

**ICANN**

**Moderator: Gisella Gruber-White  
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Mathieu Weill: It is a great pleasure for me to introduce this last session of our face-to-face meeting. We will have to - we will now take on a section about ensuring we have the same understanding in what we've been achieving -- so taking stock - - and we would like to start this with going back to the first point yesterday and circling back to the CWG request for support on our group and interrelation and Thomas, are you taking over on this point?

Thomas Rickert: Thanks. Thanks Mathieu. I guess the purpose of the exercise is to get some feedback after we had two days of intense discussions as to what our groups views are with respect to the Asks from the CWG. As you will remember, we have planned to have a joint communication with the CWG chairs and I think we would appreciate a little bit more clarity on what message we could convey to the CWG and then ultimately to the wider community.

So I suggest that we don't spend too much time on this. Certainly we will have to explore these points further as we're doing our work with respect to requirements and so on and so forth but I think it would be good to catch up on these. So the first one is related to budget accountability which is one of the key issues for the CWG. You will remember that we have included that in

our tree structure relating budgeting approval. That's the financial aspect. Do you think that we've adequately covered the Ask by the CWG in what we have so far? I see Steve raised his hand but please for others to also chime in please.

Steve DelBianco: Yes. I'll start by saying that the tree, the decision tree we did, is only an up or down vote on the entirety of an annual budget. At that level of broadness, I don't believe it'll be granular enough to work for what it's written under, what the CWG was looking for. That seems to be a little bit more focused on the entities that support the IANA functions. If it is adequate, up or down vote on the entire budget, then fantastic but I don't think we should presume that that level of oversight is where they're at.

Thomas Rickert: Do you think it would do the trick if we would specify that the budget should include special positions on these functions?

Steve DelBianco: To answer you there, I worry that where would that ever stop? The budget transparently has that information on it but if this cross community group came together and began to pick and choose line items of the budget, I believe we would unravel the process. So transparency of the budget is there for an up or down vote but I don't believe that any of us anticipated going in and changing line items on a budget. I don't think we want to go there with respect to this last resort capability.

Thomas Rickert: I guess, Mathieu, did you want to speak?

Mathieu Weill: (Unintelligible) transparency on the IANA budget is probably something that the CWG might have the opportunity to issue as a recommendation without too much additional work and that might be a step to assure this transparency which is (unintelligible) needed.

Thomas Rickert: Okay. Since these were points brought before us, would an adequate response at least for the moment be that we have in the chart that we have not foreseen to further break that down to the level of detail that the CWG might be requesting and that we encourage the CWG to request that transparency with their own recommendation. So are we going to play the ball back?

Steve DelBianco: I think we should claim that when we explain the item in the tree, it is the last resort element measure but short of that, we would happily support the CWG by requesting a level of transparency that they seem to be requesting because transparency is very different than being able to approve or disapprove a single line item. I would like to be more supportive of their quest for transparency to the extent that it doesn't already exist and remind them that while we are proposing a mechanism for an up or down approval of the budget and we acknowledge that might not allow them to adjust a line item that they feel is to high or to low.

Thomas Rickert: I see (Chris') hand is up. Please.

Chris Disspain: So just a question. Are you asking for input on just the budget right now or the other ones as well?

Thomas Rickert: We're going to go through them one by one. So now we're talking about budget.

Chris Disspain: Okay. Thanks a lot. So I'll wait a second when that comes up. Thanks.

Thomas Rickert: Okay. So my takeaway message would be to describe to the CWG that we're just doing this binary thing, budget approval, yes or not and that we support the notion of getting more budget transparency, that we will include

something on budget transparency likely I should say because we haven't yet final determinations in our recommendations but also encourage the CWG to do the same if they have very specific demands in that regard. Does that accurately capture the temperature in the room? Good. Then let's move to the second point which is accountability for delegations and redelegations. I think that we - this is the point that you wanted to speak to. Please do.

Chris Disspain: Yes. Okay. So I want to make it very clear that what I'm about to say, I'm saying with (unintelligible) manager who's the CEO of (Alda). This concerns me enormously. I think that the GTLD redelegations or delegations -- well, certainly redelegations -- are governed by the contract that the GTLD registry has with ICANN. Those contracts are clear lines of dispute mechanism, resolutions and so on and ultimately would end up in court and because it is a legally binding contract, it seems to me that I don't see how it's possible that you could have some form of outside community involvement in that.

In respect to the CCTLD's, the current situation is that the work with the CCTLD framework of interpretation working group has completed a number of recommendations which in one form or another will end up being the way that CCTLD's are dealt with in respect to the IANA function. One of those recommendations is that the CCTLD should work on bringing to fruition something that was muted in RSC1591 which is that there should be somewhat of a shorthand and appeals mechanism under which a CCTLD manager who is being re delegated perhaps without their consent would have a final port of call appeal.

That is a very, very specific and very CCTLD focused issue and that's where it should be dealt with. I'm not sure that there is necessarily scope or indeed need for a separate mechanism, community lead mechanism, on accountability for redelegations. Redelegations, especially in the CCTLD

world, are intensely politically sensitive, they involve usually a sovereign government, they involve an incumbent CCTLD manager and they involve the IANA process. So I have a little bit of a concern that this cross community working group would find itself in a position where it needed to come up with a function or an accountability mechanism.

The only exception I can see to that would be very specifically that any board, any mechanism, accountability mechanism, that held the board accountable for actions that gets took in general terms could be used to hold the board accountable for any action it took in respect to a redelegation. To give you an example of something that might fit into that and then I'll stop, it would be a circumstance where, for example, the government of Australia went through the redelegation process requesting that out of the removed of the CCTLD manager and replaced by somebody else that the IANA staff produced a report that said this delegation should not proceed and that the board overruled that report and said that the delegation should proceed.

Now, the CC's themselves should be putting in place a mechanisms for dealing with that but I acknowledge that you could use a board mechanism for dealing with that decision but that's the only circumstance that I can see where this would be the case. So I'm more than a little perplexed that the CWG should be asking us to come up with a CCTLD centric accountability mechanism when I think that that is absolutely and solely the role of CCTLD's and with GAK involvement as well. Thanks.

Thomas Rickert: Thanks Chris. Steve and then Jordan.

Steve DelBianco: Agree with Chris and I believe we can give them an answer that says two parts. First, to the extent that ICANN's board takes a decision or fails to act with respect to it, CCTLD delegation, then we are pursuing mechanisms to

challenge review and redress on that board decision. Second, we are also pursuing mechanisms that if management and staff pursue an action that we would have a reconsideration capability for that from the community and the example would be, (Eberhart) educated me about the notion that staff just checks the box as part of the IANA function and checks the box to say procedures were followed and (Eberhart) helped us by restructuring the Stress Test Number 21 if you recall and he suggested that - he used very precise language about the fact that if staff checked the box the procedures were followed when in fact, there wasn't procedures followed and there's redelegation of a CCTLD in the country, well then, we would be able to assist the CWG because we would have a mechanism. That is to say reconsideration of a management action and not just on following - it could be on following processes. So the current reconsideration language may well work perfectly there. So it's a two part answer, one board and one with respect to management on whether processes were followed.

Thomas Rickert: Yes. Thanks Steve. Jordan?

Jordan Carter: I'll actually agree with what Chris and Steve have said. I just wonder whether in addition to those things there's any need to go back to the stewardship CWG and say that this remains a TLD matter and whether we can say that or whether it's worth inviting the TLD's to do any further policy work they have rising from the FOI and just so that it's not seen as a gap or an omission.

Thomas Rickert: Thanks. (Alan)?

(Alan): Yes. I think we need to send it back with the specific question. I was the author of the first part of this and then I turned it over to someone else but the original request came in explicitly from a GTLD and then CCTLD's were added on after the fact. So we seem to be speaking different languages here

and we need some clarity. Either we're missing something or they're missing something.

Thomas Rickert: Great. I think what Steve said, we can lightly take more less literally with the two parts. I guess that one or that two bits that I would add regarding board decisions, I think we should maybe clarify that the board would make a decision on a delegation or redelegation. If they do, they approve it. The current process is that things would go to the board and then it would be enacted up to the board has taken a decision and that decision must not - the part where the sovereign states are concerned with the CCTLD's must never be subject to board decision. That's what I'm trying to say.

Chris Disspain: Thomas, it's Chris. That's not straightly correct. Under the terms of the current NCIA contract, the board is actually designated in the contract as merely finding that the process has been followed. The board itself does not say yes or no to a redelegation and it's a clause in the NTA contract that that is the case. So the decision is about process and not about the actual delegation itself.

Thomas Rickert: Thanks for the clarification but that I would deem a board decision and maybe it's just words. If you think it's unambiguous that the board doesn't have a say in that, fine. I would just be as clear as can be that the board will never have a say with respect to the delegation or redelegation of CCTLD's.

Steve DelBianco: Better to say to the extent that the board makes a decision on the redelegation, we have mechanisms we're designing to challenge that decision. Let's start with to the extent because we don't know forever and ever what's ever going to be the boards role with respect to redelegation. So we're making sure they understand we're not requiring the board to dive in, we're not allowing the community to dive in and question the redelegation. We are doing nothing

like that. So that's why I'm saying to the extent the board is there but to clarify in the second one, management, staff do take an action and that somebody who works for ICANN corporation checks a box to say the procedures were followed and that should be subject to reconsideration.

Thomas Rickert: So we don't have to dwell on that for too much longer if it's just me but if you think it's sufficiently clear not to step on any CCTLD operators toes, then it's good. (Suzanne), you had your hand raised as well.

(Suzanne): Thank you. Just to add a little bit. (Suzanne) for the record. Sorry. Just to compliment what Chris just said and so I will defer to Chris and Bruce as to whether they'd consider that a decision but his characterization of the current contract is completely correct and my understanding is that the board receives a report and so I guess you acknowledge the report. Again, I defer to you all as to whether you call that a decision visa vi a particular del or re del but it's technically a report. Thank you.

Mathieu Weill: Yes. I mean, I think to me (Suzanne) it's not that much different to what the NTIA is actually doing because then after the board has it, it goes to the NTI and they do exactly the same thing. You're checking that the process has been followed. So really I think we've been trying to improve our wording around that. So basically we're certifying that the process is being followed and then we give it to the NTIA and you do your own checks.

Thomas Rickert: I apologize for having kicked off this discussion. I wanted to be very clear. Obviously there is clarity in the room. So let's move onto the second point that I wanted to make is that I think the CWG has expressed the need for an accountability mechanism where a flawed delegation or redelegation can be appealed and that is - I think what we can maybe respond is that this - that we



could make sure that the board can be directed to take care of that to be fair with other...

Steve DelBianco: What we can say is that we've got mechanisms to challenge staff indication that process was followed. It does answer a big part of this.

Thomas Rickert: Okay. So if it's specific enough, Becky, your hand is raised.

Becky Burr: Why don't we just say that there either are mechanisms or appropriate - what either the relevant SO's are developing process are in the developing process because I think for the CC's we will try to work out what the RFP5091 requirements are for that appeals process.

Thomas Rickert: Kavouss?

Kavouss Arasteh: Thank you. Kavouss is speaking. I don't know whether this piece of work has been sent to us, CCWG, for information, for comment or for a specific request. It is not clearly a document of what has been asked of us to do so. Who is the addressee of this? Some of them may not go to such level of detail that is specified here. So this is a cross (index). Do we need to react and if we need to react on what do we have to react and what is the specific questions to ask (unintelligible)? Thank you.

Thomas Rickert: Thanks Kavouss. The history of this document is that we (unintelligible) with co-chairs of the CWG and we were looking for areas where our work would be interlinked and where there might be areas of overlap that can be deployed by both groups and we have, as you will recall, with the high level statement that we've provided, we have offered the opportunity to the CWG to build on work results of our group that we're likely to product and basically they have provided input that's coming out of their deliberations as to where they see

areas where our work could be helpful for them and so I think we are the addressees as the CCWG and I think this is an encouragement for our group to respond which is why we're now looking for input as to what contents should go into the response.

So with that, I think we can move to the third item which is independent review of board actions. Any views, any feedback to that? I think that's something that we've covered in great detail or in the best possible detail in our chart. So we can then move to the next item which is independent appeals panels and we haven't got to the level of specificity as in this request but I think it's safe to say that the mechanism that we are envisioning would be flexible enough to encompass these tasks. Would that be correct? Steve?

Steve DelBianco: Yes. To the extent that the board has taken a decision or inaction or to the extent that management took a decision or action. So I just wanted to qualify that. If in fact a registry made a change to its own file or who is, it didn't involve policy, it didn't involve ICANN, it didn't involve the board or anyone else, we're not suggesting there's any means to challenge that.

Thomas Rickert: Thanks Steve. Unless there are objections, I would say that we respond along these lines which would allow us to go to the last point and that's control over ICANN board decisions and I think maybe the first part of your answer Steve would be applicable here.

Steve DelBianco: If I may though, they use the word mandate a particular board decision and we have not crossed that bridge here as a group but we're trying to design a mechanism to mandate a board decisions. We have mechanisms to challenge, review and redress on board decisions to believe that mandating is something that is really the job of the bottom up multi stakeholder process. So we'd want to clarify that in your reply.

Thomas Rickert: Okay. Wouldn't it be possible that the term mandate is reflected in our action because of inactivity?

((Crosstalk))

Steve DelBianco: If there were inactivity where there should be activity. We have anticipated on the (mine map) was challenging the board decision not to act. We're having an independent review panel who says they should've acted. The result of either the reconsideration or the IRP will be yes board, you should act but it doesn't mandate how and what they should do. That's why I'm being careful about it. We're not mandating a specific action but mandating some kind of action.

Thomas Rickert: Yes. The point that I'm trying to make is that the closest we have in our inventory is the inaction point and I think we should respond that we have not foreseen to include something that will mandate the board but that we have this point of inactivity or challenging an activity and then it's up for the CWG to decide whether they think that's good enough. I think Bruce was a millisecond earlier.

((Crosstalk))

Bruce Tonkin: I'm really weary of the heading here and perhaps the wording of that first sentence. I think we need to be careful to say control over board decisions, the ability to mandate or overrule board decisions. Normally what I think what you want to do is you want to limit the power of board decisions to be within its mission vitals and articles of incorporation and say it's more limitation of power that you're talking about here and then having an independent review process and not a control mechanism because then it becomes - whatever this thing is basically becomes the new board and whereas making sure that the

board stays within its mission, bylaws and the corporations on limitation of power and that is set through an independent panel reviewing that standard.

Thomas Rickert: Alan and then Kavouss.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you. Alan Greenberg speaking. I can explain the origin of that. A number of the models that were being looked at for the IANA transition, the internal to ICANN models, required some mechanism by which should there be a doomsday scenario, nuclear option, whatever that ICANN ordered to divest itself of IANA and it was mandating that particular type of action that that was referring to. Perhaps not but it was essentially ordering that action and that there must be a bylaw or whatever provision to allow that group to order that action.

Man: Right. So the myth that there's something that's put in the bylaws and then whether they adhere to our bylaws or not. Yes.

Thomas Rickert: Okay. I think we're still converging and I think we need to be very aware of the respective scopes of both groups and not to over step onto the request from the CWG which it is not upon us to amend but rather to commence upon and provide and explain what we can provide and maybe what remits we might have and I think it's useful for the CWG world to recap the discussions we've had regarding how mandating specific decisions might undermine an (artistically) model and that we won't cross that line for that particular reason unless of course, there's something in the bylaw that says in this case, in that case, in that case, the board has to act and then we would have this option of mandating the board's decision not to act upon the bylaw. And so, highlighting this as one possibility for the CWG, if they want to proceed in this direction for that particular case, it might be useful heard if that's an

appropriate recap? I see you nodding, so hand it over to (Unintelligible) to say something. We'll have a direct follow up.

Alan Greenberg: At the time this was formulated I don't think we were worried about the, what if they don't follow it. It was the need to put a bylaw in to allow, you know, that entity requested. And that's the part that we were looking to the CCWG for. I don't think we thought the second order one of what happens when they don't?

Thomas Rickert: Thanks. Kavouss and then Greg Shatan.

Kavouss Arasteh: Thank you. Kavouss speaking. I think as far as the review of the decisions of the board is concerned we have addressed that in the flow chart, but we use different terminology. We have not used the familiarity of control, because control if you take French, has a different meaning than control in English, two different things. Control in French means that you decide whether it should go or not go. Control in English means that you monitor, so I don't know whether English is spoken has started this or French has spoken, this is one.

Second, more important is that these measures might need to be augmented by advancement of such decision. It doesn't mean that every decision at ICANN should be put before deciding to the community to react. Of course the fact is entirely different. They decide and then they review. If the decision is not correct, we address that but not asking that please inform almost all of your contemplated decisions whether we agree with that, if not don't go to the decision. It's quite different context here. Thank you.

Thomas Rickert: Thank Kavouss. And I guess adding to what (Ma tear ah) said earlier, we will explain what we plan to do. And then it's up for the CWG to see whether that

fits. And I think we will very actively work with Avri in her liaison role to make sure that there's no misunderstandings in terms of language and us understanding the request. Let's go to Greg. Hi Greg.

Greg Shatan: Hi. Good morning. Good afternoon. Good evening. At least it's morning here.

Thomas Rickert: Greg? You might be on mute.

Greg Shatan: Yes. Can you hear me?

Thomas Rickert: Now we can hear you. Welcome.

Greg Shatan: Okay. Good morning. Good afternoon. A couple of thoughts here, I think that, you know, documents like the one in front of you are necessarily short and leave out detail sometimes important details, and then assumptions can be made about what those details would have been that don't fit with those of the drafters. I think this is a case of that in my opinion.

Talking about number five the control over ICANN board decisions, the underpinning of this was that the control would take place after a multi-stakeholder decision or multi-stakeholder process resulted in a decision. So for instance in this specific example that Alan gave earlier that the decision that the board was being mandated to divest itself of the I-Anna functions group, that decision to mandate the board to do that would be a multi-stakeholder decision.

It would follow the multi-stakeholder models, so this is not an issue where the multi-stakeholder model is being ignored or side stepped, rather it's a situation in which the multi-stakeholder model is being empowered. Empowered over even the power of the board. So whether you disagree or agree with that, I just

want to make sure that it's clear that this is entirely within the multi-stakeholder model.

Second, while I only possess fluency in one language, which defines me as an American, my understanding of control in this document is perhaps what a distinguished colleague (unintelligible) French meaning, which is control as in power over others, not monitoring but rather the ability to dictate or mandate whether a decision be taken or an action be taken.

And finally, I point out that some of the language here is careful or maybe it's all-careful, you know, where it is drafted. You're referring to mandating or overruling or a particular board decision. So this is not intended to be a broad review process or a final stop for all board decisions. But rather it would require a multi-stakeholder driven decision to either overrule a particular board decision or to mandate that the board act in a particular way.

Whether any or all of this is completely realistic or easy to implement is a different question for a different day, but I just wanted to clarify at least in my mind what the CWG was aiming at in this particular section. Thank you.

Thomas Rickert: Thanks Greg. That's very important information. Nonetheless, I think resulting from our two-day meeting I think that we can't go further than what we have in our chart. So I would suggest we respond to the CWG as we've discussed, and it's certainly in the CWGs further discretion to alter their requirement specification and maybe deploy what we can offer. But unless the group advises, otherwise I think we should stick to the response as we've outlined it. Kavouss? Your hand is up.

Kavouss Arasteh: Yes chairman. Kavouss is speaking. If we read below each of these items, it is mentioned this could be used in item two above for CCDLD. When we reply

to them we should mention that CCWG has noted that some or many of the indicated items relates to the accountability in regard to the CCDLD, whereas the accountability that we are discussing is not limited to that particular thing. There is a more overall accountability. So we should mention that, the differences. Thank you.

Thomas Rickert: Thank you Kavouss. Any further comments on this? No?

Alan Greenberg: We'd be happy to review the draft of the response. If you felt you had to go out on a limb to write it, we could help.

Thomas Rickert: No. We'll share that with the group. Avri? Please.

Avri Doria: Thanks. This is Avri. Yeah. I missed the very beginning of this walking in, which of course was very irresponsible of me. But I'm trying to figure out since we do have a work area. And it sounds like you all are volunteering to write it, which is kind of nice and somewhat unexpected.

And so because I was wondering how you wanted to use the work area that you defined for this kind of communication, and whether perhaps you wanted to take your draft or part of the discussion or my helping to build the draft and put it into that area for a certain amount of discussion before it went?

Or is this something that you guys are going to write up a note, pass it for review and then send it? So, I'm really asking about the process of answering this and how you want to do that. And since I put myself on the hook as the repeater on that one, I figured I should ask the question.

Thomas Rickert: Avri? It almost sounds like you're disappointed or jealous not to hold the pen...



Avri Doria: Not at all! Not at all! I just wanted to make sure that I wasn't skirting my duty.

Thomas Rickert: I think or I would suggest without having consulted with my colleagues that we could volunteer with (staff) assistance to derive the answer from the transcript of this meeting because I think everything that needs to go in a response is there. And I expect that in direction between the CWG and our group will be required to further work on the details, because I think it might be better for you to take over that role rather than us doing that and the weekly co-chair calls.

So, if I may suggest, we would set the scene with a response that we're going to draft. We will check with the group and I think you will pay special attention to that with your role as repeater. And then we would leave the follow-up to you and the group. Is that an acceptable proposal?

Avri Doria: That works just fine for me.

Thomas Rickert: Great.

Avri Doria: Thanks.

Thomas Rickert: Good. Now, I guess we have like two items left for today. Just to make sure we haven't forgotten to recap on this part because you're going to get the recap of this session in the draft right? So we're not going to summarize this but we would like to speak a little bit about the planned statement by the co-chairs that we will publish, as did the CWG. We think this is very good practice for the co-chairs to inform the community about the progress that we've made.

And after that Mathieu has volunteered to recap the day briefly so that everybody can refresh their memories on what we've achieved today. So, basically what we can say I think is that we've been working on the finished document yesterday, that we have matured the document to a level where we can share it with the independent advisors, which I think is a huge milestone because this group has completed its work to the best possible extent. And now we're seeking independent advisors feedback, and then it will come back to the group for hopefully finding consensus on it. So, that's the first outcome.

The second outcome I guess is that we work on the requirements of an accountability mechanism. We have detailed and reached agreement on the set of requirements. That's not to be mixed up with consensus on the implementation or feasibility. So this document just is the basis, or let's say a roadmap for our considering work on these questions. But I think it's very good to have a list of very specific things that we now have to flush out. So we have the building blocks of an accountability ecosystem if you wish, but we need to further refine.

We have identified working parties or avenues that we'll work on these and we'll further specify these. And we will scope or we have a scoping document stemming from that exercise that would inform external legal advice that will then hopefully help us with the implementation. And I think I should also add that we have a list of contingencies that we've been working on. And we have allocated such teams to work on and further ask the four specific questions with respect to contingencies identified, which we would then use for stress test purposes as we move on.

So, I think these are the main takeaways that we would like to share with the community. We will certainly alter their word about the CWG to inform them that we are in constant discussion with them, and that we're making progress

with this close interaction with the CWG. Is there anything else that you would like to see highlighted in the co-chair statement? Steve?

Steve DelBianco: Steve DelBianco. Right before the break I had a huddle with the backbench in the room, and they really do have more fun back there. And what troubled me was the post lunch discussion about whether or not another structure or entity or uber committee had to be there. And our discussion revealed a much easier way to think about it. And I would invite the chairs to consider this in your statement.

After explaining the mechanisms and the map where the community would be able to exert these powers and have this standing and that the board had to follow them, after that's articulated, I would indicate that the word community in that mind map is an open question as to what form it would take. On one hand it might just be the existing community getting together via email through the ACSO and SG leaders, if that's possible.

It might also be a permanent cross-community working group such as we use for policy development today and affirmation reviews. On the other hand it may need to be something with more legal structure if it's to have these powers to overturn board decisions and we're pursuing legal advice on that. So, the progression from just an email list to a member structure is a progression that is driven by the legal requirement to have something in the bylaws and articles that works under California law to be able to overturn a board decision.

I remind you of what was already in the inventory. Our articles of incorporation today already say that the boards' decision on bylaws can be overridden by members, if we had members. There's a section in the bylaws

that says we don't have members. It may be that we need members in order to exercise these powers.

But if we don't need a member structure to exercise powers over the board, I don't believe anybody in this room said we opt to do one. There was never any desire to do a member structure it was a mechanism to accomplish the ability to overturn a board decision, to vote up or down on a board budget or a bylaws change. So, I think explaining it in that way makes it clearer. And I do hope Robin and Aubrey are nodding in a vertical direction, as opposed to negative. But I think that's much clearer about it and it should relieve a lot of the unease that was associated right after lunch. Thank you.

Thomas Rickert: I think those are very good points and that actually captured the spirit in which we want to be working on that issue. I mean, as much as we can rely on existing stuff and not create new things, we will, be based on what is achievable in the context. And that's very important to stress just as it was very important to stress that the mechanism should not undermine the (unintelligible) model. So unless there are further comments or remarks I can hand it over to Mathieu.

Mathieu Weill: Thank you Thomas. My work here is greatly facilitated by the fact that the chair statement is already recapping everything we said already today, so I won't go over it once again. What I'd like to stress is our open work items so that we leave this room with clarity about what's next for our group, for this group. So, there's work on liaising with the CWG both at chair level and through Avri and work are three, which is clearly outlined.

This work on contingencies for adjusting the questions, that's something that we've taken on as co-chairs, and to work on the different (unintelligible) and expanding the responses to these questions within the group that's been

created for that purpose. Regarding the documents and scoping, there is ongoing work because I've received some input over the day, very valuable to finalize the documents (unintelligible) to this list, discuss this at an upcoming meeting that we'll have, a conference call and separate it to the advisors.

We are setting up the two avenue working parties. And I am delighted to say that we have two very skilled and committed repeaters, Becky for the review and re-address avenue and Jordan Carter, for the record, Steve said oh yeah! So Jordan Carter for the community empowerment avenue. I want to thank them. We are very pleased to have you onboard. And the first task of these avenues is going to be to clarify scope of those avenues.

And then we'll move into the how-can-we questions, so that's what we have. And we also have, and I want to stress that as well, three different background items to tackle. First, we will go through a thorough review of the timeline and that's both to ensure we can be consistent with the expectations to present something by Buenos Aires in a manner that accommodates the various delays we have to be facing for public comments and supporting organizations and advisory committees engagements. So, that's something we are going to undertake with the support of Barry from staff.

And part of this will certainly come to the discussion about a novel face-to-face meeting between Singapore and Buenos Aires. We had in mind something around April, and it has to be designed, but I also include in that some form of, and that's going to be quite a bit of work, of timeline regarding the other items from our list that were not flagged as one, and where we got that very relevant remark that, unless Barry's trusted timeline for that that might crumbles the whole system. And so I think we will need to organize some work on that matter, and I'm not losing track of that at all.

Second thing is preparing for Singapore. We've addressed that this afternoon. We need a full hour for each plan and probably one page of other things, so I will not underestimate the amount of work to prepare for that. And finally, we do need legal advice. And that is also something we are taking on from that meeting to expedite would probably be a bit strong, but would be great. The urgency on that matter is quite high, and I think we've all agreed on that.

So in terms of a recap of where we are I think that's it. This meeting has exceeded my expectations in terms of our strength. It might not be the case for you, but at least in terms of the progress we've made I think we've come a good way. There's still a lot to be done. But I've been very impressed by how constructive everyone has been and the level of participation both in this room and remotely has been very high.

And I take this as an extremely encouraging sign that our work is getting people involved and that's obviously extremely important. (Unintelligible)? Did I forget anything?

Man: I think you have actually. And I think we owe a big round of applause to the technical support team for making everything run so smoothly, and to our superb staff at supporting us.

Alan Greenberg: And to our superb co-chairs.

Thomas Rickert: Kavouss? You want to add something?

Kavouss Arasteh: Yes. I think at every meeting usually delegates or participants my give their impressions. First of all, thank you very much co-chairs, sincere appreciation for all of the preparing that you have done, including the activities and work of the ICANN staff.

Secondly, the way that you have conducted the meeting, created an environment of friendship to allow everybody to effectively and friendly and smoothly participate in the discussions, even if we had some little difference some times, but we express it in a more friendly manner that's contributed to the success of the meeting.

Thanks to the way that you have conducted. Above all of that we always, having this face-to-face, remember your smiles, very, very constructive. It really injected a lot of incentive to us and allows us also to share that and be more friendly. Thank you very much. Continue to smile, someone like Mathieu was more visible from others, his was hidden way back and all of you were smiling so thank you really very much.

END