

**Draft Answers to CCWG Questions for Bylaws Coordination Group**  
**12 April 2016**

**Mission:**

1. The latest draft text for Article 1, Section 1.1.a.i describes ICANN's naming mission as follows: "Coordinates the allocation and assignment of names in the Domain Name System ...". This text differs from the conceptual language proposed in Annex 05 – Recommendation #5, which read as follows: "Coordinates the allocation and assignment of names **in the root zone** of the Domain Name System ...". The words "the root zone of" do not appear in the current ICANN Bylaws, which states that ICANN "Coordinates the allocation and assignment of [...] Domain names" (without any qualifier or limitation to "the root zone"). It is not true that ICANN coordinates assignment ONLY in the root zone, as such term is currently understood. ICANN's gTLD registry and registrar agreements and policies deal substantially and primarily with issues relating to assignment of names at the second (and in some cases lower) levels of the DNS. If in the root zone is currently intended to include the second level that should be clarified in the use of the term. For example, the UDRP, the Inter-Registrar Transfer Policy, and the Expired Registration Recovery Policy are all ICANN policies relating to second-level gTLD registrations <<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registrars/consensus-policies-en>>. Do we need to define the term "root zone" to include the second level or remove the words?

**CCWG Revised Response 11 April:**

- Lawyers shall ensure:
- ICANN is not in charge overall of names in the DNS.
- ICANN has policy authority over what labels go into the root zone.
- Additional conditions can be imposed on the registry operating the TLD, but must be in the Picket Fence.

2. The latest draft text for Article 1, Section 1.1.d.ii provides that existing gTLD registry agreements and registrar accreditation agreements (and unsigned/future agreements on the same current forms) may not be challenged on the basis that they exceed the scope of ICANN's mission. This concept is based on the "Note to drafters" at paragraph 48 (#3) of Annex 05. The conceptual language in the Annex however proposed to restrict this protection for current agreements to last only "...until the expiration date of any such contract following ICANN's approval of a new/substitute form of Registry Agreement or Registrar Accreditation Agreement." This concept of allowing for challenges to agreements once they have been renewed does not appear in the current proposed draft Bylaws, based on the rationale that ICANN's current and legacy registry and registrar agreements all include clauses mandating renewal by ICANN under specified circumstances. ICANN is requesting the Bylaws Coordination Group to confirm that existing gTLD registry and registrar agreements should not be subject to challenge as outside of mission just because they have expired and have been renewed pursuant to the renewal provisions of those agreements. ICANN is also requesting the Bylaws Coordination Group to confirm that "new" form gTLD registry and registrar agreements should receive the same grandfathering treatment but only for the terms and conditions of the "new" agreements that are contained in the existing form agreements.

**CCWG Revised Response 11 April:**

Lawyers shall ensure:

- Existing Ry and Rr agreements can be renewed
- Applicants of the current “round” can sign the Ry agreement in the currently used form
- The t&cs of new form gTLD Ry and Rr agreements are not grandfathered

**BOARD:**

6. There remains the ability for the Board to remove directors without cause, but only after a ¾ vote of the Board and consent of the EC. However, the proposal is silent on how the Board could obtain the consent of the EC. One possibility, to be agreed upon and then drafted appropriately, is: (1) Board approves the director’s removal; (2) the EC has the opportunity to oppose the removal, using the escalation process and thresholds for the standard bylaws rejection process in Annex D; (3) if the EC does not oppose, the EC must send a certification of such lack of opposition (i.e., consent to the director removal), to the Secretary.

**CCWG Revised Response 11 April:**

Lawyers shall ensure:

- The Board must be able to remove colleagues. Formal requirements must be baked into the bylaws.
- The CCWG recommendations do not suggest that the approval or any other decision from the EC is required to exercise that power.

7. The CCWG proposal was silent on how the Interim Board is to consult with the community to make major decisions. We have included a suggestion that the Interim Board shall “(a) consult with the chairs of the Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees before making major decisions (as if such action were a Rejection Action [as defined in Annex D]) and (b) consult through a community forum (in a manner consistent with the process for a Rejection Action Community Forum pursuant to Section [ ] of Annex D)” prior to taking the action. Are these the right processes?

CCWG Response:

Agreed with Option a)

**REQUESTED FURTHER CLARIFICATION:**

The Proposal, in Annex 4, Paragraph 98, provides as follows:

The ICANN Bylaws will state that, except in circumstances of where urgent decisions are needed to protect the security, stability and resilience of the DNS, the Interim Board will consult with the community through the SO and AC leaderships before making major decisions. Where relevant, the Interim Board will also consult through the ICANN Community Forum before taking any action that would mean a material change in ICANN’s strategy, policies or management, including replacement of the serving President and CEO.

Our request for clarification was not intended to present a choice between two options, but rather to seek the CCWG’s confirmation that the Interim Board’s consultation with SO and AC leadership would follow the same procedures as a Rejection Action, and that, similarly, the Community Forum consultation would follow the same procedures as a Rejection Action Community Forum.

Based on the response to our original Question 7, we understand that the CCWG agrees that procedures for a Rejection Action are appropriate for Interim Board consultation with SO and AC leadership. We would like to confirm that the CCWG wishes to modify the Proposal by eliminating the Interim Board community forum consultation requirement.

**CCWG Revised Response 12 April:**

- The Lawyers recommendation that Interim Board consultation with SO/AC leaders and/or Community Forum would follow the same procedures as a rejection action. is supported in absence of any opposition.

29a. On NomCom Board member removals, Annex D, Section 3.1(a) of the draft Bylaws provides for the possibility that a Nominating Committee Director Removal Petition could cite a GAC Consensus Board Resolution as part of the rationale for removal. (See also 3.1(c)(i)(E) and 3.1(g)(i and ii) for implementation of the resulting GAC carve-out in that case.) After discussion with the CCWG and among counsel, we conclude that this is beyond the scope of the GAC carve-out envisioned in the Proposal. We therefore recommend that this possibility and the related implementation of the GAC carve-out be deleted, so that GAC would be entitled to fully engage as a Decisional Participant in decisions by the EC regarding NomCom Board member removals. While a rationale must be stated in the Nominating Committee Director Removal Petition and that rationale might refer to votes of the director to follow GAC consensus advice, the GAC carve-out should not apply, since removal of a single director does not constitute a challenge to the Board's implementation of GAC consensus advice. We would like the CCWG to confirm this approach.

**CCWG Revised Response 12 April:**

- The Lawyers recommendation to confirm that NomCom Board member removal is beyond the scope of the "GAC carve-out" (since removal of a single director does not constitute a challenge to the Board's implementation of GAC consensus advice) is supported in absence of a significant number opposing.

29b. As discussed with the CCWG and provided in the Proposal, we have generally adhered to the principle in the draft Bylaws that, within the EC, the Decisional Participants who were responsible for nominating a director are also responsible for directing the EC as to that director's removal. This is true for removal of directors nominated by the ASO, the ccNSO, the GNSO, and the ALAC. We considered whether, on the same principle, since the GAC is the only Decisional Participant that does not have a voting delegate on the NomCom, it would be appropriate to exclude GAC as a Decisional Participant from decisions to remove directors nominated by the NomCom. After discussion among counsel, however, we conclude that, in lieu of the NomCom, the Proposal gives the EC the power to remove any NomCom director without reference to excluding Decisional Participants who do not hold the right to appoint voting delegates to the NomCom, and the principle cited above is insufficient to require any deviation from the Proposal on this point. We therefore recommend that all Decisional Participants in the EC participate in any EC decision to remove a NomCom-nominated director. We would like the CCWG to confirm this approach.

**CCWG Revised Response 12 April:**

- The Lawyers recommendation that all Decisional Participants in the EC participate in any EC decision to remove a NomCom-nominated director. (without reference to excluding Decisional Participants who do not hold the right to appoint voting

delegates to the NomCom) is supported in absence of a significant number opposing.

**Additional questions from the CCWG, added after the legal teams circulated their draft on 2-Apr-2016.**

**1. Selection of IRP panel**

The report states : [...]

3. The community would nominate a slate of proposed panel members.

4. Final selection is subject to ICANN Board confirmation.

The Draft Bylaws include:

ICANN shall, in consultation with the global Internet community, initiate a process to establish the Standing Panel to ensure the availability of a number of IRP panelists that is sufficient to allow for the timely resolution of Disputes consistent with the Purposes of the IRP. The community shall be directly involved in the selection of the Standing Panel and the designation of the Chair of the Standing Panel.

This does not seem to fully capture the importance of a community driven selection process, as well as the role of the Board, which is to confirm (or veto) Panelists. Our recommendation is to provide additional safeguards about this process in the Bylaws to ensure that the intent of the Report is carried out.

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

Lawyers shall ensure:

- Process “in consultation with the community” is not strong enough
- The selection process must be truly community driven
- The role of the Board is only to confirm or veto proposed Panelists

**2. IRP rules of procedure**

The Report states:

Implementation of these enhancements will necessarily require additional detailed work. Detailed rules for the implementation of the IRP (such as rules of procedure) are to be created

by the ICANN community through a CCWG (assisted by counsel, appropriate experts, and the

Standing Panel when confirmed), and approved by the Board, such approval not to be unreasonably withheld.

Bylaws:

Members of the global Internet community shall develop processes for the IRP that are governed by clearly understood and pre-published rules applicable to all parties (“Rules of Procedure”).

The community driven nature of the establishment of the rules of procedure should be reinforced in the Bylaws

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- The community driven nature of the establishment of the rules of procedure should be reinforced in the Bylaws (note from the meeting - Rules of procedure changes can be discussed and proposed by the panel but must be approved by the community)

### **3. GAC Carve out - Annex D Section 3.3 (NOTE: possible linkage to Q29 above)**

(a) Subject to the procedures and requirements developed by the applicable Decisional Participant, an individual may submit a petition to a Decisional Participant seeking to remove all Directors (other than the President) at the same time and initiate the Board Recall Process ("Board Recall Petition"). Each Board Recall Petition shall include a rationale setting forth the reasons why such individual seeks to recall the Board and a statement, where applicable, that the Board Recall Petition is based solely [or almost solely] on ICANN's implementation of a GAC Consensus Board Resolution, citing (i) the specific GAC Consensus Board Resolution, (ii) the acts of the Board that implemented such specific GAC Consensus Board Resolution, and (iii) the IRP Panel award concluding that the Board's implementation of such GAC Consensus Advice did not comply with the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws ("Board Recall GAC Consensus Statement"). The process set forth in this Section 3.3 of this Annex D is referred to herein as the "Board Recall Process."

Comments:

1. The manner in which the above txt is drafted may give the impression that "Board Recall Process" IS solely designed on ICANN's implementation of a GAC Consensus Board Resolution, which would not be compliant with paragraph 77-83 of Annex 4 ( Recommendation 4 ) of the supplemental CCWG Report.

We would request confirmation that this not the case and would welcome, if possible, any improvement in language that would alleviate this possible misinterpretation.

#### **CCWG Response 11 April:**

- See response to AQ11

### **4. HR FoI - Section 27.3**

Section 27.3 is part of article 27 Transition Article and now reads:

Section 1.1. human rights

(a) Within the scope of its Mission and Core Values, ICANN commits to respect internationally recognized human rights as required by applicable law. This commitment does not create and shall not be interpreted to create any additional obligations for ICANN and shall not obligate ICANN to respond to or consider any complaint, request or demand seeking the enforcement of human rights by ICANN.

(b) Section 27.3(a) shall have no force or effect unless and until a framework of interpretation for human rights ("FOI-HR") is approved by (i) the CCWG-Accountability as a consensus recommendation in Work Stream 2, (ii) each of the CCWG-Accountability's chartering organizations and (iii) the Board (in the case of the Board, using the same process and criteria used by the Board to consider the Work Stream 1 Recommendations). Upon approval of the FOI-HR as contemplated in this Section, the text included within Section 27.3(a) shall be inserted into Section 1.2(b) as a Core Value

(c) No person or entity shall be entitled to invoke the reconsideration process provided in Section 4.2 or the independent review process provided in Section 4.3 with respect to this Section 27.3 for any actions by ICANN or the Board occurring prior to the date that the conditions set forth in Section 27.3(b) are satisfied

Section 27.3 as a whole should be put in section 1.2 (a) as it is a commitment by ICANN and it is not really meant to be a transitional bylaw but instead a firm commitment pending full applicability to the development of the FOI as part of WS2.

#### **CCWG Response 5 and 7 April:**

- CCWG report Annex 6 paragraph 23 states “Within its Core Values, ICANN will commit to respect internationally recognized Human Rights as required by applicable law. This provision does not create any additional obligation for ICANN to respond to or consider any complaint, request, or demand seeking the enforcement of Human Rights by ICANN. This Bylaw provision will not enter into force until (1) a Framework of Interpretation for Human Rights (FOI-HR) is developed by the CCWG-Accountability as a consensus recommendation in Work Stream 2 (including Chartering Organizations’ approval) and (2) the FOI-HR is approved by the ICANN Board using the same process and criteria it has committed to use to consider the Work Stream 1 recommendations.”
- As a consequence, the group recommends that section 27.3 (a) be moved into the core value section, with a clarification that it will not enter into force immediately.

#### **5. AoC Review of new gTLDs - Section 4.6**

Jeff Neuman observed that CCWG Final Report is not fully reflected in the draft bylaws text at Section 4.6 d - Competition, Consumer Trust and Consumer Choice Review (CCT). Per the Affirmation of Commitments, a CCT review team is already in process. There are also several other reviews of the latest round of new gTLDs already in progress. CCWG anticipated that the “new” bylaws reviews might conflict with the AoC reviews already underway, and added this to our final proposal:

New review rules will prevail as soon as the Bylaws have been changed, but care should be taken when terminating the Affirmation of Commitments to not disrupt any Affirmation of Commitments reviews that may be in process at that time. Any in-progress reviews will adopt the new rules to the extent practical. Any planned Affirmation of Commitments review should not be deferred simply because the new rules allow up to five years between review cycles. If the community prefers to do a review sooner than five years from the previous review, that is allowed under the new rules. (para 6 of Annex 9)

Jeff also asks about draft bylaws text regarding when a CCT review would be required, if ICANN were to open an ongoing process for new gTLD applications -- instead of discrete batched rounds.

CCWG anticipated that new gTLDs might be a rolling application instead of discrete rounds of applications. In Annex 9 para 118 we said:

The Board shall cause a review of ICANN’s execution of this commitment after any batched round of new gTLDs have been in operation for one year.

The draft bylaws text at Section 4.6 d (ii) did not retain the word “batched” and should probably include that concept to clarify if and when the 1-year trigger applies.

After any discrete New gTLD Round has been in operation for one year, the Board shall initiate a competition, consumer trust and consumer choice review as specified in this Section 4.6(d) (“CCT Review”).

If ICANN moves to rolling applications for new gTLDs, then a review is required no less frequently than every 5 years (para 127).

For that reason, Bylaws Section 4.6 d (iii) should avoid using the phrase “the New gTLD Round” and retain the CCWG proposal text “expansion of gTLDs”, as follows:

(iii) The review team for the CCT Review (“CCT Review Team”) will examine (A) the extent to which the expansion of gTLDs New gTLD Round has promoted competition, consumer trust and consumer choice and (B) the effectiveness of the New gTLD Round’s application and evaluation process and safeguards put in place to mitigate issues arising from the expansion New gTLD Round.

#### **CCWG Response 5 and 7 April:**

- This was discussed on Apr 5 and 7 and did not receive any objection.

### **7. Confirm approval of the concept of the EC Council**

During drafting, the concept of the EC Council was introduced. This construct was needed to allow the Bylaws to be clearly drafted (and then followed!). Our group supports the introduction of that concept.

#### **CCWG Response 12 April:**

- The concept of the “council” is approved and the name is not critical and can be solved on the list.

### **8. Apart from the grandfathering**

, there was an explicit provision that PICs could be part of future agreements entered and enforced by ICANN (annex 5, para 15: ICANN shall have the ability to negotiate, enter into and enforce agreements, including Public Interest Commitments (“PICs”), with contracted parties in service of its Mission.)

Section 1.1 d) iv) of the draft Bylaws states:

"(iv) ICANN shall have the ability to negotiate, enter into and enforce agreements with any party in service of its Mission."

Can the lawyers confirm that it is meeting the requirement or detail the reason why PICs are not mentioned explicitly?

#### **CCWG Response 11 April:**

- Lawyers to respond to Jorge Cancio directly.

### **9. The draft bylaws give the IRP panel the right to change rules of procedure (Section 4.3.(n)(ii)). In this respect the panel seems unconstrained, only having to publish revisions and possibly to get a consensus (not clear of whom – the COs, the EC, the panel, other?).**

As I recall, the final proposal did not give the panel this right. It seems to me that the community and Board need to retain some oversight here. Annex 07, paragraph 63,

indicates that rules of procedure are to be created by the community and approved by the Board.

It is true that Annex 07, paragraph 55 says that, "Panel decisions would be determined by a simple majority. Alternatively, this could be included in the category of procedures that the IRP Panel itself should be empowered to set."

But this indirect reference to setting rules does not appear to justify displacing the community-development and Board-approval rights when it comes to rules of procedure.

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- See answer to AQ2.

**10. Human rights, specifically an implication in Article 27.3.(c) that HR claims might be a proper subject for RR or IRP after the FOI is developed.**

This implication is not in the Annex 06 bylaw text (paragraph 23), although it appears in explanatory text (paragraph 19). But both bylaw text and explanatory text say that acceptance of the FOI will depend on the same processes followed in WS1, and bylaw text makes clear that the FOI has to be approved by the Board after it follows the same process and criteria it used in WS1.

In my opinion it is a mistake to insert this implication in "real" bylaws as the issue is important as well as complex and the WS2 FOI group should have a chance to debate the merits.

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- BBurr HR cannot be brought to IRP before the FOI is complete for HR.
- See also response to AQ4 above

**11. Carve Out**

As I mentioned in the call on 5 and 7 April, a careful reading of the draft Bylaws reveals that there is an intended or unintended proliferation of "GAC CARVE-OUT" in many Articles of the main Bylaws as well as in Annex D

As you all know the so-called "GAC CARVE-OUT" «was introduced at almost last calls Irrespective of the degree of consensus on the "GAC CARVE-OUT" at CCWG, Final version of Recommendations 1 &2 including /taking into account the GAC Statements as contained in its Marrakesh Communique was agreed by Chattering Organizations and subsequently by ICANN Board on March 11

In order to avoid any misinterpretation and avoid heavy drafting and also avoiding proliferation of "GAC CARVE-OUT" in many Articles of the main Bylaws as well as in Annex D to the main draft, the most easiest and accurate course of action would be:

To cut and paste indent 3 of paragraph 08 of Recommendation 1 and paragraph 74( together with its indent) of Recommendation 2 in two specific legal text under the title of "GAC CARVE-OUT"

Delete all references to "GAC CARVE-OUT" in the draft

The above suggestion precisely captures the objectives and implementation of "GAC CARVE-OUT" concept.

It is recalled that the carve out was crafted to avoid the double Bites to an apple knowing that ccNSO has and continue to have the privilege of that double bites to apple As for the GAC CARVE-OUT, the objective was merely and solely to enable the community to challenge the Board's diction on GAC consensus advise on the claim that such decision was inconsistent with ICANN bylaws including ICANN Mission and nothing else.

During the debate it was reiterated by the author of "GAC CARVE-OUT" that its occurrence probability is too low. It is surprising and even inappropriate that for a case the probability of its occurrence is too low one need a very heavily loaded provisions addressing that very low probable circumstances.

This is a safe, wise, secure and confident approach which would totally eliminate any intentional or unintentional misapplication of the concept.

It is to be noted that, the current draft with such proliferation of "GAC CARVE-OUT" most of which based on misinterpretation and unilateral expansion is totally unacceptable.

This is a very critical and delicate issue the unnecessary and unilateral proliferation of which would be detrimental to GAC and would result in another net win for private sector similar to the net win which was stated in the testimony before the sub-committee of the House and thus would end up

That GAC be loser for the second time ( in addition to that imposed to it by ST18 and initial Carve out concept.

#### **CCWG Response 11 April:**

- The CCWG is asking the lawyers to revise the language in the Bylaws to more clearly reflect the recommendations. The Carve out must be implemented in the Bylaws according to the CCWG recommendations.

#### **13. 1.1(a): the "root zone" of the DNS is missing compared to the CCWG recommendation. I think this is a mistake.**

I understand the reasoning for this is that ICANN has involvement in the policies in other than the root zone. I contend that this does not mean that ICANN is co-ordinating allocation or assignment in those other zones.

ICANN actually does determine, according to its own policies, what goes into the root zone.

ICANN does not determine what goes into other registries. Instead, it sometimes has agreements with others (all contracted TLDs and some ccTLDs) that specify rules for \_those\_ registries. Effectively, these are conditions on ICANN's willingness to delegate from the root zone.

It's true that ICANN does that using its processes, but it does not do that for all zones. It doesn't even do it for all TLDs, since ccTLDs are not subject to such policies. Therefore, it just isn't true that ICANN 'Coordinates the allocation and assignment of names in the Domain Name System ("DNS").'

I've heard an argument that claims that, since the previous versions of the bylaws did not have the limitation to the root zone, therefore this was not a limitation on ICANN. But the effort in this Mission

work is exactly to arrange the Mission bylaw in accordance with ICANN's actual responsibilities. If ICANN's responsibility is only to allocate and assign names in the DNS root, then that's what ought to be in the bylaw. I do not believe that ICANN has ever actually been directly allocating or assigning names outside the DNS root, and if the claim is that ICANN does that I think we have a fairly serious disagreement.

Nothing about this Mission would prevent ICANN's role in co-ordinating policies for those names delegated from the root, because those policies follow directly from ICANN's policy control over the root zone and its ability to extract contractual terms from operators of TLD registries in return for delegation from the root. I do not see how the text as contemplated in the CCWG's report would undermine that ability. But I do see how the text as proposed in these draft bylaws extends ICANN's responsibilities quite a lot more widely than ICANN's actual responsibilities. Therefore, I believe that the draft is not in accordance with the community consensus, and the "root zone" constraint ought to be reintroduced into the bylaw text.

**CCWG Revised Response 11 April:**

- See answer to Q1.

Do we need to define the term Root Zone?

**CCWG Revised Response 12 April:**

- The CCWG would prefer to not define but would request that the lawyers confirm that this will not create significant risk if we do not.

**15 4.2(c)(iii)**

Why is this restricted to "the resources for protocol parameters"? Why isn't it just "disputes relating to protocol parameters"? I'm quite sure the second is what's intended. No dispute of any kind involving protocol parameters is to be subject to this reconsideration process, because the IETF already has a reconsideration process for them.

Note: There's approximately the same issue in 4.3.c(iv).

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

Accept suggestion of "disputes relating to protocol parameters"

**17. Section 4.2(a) Reconsideration**

4.2(a) "ICANN shall have in place a process by which any person or entity materially affected by an action or inaction of the ICANN Board

or Staff (i.e., employees and individual long-term paid contractors serving in locations where ICANN does not have the mechanisms to employ such contractors) ("Requestor")" is slightly ambiguous. The "i.e." is presumably attempting to clarify what is "Staff", but could possibly be misread to restrict the reconsideration requestors to the class under "i.e.". Perhaps, "where 'staff' means 'employees and individual.

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- This is a valid concern and the CCWG would request that lawyers provide language to address this.

**18. Section 4.3 IRP**

4.3(o)(vii) Should it also (or instead) refer to the cost shifting in (r)?

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- The CCWG agrees with the suggestion.

**19. 22.4(b)(ii) IANA Budget**

22.4(b)(ii) It isn't clear to me why this distinguishes between the IETF and IAB. The IAB is the conduit for consultations with the IETF from outside organizations. I don't really care about this (I think the duplication is harmless), but it's a little untidy. I think in the liaison language, the appointment comes from the IETF. (Which is true -- the IAB appoints the liaison, because IETF liaisons are appointed by the IAB.) You could probably drop either IAB or IETF. The former is easier to consult with, because the latter could need a consensus call to answer you. (In general, liaison appointments from the IETF are made by the IAB.)

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- The CCWG, after consulting with the IAB liaison, recommends that the Bylaws refer to the IAB and not the IETF in this section.

**20. Article 4 ACCOUNTABILITY AND REVIEW**

Article 4 and Appendix D Article 4 do not specify if, after a Requestor or the EC requests review or reconsideration, the decision is suspended pending resolution. This would seem to be necessary to prevent irreversible harm.

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- Can apply to IRP if requested, not applicable to Reconsideration.

## 21. Article 4.3(x)(ii)(B) IRP

Article 4.3(x)(ii)(B) says “If the Board rejects an IRP decision, the EC Chairs Council may convene as soon as possible following such rejection and consider whether to authorize commencement of action in a court with jurisdiction over ICANN to enforce the IRP decision.” I had thought that anyone could commence a court action to enforce an IRP decision if the Board rejects it. However, I did not see this stated explicitly elsewhere. I believe this should be made clear in the appropriate place.

### CCWG Response 11 April:

- Any party to the action can start an action to enforce. The IRP rules will confirm this.

## 22. Article 8 – Recalling NomCom Directors

Article 8, as discussed in the chat, I do not believe that the GAC should have an EC vote on the decision to recall a NOMCOM Director because they do not vote for them in the first place. This would mirror the authority of the appointing SO/ACs to dismiss their appointed Directors.

### CCWG Response 11 April:

- See response to Q29

## 23. Section 25.2 – Fundamental Bylaws

Section 25.2, it seems odd that the existence and composition of the ASO, ccNSO, gNSO, and ACs (Articles 9-12) should not be fundamental bylaws. I don't recall this being specifically discussed, but should the dissolution or rearrangement of the SO/ACs be a regular bylaw change?

### CCWG Response 11 April:

- This was not foreseen in the CCWG recommendations and should not be applied in the Bylaws.

Section 25.2(e) and (f) on page 126 of the tracked document appears to be an inadvertent paste and in need of editing. The section deals with fundamental bylaws, but the text refers to standard bylaws.

### CCWG Response 11 April:

- Agree.

## 24. Annex D

Annex D Section 1.1 (b) refers to Section [ ] and Section 25.3(b). There are no such sections.

Annex D, Section 1.4(b)(ii) refers to the incorrect interpretation of the GAC carve-out that I sent to you on Tuesday. The threshold should not be lowered from 3 to 2 on an approval action for a Board decision based on consensus GAC advice because this would merely institutionalize the GAC's presumed supporting vote. The threshold should remain at 3 in these cases. I appreciate that this has been corrected.

Annex D, Article 3, Section 3.1(g) the GAC should not have an EC vote in removing NOMCOM directors as discussed in the chat and above in bullet 4.

Annex D, Article 4, the GAC-carve out should apply throughout the IRP and reconsideration request process if it involves a Board decision based on consensus GAC advice.

**CCWG Response 11 April:**

- See answer to AQ11.