

5A Community Mechanism as a Sole Member Model

Penultimate Draft: 28 July 2015

5A.2 Influence in the Community Mechanism

The CCWG-Accountability considered the decision weights of the various parts of the community. The following table sets out the voting distribution proposed by the CCWG-Accountability.

COMMUNITY SEGMENT	COMMUNITY MECHANISM "VOTES"
ASO	5
ccNSO	5
GNSO	5
At-Large	5
GAC	5*
SSAC	5*
RSSAC	5*

Each participating SO/AC would have 5 votes. Although each SO/AC has a specific number of votes, those votes may be subdivided however the SO/AC decided and, in particular, fractional votes are allowed.

This allows voting capability to be allocated within the SO/AC. Such allotment would be done through a formal decision of the SO/AC. The SO/AC or the appropriate sub-group shall designate the individuals who officially communicate its decisions regarding votes. If no other decision is made, the Chair of the SO or AC is assumed to be the person who can communicate its votes.

At the time of drafting, it is anticipated that the first four SOs and ACs listed above will be initial participants with voting rights in the community mechanism. The Bylaws that establish the CMSM model will provide for the voting rights set out above, even for those ACs that are not planning to participate at this stage.

If such an AC was to decide in future to participate, it would formally resolve to do so by means of its usual processes and give notice publicly to the ICANN community of this decision. Three months following such announcement (the "notice period"), that AC would obtain the right to participate on the same basis as other voting SOs/ACs. Such an incoming AC would not be able to cast votes on any decision that was already in progress at the end of the notice period, but would be eligible to do so in future.

If an SO or AC at some future point decided it no longer wished to participate in the CMSM on a voting basis, it could resolve to leave the mechanism. Such decision would take effect 180 days after notice was publicly given to the ICANN community.

Where an SO or an AC joins or leaves the community mechanism, it cannot reverse this decision until at least one year has passed from the end of the relevant notice period.]

This proposal gives influence on an equal basis between the existing Support Organisations and Advisory Committees. If a new SO or AC is formed in future, inclusion of that SO or AC in the community mechanism would require changes to the Fundamental Bylaws where the CMSM is established.

The logic for 5 “votes” in the community mechanism is to allow for greater diversity of views, including the ability to represent all the ICANN regions in each participating group, than would be the case if there was only one “vote”.

CCWG-Accountability anticipates that the votes each SO and AC casts will be a reflection of the balance of views within that SO or AC (or where possible of that sub-division, where votes have been allocated to sub-divisions). That is, block voting (casting all votes in favour or against the use of a power, even where there are diverse views) is not encouraged.

As noted in section X (Community Powers), no votes are exercised until after petitioning and discussion phases.

Quorums and vote counting

This section needs to be developed – staff are working on a draft paper.

[Given that the number of votes available to be cast in the Community Mechanism can change over time, all quorums or thresholds are expressed as percentages – either of votes cast, or of votes available within the Mechanism.]