On the Power to recall the full Board, just under half of the comments supported this power. Commenters expressed concern about the threshold and standards required to remove the Board, as well as the standards and requirements for the appointment of an Interim Board. Specially, there were 7 comments on the question of Board removal by a single SO (a minority view in the proposal), and 6 of those comments very clearly rejected this idea. Finally, 2 comments suggested that community standards for the Board be developed in WS2, possibly indicating that the development of this power be put on hold until then as well

Recall ICANN Board	Support areas	Issue areas
ALAC (At-Large Advisory Committee)	General support (prefers individual removal over full recall)	Paragraph 424, bullet 1: The ALAC is concerned that some SO/ACs and the Nominating Committee may not be able to identify replacement Board members within the 120-day limit prescribed in the proposal. 120 days is a reasonable target, but stating as an absolute maximum without any way to enforce it makes little sense. Paragraph 429-430 Removal of the Board by a single SO: The ALAC rejects the minority view that a single SO be allowed to remove the entire Board.
AFRALO (African Regional At-Large Organization)	N/A	Paragraph 415: We think that to recall the Entire ICANN Board, at-least one SO and one AC should be required to sign a petition to trigger the process.
BC (Business Constituency)	General support	N/A
ccTLD France (Afnic)	General support	refinements needed for powers;
ccTLD United Kingdom (Nominet)	General support	Recall Board (timing issues, repeat issues): "we are pleased that the current draft acknowledges the extreme nature of recalling the entire Board (paragraph 414) and the intention to develop community standards for Board members in WS2 (paragraph 413). However, for a recall of the entire Board, very tight deadlines for discussion could open the process to capture: for such a serious step, time limits could be set in the light of how much community discussion had already taken place, perhaps also invoking the Community Forum prior to the formal process being launched."

Recall ICANN Board	Support areas	Issue areas
CyberInvasion Ltd	Support for Board removal (in interim Board, diversity requirements can be waived for better governance expertise); : "Support the power to remove the entire ICANN board as an option of last resort for the community. We support that due to the likely chaotic nature of the ICANN ecosystem at the time of such an action the normal standards of diversity may be temporarily suspended with regards to the selection of Directors for the interim board. Respectfully at a time of great unrest it will be critical to select Directors with the deepest technical and governance abilities above all other criteria in order to preserve the Security and Stability of the DNS in such an instance. As part of the Work Stream 2 effort we suggest that an enhanced set of Director selection standards be developed to assist in guiding the selection of interim Directors in the case of Board recall."	N/A
Edward Morris	General support	N/A
Erman Öncel - Partnership Istanbul	N/A	Does not support Board recall: "we think the authority to call entire ICANN Board goes beyond purpose"
Google	N/A	Does not support Board recall, but " if the CCWG moves forward with a proposal to include a community power to recall the entire Board, any recall should have widespread community agreement. In particular, the CCWG should reject the minority view suggesting that "each of the three SOs should be able to exercise the power to recall the entire Board individually." Allowing any single Supporting Organization to recall the entire ICANN Board would be profoundly and needlessly destabilizing, and Google could not support such a proposal."

Recall ICANN Board	Support areas	Issue areas
Government of Kuwait	N/A	We do not support the right of the community to recall the entire ICANN board. The report is not clear on what justifications or grounds related to accountability that may trigger such action. The community can press the removal of a board member in case of misconduct or conflict of interest but the removal of the entire board is a disruptive process. […] Without a clear justification of why to give this power to the community, The removal of the entire ICANN board is risky and may occur because of a view disagreement between the board and the community that is not necessary related to accountability issues. Eventually such a power can lead to the hijack of ICANN as an organization.
Government of United Kingdom	"[…] would be undertaken only when absolutely necessary, with full community support, after all other existing procedures have been exhausted, and with the aim of addressing and correcting any fundamental failure at the core of the organisation or to prevent any manifest risk of capture of policy development for specific commercial or other advantage. "[…] needs to be rigorous safeguards and provision of contingency mechanisms to ensure that the exercise of these powers do not undermine the effectiveness of the organisation by creating an extent of institutional and functional paralysis which could substantially put at risk the coordination, management and stability of the domain name system."	N/A
i2Coalition (Internet Infrastructure Coalition)	N/A	A single SO should not be permitted recall the entire Board. The CCWG's proposal notes a minority viewpoint suggesting that a single SO should be permitted to recall the entire Board. Such an action would be deeply destabilizing. A true multistakeholder approach to accountability should require more than one single community to exercise this emergency power.

Recall ICANN Board	Support areas	Issue areas
ICANN Board	We agree that the community should have a right to remove every voting director in extraordinary circumstances. […] The Board agrees with the CCWG-Accountability's concept of a rigorous process and threshold for the recall of the entire Board	The Board notes that the availability of the pre-service letters […] gives a path to voting each individual Director out of their position. There is nothing to stop those 15 votes from happening concurrently. The Board agrees with the CCWG-Accountability's concept of a rigorous process and threshold for the recall of the entire Board. As the removal of a majority of the Board at one time would be a very significant event for the credibility of the organization, the Board suggests that the removal of 8 or more Directors should be subject to the more rigorous thresholds proposed by the CCWG-Accountability for the removal of the entire Board. The Board recognizes the need for a swift mechanism for seating of the Interim Board, and believes framework of the proposed approach is workable. However, the crisis situation that would be reached if the entire Board were unseated at the same time should be met with an insistence upon some key criteria, such as, a high level of independence and professionalism among the Interim Board, and the insistence on operational core competencies such as in finance, risk, audit and governance. There should also be an important role for those familiar with the work of ICANN, but that should not predominate. At no time should the Board not meet the regulatory aspirations of a predominance of independent Directors. The Board notes that the development of a unified, objective removal process across all Directors helps reduce the potential for the Board to become more of a representational entity serving individualized interests.

Recall ICANN Board	Support areas	Issue areas
Internet Association	General support	"The power to remove the ICANN Board as a whole could have a potentially destabilizing effect on the Internet ecosystem. Therefore, any recall should have widespread community agreement.""In particular, the CCWG should reject the report's minority view… Allowing any single SO to recall the entire ICANN board would be profoundly destabilizing, and the Internet Association could not support such a proposal."
IT Law Institute - Istanbul	N/A	Serious concerns - Details issues with recall of the Board, sole membership model, balance between ICANN communities: "- That competence is blurred and must be clarified in which matters and circumstances would the community request to recall - Recall competence does not compromise with the nature of multistakeholder model. It gives only the community super power and excluding other stakeholder. It breaks the balance in terms of equality of rights of all stakeholders. Each stakeholder would like to say something about the Board decisions. Giving that power just one of the stakeholders, renders the logic of multistakeholder model meaningless"
ITI (Information Technology Industry Council)	General support	N/A
Linda Breucker	N/A	* 415, 423: What requirements need to be met by this Interim Board? What happens if the SOs and ACs cannot agree on directors (Hence, no notice which includes a signed statement from the candidate(s) of their willingness to serve and any other information that the Bylaws require Board candidates to provide prior to election would be given)? Paragraph * 429, 430: I do not agree with this minority viewpoint.

Recall ICANN Board	Support areas	Issue areas
LINX (London Internet Exchange)	Supports power to remove Board	"We reiterate our previously stated concerns about the implementation of the power to dismiss the Board. We support the Minority View within the CCWG that regards as highly destabilising the continuation in office of a Board that has survived an attempt to unseat it by an entire SO."
Nell Minow (CCWG Advisor)	General support	Concerns with power to remove Board members; ""We have extensive and details goals, principles, and deadlines but we do not have clear consequences for failure to meet them. There is a labyrinthine and cumbersome process for removing or replacing members of the board"
Public Knowledge	General support	Establish standards for Board removal in WS2
USCIB (US Council on International Business)	Supports powers	Supports higher threshold for Board recall; "we support an even higher threshold of 80 percent for this action. In particular, the CCWG should reject the minority view suggesting that "each of the three SOs should be able to exercise the power to recall the entire Board individually."2 Allowing any single Supporting Organization to recall the entire ICANN Board would be profoundly destabilizing, and adopting such a proposal is needlessly risky."