

# CCWG Accountability

## Mailing List Discussions

### Week: 20 February – 26 February 2015

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#### CCWG accountability ([archives](#))

- **Model-related proposals**
  - A model for a dual-board structure was discussed where:
    - "A" Board -> which would be responsible for matters of public interest & contract co;
    - "B" Board -> a private non-profit implementing Board A's policy frameworks.

Noted that dual structures may result in twice as much Board and the community may still not know where the ultimate responsibility resides. The second structure, the "B Board" also appears to be a hybrid of Board and management, which should be different and distinct roles.
- **Consensus**
  - Continuing an earlier discussion thread, in the context of the Accountability Mechanism Template of work party 1, a contributor sought clarification on the definition of consensus and suggested using the general "full consensus" standard as a starting point, and when necessary indicating when the lower standard of "rough consensus" from the ICANN Bylaws is used.
- **Independent Review Panel**
  - A contributor called the group's attention to an International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) [declaration](#) as well as shared an [update](#) on pending IRP/CEP (cooperative engagement process) matters and commented this may have implications for efficacy of ICANN community decision-making.
- **Legal Questions**
  - The legal subteam shared their initial [set of questions](#) and informed the group that Robin Gross is in the process of drafting a framing letter that will provide context to the external lawyers. There was general agreement that the number of questions should be reduced further.
  - The initial set of legal questions was refined based on input received from the CCWG on call # 14 and [recirculated](#).
- **Stress Tests**
  - The Stress Test WP shared a suggested stress test [analysis](#) for which it applied the set of proposed accountability measures: Stress test #17,

which describes a scenario where ICANN attempts to add a new top-level domain in spite of security and stability concerns expressed by technical community or other stakeholder groups.

- **Recalling Board Members**

- A contributor raised concerns about a suggestion to only give the concerned community, i.e. the one that made the original selection, the possibility to remove their Board member. Board members would be stimulated to serve their community's interests primarily, instead of the public interest. He furthermore suggested that the power to recall the Board (or part thereof) can only be effectively given to representatives of the community (e.g. a membership structure). The power should be implemented through vote and would require a supermajority to pass. It was also suggested that it would be relatively easy to have stakeholders' representatives vote in favor of recalling particular Board member if there is evidence.
- A contributor commented that any SO/ACs should be able to remove their appointees if they lose confidence in them. A Board member is appointed because of a presumed shared set of values. This recall measure should require a supermajority. It was pointed out that a Board member may choose to act in their community's interest even if against public interest. The community should also be able to remove NomCom appointees (who have no SO/AC), or the entire Board by significant consensus. The contributor expressed doubts that a critical mass could be accumulated to take community action.

- **Shared on the list**

- [Update on IANA Stewardship Transition/ICANN Accountability Discussions](#)
- [Summary of One World Trust report "ICANN Accountability Benchmarks and Metrics"](#)
- [Senate Hearing on the IANA Transition](#)
- [Domain names and politics: Why Chrysler might have to let .ram go The Tricky Issue Of Severing US "Control" Over ICANN](#)