that portion of

our, you know, solution it pertains more to them than to us, and how we would back up that notion, how we would make an MRT plus that was sufficiently diverse and embraced enough of the community so started looking at some of that kind of issue.

So just then in pictures we drew the current structure, we drew the structure without NTIA and not and then based the subsidiary. Now one of the questions that came up, and I'll stop talking real soon now, was that the IETF might not want to have an SLA with new post transition IANA that would prefer to keep it with ICANN.

And that variant on the model is really quite simple, ICANN then just, you know, the SLA MOU remains as it is and ICANN just, within its SLA, within its relationship with the wholly owned subsidiary, you know, farms out its work to there.

Oh yeah, one of the things about the model that's not stated is by doing this structural separation we give ICANN the same ability that the others have, not an ability I like, not one that I am very supportive of but one that sort of says, we don't like the way IANA is doing it anymore and we want, you know, some new entity to do this.

We've all been in companies that have shifted over there service from their internal to something external and, you know, and that is as possible here as it is for the IETF. And especially if we've gone through the effort of understanding the budget, understanding what portion of the budget goes to what, understanding having an SLA and having an SLA that could, you know, be granted somewhere else.

So ICANN gains structural separation even in a wholly owned subsidiary, that same capability of saying no, we want to do something different. And the second model is the slight variation on the shared services which as I say, we thought was the strongest model in terms of accountability; accountability based on checks and balances between or among the multistakeholder communities.

And then finally, you know, a path that one could evolve towards, is the freestanding model. Now in my personal view, and this isn't something we've covered, that transitioning from any of these models once we were post-transition, would almost involve the creation of a new ICG process, would involve the whole community getting together and saying, you know, quote we got works but it doesn't work as long as we could and we want to look at taking it further.

But I don't see - added something that would require all three communities to work and agree again. So it's not something I see happening easily but it's not something that is precluded.

So I'll stop there but I think it's a model with continuity, with separability, with greater simplicity even though the explanation may not be all that simple. And it eliminates some of the unknowns. And what we really wanted to do is try and find a consensus point to bring the two concepts of internal and external together. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Avri. That's a pretty clear summary I think of where - where you came from and how you got to be where you are. Let me throw it open for questions or comments. Milton, go ahead.

Milton Mueller: Hello. Yes, as you could probably guess I really like the structural separation element of all of these models. But I'm wondering if in the first one when it is a wholly owned subsidiary of ICANN I'm not quite understanding why you need a community board.

In other words you'd have a structurally separated IANA that is contracting with IETF and with the RIRs, and then why not just have a contract with ICANN itself, and then look at the IANA as a purely operational function that is meeting, you know, presumably is still separable so that it, the contract could be altered if necessary. But why would you need a board for IANA if it were a subsidiary of ICANN?

Avri Doria: Should I just answer, Jonathan or wait for a couple questions.

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: Please go ahead. I won't keep coming in, if you feel able to answer go ahead, that would be great.

Avri Doria: Okay. Okay fine. The community board is more an accountability anchor. Certainly it could work, the configuration could work, as you suggested. I personally think that it's weaker in terms of its accountability even than a subsidiary with a board that has the three multistakeholder communities.

The notion of accountability that it's working on is one of checks and balances. If it's a fully owned subsidiary and it has just commands from ICANN, that certainly works. But then we're back to depending upon ICANN accountability a loan. And then that, in my mind, makes us start thinking again of what do we need from the accountability side to make sure that

everybody is comfortable with ICANN keeping 100% control over the subsidiary.

I can still ultimately has the decision-making capabilities because it has to approve budgets, as it would on any wholly owned subsidiary. But wholly owned subsidiaries can have different degrees of independence, and by having a multistakeholder community board it basically both makes it more independent of ICANN while being its subsidiary yet anchors its accountability in the other operational communities.

And so that was really the important consideration. But what you suggest does work as a configuration, it just needs to borrow some degree of accountability from elsewhere. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Avri. While we wait and see then if any other questions or comments come up, I have a couple of thoughts. One specifically, you made a reference early on to the GDD, and I thought you said that this was less separate in some way, less functionally separate...

Avri Doria: No.

Jonathan Robinson: ...than the GDD.

Avri Doria: No, one step further.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay, good. That's - because that didn't make sense to...

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: Sorry, no. I may have misspoken. What I said was one degree further of separability - one degree further of separation.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay, fine. So that was an example. And we needn't go too far into but I just wanted to make sure I got it right way around.

Avri Doria: Right.

Jonathan Robinson: Are you advocating...

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: And in fact it means some of us - and this is - sorry, are we advocating for one particular configuration?

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: Over and above any of the others. I mean, as I see it there are three variants here...

Avri Doria: Right.

Jonathan Robinson: Are you advocating particularly for one or are you relatively neutral on the three?

Avri Doria: I think as model proposers we think that the shared services arrangement is the most accountable of them and is therefore the strongest. But I think we are advocating more for the model and have flexibility within the configurations though there's definitely a preference for the shared services arrangement. But the model is more important than the details of a configuration. As I say, they

were three sort of standard positions - examples; one tightly coupled, one loosely coupled or coupled to many and then one very loosely coupled.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay, well either for whatever reason we now have a few more hands up in the queue so let's go to Andrew Sullivan next. Andrew, go ahead.

Andrew Sullivan: Thank you. I won't repeat all of the things that I've posted in the list because if you've had the patience to wade through all of that you don't want to listen to me say it again. But I do want to point out a practical consideration here about these three configurations and that is it seems to me that the subsidiary approach is one that could be achieved relatively quickly like within the time that we have, whereas I think the other two configurations are, at the very least, going to require quite a bit more time.

And that might be a reason to just focus on the subsidiary approach if we're going to embrace this model. That would be a reason to focus on the subsidiary approach because it's something we could actually do.

I don't really see the hope of a shared services model, for instance, coming to fruition this year. It would be rather a big deal at least from the point of view of one of the communities that would have to be involved in that. And, I mean, the first step would be, you know, you'd have to convince everybody to do it and then secondly you'd have to, you know, hammer the agreement and that doesn't sound to me like something that could be achieved before September.

Avri Doria: Understood.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you, Andrew. Elise, let's go straight to you next.

Elise Lindeberg: Yeah, thank you. Can you hear me?

Jonathan Robinson: A little faintly.

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: Yeah, that's better now.

Elise Lindeberg: No just talking about a structural separation, functional separation and I find it a bit difficult to understand the model but I have to (unintelligible) but I was wondering what we are discussing - what is the (unintelligible) discussion we had and the - and still have I think is the possibility for separation of IANA and the function from ICANN as a whole, you know, totally in the future as (unintelligible) option.

And I was just wondering, Avri, could you explain a bit more to how you see this could be done in an (unintelligible) model wholly owned by ICANN and with a budget from ICANN. I don't see - I didn't get your argument for that. Could you just explain a bit more about that? Thank you.

Avri Doria: Okay.

Jonathan Robinson: So, Avri, it would be - just before you go and just to make sure that Elise was a little quite there so just - my understanding of the question perhaps you could confirm this, is that the question is how does the issue of ultimate separability or in extremis separability get handled by one or more variants of this model.

Avri Doria: Yeah, yeah, thank you. And I did understand the question. I spoke about it a little but not. Basically the notion is one can evolve from one of these models

to the other though I do think that the - there needs to be a process that would take that. And so it would - and in my mind, you know, we have two options for doing that.

One, ICANN itself could sort of say hey, you know, we don't find that this IANA subsidiary is working for us anymore and, you know, we are going to phase out the IANA subsidiary in a couple years or we'll, you know, we'll keep it as a for-pay thing for the other communities. But, you know, we are going to take our business elsewhere and, you know, as all the other two could. So that ability in a catastrophe exists there.

The other possibility is, and especially if there's a community board, that sort of decides and works with the three communities, in an ICG-like process, to sort of say, you know, we've tried this arrangement now for several years, it's not working. ICANN is just not delivering or, you know, there's five more operational communities that we need to include in the model and therefore we need another model.

And that would involve basically going through a process similar to the one we're going through now to see how do we evolve it. The fact that it's already structurally separated means that it is a complete package that also one can decide to say, you know, the free standing model really was the right idea in the first place. We should have taken it there.

And, you know, at that point we have the two operational communities sort of saying, yeah, yeah, you know, it's got to become independent, we agree, and then we would move. So by doing the structural separation the next step is easier because it's already cut out, it's already got a distinct budget. The staff is already organized into an individual company.

And what you now do with that, spin it off, you know, separate it, sell it off, you know, get the other partners to come in and turn it into a shared services arrangement, those are all options that are easier to take once you have achieved full structural separation. Thanks.

Elise Lindeberg: Okay thank you, Avri. That was very useful. Thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Elise. Thanks, Avri. Over to you, Milton, next.

Milton Mueller: Hi, well Elise was asking the question very similar to the one I had planned to ask but mine is a little more specific. I was interested in hearing Avri describe how separability would work under the shared services arrangement. I mean, it's clear that if you have this IANA's on board and it represents the three operational communities I think that's very good from an accountability standpoint.

In other words, there's been arguments that we can make IANA accountable by making ICANN as a whole more accountable. But it's clear to me that most of the accountability concerns are going to be with ICANN's policymaking process and we don't want IANA to be fired or messed up or changed because of policy concerns - policy differences.

So having ICANN represented on a board but also having IETF and NRO represented seem to make a lot of sense. But again, I'm not sure I understand how separability works.

Avri Doria: Okay. Answering again, first of all we're already moving down the path of separability to various stages of separation from functional to structural and at that point to shared services. My view of this - and this is not written up yet -

is basically in that case if you did have a fully shared service arrangement that board itself could decide that there was reason to separate off from the three.

It would present the proposal for spinning itself out towards a free standing thing. And as with all subsidiaries, you know, you need to get the approval of the three owners to do it. And, you know, that approval can be, you know, one of those things that is written into its notion that any major corporate changes that the shared service arrangement board would want to institute need to be approved by, you know, the shared owners - the sharing owners. So that would be the method by which they do that.

Now obviously, when you're doing that there's still always that over-hanging, you know, well if the other two don't agree I'm leaving anyway possibility. Let's say that one of them, that, you know, the RIR board members, since they haven't ventured any comment yet, decide that, you know, this isn't working anymore, we want to spin this out as its own entity, and the other two said no, no, no, we're happy with what we got, we don't want to spin it out. They still have their ability to leave and have it be a shared arrangement between two.

The shared arrangement is also obviously open to let's say this does prove stable and we do, you know, live for it for the next 25 years, it seems possible of, you know, IANA taking on a new registry type service and adding a new member again, with the approval. So it has that kind of flexibility for both separating and for both, you know, doing more registry work within its current mission if that were needed.

So I think that's how one moves one degree at a time. I think these things, though, need to be somewhat difficult and do need to require, and this is my personal opinion, and it's not built into the model quit yet, but it's there, is that it requires for anything other than the shared - I mean, for the wholly owned

subsidiary, it does require the buy in of all the communities that are sharing the service. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Avri. And that's a point I think we should return to is that likelihood or not of getting the buy in of other proposed participants. But before we go there, because that's part of the discussion on the chat and it seems to be key that, you know, what the other proposed participants may - might feel about this. But let's hear from Siva next and then Seun. Siva, go ahead.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: Can you hear me clearly? If you can hear me clearly please...

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: ...hear you but not too clearly. We need more volume if possible.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: Is it okay now?

Jonathan Robinson: Yes, if you speak as you were there. If you could keep up the volume that would be great.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: Okay. I think of the three models the subsidiary model is very attractive. And if some more improvements could be made to this model it will be all the more better. For example, (unintelligible) some part of the community brought and then they also form part of the operational oversight.

And apart from that (unintelligible) policy (unintelligible) about IANA within ICANN that policymaking function apart from being a cross community function, can also include RIRs and (unintelligible) in the formal capacity of

(unintelligible) and RIR. So that is one possible improvement that we could think of but (unintelligible) to it being good.

And the other thing in the diagram (unintelligible) on top, maybe intentionally, maybe unintentionally. It might not mean anything. I would prefer CSC to be constituted (unintelligible) privileges that are appropriate but (unintelligible) on the other side of the table rather than as part of the hierarchy CSC could be shown in the diagram and could be positioned in the IANA (unintelligible) as a body on the other side of the table. And (unintelligible).

And the third comment that I want to say is about (unintelligible). This (unintelligible) could be constituted as a larger body with appropriate server. So that was what I would say.

Avri Doria: Thanks. Let me respond to all three. Thank you for the comments. On the first one, I mean, my hope coming out of here is that indeed we do form a, you know, less ad hoc, less just the three of us group and actually do work on some of the other issues and some of the refinements that the various realities and the various, you know, different points of view, you know, bring on to the model realizing that this one was done from a relatively narrow perspective. So if you know anything about the NCSG you know that our perspectives run the whole gamut and we disagree with each other bunches.

On the second point about the CSC, I tended to see - I have trouble with moving that into the IANA because what that is, at least as I understood it, was they were the ones that had the SLA on the ICANN side and they were the representing the wellness and the accuracy of it being carried out by the IANA.

So I tended to see that as an IANA function just like within the IETF and the RIRs and I didn't picture them here, they have their own internal mechanisms for deciding is IANA doing the right thing. Are we having problems with IANA? Do we need to negotiate, you know, a new SLA or it's time to negotiate a new SLA. And we need this new stuff and basically people watching it.

So I tend to think that that customer service needs to be represented on - now within post-transition IANA these are things that we sort of mention but haven't gone through. Does it need its own ombudsman function? Does it need its own customer service function? Those are things that are quite possible.

And, you know, now they probably rely on - although I don't actually know the answer to this question, they probably rely on the regular ICANN ombudsman and customer service vehicles but then it may need its own especially as the degree of separation increases from fully owned subsidiary where the ICANN customer service may indeed remain sufficient especially if there are no direct SLAs with the post-transition IANA function.

So I tend to see that ICANN needs a CSC of its own even if perhaps some other function, similar function, a responding function, needs - is needed in post-transition IANA. And those are things that, you know, definitely belong in further discussions.

And I was sure I remembered the third point as I started talking.

Jonathan Robinson: Avri before you go - Avri, just a moment. Before you go...

Avri Doria: Yeah.

Jonathan Robinson: ...go to the third point I just wanted to make sure that that second answer answered the question. And perhaps it was actually that Siva was just making a much simpler point. Rather than integrating the CSC with the IANA function, but was literally talking about a representational point, i.e. how it's presented in the graphic...

Avri Doria: Oh.

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: ...that the CSC is not - I just wonder whether that...

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: I see. Okay. It's not hierarchical, it just happens to be in the ICANN box. Right, I certainly could move it down pictorially. It's not a hierarchical, you know, the only ones that are hierarchical are probably the ones that are little arrows. It just happens to be a function that we're talking about that sits in ICANN; it wasn't meant to be hierarchical in any sense.

And if someone could remind of the third question.

((Crosstalk))

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: (Unintelligible).

Avri Doria: I didn't understand.

Jonathan Robinson: Siva, I'm afraid you're not very clear. Were you talking about the third point there or were you referring again to the CSC? If we could just make sure we give Avri a queue on the third point so we can move on from here.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: Yeah, yeah, let her go to the third part, no problem.

Avri Doria: Right, and that's what I was asking for a cue on because I didn't write them down while you were saying them and I lost them while I was talking. I apologize. So your third question was? Can anybody help me?

Jonathan Robinson: I don't recall exactly, Avri. Let's let Siva put that in the (unintelligible) if it's still an unanswered...

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: ...keep things moving and we'll go to…

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: The third point - the third point was about IAP and it was about...

Avri Doria: IAP being broader.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: Yes.

Avri Doria: Right. Yes, the IAP is something that we still haven't really worked on. We keep saying there will be one. The one point I mentioned that I think is important in any model but especially in this model in terms of having what I'm calling, you know, belts with double buckles, suspenders and an elastic waistband for accountability is that it has the ability to bring about, you know, binding mediation, arbitration type of mechanisms.

But I think as a whole we need to work on the IAP and I think it needs to be external and dependent and trusted. And, you know, I don't see us having necessarily different objectives for the IAP. The only difference I can see shared services arrangement then there's a question of to what degree is the IAP accessible for IETF and, you know. But I guess we have that question in any case.

If IANA has an IAP, you know, who has standing and does the IETF have standing or does the IETF who is merely a IANA customer, have to go through ICANN - I mean, who's merely an ICANN customer have to go through ICANN to get to it.

So there's lots of questions about the IAP that haven't been explored and I meant to write a piece of questions for the IAP but I have not gotten to it yet. But hope that answers it. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Avri. Let's go to a final question from Seun as we move towards the top of the hour that would be great. Seun, we don't hear you yet. No, Seun, I'm afraid not. We have no audio from you at this stage. While we wait for Seun, it certainly seems to me, Avri, that from what I gather, if I get this right, there is - it certainly feels, as I said earlier, that there's some requirement to have a discussion with the other communities potentially involved in this.

And it seems - it seems that the extent of their involvement escalates as you go through the three different variants. So it strikes me that it certainly feels like an important question to ask would they support one or more of these - be interested in being involved in one or more of these. And that communication needs to be - seems particularly important given that the implication that they are involved. I don't know what your plans are to do that.

Avri Doria: Well there has sort of been a chicken and egg problem. This is Avri again. There's sort of been a chicken and egg problem. We certainly talk to a bunch informally. We certainly had Andrew's, you know, viewpoint and it's impossible to disagree with that, you know, a model based on an ICANN - wholly owned ICANN subsidiary with ICANN holding onto the contracts is the easiest one to get on the table immediately.

I felt - and I think we all felt - sort of skittish about going to the other communities with a proposal that our community hadn't even heard and discussed yet and wasn't supportive of. I certainly see us able as able to come up with our recommendation based on their conversations with them and an opt-in opt-out type of proposal.

And certainly in the subsidiary model with the community board it can be presented as this is what we think is best, you know, but if they opt out of participating in the board or if they say, listen, you know, we might be interested in it but it's going to take us a year to figure it out and to decide whether we want to, we can have sort of an opt in model that sort of says that board has points where it can, you know, change but it could start out as an MRT plus and then be modified in the subsidiary model.

I agree that if we're going to go to the shared services arrangement then we need a certain amount of, you know, a prior willingness. Now given the way the ICG works, which basically says you guys propose, we will send your proposals to the others and they will decide whether they can accept it or not, whether they can accept living with it or not or we as the ICG will look at your proposal and see how the puzzle pieces fit, I haven't been quite sure how that works.

But one thing I was sure of is without the ICANN CWG being willing to say, this is something we're willing to work on and we'll take further, that it wasn't appropriate to do anything more than informal discussion with the people we knew. And I have talked to people I knew in, you know, both of these communities since they haven't spoken up themselves, I'm not going to quote them as testimonials. But there was a certain amount of conversation.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay. Thanks for that clarification. I wonder how long we let this run for. We've given a substantial - and I do notice the point from Elise in the chat and I think that's worth highlighting the discussion about additional involvement from IETF RIRs in oversight seems like a distraction from trying to solve the core issue of contention before this group which is the oversight to the names function.

Seun, your hand remains up. I want to see if we can bring you in on audio or not at this stage. Let's see if...

Avri Doria: He says he's posting his questions there.

Jonathan Robinson: Yeah, thanks Seun. So I think we've given this a pretty good airing. It certainly helped my understanding of what's proposed and in a sense, for want of a better expression, the hierarchy of the models.

I have one other question that - and I see a couple of other hands sprung up now. So let me close the queue after Elise and Olivier and obviously Seun's question. So we'll - and I have a question that I thought I heard you say something, Avri, to me a wholly owned subsidiary the owner of the subsidiary gets to appoint or not the board.

Yet I don't think that's your view. I didn't hear you saying that. I think your understanding or intention of the model is that the communities get to appoint them - the members of the board and have that right somehow built in. So I think it's worth making that absolutely explicit if that is the intention if you haven't already...

Avri Doria: Right.

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: Yeah, that was the intention. And that is a possible - obviously there is a, you know, and this gets us into the - some of the accountability mechanisms so we're not perhaps completely free of them. You know, under what condition can ICANN, as a community, you know, perhaps a community veto notion, object to that board that is bottom up-created.

It, you know, in the differentiation between what's ICANN, if it's a wholly owned subsidiary and if the other communities are not participating in creating it then it is the MRT plus and its relationship to the ICANN board in any of our models is indeed, you know, an open question.

Jonathan Robinson: I'll just reiterate then that Elise remakes or makes the point that we do need to make sure there is support amongst A name stakeholders and B potentially, numbers and protocols stakeholders...

Avri Doria: Yeah.

Jonathan Robinson: ...for this kind of...

Avri Doria: Yeah, and a response to that, that's one of the reasons why I haven't gone, you know, trying to sell it to the other communities yet because if we're not buying into some method of compromising or finding a consensus point between our internal and external models then, you know, we don't have anything to talk to them about yet.

Once we get to the point of saying, yes, we are going to try and find a consensus point between the internal external and this model looks like it may be useful in some variant, then, you know, we've got something to talk about. But it certainly wasn't there to be talked about beforehand other than informally.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay, let's take a question then from Elise followed by Olivier and then try and wrap up this item. Elise.

Elise Lindeberg: Okay thank you. And (unintelligible) more comment than a question. (Unintelligible) with the stakeholder group (unintelligible) model that has been put forward I can see that there is no (unintelligible) mentioned in any (unintelligible) to say that it could be difficult, the government (unintelligible) some formal board (unintelligible) much more difficult than it would be an MRT, as I see it now.

And at the same time (unintelligible) very important that any top mechanism, you know, call it that, to have oversight of any model should be (unintelligible) multistakeholder. Remember we are going from one government who had all the power, all the (unintelligible) ICANN and then we should have a multistakeholder component that also includes a governmental vote.

So I just don't see (unintelligible) now because it will be an issue but I'm not sure that these - that these things that have been run up is complete (unintelligible) governments.

Avri Doria: Okay, yeah.

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: Yeah.

Jonathan Robinson: Can you make sure that you explain Elise's question. At least...

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: ...we really need you to come up louder in future, it's - but, Avri, go ahead and just capture...

Avri Doria: Yeah, okay.

Jonathan Robinson: ...so if I understand the question it's that none of this shows any governmental participation in that and that participating in a board would be more difficult for governments than participating in an MRT.

In the note that was written on the PTI board is where I - that gets discussed. And one of the proposals or the possibilities there is first of all, you know, we're using a notion of subsidiary so each of the multistakeholder communities figures out how it wants to be represented on this board.

And one of the possibilities that I mentioned is that something like either the CWG or perhaps an implementation review team of the CWG that is the full

composition or has the full diversity of ICANN plus its own outreach to the community, could be what stood behind those board members and that that CWG could indeed be, let's say, that we came on a model because there was also this notion to try and keep that board small.

You know, my favorite option is three people from each; it could go to five, it could go to seven. At seven we've got more people on the board than IANA has staff. So there was a real desire to sort of say if there is a board it's not doing very much and it's minimalist.

And if it could be created in such a way and now looking at the ICANN side where behind it was something like a cross community working group on IANA issues, and perhaps the board members for ICANN on the post-transition IANA got their instructions from that CWG or came out of that CWG and had accountability to that, that's a way to sort of take the full scope and diversity of the ICANN multistakeholder model.

And that was sort of the notion that the RIRs and NRO have their full, you know, multistakeholder representation as does the IETF though they are different styles of multistakeholder. But - and within the ICANN multistakeholder we do have the governments as an integral component and as with this group I would expect that if we did have a group behind it.

So I've started exploring some of those issues in that. But in terms of this model I was trying to sort of, you know, we were trying to sort of stay - going too far going into those details especially some of which are a subsidiary to each of the groups.

Elise Lindeberg: Okay, Avri. I see that - I see that we have...

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: Thanks.

Elise Lindeberg: ...all the details. At the same time I think it is important (unintelligible) we are actually discussing details now. I think...

((Crosstalk))

Seun Ojedeji: Hello, can you hear me? Hello?

Elise Lindeberg: ...governments it's - well, let's - we can have further discussion on that, we will have. Okay, thank you.

Avri Doria: Right. And please read and comment on the other note. All the other notes are in Google drive format - the URLs have been sent out and posted here. And they're open for comments by anyone so please, you know, started working on some of those ideas in the hopes that we're taking this model further but, yes, I think you're right, there has to be multistakeholder representation somehow. Thanks.

Elise Lindeberg: Yeah.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay, I had the final question from Olivier. I understand Seun has battled to get audio established so we'll have two final questions and one from Olivier and one from Seun. Go ahead, Olivier.

Olivier Crépin-LeBlond: Thank you very much, Jonathan. Olivier Crépin-LeBlond speaking. Can you hear me clearly?

Jonathan Robinson: Yes.

Olivier Crépin-LeBlond: Okay thank you.

Avri Doria: Yeah.

Olivier Crépin-LeBlond: Avri, thank you very much for this integrated proposal. One concern that - well one big discussion that we've seen on the list is whether the IETF and the RIRs would be interested in participating in this board. If they - in the case that they would not be interested and so you would only have the names community on this board, is this model still possible? Is it still viable? And could it work?

Avri Doria: Thanks for the question. I believe so. I believe it gets rid of some of the accountability and we end up only with belt and suspenders instead of more in that an MRT could be composed to be as diverse as possible. And even could be, you know, designed to include people that are, you know, have both feet or have a foot in each of several communities.

You know, there are many of us in ICANN that are also, you know, IETF participant. I'm sort of a back chair participant and we have some ICANN people who are in the leadership of IETF. We have a, you know, full mix. We have people in ICANN that are, you know, working group chairs in the RIRs and participant here.

So I think it would not, I believe, be as accountable to the whole community as it could be but I think that it would meet a minimum threshold of accountability though, as I said, it may rely a bit more on some of the changes that come through from the CCWG.

The more distributed the model, the more distributed the community participation in that community board, the more accountable, I believe, it is, the more - I tend to think in terms of accountability anchors as sort of when you say you are accountable you are accountable to some group, to some entity. You're accountability is anchored in that other group.

With three sharing, you know, the responsibility you're anchored in three places. If it's just anchored in ICANN, you know, it becomes much more like an internal model except that you still do have the structural separation. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Avri. Seun.

Seun Ojedeji: Yeah, Seun for the record. Sorry for the bad connection from my end. I actually I did post my questions (unintelligible) to start of (unintelligible). I don't know whether...

((Crosstalk))

Seun Ojedeji: ...questions and could actually...

Avri Doria: I've been talking so much I didn't see them.

Seun Ojedeji: Oh okay. So my question is on the subsidiary (unintelligible) proposal looks quite promising. I wanted to (unintelligible) is it (unintelligible) the SOs and ACs (unintelligible) represent. Second question, considering that ICANN is (unintelligible) agreement will ICANN board exercise at the level of oversight on the activity of the community board? Question three, how does community board (unintelligible) mentioned is that oversight of the IANA team and operations.

So for instance, if (unintelligible) staff or employ more staff does (unintelligible) to ICANN management (unintelligible) ICANN board or does it just be implement by (unintelligible) approve budgets.

Question 4 (unintelligible) in the subsidiary (unintelligible) can it be maintained as there is the need for (unintelligible) without a need for the community board. (Unintelligible) community board to (unintelligible) instead the community board to maintain (unintelligible).

If there is, Question 5, if there is (unintelligible) issue so the community - how does the community board decide on that (unintelligible) issues specific to relevant communities, how do they decide on that - on those issues. Thank you.

Avri Doria: Okay, thanks. That's a whole lot of questions. Okay in terms of ICANN and the ICANN, as I said, I tend, in a previous answer, I tend to see it not as the - I mean, certainly the board is the supervising board if we're going to use that kind of terminology of a fully owned subsidiary.

Now, you know, within any fully owned subsidiary that subsidiary has certain defined responsibilities. In terms of its budget, most likely, yes, the budget does need to be approved by the parent board. In the shared services arrangements that budget would need to be, you know, approved perhaps by the three parents. So in either of these two models it does remain tethered.

In terms of - I'm probably going to take the questions out of order. You asked considering is a signatory to all existing contracts. What - in the full subsidiary model the ICANN board has ultimate decision making authority over its subsidiary. And therefore we end up still relying in that particular

model on the - on the community veto and some of those other notions that are being talked about in the CWG.

In terms of name issues that come up, the way I see those still happening, and we discussed this somewhat amongst the three of us, is that the CSC is still the one that is working with IANA directly to deal with its naming day to day issues that if there is a problem then the next step is some sort of appeals process with the IAP. It's only once the IAP has a recommendation or engages in the binding (unintelligible) that you get into this board having something to do about it.

In terms of keeping this board to a minimum and keeping it out of policy, the notion is that it only responds to the greatest, you know, to be exceptions that can't be handled any other way, that rise to that level but that there are mechanisms that keep it from rising to that level. Again, at the end of all the options, nuclear options always remain.

In terms of dealing with the staff, as something that created the budget for that certainly they would work with, you know, the person leading the staff there in terms of, you know, staff expansion and the need for greater budget and where did that budget come from and did ICANN or in the services did the three services agree to the extra funding.

It really is very much a normal subsidiary and over, you know, an owner company type of model whether it's in the wholly owned subsidiary or the partial subsidiary. One of the things where we deviated from what was already on paper or already existing we tried to stick very much with well understood models of corporate interaction and corporate subsidiaries.

And if you look at, again, you know, I'm not a lawyer but, you know, the child of two of them and I'm fairly old now, is that, you know, subsidiaries are handled by parent companies in many different ways and that those ways are indeed defined in the, you know, the incorporation and the agreements between the parent company and the subsidiary.

Sometimes they have incredible freedom and sometimes they need to go back for every decision. I would hope that the model we would build, if we follow forward with this, would be one of checks and balances but not micromanagement.

Did I cover them all or did I miss one?

((Crosstalk))

Jonathan Robinson: Avri, I'm keen to...

Avri Doria: ...the questions.

((Crosstalk))

Avri Doria: ...signatory, community board, staff, I talked about that; separation intent, can it be maintained without the need. Yes, if it's - first of all if it's already structurally separate it's separate. Now depending on how many owners it has gives you the definition of how hard it is to take it the next step and whose approval so but separation is there.

Separability remains - further separability remains possible but thinking in terms of separability as something degrees with I think somebody talked about

ultimate separation or what have you, but, you know, this model has intermediate levels of separation with further potential separability.

Seun Ojedeji: Yeah, okay thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: I think that...

((Crosstalk))

Seun Ojedeji: Hello.

Jonathan Robinson: Seun, I think we're going to have to take the remaining discussion on list. I mean, this has run on for quite a long time and we've got some other things to do...

Seun Ojedeji: Okay.

Jonathan Robinson: ...so I'm - that we bring this to some sort of wrap up.

Avri Doria: Okay, thanks. I want to thank people for listening to me this long and really hopefully we can take this on as CWG work but all the work we're doing is open to comments and, you know, if it becomes something real inside CWG love to see bunches of other people working on it with us. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you, Avri, and your collaborators working on this and for the group for a civil and comprehensive discussion of the model. I think I heard, and I'm sure I run the risk of someone disagreeing with me but I'll try and capture a couple of things that I believe I took away from this. I sensed a favoring of the subsidiary model of the three variants.

There certainly seems to be an ongoing concern about the involvement or not of the other communities, RIR, IETF. We talked a lot about accountability and we have to be careful because it's a vulnerability from the point of this group that appropriate accountability certainly operational accountability but we need to make sure we continually are aware of what is being done in the CCWG on that.

So if you - if you did a word count there was a lot of mention of accountability and we need IANA to be accountable for what IANA is and ICANN to be appropriately accountable for what IANA does.

You were questioned about separability and started to deal with that so that does sound like it needs some further development. One thing that I took away from this is it seems like there remains the concept of a CC and an IAP so it strikes me that notwithstanding any work that gets done on this as a sort of overarching model there's probably work for a couple of design teams to still continue to develop or commission a couple of design teams to flesh out the CSC and the IAP. That feels like something we could usefully do.

So I'd like to move us into the discussion on the design teams now. You'll be familiar with this because we've talked about it on a couple of occasions and we're very keen to commission at least a couple of these and get a couple more going in relatively short order.

I think we envisage having capacity for perhaps three, four at a time. It's difficult to say exactly; it depends how they go but certainly need committed volunteers to turn around work in short order and bring back (unintelligible) proposals from the design teams for such that they can be reviewed.

So the - we put the - I see we have the post ICANN 52 work methods in the window at the moment. But we also put out on the list - and I know there was some other discussions about design teams but we put up three for consideration and there were other discussions as well.

But certainly the one that seems to have got the traction since Singapore and something that's been a key focus is service levels. And you'll notice my comment back on list at service levels but there's probably three layers with which this can be dealt with perhaps by the same design team.

In addition there's the possibility of working on the authorization function and clearing that off or developing whether there remains a need for an authorization function, if so what that is.

I know there was talk of the - any dealing with confidentiality or conflicts of interest in the CSC. I think the CSC is a - feels to me like a fruitful area to develop aspects of the CSC and flesh that out because it seems to bridge a number of different proposals. IAP also is potentially an area of fruitful work.

So I now in terms of the SLAs, I think Paul Kane has put his hand up to some extent on the SLA one. I'm not sure, Paul, you're on the - if you're in the room with us not. I don't know if you were offering to lead on the SLA design team, Paul or if you were simply offering yourself as a participant.

So let's pick those off one at a time and have a look at those. Paul, your hand is up, go ahead. Paul, we don't have you on audio yet. So I'm not sure if you're on mute or struggling for an audio connection.

Paul Kane: Okay, how's that? Is that better?

Jonathan Robinson: We hear you now, Paul.

Paul Kane: Brilliant. Thank you. I'm fairly familiar with ccTLD interactions with the
                  IANA. And I would be very happy to be involved and even lead the SLA
                  design team if everyone else thought it appropriate.

                  What I would welcome though, is input from the gTLD community as well. I
                  think our requirements of the IANA will align fairly well but it would be good
                  to have operators who are - have also experienced working with IANA giving
                  their substantive input where they see - where they've been using the IANA to
                  date, what has worked well, what hasn't worked well, just to make sure that
                  we identify the service level expectations clearly.

                  And then from the potentially identify how long we think it should take to
                  perform based on past performance and particularly with automation coming
                  but also an escalation path for things that possibly have not been done within
                  the prescribed timeline.

                  So one step at a time. Initially I think the design team would benefit
                  significantly from gTLD input and additional ccTLD input just to make sure
                  we get the specification right. But I would be very happy to be involved in
                  that project.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you, Paul. Donna, your hand has gone up so let's hear from you.

Donna Austin: Thanks, Jonathan. Donna Austin. So, Paul, just in response to your request to -
                  for gTLD participation, I have sent a note to the Registry Stakeholder Group
                  list and we do have some volunteers that are lining up so we can - depending
                  on how this runs we can coordinate to make sure that we have input from the
                  Gs as well. Thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks, Donna. So I think that from - I mean, Lise and I have clearly discussed this and based on, A, the emergence of this as an early suggestion, B, of meeting the requirement for operational and related points, we would very much like to see this design team get up and running as soon as possible. So it would be great if we could get a set of names, four or five names.

Paul, if you are willing to lead it and no one else steps forward I think it would be great if you'd pick it up. And, you know, we'd like to see output from this as soon as possible. If you have - as soon as you have provisional output I think we'd like to see it on Thursday's call or next Tuesday's call and start demonstrating the ability of this group to work in this way. So we'd very much like to see that so that's good.

Are there any comments or questions before we think about one or two others? Stephanie, go ahead.

Stephanie Duchesneau: I have a quick clarifying question. This is Stephanie Duchesneau.

Grace Abuhamad: Hi, Stephanie. This is Grace Abuhamad. What might be going on - there's a lot of echo on your line. What might be helpful is for you to mute one of the lines. You might have your computer speakers on and your audio at the same time. So if you mute one of the two then you should be able to clear the echo.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay so confirming that we'll wait for Stephanie. I actually have to admit, my mic was live there so I may have contributed to or exacerbated that problem so I'll mute my mic now and give you another chance to go on audio, Stephanie, otherwise continue your typing.

Stephanie, that's a good question. And it relates to some dialogue that we had online so, Stephanie's question is whether or not the escalation path and SLAs are being addressed as part of a single design team.

And what I suggested in response to the proposal on the - in the email -on the list was that we dealt with this - that they are - potentially one and the same design team but we break it down into smaller chunks. And so the way that was - a suggestion and I think Paul's picked upon that suggestion is we first defined the set of services for which an SLA is required, we then define the service levels that are required for each and then we define the escalation path.

Now these - it's likely that this is, in essence, one and the same time design team. But the idea is that they bring it back in smaller chunks to the group and say, look, we've sorted this out, everyone happy with this. We then sort it out the service levels; we then sort it out the escalation.

So unless something goes wrong with that design team I'd expect it to be - likely to be the same design team that's dealing with it in smaller chunks. So that's the - the sort of thought there.

Stephanie, if that answers your question you could lower your hand. And I see you're typing as well. Okay thanks.

All right so I guess what we want from you, Paul, as a prospective leader of that group is a proposal - a very brief proposal which we've essentially got already. And we can then seek to commission that in very short order, that design team. And we'll be looking for volunteers from CC and G registries. It sounds like that's what's likely to come for this group. And let's kick that off.

We had a couple of others, as I mentioned a moment ago. There was the authorization function where NTIA currently approves all change requests from root zone and root zone Whois. And the question is should this be transitioned and if so how? This may be quite a chunky piece of work. Some of us were under the impression coming out of Frankfurt that this was not going to be required. And this may be - I'm not sure that this is necessarily the best thing to be getting on with now. I'm open to other suggestions.

Certainly feels to me like the CSC specifying and scoping the CSC is a key area as is the IAP and these seem to be broadly independent of the proposal. And I realize that's a little bit of a sweeping statement. So I don't know if anyone is particularly interested in picking up CSC, IAP or authorization function for that matter.

And once one goes into CSC it appears that a natural move on from that will be dealing with confidentiality and conflict of interest issues. But probably so those are the kind of areas that could be worked on by design team 2 or 3.

Okay I see some interest in - from Cheryl supporting the development potential of a CSC and/or IAP as design teams. Perhaps we can either - we can put these out to list or interest as a team lead and/or participants remembering that we want to - we explain that we'd like qualified participants that ideally with some relevant experience and a willingness to commit short term to doing something on this.

And clearly reminding you that the first step in all of this would be definition of the problem and I see Kurt makes some recognition of that by defining what the authorization function is and why therefore it would need replacing.

Okay well I think it feels to me like we have at least a start here and perhaps that's as good enough as we can work with for the moment. We certainly got a good start on service levels. We have the prospective work on authorization, IAP and possibly CSC.

I'm loathe to kick off 4. So it may be that we try and stick with - I see the notes have covered potentially service levels, authorization and IAP. Yeah, so it seems to me like that that might be a good start is if - perhaps authorization function is a little chunky. And we have, as Greg notes, done some decent work on - just trying to capture the comments. We've done decent work on CSC.

Yeah, that's a good point, Stephanie, your point on if we - that, I mean, I tend - personally I've seen IAP as a very tight function. And so let's work with service levels, IAP and CSC bearing in mind that the team lead in each case, the group lead, we're going to need volunteers for each design team and a design team lead is going to have to be responsible for, first of all, coming back with a very tightly scoped specification.

And if you could take the example we did with the SLA and try to - to break it down to the smallest possible chunk that can be dealt with. So for example, CSC might be dealt with in a series of chunks like we did with IAP rather than necessarily all at once and taking - and taking too big a time for it.

Elise, go ahead. Elise, we don't hear you.

Elise Lindeberg: Can you hear me now? Okay, sorry...

Jonathan Robinson: We can hear you now.

Elise Lindeberg: I was muted. No, I just - just one small question, (unintelligible) I saw that (unintelligible) back on one of the lists for a possible (unintelligible) did it integrate in the others? Is it still on the list? Or that something we have to move from later. Just a question, because I need to be on that one.

Jonathan Robinson: I missed which one that was, Elise, if you could just repeat which it was?

Elise Lindeberg: The dotInt - the questions about dotInt for the future.

Jonathan Robinson: Yeah, good point. And actually that's a good point in two ways, one because it may well have been mentioned and I'm just not remembering it. I do remember some discussion about it.

                     Two, I just - to set people's minds at rest, we propose to have a funnel of potential - a list of prospective design teams so as we get a bit of momentum these will - we'll get a list of these going and we're likely to put them on a one, two or three priority so that we can pick off the ones and get those working right away.

                     So this is a slightly stumbling start because of the speed with which this meeting has come up. But I'd very much like to get the three going now so we'll work with service levels, IAP and CSC and then make sure the remainder get recorded in a queue. Yes, Greg, thank you for making sure the funnel was understood, it's a queue or a list of prospective design teams. So we will build that list up and that will be a working document of the CWG.

Elise Lindeberg: Okay, thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you, Elise. All right, I think that's - we can build the - it would be great to get - and I think we had a volunteer in - Alan perhaps on the IAP side.

I'm not sure we saw a volunteer for a lead on the CSC. But we'll look forward to picking up some volunteer names. Please make sure you are really available to do the hard work in working with your colleagues and analogous to what Avri and Brenden and Matthew have done on their model proposal where there's really intensive work at high speed to produce rapid turnaround for the CWG.

Okay so let me move us on then on to the AOB item on the list. Yeah, okay just before I go off that topic, having identified a lead and prospective group - design team members we do need to review the proposal for the scope of the design team and make sure there's a sign-off on that so it'd be - they can come to the list but, Lise, I would very much like to see those proposals and make sure we agree on them before they go forward so that the design teams don't just go off and work without some form of oversight and agreement.

And as I said at the outset, this is a method that's work in progress but we'll hopefully get to develop it respectively.

I've got three points on AOB. We've had some discussion of - regarding a liaison to and/or from the ICANN Board. I think it was an innocuous suggestion but there was certainly some concerns over it, not the least of which was the introduction of this at such a late stage in the - or at such an advanced stage of the CWG's work.

I think on balance, Lise and I have talked about it and we suggest leaving - not developing the idea and just parking the prospect of a liaison. I think as an obvious significant stakeholder we wouldn't want that message to go to the board that we do not welcome board member participation in design teams or in the CWG as a whole.

But we, on balance, think that the appointment of a liaison is sufficiently controversial and frankly potentially distracting that it's not worth pursuing at this stage.

We are going to have to be very mindful of our time table and we'll be producing a refreshed version relatively soon. But obviously a key highlight of that is that the very recently announced, and to those of you who may have missed the announcement on list, the face to face meeting will take place in Istanbul which, as you know, if one of ICANN's hub centers. That wasn't a significant determinant.

There's a note explaining some of the rationale behind why Istanbul. It does help that ICANN has a hub there and we were mindful of other issues including all of the practical issues that go with choosing a meeting venue and travel and visa issues for diverse participants.

So that's a (unintelligible). And then I guess one thing I just want to remind everyone of, I mean, we get into some robust discussion on the list, email discussion and that's good. People have strong views and strong opinions and argue for those. But please keep it civil and make sure that at no point do you make any sort of personal reference. And just recognize what's reasonable standards of behavior.

And possibly also recognize that, depending on how you participate as an individual or what kind of institution or company you may or may not be associated with might limit how robustly you can respond so some of us have perhaps more freedom to argue than others. And so just be sensitive to others positions and respectful of one another and to keep this - there's some strong feelings about some of these issues and so just to remind you of that.

Alan asks in the chat whether it is expected that CWG members would be in Istanbul on the 25th, which is think is the Wednesday, Alan, because let me just cross check that on my calendar and make sure I understand what that is. Yes, that's the Wednesday.

Yeah, I - that's my current understanding, Alan, that we would be available - we would be arriving on the 25th in order to work a full day on the 26th. But to be honest with you I can't confirm that completely based on logistics but that's certainly my expectation. And so we would be overnighting on the 25th and the 26th. And depending on logistics, departing late 27 or possibly even early 28th.

And, Jaap, fully sympathetic to Jaap from SSAC indicating that he has other commitments. And we were very mindful of that, Jaap, and there was a number of parameters that had to be juggled in order to get the right dates and it was not going to work for anyone. And you did make it clear that that was a problem date for you and to that extent apologize. But, yes, to the extent that SSAC can substitute with an alternative we'd welcome their participation.

And Grace makes a note that please remember that alternates need to be current participants of the CWG and supported by SO, AC or SG for that. And the reason for that clearly is that they will be up to speed - appropriately up to speed.

Can I call for any closing questions, remarks or AOB points in case anyone has not had the opportunity to make a key point? Siva, go ahead. Siva, we do not hear you yet.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: (Unintelligible) what happens to the RFP? (Unintelligible).

Jonathan Robinson: Yes, I heard you, Siva. Your question is what happens to the RFP? I think we made that clear previously but let's make sure it is clear. Two things happen, one, we will no longer run the RFP groups from now so we will continue to deal with things as a committee of the whole, as the whole CWG by meeting twice a week. And we will pass a lot small amounts of work into the design teams bringing those back to the committee as a whole on a regular basis.

Those RFP coordinators that were responsible for those groups Lise and I will continue to rely on them to assist us with in particular making sure that those parts of the document having a sort of editorial and supervisory role on those parts of the proposal that are needed and so we'll lean on them and rely on them but the RFP groups we are no longer going to run as they were.

Sivasubramanian Muthusamy: All right, thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you for your question, Siva. Right there's a small window of time left but I'm sure nobody will resent having that opportunity to catch up on a few things in their day. So I hope you felt that was a productive meeting that dealt with substance.

Thank you again, Avri and your colleagues for the work going into that and for everyone for the discussion on that. Let's get to work on these three design teams and see that we can experiment and make this kind of process work. And I expect that work on the sort of overarching model issue will continue in parallel in any event. So thanks, everyone, for a productive meeting. And we'll see you again on Thursday.

END