CCWG LOS ANGELES '15

ACCOUNTABILITY

OPEN MIND
TO ALL COMMUNITY INPUT

WHERE DO WE HAVE SUPPORT?
WHERE DO WE NEED TO BRIDGE GAPS?

REVIEW/INCORPORATE THE BEST IDEAS

FOCUS ON REQUIREMENTS 1ST
THEN IMPLEMENTATION

ORDER OF DISCUSSION = OUR PROPOSAL

90+ COMMENTS SUBMITTED

REVISED CCWG ACCOUNTABILITY PROPOSAL
Allocation of Time & Energy

100 Coins

A: 5
B: 5
C: 20
D: 10
E: 10
F: 5
G: 10
H: 5
I: 10
J: 20
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NTIA</th>
<th>CWG-Stewardship</th>
<th>CCWG-Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model</td>
<td><strong>ICANN Budget</strong> - Community rights regarding the development and consideration</td>
<td>Power to reconsider or reject the Operating Plan and Budget</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet DNS</td>
<td><strong>ICANN Board</strong> - Community rights regarding the ability to appoint / remove members, and to recall the entire Board</td>
<td>Power to reconsider or reject changes to ICANN “Standard” Bylaws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services</td>
<td><strong>ICANN Bylaws</strong> - Incorporation of the following into ICANN’s Bylaws: IANA Function Review, Customer Standing Committee, and the Separation Process</td>
<td>Power to approve changes to “Fundamental” Bylaws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain the openness of the Internet</td>
<td><strong>Fundamental Bylaws</strong> - All of the foregoing mechanisms are to be provided for in the ICANN Bylaws as Fundamental Bylaws</td>
<td>Power to appoint and remove individual ICANN Board Directors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTIA also specified that it will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution</td>
<td><strong>Independent Review Panel</strong> - Should be made applicable to IANA Functions and accessible by TLD managers</td>
<td>Power to recall entire ICANN Board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Areas of Consensus

**Consensus**
- Existence of Fundamental Bylaws
- Core values: balancing requirement
- Principles of binding IRP, and standing panel and exclusions for ccTLDs
- Principle of 5 community powers
- AoC reviews and their 5 year frequency
- Jurisdiction in WS2 and not focused on ICANN HQs
- Standard Bylaw change
- Existence of a community forum
- Request for reconsideration enhancements (add staff to Ombudsman)
- SO/AC accountability enhancements
- Human rights as part of WS1
- Board director removal for cause (but no limited set of causes)
- Strategic plan veto right

**Key differences to bridge**
- The model (CMSM vs MEM)
- Voting
- Budget veto
- Stress test 18 bylaw change

**Other issues**
- Contract enforcement capabilities in the M/C/V
- Scope / standard of review / timeline / cost for IRP
- Support of AoC reviews by consensus?
- Process for Fundamental Bylaw change
- Board removal / recall "for cause" only or based on "strategic differences"?
- WS2 or ATRT3?
# Areas of Consensus

## Consensus
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## In process
- The model
- Voting
- Budget veto
- Stress test 18 bylaw change

## Operational issues
- Contract enforcement capabilities in the M/C/V
- Scope / standard of review / timeline / cost for IRP
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