

**ICANN**

**Moderator: Gisella Gruber-White  
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11:00 am CT**

Grace Abuhamad: Thank you, Jonathan and Lise I'll turn it over to you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you Grace, hello everyone welcome to the fourth of these calls that we're running over this weekend on the 10th and 11th of January.

We have dealt with a number of items and had a very productive three session's, so far so thank you all for your efforts today and we'll try to make this final meeting come back to the same spirit. We've got someone who is - at least one person who is not on mute on the line so if you could please make sure your line is muted if you're not actually (conversation) to the audio of the meeting.

Man: Especially if you're playing doodle-jump.

Jonathan Robinson: Great so you'll see up in the right-hand portion of your Adobe Connect room if you are on Adobe Connect as we're go to the agenda of the meeting.

And the objective of the call is really to focus on accountability within the scope of this working group. And if - and also the links (between) this

working group and the so-called CCWG on accountability which has become critical to many of us to make sure that we are appropriately and effectively the work of the two groups is linked and that the right conditions of linkage are in place.

So we also as part of this survey that we undertook on the back of the public comments which those of you have been on the call to date have been familiar with, we ask some specific question in around accountability and we'll run through those. But before moving on with that we will take a roll call in the way in which we have been doing previously which is to record everyone in the Adobe Connect room as present in the meeting and anyone who is not in the Adobe Connect room to make themselves known over the audio now.

So please make yourself known if you are not in the Adobe Connect room. Thank you, we'll record everyone as present that we can see in the Adobe Connect room. So moving straight on then to Item 3 which is a review of the accountability components of Survey 2, we start off with Question 1 - sorry we start off with Question 3. Now it happens that there are no items that - in this section that on accountability that meant - that what the yellow threshold of what acceptability or of a sense of responses.

They were either white like one and two or green like three. So moving straight onto three it says, ideally - let me pause for a moment to get it up in your screens.

Woman: The other group, sorry - you have it up, it's up.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you we now have Item 3. Ideally the CWG would have begun its work following the adoption of recommendations by the Accountability Cross Community Working Group.

And this is green indicating that there was the sufficient threshold of balance of opinions in agreeing, strongly agreeing or unacceptable. Well that idea cannot be met because we're out of synch and in many ways the purpose of this call is to start to - or is to start to and continue to work on how effectively we bridge the gap between the two groups. Item 4, ideally the Accountability Cross Community Working Group would have begun its work before or at the same time as the CWG IS so the groups could work in parallel again while there's no one disagreed with that.

So that is the - that's useful to record that, but in practice we simply have to get on working together. And Lise and I as you well know - your co-chairs have met on a recently regular basis with the co-chairs of the CCWG and our group now will work on how - elements of how we work together. There have been various components of that which we'll come to when we deal with the work post the survey. Item 6 of the survey - Question 6 of the survey - this is an interesting one.

ICANN should formally link the CWG IANA and this accountability CCWG processes to ensure that the work moving forward takes into account equities from both processes so that in the end the community, ICANN and the NTIA have two well-formed and robust plan to ensure (unintelligible). Again (I'm at) the threshold and I guess this really speaks to the lessor part of this call because we as the CWG are going to be talking about how we formally link our work into that of the Accountability CCWG and how we effectively manage that inter-linkage.

So to the extent that we can do what this question (posits) that ICANN should have done we can sort this out ourselves. Any comments or points anyone would like to raise in this respect? Item 7, Point 7 from - that came out of -

Question 7 from the survey - in (half) accountability regardless of who the IANA functions operator is must be in place prior to the IANA stewardship transition. A couple of no responses, a little disagreement but comfortably into the green threshold - Greg, go ahead.

Greg Shatan: I guess on the - I didn't - don't recall how to answer this question but - I'm sorry this is Greg Shatan for the record.

But I suppose, you know, one of the issues here might be what is enhanced accountability mean? And a reason to disagree with this might be the whole Work Stream 1 versus Work Stream 2 that the Accountability Group is dealing with. You know, clearly whatever I - whatever's in Work Stream 1 needs to be in (just by) definition of what Work Stream is. And Work Stream 2 is stuff that, you know, just - there's a plan to put it in place but it's not actually in place.

So, you know if enhanced accountability means Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2 then this state- then I would disagree with this statement. But I think that's probably fairly self-evident that we're really only talking about Work Stream 1 being in place. Otherwise I don't think there would be a lot of agreement that everything needs to get done before there's a transition only that which is promised - only that which needs to get done.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes the question doesn't specify - or the statement that led to the question simply talks about enhanced accountability doesn't particular (unintelligible).

All right, Point 9 - Statement 9, following publication of CCWG accountability draft recommendations and assessments should be conducted by the CWG IANA to determine whether the outcome of the accountability process provides a satisfactory appeals mechanism. This is an interesting one

because it speaks to a specific point that is whether a satisfactory appeals mechanism is in place.

But there's also a hint of another process which we might like to discuss now or probably later in the call and that is how the cycle of conditionality between the two groups' work may exist. In other words this group having cer- making some form of assessment analysis or other process to review the outcome of the CCWG on accountability for its satisfactory scope and effectiveness in relation to this group's requirements.

Okay and Item 10 then, a placeholder should be included in the CWG IANA proposal that is our proposal that is submitted to the ICG to allow for further evaluation and work as needed after the CCWG accountability Track 1 recommendations are finalized. This receives clearly sufficient level to have the green level of support. And if you look at the percentage difference between those two agreed and those who disagreed it's touching on 94%, so there's a pretty strong view here that there's going to be a (the fact of) - (unintelligible) for concluding of the cycle.

Would anyone like to make any additional comments or input on these outcomes of the survey? I'm reminding you again that this is fed from the public comments into survey questions such that we can then understand the response of the group to those public comments, the response of this working group to those public comments and our convergence of views around those. And we've spoken - we've typically discussed over the last few calls the extent of our convergence and our willingness to accept their call to these contributions from the public comment. Okay Greg please go ahead.

Greg Shatan: Just briefly - I know we're going to get to kind of the question of timeframes later on in the call.

But, you know, clearly if we say that we're going to allow for further evaluation of work basically the - asking the ICG to kind of give us another shot at changing our proposal whenever the CWG - CCWG comes up with their Work Stream 1 evaluation kind of, you know, pushes this off. So this may be a nice to have but if we worry about - and I see it says should rather than must, but if we were to insist on this, you know, it would throw a lot of the timing, you know, way off into the future.

The - and, you know, it has knock on affect that we may not fully appreciate at this time, thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks Greg and I think that's relatively closely related to Matthew Shear's point in the chat as well.

I suppose - this gets to a critical point and it's the mechanics of how that inter-linkage takes place and we should come to this in the discussion in this call, because there are two ways of looking at that. We could say something broad like we can't consider our proposal finalized unless we've seen the outcome from the CCWG. Which in my mind would - leaves us very open ended. Or another way of doing it is we could say providing Condition A, B, C, D, E are satisfied in the work of the CCWG we will be satisfied, our proposal will stand.

And in a way that's a more closed ended way of doing things, so that's a - that's something we need to think about and I think we should come onto that now or shortly in the call. Okay so let's close off the review of the survey which in effect completes our entire review of the survey which has been substantial and thorough at least in so far as we could manage to do within the

time available. And we seemed to have done a pretty good job of going through it and getting - moving the conversation ahead.

We now move on to Items 4 and 5 in the agenda which start to deal with operational and broader accountability and this group's relationship with that. I'm going to try and make a couple of remarks to start the thinking off and they may cause you to respond in agreement or disagreement, it would be interesting to hear. Clearly the NTIA transition comes with it both an oversight of operations and NTIA's oversight of some description of ICANN's broader accountability in governance.

What that then throws up is what is the work of this group according to the charter of this group and what can we effectively link into the work of the related and interconnected work of the I - of the CCWG on accountability. What is very clear when we talk about accountability in our context and the context of the CWG that we have to have - our work must produce some form of accountability and oversight of the functional performance of IANA.

Therefore that we have at minimum oversight of the basic operational accountability associated escalation with respect to that accountability and content continuous improvement of that performance. We have to think about that in a way as a kind of Level 1 of operation accountability. In part our groups also talked about another form of operational accountability which is - should after many intermediate steps and escalations have taken place.

Is there a point at which operational accountability - operational performance rates now such that some form of severance between ICANN and IANA is possible, whether you call that re-tender, re-contracting and so on? But all of that relates to what one might call operation accountability and I think perhaps that's notwithstanding the structural issue of contract (code) or not. That in

many ways is perhaps our easier task and that relates to the work of the CFC and so on.

But we did have a question yesterday which I thought was worth nothing and that is the accountability of the CFC and/or the MRT, to whom are they accountable? Which is an interesting one. So those are some thoughts on operation accountability. Clearly when we go into the broader accountability we start to link - think about the linkage with the CCWG's work. And in thinking about that it's really - we have a couple of practical things that we need to think about.

Our input into the scope of the CCWG which is still possible in setting out what we would expect the CCWG to be working on. And what if any components of our ultimate proposal are conditional on the work of the CCWG? And if they are conditional - if our work is conditional, you know, we need to be specific about how might those conditions be satisfied in giving that appropriate level of guidance to the CCWG.

So I've touched on both operational and broader accountability, let's hold off on - let's go back to the operational and make sure that this scope for anyone to make comments on and input onto the definition if you like and scope of operation accountability. Which is this oversize of the function or performance of the IANA function, arguably split into two levels. One is ensuring basic operational accountability and the associated escalation with that, ensuring continuous improvement of functions.

And the second is an extremist leading to potentially a series of escalations which may ultimately lead in severance. Any comments, questions, thoughts on operation accountability? Donna go ahead.



Donna Austin: Thanks Jonathan, Donna Austin - so this goes to something that came up on the list recently with the discussion about - one was about budget and the other was about - it raised the question for me of in the event of a rebid do the conditions at NTIA have set for transition continue in perpetuity?

Or is it once that they - once that NTIA is satisfied for the pur- for this purpose that the transition can occur do those requirements that they had no longer hold? So this is in the context of a discussion of us having where I suggested that in the event of a rebid ITU or (unintelligible) might be a possible bidder, which was rejected outright. But one of the things that Milton raised was that it's not possible because it would meet the NTIA requirements.

But my question is do the NTIA requirements that we have now continue in perpetuity? Thanks Jonathan.

Jonathan Robinson: It's a really interesting question. I don't know how - I mean how much it relates specifically to operation accountability.

But I see the value in the question, it's - it is - it's the survivability of the conditions at the transition. How much do those conditions set in place by NTIA at transition? Yes and Steve makes an important point in the chat, what keeps the perspective rebidding decision from being used as leverage on ICANN unrelated to IANA rather than specifically? Well I guess that - I mean I could take a stab at answering that.

That depends on the - on how tightly scoped the operational accountability components of the proposal are, at least to the extent that we're talking about operational accountability, how tightly those are scoped. And that's incumbent on this group to scope those very effectively - (Alan)?

(Alan): Sorry from the notes I'm not clear whether we decided that the accountability of the CFC and MRT are part of operational fund- operational accountability or not. In my mind they are but the notes don't say. You did mention the subject but I don't know what the outcome was.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes so (Alan) the context in which I mentioned that is - we're talking about operation accountability.

Operation accountability will be supervised by the CFC and the MRT. And I raise the fact that yesterday someone had said, well in that case who is - who's supervising or who is - to whom or who is the account between the CFC and the MRT managed? So that's what the note should reflect - (what)?

(Alan): I'm suggesting that that very much is within scope because if they're verifying the operational accountability and no one's verifying that they're in fact doing that job it's moot.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay so what I think you're saying (Alan) is the proposal needs to contain some language which deals with the accountability of the CFC and the MRT?

(Alan): Yes indeed that is what I'm saying in a much clearer way than I said it.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you, I was just trying to capture it - Greg?

Greg Shatan: Greg Shatan for the record. I think, you know, first - kind of fall into what (Alan) had said some of the, you know, additional work that has been done in the RFP3 group.

You know, we have discussed, you know, the issue of recall by a, you know, assuming the MRT is a multistakeholder group, that they are representatives,

that there are people serving our representatives of the organization, that the organization can recall their members if they're going (road) and that there should also be a methodology for which, you know, for the MRT itself to deal with members who are, you know, perpetually or repeatedly absent and failing to perform. So I think those things are being contemplated on that level.

I think there are, you know, obviously there are broader issues of accountability too that would need to be dealt with in terms of performance, reviews and accountability to the community. But those are to some extent inherent in any multistakeholder expression so to speak, thanks.

Greg Shatan: (Alan) is saying in the chat that accountability of CFC and MRT in the contract (of model) is equivalent to the accountability of ICANN in the internal model.

I don't - I think that's a false equivalency. I think the CFC and MRT are really more like working group in the sense of their accountability to the community. They're not corporations; they don't have board issues of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty with corporation and all sorts of other things. ICANN accountability is a heck of a lot more difficult to solve than accountability of a group of stakeholders in my opinion, thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay there's a couple more hands come up. We've got Lise and then (Alan).

Lise Fuhr: Hi it's (Lisa Gore) for the record. I just saw Steve Crocker's question in the chat and Steve could I ask you to elaborate a bit on this? Because you're asking if a decision goes outside of it's charter - is this regarding the issues in this process or later on? Thank you.

Steve Crocker: Sorry I was muted, what I'm raising is if you have a group that is empowered to recall board members or the like then that gives them the full power of exerting influence over the entire operation of ICANN for any purpose whatsoever irrespective of whatever is written down.

So if we write this with the intent that this is only for actions related to lack of performance or issues related to IANA that the group that is in place gets it into their minds that they've got the power and they're going to exercise it for whatever reason, what are the rules of their governance? What are the appeal mechanisms, what are the accountability mechanisms? They can do as much damage as they like - and I say this not with the expectation that that will happen.

But if we're trying to write some rules that are going to last for a while then the exact same set of governance issues that we deal with for ICANN and indeed for any institution that we set up would apply for this new effectively super institution.

Jonathan Robinson: Lise would you like to...

Lise Fuhr: Yes, yes - I was just - so what I hear you are saying is if we're going to have mechanisms of like being able to having board members remove or whatever, you want us to make a mechanism that ensures that it's not going to be done in a broader sense? But this is - it's - yes, sorry, you know.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay but I'm a little worried that we're getting off track here because the track here is operational accountability.

The discussion as I understand it is we have a function that's being performed and reviewed by a customer service committee for basic operational

accountability, associated escalation and continuous improvement. We have the ultimate prospect of that an extremist being escalated for functional performance breakdown to a perspective severance. In this context when we're talking specifically about operational accountability, not the next section which is about broader accountability.

There is no circumstances that I'm currently aware of that board - that's going to interfere with the composition of the ICANN Board for example. This is all about - when we talk about operational accountability this is simply about the effectiveness of performance of the technical and administration operational functions of the IANA function - of the IANA. So let me go to the queue and make sure but that's where I think we're at - (Alan)?

(Alan): Thank you, in response to Greg, when I used the term equivalent I didn't mean the solutions are the same or the details are the same, I meant it's at the same level.

That is ICANN accountability in the internal model says let's make sure ICANN is really doing the job that (unintelligible) to, you know, intellectually if not in a contract and the same is true at the CFC and MRT. And yes it is simpler in some level because we don't have boards of directors. It's also more complex because we have still not defined the MRT as to what kind of entity it is. It's supposedly not incorporated and how do you control this free floating entity, how do you have control over it?

So equivalent did not mean the solution's the same, it just means there's an issue that we have to address in my mind - thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay I've got a queue but I note that Matthew Shears points out that - in the chat - that operational accountability is within - is (fall) within the scope therefore of the CFC and the MRT - Greg.

Greg Shatan: Greg Shatan for the record, I think that we are kind of getting off to the more attractive or controversial discussion which is the nuclear option or various nuclear options, you know, such as, you know, blowing up the Board and blowing up the IANA relationship to ICANN.

And that maybe that's just not where we are yet. We'll need to get there obviously. And just to respond briefly to what Steve said earlier I think those are good cautionary words; however I think they are cautionary words for any organization setting up any kind of accountability systems that has teeth. So cautionary words are good but those challenges are unavoidable for us - thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: So given that we're on Item 4, kind of in scope if you like right now is this discussion in and around operational accountability. And very shortly we'll move to Item 5 which is the relationship between the work of this group and broader accountability - (Petro)?

(Petro): Yes a couple of comments. The first element when we talk about operational accountability as far as I understand from my experience the best accountability system is something that has different levels and can function at the lowest level possible.

Which means that some element in the operational accountability include the issue of transparency of the request which seem to have a good level attraction in consensus. It includes the ongoing monitoring and the capacity to have direct request for regress directly to the IANA operator without having

necessarily a huge system of escalation and I think also the system of escalation. So the notion that account- operational accountability is actually a layer system that needs to have capacities of intervention so that reaction to any malfunction can be done as early as possible and at the lowest level possible.

That's the first one, the second point is when we all talk about the nuclear option there was something that emerged in previous discussion and that was documented in the chat in particular is that I think there was great consensus emerging on the notion that whenever there is the possibility of a nuclear option it needs to be on preexisting and pre-established, very precise criteria. And I think a certain number of people believe that this better criteria should put a threshold relatively high because there's a balance and stability and accountability.

And the final point is not to forget the question that (Donna) asked which we have never come upon before but I think is very valid on how permanent are the requirements that have been put by NTIA today on any possible change of operation, thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks (Petro) - two (outreach) responses in the chat. One yes agreed and we must look at layers in all of this.

This is not a binary here either. No customer supply relationship should be binary where you are - whether it's an employee, a supplier or anything else. You don't just go from performing adequately to fired, there's a whole lot of steps in-between that need to be fleshed out. Two, I'm simply not sure how to - I think (Donna)'s question is exceptionally valid. I agree with you I'm just not quite sure how it fits into this particular topic or how we deal with it. But I do agree with you, I'd like to capture that and find a way of discussing that.

So any comments on those intermediate steps are welcome - any thoughts or comments on that. But it feels to me like we would - what - as (Pet) - Greg said and others that really the operational accountability is as much about a series of detailed specifications and much less about the more sort of philosophical or broader points that we need to cover - (Petro)?

(Petro): Yes if I may chime in, when - I fully agree with that. And when I was trying to list a few things, maybe it would be useful at that stage to list a certain number of things (in order to) compete.

The first step for accountability is the transparency of the the request so that there is more visibility on the whole workflow. The second element is the role that the CFC will have in monitoring ongoing performance. The third role is the capacity to directly or the channels for direct request to the IANA operator, whatever the channel to correct any potential mistake. The fourth one is the role that the CFC or potentially the MRT as I understand there are discussions will have on performing annual reviews and potential regress.

And the fifth one if my numbering is correct is the whole mechanisms for appeals. I would put that and maybe the list is not complete but I think it would be interesting to try to lay down those different levels before we get to the second dimension which is the larger nuclear options of change operators (that we have).

Jonathan Robinson: Yes, thank you (Patro); I agree it would be helpful to have any bearing in mind that an objective of the discussion is to help us flesh out those levels. So any suggestions, constructive input on that is helpful so I agree that's a helpful suggestion - Chuck.



Chuck Gomes: Thanks Jonathan and thank (Petro). I would just add one simple one after the transparency one - in other words number two.

And before going to the CFC is the particular registry operator that's involved in this issue should have the opportunity, in fact responsibility to try and resolve the issue with the IANA functions operator before even going as far as the CFC. And if that doesn't happen then you can go to the CFC. But just adding one (staff) and I'm sure there are others we can add too, but I think as far as I know nobody's ever thought that we need to jump right to higher levels.

We should solve it as I think you said yesterday at the lowest level possible and so thanks for the steps you provided and there's one more. And by the way that one as you know, for those that were on the call yesterday - I don't remember which call it was on but we actually talked about some statements that there was strong support for, for allowing the individual operator to go directly to the IANA functions operator to try and get resolution - thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes thanks Chuck, so - can (Petro) can you just check that you're satisfied in some ways and Chuck as well if those notes are (I mean) adequately captured?

Because these constructive suggestions as to how we develop the documentation - the thinking and the ultimate documentation of the thinking is very helpful. And to the extent that it's not either come in on the audio now or email us on the list so that we capture.

(Petro): Yes (ideally) just to quickly chime in. I mentioned in the chat the point that Chuck mentioned was what I intended by the second point, so I can put in the chat the four or five points that I (unintelligible).

Jonathan Robinson: So any more detail that others would like to provide I think we - before we move on to Item 5? Yes I know (Robert) reinforces that in the chat with this (print cycle) - principle of subsidiarity which essentially resulting in the lowest level which is important - Chuck?

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Jonathan, and the reason I'm jumping in again because the - (Robert)'s comment in the chat is related to a post I sent to the CWG list in-between meetings today regarding the SAC069 document.

Which has some very good principles including the ones that (Robert) mentioned here. And we don't need - this isn't the time to talk about those but I just call your attention to that because there's some very good principles that the SAC069 document supports and that I think we could easily endorse - thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: All right I think that gives us an opening then to move to Item 5 unless there is something else that anyone would like to raise prior to doing so.

So in moving to Item 5 we have a situation where transition of stewardship takes place. This group has created the - an appropriate proposal for sufficient future management of the IANA functions. And within that operational management there is an ultimate condition of the substantial layers of intermediate steps, (why) should performance remedies there's an escalation route. However there's a view that in addition to that NTIA in its stewardship role had an overarching oversight of ICANN and its accountability.

Now that may well be being dealt with adequately or within the associated and interrelated work of the CCWG. The question for this group is what form of steerage or guidance should we be given - giving to that CCWG? And what

if any components of the proposal that we prepare should have some conditions in it for the work that CCWG? I guess to introduce this it's probably worth looking at where we are with the CCWG on accountability at present. Lise before I ask Greg to look at the statement is there anything you - would you like to say anything about our work with the CCWG today?

Lise Fuhr: Thank you Jonathan, this is Lise for the record - (Lisa Gore). Well the statement is a product of our work with the CCWG.

We have weekly meetings with the chairs of this group and I guess the statement is not as we expected. It's not as fulfilling and that will - Greg will introduce you to that, those of you who haven't read it yet. But we're still confident it's a very good relationship and work we have with this group. And - but we're - we would have - it would have been nice to see more from this group for this. But we're - we know they're working hard on reaching some of the issues or finishing some of the issues of the (core) - Greg.

Greg Shatan: Thank you Lise, it's Greg Shatan for the record. As Lise indicated and as many of you probably already know about a week ago the CCWG sent out what they termed their high level statement.

Which they indicated were not only for our edification but also to guide the work of the other groups preparing ICG proposals - proposals going to the ICG for transition of the IANA functions in their communities. So although they're in many ways responding, you know, specifically to requests made by this group essentially, you know, we had - earlier we had noted specifically to that group that there were three issues that we were grappling with. But, you know, generally dealing with the larger issue of accountability, we're dealing with specifically, you know, finding review of board action.

At that time we were talking - we haven't talked so much lately actually about the independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests, also (about) the independent appeals panel. But largely really now I think the focus has shifted as it should to the issues of interlinking on the issues of accountability. And we were certainly hoping that we would see some response about how they were going to deal with the issues of enhancing ICANN accountability.

And we had asked for feedback that could be received early enough to be taken into account as we, you know, finalize or continue to work on. On our proposal we had even suggested that it would be highly attractive if they could give us something to work with for this high intensity work weekend that we have now been embroiled in. Their response - and I think it speaks for itself is that while the CCWG accountability appreciates the sense of urgency and works as expeditiously as possible on the tasks it has been chartered with, it is not feasible to publish the work results of the group in January.

I'm not sure (you) are asking for work results but it's basically I think their message is that we can't count on them for anything concrete or even with any level of specificity in (kind of) the near future. I will need to see more specifically what they're - when their timeframe might issue forth something of value. Right now they've, you know, told us that - they've said that there are three kind of high levels they would assure us and I guess all the other groups that their accountability will address the concern of to whom ICANN should be accountable.

What ICANN should be accountable for and how the ICANN or it's Board of Directors should be accountable, which I guess is really just a way of restating their initial work statement. So that I'm not sure if all that's useful for us because that doesn't indicate anything about how they might actually solve all

those problems; that is really only a problem statement. If their problem statement were that they were going to turn lead into gold I would not have confidence.

I have a much greater amount of confidence in the CCWG that ultimately they will solve all these problems, the only - the issue is when. Of course done is better - this is not a case of done is better than perfect, this is a case of we better get this right because we have only one shot. And while perfect is not what we aim for because they're going to have to be compromises and realities to be dealt with. Quick is not better than good enough which is not enough.

And so I am, you know, very sympathetic to the bind that the accountability group is in but nonetheless I'm not sure what - if there's anything we can do other than to continue to do our work. But to think about what we need to communicate back to the (ECCWG) so that they can continue in their work and produce something that will ultimately be helpful to our end result and to the ICG and the NTIA when they see the proposal. There is one specific point that they make in reference to our group which is - and I'll read it again verbatim.

Unless the CWG stewardship specifies other ward - otherwise Board decisions that are directly related to IANA functions could be added to the remit of independent mechanisms. And here they mean independent mechanisms for review of Board decision - for the review and redress of decisions of the ICANN Board of Directors which the I- CCWG accountability may address in Work Stream 1.

So that I guess gives us some comfort that they will - that they are looking at Board oversight issues that we could latch onto if they meet certain criteria that we would think are appropriate in terms of review and redress of IANA

related decisions by the Board. But by and large my personal reaction to this at least is that we need to continue with our work without specific - without much specific guidance on the CCWG accountability.

And rather we'll need to give them some guidance on what we would like to see from them when, you know, by - in terms of criteria in order for that to kind of satisfy our concerns about broader accountability - thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: And so Greg in my mind I formulate that into a couple of related questions. Is how might we help steer the work of the CCWG?

And what conditions of our proposal might exist - in what way might our proposal be conditional on the outcome of the work of the CCWG? And then I guess ultimately what's the feedback loop? But as you say there is a very specific question there - is they have - they phrased it in the way of a statement - we will do this unless the CWG tells us otherwise. So the question on the CWG on that specific point is are we okay with that, does anyone want to tell the otherwise? (Alan) go ahead.

(Alan): Thank you, clearly the CCWG is - has its target set high and it's looking to put in place good ICANN accountability using the IANA transition as leverage to quite Steve DelBianco.

Regardless of what it is that we are proposing when the CW - CC - CCWG started Jonathan you and Lise sent a short list of three items some of which were not man - perhaps not mandatory that the accountability group had to provide if the contract whole proposal were to go forward. I think once we come up with something more concrete as our proposal you need to do that again - or we need to do that again to tell them what their minimum target is to satisfy whatever it is we're proposing.

And clearly, you know, that's going to be diff- perhaps different if we have the contract (code) model or not. But I, you know, I think that's the kind of message we need to send in no uncertain terms so they know what the targets are and will be able to deliver.

Jonathan Robinson: I understand that (Alan) and I think in some sense the implicit request is, is there anything you can do in that regard ahead of Frankfurt - their meeting in Frankfurt in one week's time? How - can we - is there anything - I understand what you'll say, well the work hasn't been done yet as far as the (unintelligible) that could be helpful - Chuck?

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Jonathan and thanks (Alan), I'm in agreement with what you said. But I do think to the extent we can we need to give them specific items that we need them to address.

I think call number three that happened earlier today, in that call - and don't ask me to site them all, I can site one - there were several items identified for which were really dependent upon the CCWG to provide some accountability mechanisms. The one that I do remember is one that I was involved in - I guess not surprisingly - where there were several of us I recall and (Donna) and I in exchanges in the chat and some verbally was well with regard to the ability for a registry offer - operator to appeal a delegation decision.

Understanding that in the case of gTLDs that happens before it ever gets to IANA, I am fully aware of that and that's why it's better in the accountability work than ours. But we still need that to be addressed so that a registry operator could appeal if they think that policy has not been followed appropriately in the delegation or re-delegation decision and can't resolve it through existing ICANN accountability mechanisms.

Then I think that's one area where we need the CCW - CCWG to address and we should communicate that to them. And along with others that we can probably pull out of the MP3 and notes and transcripts from the earlier meeting - thanks.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks Chuck that's very helpful and that's what IANA I think Lise and many of us would like to see is a concrete list that in one sense gets those issues off our plate.

And they remain off our plate to the extent that we remain satisfied that the CCWG has or will deal with them appropriately. And I'm (offence) from them that that would be very helpful to get those to the extent that we can ahead of their major meeting in Frankfurt in a week's time. So hopefully we can do that, we can pull elements out of this weekend's work that give maybe not all the full scope but as much direction as possible - Greg?

Greg Shatan: Greg Shatan again, thanks. I definitely agree with what Chuck said. We also have to be kind of thinking about what is kind of a dividing line between the accountability issues we must deal with in our group and the accountability issues that must be dealt with before the transition can occur, but that would be dealt with by the CCWG on accountability. So we can't not - we're putting some things on their plate which are really already on their plate and some things remain on our plate.

What's important for us is to give them the guidance they need because of their overall indicators are that, you know, there will not be a successful transition without successful outcomes from CCWG. And we need to (then) guidance on how these are going to interlink. And I know we're going to be getting to a discussion again of kind of timeline and also whether - and we



need to think more carefully exactly about how this puzzle is going to fit together.

As we work kind of back and forth between our duties to - for our goal of submitting a proposal to the ICG and our goal of working effectively with the CCWG. And if the more kind of back and forth and potential placeholders and re- you know, potential revisits or the (light) that we put in there the, you know, we just need to make sure that we have an idea of where these - where the timeline is going to bring us and how we're going to get there.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes and I must say that in response to that Greg you will know that Lise and myself are acutely aware of the timeline and the timeline issues.

And so I think again in an ideal world we would have in a sense one way conditionality that providing that was met we could carry on with our - we would not seek to modify our proposal - (Alan)?

(Alan): Yes thank you, I cert- I agree with what Chuck and Greg just said but I put my hand up to respond to you in response to me.

Other than workload management there's no reason why we could not create before the accountability week Frankfurt meeting convenes roughly seven days from now two lists. One is the ones that would be required for the contract code model and a super set of that which would be required for the internal one. We don't know the details of either of those plans right now but we have a pretty good idea of what's going to be required to make them work.

So, you know, I'm not trying to give you more work but we certainly could give them two lists and that would, you know, address what they're asking for in - with more detail.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes or one list segmented with those two points. I guess I take the point that...

(Alan): Yes one list with a, you know, a division between the two, whatever.

Jonathan Robinson: (Petro)?

(Petro): Yes thank you, let me think out loud here for a second and I'll be brief. When I look at the ICANN accountability and the role of the ICANN Board one thing that have always struck me and (I've been setting) any discussions.

And I experience that on a personal basis as a Board member is that the ICANN Board has actually two functions and two types of accountability. It is the Executive Board or it is the Board of the Corporation and has elements of the Council in regarding how the operations of the corporation function. And the second I mention is that it is a step in the policymaking process where there is a different type of accountability.

Particularly when there's a question of whether the Board is overstepping it's responsibility and was more than validating the process that are being conducted by the SOs and making decisions on its own. When you look at the IANA function even today, not only is the IANA function very administrative and clerical process. But the ICANN Board actually has a relatively limited if at all responsibility in the chain.

What I'm seeing in the architecture that we're exploring in accessibility is that by the creation of the CFC and the MRT we are creating a chain for accountability that actually could almost allow if I push the envelope to have the Board of ICANN completely out of the actual substance of the thing. And

I wonder whether the accountability issue on the IANA thing is not more in the direction of strengthening the CFC and getting the Board almost out of the loop of this.

Which would mean in that case that the question of accountability of ICANN as a whole would be much less important and that the tracks might be a little bit more separate than we might think. And if we provide accountability mechanism or (expansion) on all the layer thing that we just discussed to make sure that the CFC and the IANA staff are operating properly then the responsibility of ICANN here is not so much at the level of the Board but just at the level of the staff and the administration.

I'm just trying to think out here because I'm not sure that the - it is not possible. I think it is possible to strengthen the accountability chain in the IANA operations themselves with the CFC and MRT that will be (just tremendously) the need for having ICANN accountability as a whole even in (Internet) solution. Final point is, that being said the fact that everybody agrees that there is a link between the ICANN accountability in general and the IANA transition is about leverage.

And I do support the notion that there shouldn't be a transition and that there is an opportunity to provide accountability for the rest of the ICANN processes, including policy. But that it is not so much that the CCWG needs to solve the issues that are regarding ICANN - IANA accountability if you (unintelligible). Once again it's just thoughts that (think) but an attempt.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks (Petro), I'm just going back to the previous speaker before to seek any responses to your thoughts and I know I've got Greg in the queue as well.

I just wonder (Alan) if you would be willing to make a stab at that list of building that list up of the super set that you described that might - associated with that we could pass across the CCWG. If you could socialize any thoughts you've got on that because we're going to need that in short order and it would be good to get that something circulating on that.

(Alan): Certainly, I have nothing else to do this coming week.

Jonathan Robinson: Wonderful, thank you very much. So bearing in mind with that transcript if anyone would like to respond to that please as well and I'll put Greg next in the queue.

Greg Shatan: Thanks, I am responding to (Burtrone), I agree with one - part of what (Burtrone) has said and disagree with another.

The part I agree with is that it's not up to the CCWG to deal with issues of operational accountability for IANA. But I disagree with the idea that somehow by creating a CFC and the MRT we're making ICANN or the Board any less accountable for performance of the IANA function. I think they are two very different relationships, whether or not it's a kind of the contract co-external relationship or a more internal relationship.

The relationship of the community and the multistakeholder community to the IANA function is different from the responsibility of the corporation for which all those people work and for - and where all those assets (lesson lie) and need to be take care of. So I don't think - even if the IANA function felt that they were a relatively small portion of the Board duties I don't think they're off the hook in any, you know, way, shape or form for that.

Maybe we'll (be a) - maybe the CFC and the MRT will be a better steward of the IANA function specifically then the NTIA or not. But I think that if the transition doesn't change ICANN's responsibility or the Board's responsibility for the IANA functions - thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: (Beshone) it looks like your hand is up and you might want to come back on that.

(Petro): I just wanted to respond very quickly to Greg. I agree there's a distinction. What I was alluding to is that (since) - let me put it this way, in the current IANA workflow there are two different things in terms of the responsibility of ICANN.

There is one thing which is the correct (tapping) and the resources and the technical operations and so on. And the second I mentioned is what are the decisions that are being taken along the way when the IANA team is actually dealing with a particular request? The first part is the general functioning of ICANN. It's an operational performance in terms of having the correct (testing) and so on.

The second part is more in the workflow of validation and what I meant is that from my personal experience at the moment the ICANN Board has a very limited role in the validation chain. Particularly because for the gTLD if I'm correct - and correct me if I'm wrong - currently the delegations are being handled by the ICANN - IANA staff. At the moment the ICANN process for deciding that the gTLD is delegated has been decided in the other part. But in the IANA they just received their order to delegate and if I'm not mistaking it doesn't even go to the Board.

And on the delegation and re-delegation there were intense discussions all along inside the Board on whether there should even be a set of the Board validating this. This is what I was addressing and I wonder whether the creation of the CFC and the MRT is now creating a channel that actually could replace the very small function that the Board were doing. So the accountability is different for the workflow and for the administration staffing and so on.

That's (rather) the distinction I'm trying to explore and I'm not completely set on that, so just the clarification.

Jonathan Robinson: Note in that regard, Matthew Shears comment in the chat, pointing out that the model for the proposal has currently dropped or (absent village) doesn't see the Board overruling the CFC or the MRT. In fact there is little if any role for the Board in that work. Chuck your hand is up.

Chuck Gomes: Thank Jonathan, I'm going to digress from your specific request with regard to specific requests and go to a general one.

I wonder - and I - obviously this assumes on that the CWG in large part agrees with this - but I wonder if we should also communicate some general state - recommendations to them? Some of which I think have been discussed a little bit in the community but it might be good to specifically say them. And I'm going to focus on the area of the three Work Streams - or two Work Streams and suggest maybe that there should be three.

My first proposal for a suggestion to the would be that in cases where it's not clear where an issue should be dealt with in Work Stream 1 or 2 that the error - that they air on the side of caution and put it in Work Stream 1. Because it's very important to us, right on that. Secondly a possible recommendation

would be that maybe they create a third Work Stream that would be one where - and again this is an issue that has come up in community discussions and I'm sure in their discussions.

Where the - there needs to be a guarantee that a particular recommendation will be implemented but it does not have to literally be completed. The implementation does not have to be completed until after the transition, so it allows some flexibility there. Because some things will take quite a bit of time to implement and I don't think anybody is looking for long delays. And if we could - so now maybe they're dealing with that in another way and that's fine.

But I throw those out for CWG discussion on whether or not we might want to include a couple of recommendations like that.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks Chuck that's a sort of - maybe I thinking of that as 1A and 1B if you like, they're separate components of Work Stream 1.

It strikes me that something else we need in addition to that and I welcome any responses or pickup of that point by Chuck will be the preparation of some form of - not only is a conditional and another requirement that we want to pass across to the CCWG but we - us trying to represent this in some kind of flow How we see and discuss the flow of how this works so that we can - we have some kind of flowchart or view of how information might go between the CWG, the CCWG, the ICG.

And how it's - so that we know where if any conditions are in place, how those impact the flow of work and any timing (in past). Is there any responses to Chuck's suggestion? Have we exhausted everyone with these - all of these calls?

Greg Shatan: Will it makes sense to put - this is Greg Shatan if I may - will it make sense to kind of put that suggestion out to a list?

Jonathan Robinson: Yes we can - you mean unto that email list is shall...

Greg Shatan: Yes.

Jonathan Robinson: Well should we do a poll in the meeting right now, I mean we...

Greg Shatan: Well (I leave it with you) - all of the above and more.

Jonathan Robinson: Chuck do you want to suggest that in the form of a question that we could put potentially in a poll?

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Jonathan, Chuck speaking - sure and I think it needs to be two questions.

The first one being should the CWG recommend that the CCWG use - exercise caution in - when placing items in Work Stream 1 and Work Stream 2. And in the case of doubt air on - air conservatively and put them in Work Stream 1. Somebody may be able to do that shorter than that - than I did I'm sure of that. But on the fly that's what I came up with. Did you want me to go ahead and suggest the second one as well at the same time?

Jonathan Robinson: Yes, suggest that and I'll try and help with some wording.

Chuck Gomes: Okay, the CWG recommends that the CCWG consider a sub-work stream to Work Stream 1 that would include issues that need to have implementation guaranteed before the transition but could be implemented after the transition.



Jonathan Robinson: Yes so this - the - I guess question one could be does the CCWG default to putting items in Work Stream 1 in the event of any doubt?

Man: It should be perfect to get into Work Stream 1.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes, is there a...

Chuck Gomes: Yes, I'm fine with that. I think everybody understands the gist of what I'm saying, I'm not stuck to particular words as long as we get the point across.

Jonathan Robinson: And then should Work Stream 1 be divided such that it covers necessary conditions to be fulfilled pre-transition and necessary conditions to be fulfilled post-transition?

Chuck Gomes: That's pretty good except for the latter one, we may want to be a little more precise. In that it's not - because we want to make it clear that it's - they need to be guaranteed - whether that's the right word or not that we can debate. But the actual implementation could happen afterwards, so we just want to make sure that everybody's clear on that.

Jonathan Robinson: Yes I guess I was using fulfilled as the short term for implementation.

Chuck Gomes: Yes and - Chuck again - and I think fulfilled might not be explicit enough.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you Chuck. All right there's a couple of comments come up in the chat - or hands raised in the room - so go ahead (Alan).

(Alan): I just - I guess number one I want some clarity as to where this fits in what I was charged with? And then I have another comment but...

Chuck Gomes: (Alan) this is Chuck, I think what you were charged with doing is adding to the list I started on specific accountability issues that we need addressed before the - before our proposal can really be finalized.

These two issues are broader in scope, not specific accountability issues that they want to address. Now I probably shouldn't be the one doing this, it probably should be Jonathan and Lise so I'll let them chime in.

(Alan): Okay, what I put my hand up originally for was at this point the ambitions of the accountability CCWG are far in excess of anything we're likely to need for the contract co-proposal and probably for an internal ICANN proposal.

So I don't think we need to subdivide - to, you know, give them all these caveats, they're already targeting something pretty high. But I think we need to simply say what we need in place before. I'm not sure the other ones are really, you know, really come into our need category as opposed to want.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks (Alan), I suppose I see it in two ways, it's what do we - what specific areas of work do we need done pre-transition. And or in Chuck's second Work Stream B if you like at least specify for implementation post-transition.

And then second are any of those specific conditions of our proposal? And I note that Matthew Shears says, I think the purpose of the Frankfurt meeting is to decide what accountability measures go into which streams more fully and more fully to determine the priorities. So this is good timing to try to produce this and I think we as co-chairs are very aware of that - (Robert)?

(Robert): Yes just further to Chuck's comment I guess - his second question; that may be something to put into RFP4 which is transition implications in terms of going forward.

Because it's kind of sensitive a timeline and that may be that these certain conditions need to be met going forward before certain things get triggered. So in part of that documentation I would say just make sure that that document is there as well. So if you capture that for RP4 that would be great - thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Lise?

Lise Fuhr: Thank you Jonathan, I see in the chat that Martinborough is asking don't we want to have a say and I agree. And that's also what's been raised by (Robert) that we want to have the condition set for the accountability group.

It's not - I don't see anything that Chuck is proposing is contradictory to this that we're not going to have a say. Because you can build in mechanisms where you have a review of whatever is going to be proposed - thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Greg?

Greg Shatan: I'm Greg Shatan for the record, I'm in the process of trying to slice the (smoked meat) too thinly here, but then it crumbled.

But the concern I have or rather I suggest is that, you know, one of the list - and I think the list I see (Alan), you know, I'll call it (Alan)'s list for the moment or maybe it's Chuck, of things without which our group would be - our groups would essentially be incomplete, so that we need to give fairly specific criteria to the CCWG. And to encourage them to prioritize this even

within Work Stream 1 it's almost Work Stream 0 except I think something else has already been designated Work Stream 0.

So this is stuff that without which our proposal would kind of not be able to come to fruition which is a little bit different from things that need to be in Work Stream 1. Because even though they're not part of our proposal they're part of creating an accountability of atmosphere that's sufficient for the transition to proceed. Which I think relates to what has been called by some the backstop function of NTIA which is in essence the NTIA had kind of been big daddy.

That at least, you know, implicitly could pull the IANA function or say they're unsatisfied with ICANN's general work results even if it has nothing to do with the IANA function per se. I do think that kind of backstop accountability is part of the CCWG's work and not ours but yet it's - that sort of thing really needs to be - or a lot of that needs to be in Work Stream 1. But this work with the - that's not quite the same thing as what we need to feel that our work has been completed.

And if we're not going to do an absolute complete self-sufficient job ourselves which we shouldn't, these are supposed to be interrelated and independent then we need to give specific guidance on criteria that should be met by the aspects that are really feed into, directly linked with the accountability mechanisms and oversight mechanisms so that we're designing. And that hopefully if they do meet those criteria we don't really need to reopen and revisit our proposal to create anything further.

The converse is if we give them these criteria and they don't end up delivering because their goals are so high and far and different that they can't deal with our requirements we may have to reopen our proposal and add in some more

specifics which would be another possibility but I think one that concerns me, thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thanks Greg, I tend to agree with you. So I think it feels to me like that a high priority work item is getting a first part of that - those items out to our list.

And working with (Alan), Chuck and others of us who can weigh in on that such that we can be - I mean we'd like to review that at the Thursday meeting of this group. I mean so that - because ideally we'd be signing off on that the Thursday meeting this week of this group so that we can pass it across to the CCWG and advance of their Frankfurt meeting. So it feels to me it's a very clear stream of work that we need to get to work on because in one sense from our point of view it takes it off our plate to the extent that if you said Greg that we are then satisfied that those conditions are met.

And it really helps us from I think mine and Lise's point of view as co-chairs to be able to then make sure we can focus our group in - on the - within the key timelines that we've got to work at and delegate appropriately to our colleagues in the CCWG. It seems to me like we've covered as much of this as we can for the moment, I'm just not sure that there's a whole lot more that we can do in this call and I'm not seeing a stream of hands wanting to do more.

Personally I'm - I've - we've - I - we've had a series of meetings here that's been quite hard work so maybe we're at a point where we can start to think about wrapping this up. So where do we go moving forward from this? We have said that it's our intentions as co-chairs to draft some formal statement in order to fully inform anyone who hasn't been able to participate in part or in whole in these intense series of meetings. So the idea would be to both inform some of the critical points that have come out of this - the weekend's work.

But also to give direction as to where we see the work of this group going forward, in particular how it links and relates to the CCWG as we've just been talking about. I think a critical area that we're going to have to be thinking about and dealing with in very short order in addition to that or related to that is the timeline. I think it's pretty clear that we have been working towards getting a proposal. I mean our original intention as of yesterday was to have sufficient basis to write a proposal this week for circulation to the chartering organizations in a week from now.

If it - that time scale needs reexamination, it just doesn't feel that that's realistic to make that, but nevertheless we are mindful of the ICG and they timeframe they're working on. So I think that's something Lise and I will have to pick up in very short order after this meeting and rethink what it - what remains a realistic timetable and assess that given where we are in the process now.

One related point to that timeline is that arguably both the bifurcations of the solution or the bifurcations of the solution that relate to the issue of the formation of a contract company or an internal solution both could probably do with some form of internal - independent legal advice. In the sense that one requires an understanding of what the implications of the setup of this independent entity and jurisdiction. And all sorts of issues cascade out of that that need some - that we'll need some assistance with.

And second the internal ICANN - so-called internal to ICANN solution or integrated solution is one way I've thought of it will also need - we'll also need some advice on. So that's something else we need to get cracking on in very short order is get some input from a legal point of view and ultimately some

independent legal advice. We plan to meet next - on Thursday in the week ahead - can I get a confirmation of time that's set for?

Man: Fourteen hundred UTC.

Jonathan Robinson: Fourteen hundred UTC on Thursday, 15th of January - Grace your hand is up.

Grace Abuhamad: Hi Jonathan, this is Grace Abuhamad: for the record, we actually have two calls that we've scheduled but we can confirm the dates perhaps after this meeting just to make sure that the time still work for the chairs.

Jonathan Robinson: (Unintelligible).

Grace Abuhamad: So there are calls scheduled for next week on Tuesday for RFP4 or potentially RFP3, depending. And then a call on Wednesday afternoon for RFP5 or RFP3 depending and then a call Thursday for the full CWG.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay so we'll have a wrap-up meeting after this and with the coordinators - the co-chairs and the coordinators and communicate shortly after that as to exactly what the meeting schedule is for the week and weeks ahead, so we can deal with that.

But certainly as far as I'm concerned the Thursday - the 15th of January meeting of this group is confirmed 1400 UTC, Lise confirms that as well - Chuck?

Chuck Gomes: Thanks Jonathan, backing up to the timeline. I'd like to suggest that any suggested adjustments to the timeline not be firm but rather be conditional.

Conditional on getting the legal advice that you already talked about, conditional on the ability to get broad community input without doing a public comment period and any other conditions we think will be factors that really impact that. If as somebody said yesterday on one of our calls I think - and it may have been Allan MacGillivray that there's - I mean we don't want to set a firm date and then miss it. And we know there are conditions on us being able to deliver and we don't want to set expectations that we can't meet.

So we need to identify the dependencies, make any suggested calendar change dependent on those conditions. I'm going to have to identify all of those now but I think that would be a much wiser way to go than saying okay let's try to get - we'll shoot for Singapore, okay that's fine - make sense?

Jonathan Robinson: Yes - Lise?

Lise Fuhr: Thank you Chuck - yes I think you're right we need to take those into consideration. But we also need to have a dialog with the ICG about this and we have to find out where it all ends.

And for me I think those are very good points because there's been a demand - not a demand but a lot of groups have opted for independent legal advice. So that's one of the very important ones that we get before we have a final solution. But we have to recognize that we're also delaying a process of this (unintelligible) consult with the ICG too.

Jonathan Robinson: I should probably just - I don't know if anyone else picked it up but Chuck know those conditions are important.

And one condition you mentioned that I just want to make sure is clear, you said conditional on getting satisfactory and broad community input without a



public comment process. In other words what I understood you to be saying was in the event that we don't do an additional public consultation we need to be sure we've got sufficient and broad community input.

Chuck Gomes: This is Chuck, Jonathan yes I mean if we don't do that then when we go out to the SOs and the ACs to get approval we will be at considerable risk.

And then, you know, and I just remembered the third condition. The other condition is that we can actually get the approvals from the chartering SOs and ACs in the timeline we give them. We're hoping that's possible but what if we don't? I think that's another condition.

Jonathan Robinson: Okay I think that probably brings us to a logical point - I see there's a hand up from (Robert) first so I'll go to (Robert).

(Robert): I'll just - this is (Robert) for the record, I'll just echo something that was mentioned yesterday and I think echoing Chuck's comments as well.

I think maybe a comment that can go back to the charting organizations is to sort of have them give us a sense of what time they envision (approval post) as being - some it may be faster or slow. But if we got some sort of time estimate that would be particularly helpful. And I'm not sure whether it was mentioned on the calls or mentioned in passing yesterday but going into - if we do go into Singapore without a proposal ready and the timeline has been passed - been pushed past that date I think it's very critical that we definitely have additional text.

That has a lot of the different items that we've discussed to show there's been considerable progress and it be seen as a positive at Singapore. A lot of work, a lot of effort, a lot of volunteer effort from everyone here and everyone on

the call has been put in. And so we really need to make sure that it is seen as a positive, that it was a very difficult task and that we've not been able to do the task - thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Thank you (Robert) that was a great point and a very important one to start to wrap things up on. Lise is there anything you'd like to say in conclusion or finishing things off?

Lise Fuhr: I was just seeing in the chat that (Sean) raised a point about what's going to be the use of the content that we've produced since yesterday.

And I - one of the means of doing this exercise was actually to give - (Bernie) was trying to draft a - some drafting on this, some direction on what should he do. And also (RFP3B) to what direction should they try to after the alternative (proposal). So I think we have a lot of input for this and that also goes to (Robert)'s point about we need to do more progress on the actual drafting of the two proposals. And I think (it needs) a lot of conversations on where should we go with this.

So I'm very positive and I think we have accomplished a lot during this weekend and I'm very glad that people have been participating actively and construct - being constructive in the dialog and thank you.

Jonathan Robinson: Great, thank you Lise and thank you all. I think it has been a brutal schedule but it has given us the opportunity to take the initial draft.

Take the public comment, take the surveys on the public comment, bring that feedback back into the CWG, chew it over very thoroughly in a way that gives us quite significant momentum to work on improving the draft. I think (Robert)'s point is excellent about the opportunity to - regardless of whether

the timeframe does shift a lot to take - to absorb this into future iteration. And we've picked up a lot of critical points along the way such as the linkages in with the CCWG, ensuring what dependencies there are (on the solution) as Chuck just mentioned.

So I think we're in pretty good shape and that's been a very productive session. So thanks to my co-chair, thanks to the group coordinators, thanks to the support staff and thanks of course to everyone - members, participants and others who've involved themselves in this work of the C - CWG. And we look forward to picking this up with you in the days and weeks to come. Let's stop the recording at that point and we'll close the call, thank you.

Lise Fuhr: Thanks everyone.

END