ACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISMS

	Name of Mechanism	Community can remove ICANN director/s
Description	Description	This would be a new power for the community to end the term of one or all ICANN directors. This draft of this template assumes that only one channel for exercising this power will exist - via whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs.
	Category (check & balance, review, redress)	Check and balance.
	Is the mechanism triggered or non triggered ?	The ability to do this is generally triggered, in the sense that in the normal course of events Board members serve the term they are appointed for. The community would need significant reason to remove director/s.
	Possible outcomes (approval, re-do, amendment of decision, etc.)	Process to remove director/s succeeds or fails. • If <u>succeeds</u>, new election/appointment of the vacant position/s is triggered. • If <u>fails</u>, nothing happens.
Standing	Conditions of standing (ie « last resort », type of decision being challenged, …)	This would be available for the community as represented in whatever mechanism we aim, but would be for collective bodies representing the community to cause, not individuals.
	Who has standing (directly or indirectly affected party, thresholds…)	Whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs.
Standard of review	Which standards is the decision examined against (process, principles, other standards…)	It is the nature of this sort of recall mechanism that it is a decision of those with recall rights and it is not generally constrained by objective standards. Since the consequences are considerable, generally the threshold is set high but standards are not.
	Which purpose(s) of accountability does the mechanism contribute to ?	It contributes to all four purposes of accountability as defined by the CCWG (those being: • Comply with its own rules and processes ("due process") • Comply with applicable legislation, in jurisdictions where it operates • Achieve certain levels of performance as well as security • Ensure decisions are for benefit of the public, not just for a particular set of stakeholders) It contributes by leaving Board members with the knowledge that if the do not live up to the community's expectations in respect of being accountable, they can be removed.

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Composition	Required skillset	Not applicable.
	Diversity requirements (geography, stakeholder interests, gender, other…)	As per whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs.
	Number of persons (approximate or interval)	See above
	Independence requirements	Not applicable.
	Election / appointment by whom ?	As per whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs.
	Recall or other accountability mechanism	This template describes a recall mechanism. The accountability of the institution / mechanism for empowering the community, to be designed by the CCWG, will apply.
Decision making	Is the decision mandated or based on personal assessment	As part of setting a high threshold it would seem logical to require a mandated decision (that is, the decision would have to arise out of democratic decisions of various SOs/ACs not simply the personal view of their representatives in whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs.
	Decision made by consensus or vote ?	Vote. Consensus is not possible for this mechanism. Consideration is needed as to whether ICANN directors that are elected by an SO/AC can only be removed by the assent of that SO/AC.
	Majority threshold (if applicable)	A supermajority.
Accessibility	Cost requirements	There are no direct costs aside from those arising from the operation of whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs. If a director is removed, there will be incremental costs associated with appointing/electing their replacement/s.
	Timeframe requirements	To be implemented before IANA stewardship transition (i.e. WS1)
	Language requirements	As general.
Implementation	Potential means to implement	Amendments to ICANN's bylaws that give power to remove director/s to whatever institution / mechanism for empowering the community the CCWG designs.

Draft 1: Prepared by Jordan Carter, draft at 28 Feb at 0845 UTC