

ICANN

**Moderator: Gisella Gruber-White
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8:00 am CT**

Gregory Shatan: Okay thank you for starting the recording. Greg Shatan and this is the subgroup call for Subgroup RFP3 for December 29, 2014, and thank you all for joining in what is a holiday or semi-holiday week for many.

And I'll try to be as efficient as possible other than not starting right at the top of the hour. So why don't we begin with a roll call?

Grace Abuhamad: Thanks Greg. This is Grace Abuhamad for the record. Today we'll do a roll call as we normally do through the Adobe Connect room, but I do note that Eduardo Diaz is on the audio-only line. Is there anyone else on the phone line only?

(Olivier): (Olivier).

Grace Abuhamad: (Olivier) thank you. Okay, (Olivier) and Eduardo. Great. Thanks Greg. You can - back to you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you very much. Well in addition to our usual business - continuing our usual business it's important to note that, you know, last Monday was the

close - the official close for comments on the draft report and that - and quite a number of comments were received.

A few were received just after but they'll be given the same consideration as those that were received just before so that's not an issue. There is a different subgroup of the group and Staff who are working on crunching those comments into a couple of different reports that are being - will be circulated.

And nonetheless I encourage you all to look at as many of the reports as possible. I think there may be some recommendations of those that have, you know, particularly, you know, good detailed analysis but obviously every comment or at least every comment that was on point is worth considering.

There were a few that were received that were, you know, clearly not really even related to the efforts of this group. So I'm referring to that when I refer to those that are not on point, not denigrating any that were meant in good faith to be part of our work.

In any case think it's - is there any comments or questions on that? I'll look for them. I'm actually still logging in to Adobe Connect so if there are any hands up Grace please let me know.

Grace Abuhamad: At the moment no hands up Greg.

Gregory Shatan: Okay. Great. And in any event we have our full call tomorrow and I'm sure that comments will be much more - will be a part of the agenda tomorrow. But I'd like to pick up where we left off on our last call, which was going through the - I believe we were going through the MRT structural analysis.

And I'd like to actually pick up with one of the issues that I think has bedeviled the group to a certain extent and it's certainly, you know, and reflected in some of the comments which is the composition of the MRT.

The - we - on one of our previous calls we spent quite a bit of time on this but without any particular result. I think part of it on that call was we decided that we needed to have a better idea of the functions of the MRT before we really determined or had - or could move forward in a fruitful manner in terms of our structure.

I think we've now had that kind of functional analysis on our prior call and we can come back to the structure of the MRT. So if there is anything that we should discuss on this I'll bring us to the portion here where we had listed Stakeholder Organizations and Advisory Groups and other - or sorry, Advisory Committees and other Names Community groups that could be represented by members of the committee.

And I'll note that Milton Mueller sent an email to the list last week, which suggested that perhaps we not think at all or largely in terms of ICANN formed groups, but that we perhaps think about other groups as being the primary building blocks of the MRT such as IETF or NOGs perhaps or others.

So I - I'd like to open the floor for thoughts first on that concept of an MRT that was essentially - was not based around really any of the groups that you - we see in the right hand column, which with the exception of ccTLDs rather than the ccNSO are all ICANN constructs. Staffan Jonson.

Staffan Jonson: Thank you. Staffan Jonson here. Yes I noted this and especially I filled in the Google Docs and suggested some alterations of these organizations supporting.

And my general comments were about there are too many groups and the need to reduce the number of groups. We will have a very large group running this specific item if we anticipate all these Stakeholder Organizations.

So specifically in this document that is shown at the end Stakeholder Organizations, Advisory Committees and other Names Community groups. I proposed in the Google Docs that we would delete a couple of organizations more relating to Internet content than actually Internet infrastructure. So that is one of the suggestions I left in the document at least.

Gregory Shatan: Staffan to follow up on that what are the groups that you consider to be related to content?

Staffan Jonson: Well if we go to the list on the right hand side we saw Business Constituency, Intellectual Property Constituency, ISP connectivity providers, Non-Commercial User's Constituency, Nonprofit Operational Concerns Constituency and so forth.

So I would relate those more to Internet content than to actually the mere specific role that is at hand in this situation.

Gregory Shatan: Just to push a little further on that why would you consider ISP and connectivity providers to be content rather than infrastructure related?

Staffan Jonson: There are of course no absolute borders here but my general concern is that this might become too many actors, too many persons involved in what is actually a - not the very large issue per se.

So we're trying to - or rather invent institutions that are too large that have too wide a mission and that usually means mission creep in the long-term. So there is a very specific task to be managed here so I hope this could be made by fewer actors.

Gregory Shatan: I see Staffan. Thank you. I think there's kind of perhaps two points in there. One is, you know, which groups should be represented or how they should be represented since a Commercial Stakeholder Group representative would at least in a rough fashion represent the three constituencies that make up that group.

And an NCSG representative would represent the two constituencies in that group plus members that are not of that Stakeholder Group or they're not members of either constituency.

So, you know, part of it is which groups and part of it is also the overall size of this, which I think is a - an important issue even with groups that are, you know, definitely infrastructure related.

The number of seats per organization is a - is an issue I think that, you know, needs to be decoupled a little bit from which organizations are represented. There's - the number of seats even if certain groups are underrepresented or lightly represented could make for a very large group as well. Milton Mueller
I see your hand is up.

Milton Mueller: Hello. Yes I just wanted to make the point that upon reading the comments, and I'm sure this'll come out in various summaries, the size and composition of the MRT was a very common theme.

There were a few commenters who wanted it to be fairly representative, mainly people concerned about geographic representation. However on the whole the comments wanted a more simple and less complicated MRT in my opinion.

And I wonder if it would be too disruptive at this point to discuss some kind of fusion of the CSC and the MRT or some kind of a change in simplification and the direction of simplification.

But the other point I wanted to make was Greg you had said that I - what - I said that we should have greater representation from non-ICANN entities. I did not mean to say that none of the groups within the current ICANN structure should be represented.

And in particular I think the Registries, you know, being direct customers of IANA should certainly be on any kind of an MRT or whatever successor entity that we come up with, so I just wanted to clarify that.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks Milton. Thank you for clarification. I knew that you would do a better job of representing your ideas than I would. In any case I think that's important.

In terms of the - I'd like to park the idea or put a pin in the idea of fusion of the MRT and CSC. I think that's a significant variation on the current overall plan.

So that's, you know, not too reject it but only to, you know, put it - put a pin in it for returning - to return to it. And perhaps if we don't get to it on this call or maybe even if we do it might be helpful to have some ideas of how that

fusion would work out to be transmitted by an email so we could figure out what that might actually mean.

And Donna Austin I see your hands. Staffan is that a new hand or an old hand? An old hand. Donna Austin.

Donna Austin: Thanks Greg. Donna Austin. So I'm - I take Milton's joint point about fusion but I don't know that we're ready to have that discussion but I do wonder.

We've spent a lot of time on the MRT and what it should look like and composition and we're - I don't know that we'll come to any agreement on it.

I was just wondering whether some discussion about the CSC and its role and composition would assist in any way in trying to refine what we think the MRT should look like.

And I think obviously a lot of the comments that have come in have said it's widely too big or it seems to be going down that path and that's a concern. So we haven't had a great deal of discussion around the CSC and I'm just wondering whether that's, you know, your intent at some point Greg to have that discussion and whether we should perhaps move it up. Thanks.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Donna - definitely my intention to turn to the CSC and to talk about its composition. I think that its composition and composition of the MRT are interlinked and certain people may feel better about different variations of one depending upon what the variation of the other is or may settle in to it.

So, you know, this is definitely a - something we need to get to. I think one of the issues that I see with this is also an issue of size. And there is I think a - at

least, you know, potentially a proposal or at least a straw man that was put up in the - this straw man matrix that the, you know, presumptively perhaps we start with, you know, one representative per Stakeholder Group or Advisory Committee and decide, you know, which if any should have more than one representative on the group, that geographic representation and breaking things up into regions and tends to lead to a large group, which given the relatively limited functions of the group may not be appropriate.

So I think starting from a small group and deciding how to build it up rather than starting from a big group and deciding who to leave out may be a useful exercise. Alan Greenberg I see your hand is up.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you very much. Just a comment largely about Staffan's suggestion but it applies overall and to Milton's also as well. The NTIA reference is to multi-stakeholders, not to closely related multi-stakeholders or, you know, something much closer as some of the public comments are to just customers.

This is the only entity in this model that has a multi-stakeholder component, and we need to be really careful that in our judgment of who does and who does not belong there that we change the whole model. Thank you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Alan. I'll just follow up briefly on that by - with two things. One is we haven't yet gotten to the structure of the CSC in any great detail and that some of the proposals are that the CSC should have a multi-stakeholder component as well and not be solely a customer committee.

So that again may affect the level of multi - the level of comfort people have with multi-stakeholders here or there. The second note I would make is - and this is also and really in response to Staffan on how he broke things up is that,

you know, ICANN by its own limitations does not deal with content and none of the groups that are here are dealing with content per se.

That, you know, includes the constituencies and groups and the Commercial and Non-Commercial Stakeholder Groups that there may be, you know, content issues at the edges or informing.

But they are here - we are here really to deal with names and names policy and names implementation and not content as such. I realize they're - that may not be quite the dichotomy that Staffan was looking to, but I think it's important to note that nobody here is really a - representing a - is here to talk about Internet content as such.

Obviously there is a certain amount of creep and a certain amount of interdependence between what is actually on the Internet and the issues that - or what is reached through the Internet rather and the issues that we deal with.

I don't mean to minimize that completely but I think that kind of dismissing, you know, the Non-Contracted Parties as content related is not quite apt. In any case any other comments on this group/on this point before we move on?

Sorry. I'm just dealing with something in the back. One of the things that I'd like to put up before we move off of this point is a matrix of potential compositions of the MRT that was put up in Google Drive and that there were some comment on and additions made to that.

I think it's coming here. No this is the wrong matrix Grace. This - the one I'm looking for is the one that has different compositions of the MRT. Sorry. Too many straw men running around.

But I think the demonstrative point that's made by that matrix is that if everybody gets all the representatives that they want for their own group that it makes for a group that is unwieldy and large, and that if we start from the idea of a more streamlined group that we could actually get somewhere.

In any case we're having some trouble locating that document for the moment. I'll ask you all who've looked to it in Drive to go back to it. But I think the point is if we look at the number of groups that are represented here or that are listed here and if we - let's get back to the first document we were on Grace. Thanks. Grace I see your hand is up as well.

Grace Abuhamad: Hi Greg. Yes this is - I'm just - I can't - I'm not sure I know which document you're looking for. I've looked in the drive and this is the latest matrix but I'll take it off...

Gregory Shatan: There's one that's called MRT Compositions Straw Man Excel Matrix.

Grace Abuhamad: Okay it's not in the drive that I have access to but I will - I'll find it. I'll contact Staff and look for it.

Gregory Shatan: Okay. In any case if we - let's go back to the first document that we started the call with. Here we are. So if for the sake of argument we eliminate or decide that we'll not go more granular than the Stakeholder Group level so that the constituencies listed here are represented at the Stakeholder Group level and not at the constituency level, there are, you know, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine - nine groups represented here broadly speaking: ccTLDs, Registries, Registrars, Commercial Stakeholders, Non-Commercial Stakeholders, GAC, SSAC, Root Server Operators and ALAC.

So one might suggest that a possibility is a nine member MRT with one representative from each of those groups. I'd like to - and that is one of the possibilities I believe that's listed on the matrix of potential composition.

I think Guru has put the link to it in the chat as well so thank you Guru. Any comments on the idea of a nine person MRT with one representative, no - essentially no proportional representation but just straight up - just nine members? Milton Mueller.

Milton Mueller: Yes I guess if you're going to reproduce the policymaking structure on the MRT then I think one person per entity makes a lot more sense than multiple ones.

However I think the big question here is the one I've been raising along, which is why are we recreating the policymaking structure for an entity that is not supposed to be making or second guessing policy?

This is the concern I think that was expressed by several commenters that if the MRT, you know, we don't want it to be in a position to be second guessing or circumventing policy.

We want it to be ensuring adequate implementation and in some sense the implementation - certainly the parties that are involved in policymaking would be good supervisors of the implementation.

But the IANA is a very narrow and technical set of functions. It's not, you know, the full policy implementation. It's simply, you know, changes in the root zone and therefore it's a much more technical function.

And it's just not clear to me why for example, you know, what is the point of having the complete gamut of the policymaking structure represented and ensuring simply that the implementation takes place or who the IANA is? That's all.

Gregory Shatan: Milton to kind of probe that a little bit more, are you suggesting that certain groups here should not be represented at all or that they should be represented proportionally less than groups that are closely related to the IANA functions or that are customers of the IANA functions?

Milton Mueller: Yes I am and, in fact, suggesting that also the people who do have a very clear interest in the technical functions who are not necessarily part of the policymaking functions might also be represented there.

Gregory Shatan: And do you think they should be represented as liaisons or full members or is that really, you know, kind of getting too granular, but the point is that they should be there?

Milton Mueller: Well, I think they should be not just liaisons. If indeed, they are in a position to reliably and securely insure that the IANA functions are performed properly.

Gregory Shatan: And I know you've mentioned some potential groups in your email but it may be helpful to go back and think about who those have non- the groups that are not listed, that were not listed, in the list that are not listed in this kind of - the columns here and what groups those might be? Are we talking IAB, IETF, and which others perhaps?

Milton Mueller: Yes, I think somebody from the IETF, somebody from the network operating groups is what I - it's all I could suggest, you know. And I realize that that's

not thoroughly thought out (supposedly) but I guess I'm just making the point that we don't want to completely reproduce the policymaking structure in the (MRT).

Gregory Shatan: And just to go back, I kind of had two different alternatives. My first question to you - and I don't know that we got to the point of which one we're talking about which is should certain groups at the - even at the stakeholder group level not be represented or is it more a question that they should be - that the representation should be proportional in terms of groups that are more closely aligned to the technical function?

You know, in other words, would you say that the CSG and NCSG, for instance, should not be on the MRT at all? Or is it more that they should be represented, say, with one member whereas registries should have more than a single member?

Milton Mueller: Well, I do think that the registries have a more direct stake in the performance of the IANA functions and that the - people like the non-commercial stakeholder's group or the commercial stakeholder's group would have - would be more interested in oversight of the registries to ensure that they are not failing to implement policies in ways that maybe serve their (owner) just but not those of others.

I do have some concerns about the presence of the GAC because the GAC is explicitly - their mission is policy advice and so I'm not sure what their relationship is to the actual implementation functions of the IANA.

I guess I can say the same thing about ALAC. It seems to me that that's primarily a policy advisory committee for individual Internet users and has no special relationship to the names function, per se.

But I know that those kinds of comments would be resisted by the people the you would expect to resist them, so - but that's the problem we're in with this kind of a representational structure. Everybody wants to be represented and nobody wants to be excluded.

Gregory Shatan: Right. That- I think that - and just to - I see we have a queue but just that perhaps an answer to that or not the - but there's no one answer. An answer is - goes back to proportionality and that having an ALAC rep but more than one, for the sake of argument, more than one ccTLD rep, may be a way to achieve both, you know, representation and also a group that is, you know arguable, at least, fit for a purpose.

So I think that this is - opposed to the - you know, as Alan has pointed out, you know, the - this is being handed over to the global multi-stakeholder community but the question of how that community is represented is not a foregone conclusion of - so, rather than quoting - or paraphrasing Alan Greenberg, I'll call on Alan Greenberg who's next in the queue.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you. Milton has indeed regularly reminded us this is not a policymaking organization. But I've also regularly reminded us this is the only policy enforcing organization that we have included.

You cannot have policy enforcement that is fair unless it is either completely outside the organization and given some mandate without bias to review everything or if it's multi-stakeholder, it has to be balanced and well (introduced) same way as the policymaking organization.

Otherwise, you will get skewed policy enforcement. And, yes, I understand the GNSO and ccNSO have not made many policies or any policies to date regarding IANA, but that doesn't preclude it in the future. Thank you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you, Alan. Staffan Jonson.

Staffan Jonson: Thank you. Yes, I'm about to say what has already been said by now. A lot of talk about representation and proportionality, so we're trying to build institutions rather than having - I'm trying to find out a way to identify a more operational - a small organization that actually can take input from others than itself.

If we do believe in the multi-stakeholder model, we don't have to have all multi-stakeholders within the organization, per se, by necessity. What is making this (coming) organization, might make this (common) organization, controversial is if it's included a lot of policy decisions.

And that's my prior talk about the (in content) as long as we can keep it (in the content) and similar issues out of the infrastructure, there will not be so much controversial work in this organization, (common) organization. So that's why a little rhetoric combined these issues which they actually aren't, but they might become.

If I understand the discussion right in the chat, I hear that we are about to propose to ICG, rather, a group - ITS, the ASO and the name in community to set together something, or do I misunderstand this? Thank you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you, Staffan. I've been trying to follow the chat as well and it does seem that there's at least some discussion that any, you know, oversight group should include IAB, IETF as well.

Of course, here we get to one of the structural - or I should say one of the issues in the way that the RFP is set up which is at least that the basic assignment of each of the communities is to come up with a solution for their community and to allow the ICG to figure out how to take that unholy trinity of suggestions, proposals and turn it into a single proposal perhaps, you know, involving back and forth with the constituent groups or however the ICG will look at that.

And I think that's counterbalanced, at least, pragmatically with the need to recognize that whatever proposal we come up with has to, at least, work with the issues of the numbers and protocol parameters, communities as well.

So whether IET and IAB should be on a names community MRT and whether the other two communities just basically do their own thing without input from the names community is one possibility.

Another possibility is some form of overall oversight that brings all three groups together. But that's - I'm not going to say unequivocally that's beyond our scope but that is not necessarily incumbent on us to figure that out.

And given that names is perhaps the largest and certainly most unwieldy of the three, both - not just the three communities, but also the three issue sets, at least in my personal opinion. Others can disagree. It may make sense for that kind of input to come to an MRT regardless of whether it's focus is names or not but not necessarily an equal measure going toward numbers and protocol parameters.

But that's a next level question but, (Stephan), I think that, you know, you do see at least - you know, some people who would want either - and I think they're not exactly the same issue.

One is to have a single MRT for - that essentially is for all three that have - deals with issues of all three communities and another is an MRT that is essentially still limited to names but which has at least some representation from the - outside of the, you know, the - what (Milton) has called the ICANN policy structure and the direct customers - names customers of IANA.

So that's, I think, you know, part of the issue here. And there's no, you know, one right answer to that. So turning back to the matrix here, you can see we have groups that at least - the smallest group that was listed here is straw man number nine which, as basically one has two registry - GTLD registry representatives to ccTLD representatives, at least here, has them broken up as ccNSO and non-ccNSO and registry stakeholder groups and non-registry stakeholder groups.

So the small group there would be eleven and there would be some proportionality there in favor of the direct customers and then it kind of grows from there. Steve Crocker, I see your hand is up.

Steve Crocker: Sorry, I was on mute. Two things. One is I wrote a couple of paragraphs suggesting politely that all of the structure is rather elaborate and heavyweight and that you might step back and think about what's the minimum structure rather than the maximal structure and I can expand on that but consistent with what we submitted with our comment from the board.

The other is that if you look at the way we did the (route) signing, we had people from all over the world, a broad representation, but not selected out of

specific groups that submitted people but individuals that sort of act on behalf of the entire world.

That changes the selection process in terms of the numbers. You don't need to have one from this group, one from that group and so forth, as if each of those groups had distinct and separate concerns.

And you don't run into the problem of, well, by the time you add up all that, you get an unwieldy number of a dozen and a half or two dozen people. How many people is appropriate to do the job that needs to be done and then - and that, of course, requires saying what the job is as opposed to worrying first about the structure. And then the selection process can be relatively straightforward I think.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks, Steve. To look further, one of the thoughts that you just mentioned, which is following the key signing structure or using that as a potential model, how would you deal with the concept of presentation in that, at least, you know, what has generally been discussed for the MRT is that the - people here are intended to be (on or intend) to be representatives of their communities and, in essence, polled into their communities as opposed to functioning as kind of as individuals or free agents.

Steve Crocker: Well, that's a hypothesis that is built into the thought process here. But there's nothing sacrosanct about that. Let me suggest that it's just a wrong assumption to make and start back from what are you trying to do?

If you want visibility, transparency and accountability, you could almost do as well - I don't mean (this seriously) but you could almost do as well by taking a random selection of a half a dozen people.

It would be better to take people who actually understand what the IANA process is but, nonetheless, you know, a relatively small set of people that are independently chosen and are accountable to the world of - at large as opposed to their individual constituencies will get the job done far, far more efficiently.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks. Any other follow up on...

Steve Crocker: And just to emphasize the other point that I'm making, the whole notion of a contract - separate contracting company and organization and all the (structures) built, is going to run into pretty strong resistance from the board.

Now, you might say, "Well, that's just the board protecting itself," but I don't think that's the right picture. But, you know, we've found ourselves caught in the position of trying to be relatively silent so we're not accused of trying to steer the process.

And at the same time, speaking up so that there's no mystery about where we stand, so I would counsel that, in addition to this massive amount of work that's going into this very elaborate set of structures, that you might step back and say - start with a clean sheet of paper and say, "What's the minimum that needs to be done to get the job done?" And that means starting with focus on what the job is.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks, Steve. I appreciate your - to the tightrope that you're trying to walk between being inscrutable and overbearing. And I think you've managed to walk between the two extremes quite well, you and the rest of the board.

In any case, any other comments on these comments? And I encourage - I know some people are being quite active in the chat and I also - it's not

entirely - there're a couple of people - at least one who's not in Adobe Connect and is also kind of - create new streams, so if there's anyone who, you know, has a comment here to what is (just being said), it would be helpful to have that in - verbally as well.

If there isn't, I think that putting aside the issue of the entire structure, I think that there's at least some validity in the concept of - that there will be some form of an MRT or of an oversight body and, you know, whether it's acting in a representational manner or representative manner and I think we did spend, on our call, last call, quite a bit of a discussion on function.

Hopefully there's been, you know, some continuity here so there can be some reflection on function. And I think a lot of, you know, in part the function, especially when it comes to the significant periodic or non-periodic events, such as potentially a new IANA contractor or a significant level of concern about the IANA contractor's function, then you know, the organization is intended to be a - as much a conduit or a recipient of comments from the broader community as it is intended to be a decision-making body in and of itself. So public comment period and the like, I think are...

Steve Crocker: So I'm compelled to say, in what way are you not effectively trying to recreate ICANN in its basic form and if you feel the need for that, then why not get in there and fix ICANN?

Gregory Shatan: Well, I think that fixing ICANN is also one on the agenda. You know, more the agenda of the accountability group. And I don't think we're recreating ICANN here.

Rather, we have, you know, certain defined stakeholder groups and, you know, ICANN has a somewhat different definition of stakeholders than is,

say, in the - (to its) agenda or in other stakeholder group listings. But I think that is reflective of kind of the major actors, if you will, in the names context.

Steve Crocker: Well, let me say quite directly and forcefully, I think that's completely wrong. And I also think you've bitten off a huge amount more than is appropriate in this group. And it's not constructive to - and try to boil the entire ocean and say ICANN is just a limited set of stakeholders and we're going to get at all the stakeholders by some other mechanism here.

That's a -- I'm trying to choose my words here -- it's the wrong problem and this group is not chartered or structured in a way that's going to get anywhere with that.

Gregory Shatan: Well, I think what we are trying to do is get to the issue of how we transition from essentially a - potentially a government oversight role to a role that's - or a role that's an (NTIA) oversight and where the multi-stakeholder community has the role in that oversight or a role in that oversight.

Now, the question of whether ICANN is the multi-stakeholder community and the, kind of divide, or really ICANN is, to a certain extent, two constructs. One is ICANN as a corporation and then there's ICANN in the community and how you deal with one of those versus the other. And, you know, great - interesting question.

Steve Crocker: The - I understand the difference between the corporate structure and the larger set of stakeholder groups as (putting) organizations as advisory committees. If you read the bylaws carefully, you see that the supporting organizations and the advisory committees have a formal role in policy development and in what ICANN, as a corporation does.

And if you read the (Boston) consulting group report on the board structure some years ago, you'll find that they site this as a unique structure different from virtually any other kind of organization they've ever looked at.

So I repeat the basic point that ICANN is a multi-stakeholder operation, is intended to be malleable over time to reflect whatever changes are necessary and that it's hard to understand the path here as anything other than, well, that's all fine but we're going to set that aside and we're going to rebuild or we're going to build another set of structures that is intended to be exactly what ICANN was intended to be because we don't trust ICANN.

That's just chasing a tail, going around in circles here. If you've got a serious problem with access into or accountability or transparency of ICANN, then that's the place to go fix it.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks, Steve. I would say that this is not, you know, fundamentally, that there are - I wouldn't put aside issues of, you know, quote, unquote, "trust entirely," but I think that we are, you know, trying to look at a group here that does have a limited role in terms of the IANA functions, per se, and not an overall role in, you know, overseeing ICANN and all of its elements.

But I think it's - you know, it's definitely worth, you know, considering kind of whether we are in the right place or not and how that would work. And I think, you know, generally speaking, we're trying to avoid recreating ICANN even if we are, you know, looking to the stakeholder breakdowns that ICANN tends to use.

So, you know, it is a, you know, a cautionary set of comments to make sure that we haven't - that we're not, you know, creating something that is beyond what's needed.

But the IANA contract - IANA, without a contract, you know, creates a whole different set of issues as well that are - even if we're in the narrow IANA mindset, you know, would be quite transformative of where we currently stand.

Any other comments? Hands up on this point? I see a lot of typing going on. In any case, I think, again, if we, you know, think about, you know, to an extent, you know, what the functions are we're trying to look for here, there really are limited functions and just to kind of remind ourselves briefly of what they are is really periodic review of IANA and IANA issues certain annual and kind of longer lead time reports and that the MRT would be essentially recipients of those reports.

Review them and deal with any oversight and accountability issues that stem out of any issues that arise in those reports. And be an area where, if the CSC -- the Customer Standing Committee -- cannot resolve issues that it sees in the kind of more day-to-day or month-to-month operations by working with the IANA operator, if we can't resolve those then it would move those up to the MRT for further attempts at resolution.

And the finally the issue of dealing with the end of any particular IANA contract or the so-called nuclear option that if the IANA functions operator is so far off course from what it's service levels and performance obligations are that it should be replaced during the term of a contract, essential a breach scenario.

That is all that the MRT is supposed to be about. So that's - those are not necessarily functions that would bring it together all that often or that would

require a lot of focus on anything other than or even any focus on anything other than IANA functions per se. I think it's a relatively narrow band-aid.

So the, you know, taking those things in mind, you know, I would - my personal suggestion or my personal feeling is that a group where there is representation from the different stakeholder groups but at a very lean level and one that is - has somewhat of a proportional tilt toward the direct customers is one that makes more sense to me.

And then I go back to looking at what's in front of us, which is so-called Strawman Number 9 with essentially four registries - four registry representatives and then seven non-registry representatives is a - is one that has, you know, at least - it seems to me to be a better starting point than some of these where there are, you know, huge numbers of individuals representing groups and creating an unwieldy structure.

Any further thoughts on that? And given the limited mandate or very limited mandate as Martin would put it in the chat. I see Donna also saying that Strawman Number 9 is a good option.

And I think that - I would just note that, you know, my affiliation within the ICANN world and it brings me here is with the Intellectual Property constituency within the Commercial Stakeholder Group and that while commercial - while the IPC, you know, with, you know, love to see - would love to have representation here and elsewhere that in the interest of looking beyond those types of concerns we're better off having a single Commercial Stakeholder Group represented with the understanding that other groups will also be a little more altruistic with their representations on the group.

But I at least want to leave that as a thought. So I think there's some general appreciation for the - for Strawman 9 at least a starting point. I see a couple of comments from Martin, secondly by Staffan. Still don't understand why four GNSO and two ccTLDs.

I guess my answer that would be that we're not - we're actually seeing here we would have two registry stakeholder representatives from the gTLD side and two from the ccTLD side.

And that the other folks coming from the GNSO are not registries and indeed, you know, have relationships with registries that are either, you know, that are quite, you know, different. They're not there to represent and often to push against the interest of registries in the nicest possible way or maybe not in the nicest possible way but in the interest of representing user (unintelligible) - some sort of interference here. Does anybody else hear that?

Grace Abuhamad: Yes. We all hear it I think.

Gregory Shatan: Okay.

Man: Yes.

Gregory Shatan: Hopefully it stopped. So I think, you know, the point there is that registrars and business or, you know, commercial private sector users and non-commercial stakeholders are really quite different from gTLDs. And that's why there are representatives from those stakeholder groups that are there. SO that's the thinking in that point.

Any further thoughts on that? I see there is, you know, some comment in the - (Alan) comments in the chat quickly divide the ccNSO into three subgroups and then there'll have to be three plus one ccTLDs.

Perhaps that's meant to be slightly ironic. I guess I would take it as being ironic in the sense that no matter how you divide up the ccTLDs, you'll always end up with the registries recognizing that there are different types of actors involved there, government, semi-government, non-government, maybe even opposed to government.

But that it, you know, no matter how you - depending upon how you divide up the GNSO, you end up with registries and non-registries (unintelligible).

Steve Crocker: Greg, apologies for interrupting. Can you elaborate a little bit what the interest of say your constituency, Intellectual Property Constituency is in the IANA functions just so we get an understanding of why all of this representation is important?

Gregory Shatan: Well I think there are a couple different reasons. One is, you know, first to be involved in overall oversight to address concerns that our members have that the IANA functions are being carried out appropriately, efficiently; service levels being met; that there isn't mission creep on the part of IANA and the like.

And I think that the concerns I think are not just, you know, narrow. We're not here only to represent for instance to deal with only with intellectual property questions but to represent the concerns of those who are in the private sector with the efficient functioning of IANA.

I think the given - the, you know, what IANA deals with of having a single representative of the entire private sector is not inappropriate or I would say in fact is entirely appropriate.

But that it's not necessary at least to have separate representatives say of intellectual property interests and business users. I should probably make an argument that ISP and connectivity providers who really are, you know, part of the infrastructure might have their own level of concerns and that are separate from the other two constituencies that make up the stakeholder group, the CSG.

But that our concern is general oversight and being able to watch - essentially to be in the kitchen in part when things are happening so there is, you know, part of - I think it's a level of checks and balances and transparency as opposed to just being outside and hearing - and dealing with things to kind of *expo facto*.

I don't know if any other representatives of non-contracted parties for instance would have any thoughts on that. (People) are quiet. We're a group that types a lot. Just not speaking as much.

So in terms of being in the kitchen, as I say, a single representative the entire private sector in the - (unintelligible) say the non-contracted private sector is an appropriate representative. Avri Doria, I see your hand.

Avri Doria: Yes. Given the - this is Avri speaking. Given the sort of (plaintive) anyone from the non-commercial side. When I look at this, what I'm looking at the MRT as is not a - first of all, I look for a minimal MRT that was more focused on contract than anything else.

But going beyond that since we're talking about representation on it and not a function at the moment is that I see it very similar at the policy implementation review teams that are coming out of PDPs now that basically it is part of the oversight in that it is ensuring from the - certainly from the non-commercial side that those policies are indeed being implemented as they were intended. And that's where the oversight comes in.

And while I would contend that the private sector is also representative largely also by registries that are mostly commercial an NCSG representative and I'm, you know, acclimating to the minimal - to the minimal model. But that there being at least one non-commercial voice because none of the other voices are purely non-commercial, even ALAC is mixed. So, you know, mixed both business and non-commercial users.

So having the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group be able to participate in that implementation (unintelligible) of the oversight would seem necessary to me. Thanks.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Avri. I see some discussion of - in the chat of whether, you know, certain groups overlap with each other. And I think in the interest of altruism there may be some groups, as I say, this is the CSG even though I think especially the ISPs are imperfectly represented if they're not represented directly in this particular context.

You know, there may be, you know, a willingness to go down to a, you know, single representative in the interest of a group that is not unwieldy and that is oriented towards operational functioning. But again, as you say, as Avri said, there's a contractual aspect - a contractual enforcement aspect to what the MRT does.

I'm going to actually suggest a pivot here as they put it in the startup world of our discussion. And having this matrix up here gives us something of a jumping off point.

As Donna said earlier, you know, it's important to think about what the composition of the CSC should be as well and that the composition of the two are interlinked and perhaps a closer focus on what the CSC is supposed to do, which is supposed to be much more of a customer led - customer committee and that deals with the day-to-day oversight or at least, you know, short-term oversight of the IANA operator.

That we could take a look at what the composition of the CSC should be. So there may be a value to comparing and contrasting CSC and an MRT. So the first question is I think the major question with regard to the CSC before you get to any other questions is should it be solely composed of customers of ccTLD and gTLD registry operators or should there be some representation of non - of the other stakeholder groups seen here?

And also perhaps representation from the protocol and numbers community of - given that the customer and community is supposed to deal with names functionality of the IANA operator. So I'd like to throw that out and kind of park the MRT structure question just a little bit.

I see Martin Boyle is finding himself on the wrong side of the digital divide. The losing Adobe and having no phone. Must be some place. Hopefully very relaxing. In any case, any thoughts on CSC composition? Because I think there are points. Donna Austin.

Donna Austin: Thanks Greg. Donna Austin. So coming from a registry perspective, I think our view is that as the direct customers we see the CSC as primarily being

representative of (GNT) to TLD registries. Even - we did have discussion around the items at one point at which it'll not show (how) they would perform.

I think we have recognized within the gTLD registries is that we have gTLD registries as a whole now overtaking the ccTLDs with the primary customer of IANA. We don't have perhaps the relationship with IANA that the ccTLD registries have and this is something that we need to work on over the coming - but we do see that, you know, as the primary customer that CSG should be largely made up of cc and gTLD registries.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Donna. What are your thoughts on other representatives besides TLDs or registries, you know, broadly speaking on the CSC?

Donna Austin: I think the view is largely that as the direct customers we are the ones that can decide whether IANA is performing functions to the extent that they should be based on any SLAs that have been decided.

I don't - and understanding that - well, my understanding of what the CSC would do, it is based around those SLAs where the IANA is actually meeting those SLAs. And (if it's done) at the customers that would be able to adequately measure that in any way, shape or form.

I think there has been discussion that registrants could also potentially be affected but I'm not 100% sure that I align with that view. I think that the CCs have demonstrated over the years that a good working relationship with IANA will lead to some good outcomes. And I think they'll achieve that through IANA's performance levels of the recent (views).

And I think also the contract that is in place between NTIA and ICANN are both - has also had a positive impact on the performance levels of IANA. So I don't really subscribe to the idea that anybody else is better placed to measure the performance of IANA against SLAs or decide whether something should be escalated. I don't think anyone else is in a better place to do that than ccTLD and gTLD registry (unintelligible).

Gregory Shatan: Thanks Donna. I see Avri Doria has her hand up.

Avri Doria: Yes. Thank you. Avri speaking again. I think on the CSG there's two other issues - CSC. I think that the suggestions that are including a security instability expert and a root server expert that the things that need to be watched for that an alarm needs to go out on certainly also requires those eyes overlooking it whether it's a representative or an expert, you know, is not all that material.

But that there be people with that (unintelligible). There's an issue here (unintelligible) issue here with root server stability that needs to be looked (unintelligible) those two voices as members of such a committee is important.

Now there's also the extra step of similar to the arguments made on implementation review teams in an oversight role that there may also be advantage in having one expert also that is there with a view of looking at the implementation and raising a flag if there is a policy implementation issue that needs to be escalated.

So in terms of the metrics and methods that would need to be done by this committee, it seems reasonable that it include at least the expertise of those

beyond the direct customers though indeed the direct customers if, you know, or certainly in terms of SLAs would be the primary voice.

But I think you also need the other eyes able to also escalate an issue. But I don't see it as (unintelligible) per se except that it's - that all of the issue types are (unintelligible) in that type of problem. So that's (unintelligible) two or three experts on that committee. Thanks.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Avri. I think you were breaking up a little bit but I think we got what you were saying. Note in the chat Steve Crocker states as a minor point note that root server operators are also customers of IANA in the sense that they too have entries in the root zone; that is they have their own primary data as published in the root zone.

So with that - following on that, would that suggest that there should be SSAC and RSSAC representative on the committee - the customer stay on the committee in addition to registries? And - or would there - would they be only experts without the same sort of role?

I see Steve Crocker saying RSSAC and SSAC are different. Yes. I recognize that. I think the questions whether security and stability and root server representatives should be drawn from the SSAC and RSSAC or from some different methodology.

And I guess I also see Graeme commented earlier on - potentially on the role of registrars in the customer standing committee. And I was wondering Graeme if you were available to elaborate on that on the call verbally - orally as well.

Graeme Bunton: Hi Greg. Can you hear me?

Gregory Shatan: Yes, I hear you.

Graeme Bunton: Oh good. So this is Graeme for the transcript. I think I tend to agree with Donna in many ways that registries probably are best positioned to assess the function or assess the IANA functions. But that doesn't necessarily mean that there are other views that shouldn't be included.

And I think that's what Avri's saying and I tend to agree with that in that I think registrars could potentially bring something important to the table there with that it's possible that registries are doing something unto wards or that they're missing a part of the picture and registrars as the piece between the registries and the - and using registrants and it's also obviously very important to our business that there is potentially insight that registrars could bring there and be useful. Thanks.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Graeme. That's helpful. Any further though from others on the role of registrars in the CSC? Donna Austin.

Donna Austin: Thanks Greg. Donna Austin. So at the risk of offending people on the call, I think for the CSC people that have technical expertise it might be a welcome addition. But I would still be - I think it comes back to what is a function and what is the role of the CSC. I think that's the important contributor.

I think in the Registry Stakeholder Group comments that were submitted on the - regarding the CSC I think we supported the idea that there were liaisons from the RARs and the IETF understanding that they are also customers of the IANA service.

And it might be useful to have - if there were concerns about IANA's performance that it might be useful to have other - to have access to the other customers and get some indication of how the IANA's performance is working for them.

I'm just not 100% sure that that was in relation to the CSC or the MRT. But I would say that for this piece that we're just talking about kind of the day-to-day operations of the IANA functions I would say that technical expertise is probably the most important. So somebody who understands IANA and what it does and what it should be doing at least and that comes back to (forming) function. Thanks Greg.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Donna. I think that's important. And clearly there was, you know, a technical focus of this. I see that Suzanne Wolfe - I do apologize for quoting from the middle of a comment that technical, operational expertise, does seem quite critical. I think that there are - perhaps those two words need to be somewhat separately looked at. That operational experience is critical, technical expertise and operational experience are - or technical and operational are somewhat different concepts.

Putting aside the issue of expertise versus experience and what the differences are between those words, but the way it see it is operational expertise is somewhat broader than technical expertise and that there is a role that can be played in terms of operational oversight that isn't purely related to a high degree of technical expertise. I think there needs to be a reasonably high degree of technical expertise or else, you know, operational oversight would be - wouldn't be possible, but that operations are a bit different than purely technical concerns.

So looking at the shape of what's been discussed I think there's a feeling that this should be a strongly oriented toward TLDs both CCNG with some input at least from RSAC as a customer and that security and stability concerns may also need to be addressed and I take Steve's clarification about the difference between RSAC and SSAC. That SSAC does not publish information and the root zone does not provide operational service.

So I guess the question would be whether roots server operators should be, you know, represented in a different fashion or should be represented in SSAC or securities stabilities advisory, you know, should not be represented as such in the group and at the risk of piling questions on what, if any, should be the role of the non-contracted parties and the GAC and ALAC in a customer standing committee.

And could those be rolled up into one or two representatives or not representatives at all, but just have say a representative or a liaison of the MRT representing, if you will, the non-customers of IANA in the CSC essentially just to provide somewhat of a transparency, accountability, check and balances, counterweight to a purely customer oriented - or customer staffed CSC. Any thoughts on that?

Elise Lindeberg: Alan, this is Elise from the GAC. Can you hear me?

Gregory Shatan: Yes, Elise. Please go ahead.

Elise Lindeberg: You know, I think that when I read through all the comments that we got from the GAC side I think that in general when it comes to the customer standing committee in light of the proposed operational nature of the CSC I see that it also (unintelligible) most (liberational) nature of it. It's - I think most of the

GAC comment goes to that government doesn't necessarily have a seat, but that's, again, is linked to the MRT and the role of the MRT.

So we have to make sure that the MRT then have a real multi-stakeholder approach and representation. I think that's a crucial key to finding out who's going to fit in the CSC and the MRT. So it's linked between those two. Thank you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Elise. I think that's a very good point and that's why have pivoted our discussion away from discussing MRT to CSC and I think that it, you know, does point out that if the MRT is - has a reasonably multi-stakeholder representation and has a role in oversight of the CSC that a CSC that is less - that is more customer driven is - it makes people feel more comfortable at that. That having essentially, you know, no participation at either the CSC or MRT level for non-customer stakeholders or non-direct customer stakeholders I think makes a number of representatives and participants in this group uncomfortable.

So I see a couple of comments in the chat, Staffan Jonson. The non-contracted parties are for sure customers and some agreement there. And so I guess a question is should they be represented as such? And I guess by non-contracted parties I'm using GNSO speak, which is, you know, a mistake obviously in a group that's larger than that. The non-contracted parties house (unintelligible) the GNSO as I'm sure most of, if not all of, you know is the commercial stakeholder group and the non-commercial stakeholder group.

You know, recognizing that many, if not nearly all, of the CCTLDs are not formally contracted with ICANN, but are - that's not quite what I meant. So I'm talking about GSGNCSG and perhaps - and then there's GAC and ALAC as well as who have a different relationship to what IANA does. And, again,

putting aside the countries as CCTLD operators, which is a different than GAC.

I see a comment from (Martin Boyle) in the chat that this will only work if the MRT goes out for a wider discussion. It should not make decisions on its own. I guess that is a balance issue for - in terms of what the - how the MRT will act. That to what extent is it a decision-making body and what extent is it a body that, you know, acts only on public consultation.

I think, not to go back and forth too much, but clearly on issues such as end of contract or breach and termination it should not make decisions without public consultation if it's an issue of just trying to resolve an IANA operational issue that has been escalated to it from the CSC. I don't think there's a need for public consultation on things like that.

So I think that, you know, going back to the CSC I see a note, (Robert Gearos) comment that a small group is important for the CSC. Let's keep it small and focused on technical operational. A larger composition runs against many of the comments that we received from the community.

So - and (Robert) suggests that we should also discuss what effect - what the effect would be of a larger group on operational efficiency. How would process and size slow down decisions versus present day where if there are decisions made of the (NTIAA) doesn't have to make it, you know, get a bunch of people together over the course of time to make a decision if indeed it ever, you know, really does on an IANA operational issue.

So, again, I think a small group makes sense. You know, if we are talking about a - let's just say for the sake of argument we have an MRT that is - looks like Strawman Number 9 with 11 representatives, 4 registries and 7 non-

registries, what should the CSC look like in that case? Be a similar number of say two to three CCs and registry groups or should it be more or less?

You know, should there be any representatives I think, you know, one possibility and I apologize for somewhat throwing this out is that, you know, CSC composition could be a couple of say two CCNSO or CCTLDS, two GTLDs, one MRT representative covering - or liaison covering the non-registry operators.

Everyone other than registries and perhaps a root server - a representative and that could be it. That might mean no separate seat for registrars, no separate seat for commercial versus non-commercial stakeholders, but it would be a small group and relatively nimble and able to deal with operational concerns that come up in monthly reports and the like. Alan Greenburg, I see your hand is up.

Alan Greenburg: Thank you. I'd like to a little bit of clarity. In a world where ICANN may no longer be part of the IANA function how would the MRT change and how are we going to insure that it changes or insure that it doesn't change if ICANN changes its internal structure or the structure of the GNSO changes? That happened a few years ago, it could happen again two years from now. I don't understand how our use of ICANN structures to insure multi-stakeholder representation is going to adapt or not adapt if ICANN changes. And I'd like some clarity because we're using current ICANN terminology, which may not persist.

Gregory Shatan: Well, I think that's a good question Alan and I don't know if you have any thoughts on how you would answer it.

Alan Greenburg: Well I - specifically, I don't because we are using ICANN terminology. We're also saying we're going to to some extent casting concrete the structure of the MRT so it can't be, you know, polluted or, you know, we're not subject to some level of class of takeover in the future. At the same time the world around it may well change.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks Alan. I guess my answer to that - or my thinking on that would be something needs to be dealt with in the charter of the MRT. That it needs to have a certain degree of flexibility to deal with changes in ICANN structure if stakeholder groups or advisory committees are rejiggered. The - you know, another more radical set of thoughts would be to use the kind of stakeholder breakdowns - to go away from ICANN stakeholder breakdowns and go to say more Tunis type breakdowns and have representation by academic, technical, private sector and government that kind of leads into a different set of concerns and I think that, you know, private sector maps not unreasonably well to the commercial stakeholder group.

Academic maps not particularly well to NCSG and ALAC. The Tunis kind of leaves out the registrants and end-users unless they're considered to be private sector. So, you know, that's a - that could probably be a conference in and of itself or at least a long long discussion about comparing different stakeholder breakdowns

I think for the current purpose even if IANA is no longer within ICANN for sake of argument that does not presuppose in any way that ICANN is no longer functioning as policy and implementation body dealing with everything else other than the actual IANA operator functionality. So I think there would still be a relevance to the ICANN breakdowns even if the IANA functions operator were not ICANN. Elise, I see your hand up.

Elise Lindeberg: Okay, thank you. Just a comment I think it was from Alan about changes in the ICANN structure in the future. I don't think we have any other option rather than to discuss the model based on how ICANN is structured today and maybe then put in the mechanism to have a review of the MRT or the composition and so on in the future if needed. That's the only thing that is possible for us to do now I think. I don't think you can have any answers on how to solve this issue. I think that ICANN or the different communities are structured different than today, but of course as was said also to have the flexibility in the MRT built in and also a general comment about sizing it down.

We're talking about the composition of the MRT and the CSC and not making it too big - too complicated and so on. I think if we have a clear expectation, a clear saying that the MRT and the CSC have an obligation to consult within their own communities and be responsible for actually - that they can show that they have done that before you make any decisions on behalf of who you're representing.

I don't think the two committees need to be that big. It doesn't have to, but that's me speaking, not the GAC as such. But I think there are different views in the GAC in this, but I think for (unintelligible) I don't think MRT needs to be oversized or grown out of proportion. I think it needs a strict obligation to consult. Okay, thank you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Elise. That's very helpful. Alan, I see your hand is up.

Alan Greenburg: Thank you. To be clear I wasn't suggesting we don't use ICANN terminology or ICANN structure today. I was asking what happens when or if it changes? What happens when or if ICANN goes out of existence to be replaced by something else or is bankrupt because the lawsuits are too large and some

other structure coleuses or the ITU takes it over or whatever? We're building a structure to work for eternity at this point and the question is how does it evolve or change if necessary? You know, I'm not questioning the validity of ICANN today.

Gregory Shatan: Thanks Alan. Thanks for clarifying. I think I go back to - and some of the things I think have been said in the chat and I said earlier, which is that there does need to be some evolutionary process built in to the charter with public consultation, especially to deal with concerns such as these if there is a major change in the internet governance landscape or in the IANA operational oversight and home of IANA type of issues.

Although I think that as long as ICANN itself is around and performing the policies and implementation functions it's a relevant way to look at and maybe the most relevant - continue to be the most relevant way to look at the stakeholders in this group. But I think that, you know, a massive reimagining of Internet governance (unintelligible) - anything we imagine, no matter what we imagine, is not going to be what actually happens - too many variables in place. I think there just needs to be some flexibility in how the organization is - or both organizations are set up. The CSC and the MRT to react to changes in the landscape. Alan, is that a new hand or a...

Alan Greenburg: That is a new hand. Again, I'll ask the question I asked in the chat. I understand the concept that we will have something in our charter as it will that allows periodic review, but then the question is who do we trust to do that review? Who do we trust to make those changes? And I'll point out to quote (Avary) in the ICANN world if we make any rule someone will figure out how to game it. So I just think we need to be talking - if we're talking about the MRT we can't be ignoring those kind of issues. Thank you.

Gregory Shatan: Thank you Alan. I think there is certainly truth to what you say, but I think that we can avoid over - we can also over think in a sense the issues of gaming and, you know, look for - toward, as we design this - if we design it in this fashion, of course, we have, you know, comments to review and a proposal to revise perhaps significantly that we can design something that will at least be flexible and, you know, reasonably resistant to capture and gaming and ultimately I have a certain amount of faith in the multi-stakeholder model and processes to avoid a truly, you know, unfair or capture type of result. I see we're not at - Alan, is that a new hand?

Alan Greenburg: No, that one is an old one.

Gregory Shatan: Okay, thank you. I see, you know, we're now at basically 10 before the hour. Probably an appropriate time to wrap up. I think we do need to - there are two things that we need to do. I think we've - there's at least been I think some - we've had some good discussion here and a realization, I think generally speaking, that a small MRT is better even it means less granular representation for certain groups and that a small - and even smaller CSC is better and that it is strongly orientated toward direct customers with just enough leavening so that itself isn't kind of a captured group.

You know, at the outset and that, you know, building large structures, you know, a 27 person Strawman - 7 person and a 15 person CSC probably takes us in the wrong direction or in a lot of - for a lot of different reasons. I think that those are kind of two takeaways here. We do need to look at the - that the CSCs functionality a little bit more, but I think there's a general understanding of what its role would be. That informs what it would do and who sits on it.

I think that - what we need to do - hopefully some of you have done this to a greater-lesser extent already is to review the comments that we've received

from the outside world on what we've been doing and that we'll need to think about, you know, to what extent this model that we're looking at is going to change, mutate or perhaps, you know, even be essentially put aside.

Alan Greenburg: Okay.

Gregory Shatan: And any different model of post-transition oversight and accountability dealt with. I think it's important that we are - that we do listen to the comments in the communities that we represent and don't just operate on a basis of momentum as enticing as that might be. So are there any final questions or comments before we wrap up? Anything in the chat that anybody would like to bring on to the floor so to speak?

Okay, well with that I'll remind you all that we have a call tomorrow of the full CWG that we are, you know, deep in the consideration of comments and that we should all be looking toward that and that if there's no further comments from everyone else I will bring this call to a close.

And thank you all for your participation. Especially those of you who are on holiday, as I am, or wish they were or are being pulled in several different directions by the holiday times even if they're not technically on holiday and so I'll say good morning, good afternoon, good evening and good night to you all and with a special thanks to those for whom they wish I was saying goodnight, but are now jumping on other calls even though they'd rather jump back into bed. So thank you and Cheryl I'm looking to you and any of our other (unintelligible) colleagues in that regard. Thank you and I will see you all either on calls later today or tonight or tomorrow. Thank you and goodbye. Operator, you may stop the recording.

END