

**ICANN**

**Moderator: Gisella Gruber-White  
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Greg Shatan: Thank you, Lise. So thank you all for continuing on the call and continuing our work from yesterday.

In the last few minutes I went into Google Docs and was able to add a fourth column for Straw-Man Proposal 4. So for the moment at least I'd like to continue with Google Docs as our place of - where we're working on this. I think it offers us enough flexibility. But if we find that there's anything else that is a problem, you know, we'll just, you know, we can try to convert it over to Sheets in order to do that.

So I think that in order to move forward on this, you know, we were pretty much - as we left off we were ending or we were - we cut off during the discussion of the oversight body or mechanism. And I think there's been a lot of discussion or a fair amount of discussion in the chat of the - of a, you know, proposal for - particularly as it relates to the - kind of that first element, creation of an oversight body or mechanism.

I'll - I see that Grace has her hand up.

Grace Abuhamad: Hi, Greg. I just wanted to make sure that you wanted me to take notes or edits live in the Google doc? Is that correct?

Greg Shatan: Yes. That would be great to live-edit that.

Grace Abuhamad: Okay. And I've also posted a link to the document in the chatroom for everyone.

Greg Shatan: Correct. So I think that it may make sense at this point to discuss what RF - what the four - what a Straw-Man Proposal 4 would be for the first element.

Avri, I don't know if that's something that you might be able to address so that we can begin to flesh out that element. I don't mean to put you on the spot. But if that's possible, we could do that. Otherwise, you know, we clearly can go, you know, down to other elements and come back to this on the list.

Avri Doria: (Unintelligible). This is Avri. I'm leaving the call now because I had an - this meeting has been double-booked.

I've been objecting to moving forward like this now. But that has gone - fallen on deaf ears. (Unintelligible) now. I'm so sorry. But, you know, this meeting got double-booked with others.

I was really happy we were done with the meeting early and then, you know, objected to this being done now. But, you know, maybe someone else can do it. Thank you.

Greg Shatan: Sorry, Avri. I just feel that we really need - we have so little time and so few times that we get together that to only use half the time we've allotted to ourselves would be - would not be the best choice under the circumstances. Obviously there are no perfect choices.

Avri Doria: And since people have decided on oversight already you're...

Greg Shatan: No. I don't think anybody's decided on anything yet for better or for worse.  
You know?

The - all paths are still open. And they will be an hour from now as well. I think at this point we're still, you know, collecting pros, cons and concerns.

In any event I know you need to go off to another call. So certainly I would, you know, not think that anything is going to be closed off before you get a chance to rejoin the discussion or that anybody who's not currently here will be - will lose their chance.

Robert Guerra, I see your hand is up.

Robert Guerra: I just - for those who may have not been on the call yesterday and maybe an idea in terms of going forward for Proposal 4, it may be the elements that may be kind of part of the conversation for each of the sections and pick off what - how people suggested, is it a possible option, where we are now for 1A, it - or to be not a creation of a - of an oversight body.

And so in a way it's a discussion of the options that are presented and either new options or, as Allan was saying, trying to distill it down into, you know, smaller list of options so we can eliminate some of the options and just have maybe a more distilled Straw-Man 4 which at the end may substitute one of the other ones.

So it's just a way to get notes from the discussion. Thank you.

Greg Shatan: Thank you, Robert. As - my view of what Straw-Man 4 is, is a separate - is a fourth stream or a set of four - of alternative elements, not kind of a greatest hits of the first three proposals.

I don't think we're at that point yet. Clearly we need to get at - to the point very soon where we are eliminating alternatives and identifying alternatives that have the greatest level of support. But I'm not going to call those Straw-man 1 through 4. At this point, you know, for purposes of discussion I want to keep, you know, everything somewhat on an equal footing in the sense that at this point any alternative is still, you know, up for discussion for each element so that those who are not on the call yesterday, I'll briefly go through the elements.

Google Docs is probably not a very good place to do scrolling. So I don't know, Grace, is it possible to put the matrix back up...

Grace Abuhamad: Sure. I can do that.

Greg Shatan: In - natively in the Adobe Connect?

Grace Abuhamad: Yes.

Greg Shatan: While Grace is putting that up, you know, the first element - and I'll kind of read this more horizontally than vertically. I'll go through kind of all of the elements kind of simultaneously, if you will.

On the first element which is creation of an oversight mechanism or committee or body of some sort, the three straw-man proposals all differ. The first proposes a committee which would not be a legal body in the sense of having an independent legal existence. The second straw-man proposal proposes an independent legal body, corporate body, of some sort. The third also proposes an independent legal body but emphasizes in contrast to Straw-Man 2, stewardship functions of this body and not merely performance review

and operational oversight. Straw-Man 1 and - Straw-Man 2 and 3 both contemplate committees being created under the main grouping, whether that grouping is a board of directors or kind of a committee of the whole.

Legal status as indicated earlier, the Straw-Man 1 proposes a body with essentially no legal status, just a committee. The other two propose a not-profit - non-profit corporation without members in the state of California.

That doesn't mean that's the only alternative. But that's what's here for the sake of argument.

Governing documents in C, if you could scroll down a bit -- or if you all have scroll control can scroll for yourselves -- governing documents would be some sort of articles and bylaws. The - in Straw-Man Proposal Number 1, you - if you go down to composition of oversight body now you see the composition of this oversight committee is solely registry operators, both gTLD and ccTLD, whether they're ccNSO or not.

As a result of that the governing documents, it's suggested in this straw-man, would be drafted by a representative group of registries, in contrast to Straw-Man Proposals 2 and 3 is, you know, would - the governing documents would be drafted by a representative group of all stakeholders because the composition of the oversight body is intended to be all stakeholders. The board of directors in each of those instances would be a representative group.

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond, I see your hand is up.

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Thanks very much, Greg. It's Olivier Crepin-LeBlond speaking.

I think just for the sake of the people who were not on the call yesterday, two things have to also be said. The proposals being in three different columns are actually also mix-and-match if one wants to do so. So one is not tied to going for all or nothing. That was one of the things.

And the Straw-Man 4 which Avri alluded to earlier is one which can just be summarized as being one with no body - no actual new body being created or committee being created but the whole system of accountability and oversight being based on a systems of checks and balances. I think that's how it can be summarized. Thank you.

Greg Shatan: Thank you, Olivier. And so I think the mix-and-match point is particularly important. There is no reason to think that we would be, you know, assembling one - that one, two or three are mutually exclusive options. They're all intended to be mixed and matched.

So continuing with the brief overview, the oversight body, as I said, would be a representative group of stakeholders in Proposals 2 and 3 and registry operators alone in Proposal 1.

In Element Number 3 the replacement of the NTIA contract would be simply with an SLA, a service-level agreement, in Straw-Man 1. Straw-Man 2 and 3 contemplates a more fully featured replacement for the IANA contract, sort of an IANA functions in an oversight agreement, common to Straw-Man 2 and 3.

The - in Straw-Man 2 and 3 -- and frankly it could also be said for Straw-Man 1 -- the term would be three years. Obviously there could be a longer or shorter term. But the idea is that there would be a limited term and it would be renewed. For sake of argument here it says at the mutual agreement of the

operator and the body. But there are other ways to deal with the issue of renewal.

In Element Number 4 the status of the IANA functions operator, in Straw-Man 1 we have the IANA functions operator remaining as a division of ICANN basically as it is now. In Straw-Man 2 the IANA functions operator would be organized into a wholly owned subsidiary of ICANN but would essentially be functionally no different than it is today, no more. It would not be really an independent organization but it would be, you know, boxed up in a corporate form. And in Straw-Man 3 a proposal is that IANA would be an independent corporation that ICANN would not have any stake in other than perhaps as a stakeholder of sorts.

For the first two where the IANA function is not independent of ICANN proposed to have enhanced separability as a possibility which is - the idea is that we'd look at how separate functionally and structurally IANA is today and if it could be made more separate so that it is more easily separable at a future time which essentially would mean eliminating or minimizing shared resources or having a transition plan in place now for resources to be unshared or dedicated solely to the IANA function. That would be what's meant by enhanced separability.

In terms of the legal status Straw-Man 1, IANA functions operator has no separate legal status, in Straw-Man 2, a non-profit corporation without members in California. In Number 3 for sake of argument, IANA would be a Swiss non-profit association and would request that the Swiss government grant it immunity of jurisdiction.

Similarly governing documents would in both cases be whatever articles of incorporation and bylaws are required under the laws of the jurisdiction.

Board of directors of the - of IANA as a subsidiary would be a - composed of both an insider board, so to speak, with ICANN representatives and independent board members from the community. Straw-Man Proposal 3 the independent IANA, the community would be - would compose the board member - representative members of the community.

The method of oversight section, a bit lengthy, but a lot of them are in common. In two and three the idea of a stewardship or, you know, more kind of higher-level review above kind of performance, per se, is that the (IFOA), the IANA replacement contract, would form a basis for a review of performance of the IANA function and also of any other policies that are established to ensure secure, stable, resilient internet operating as a single interoperable network.

Common across all of these proposals is a review of existing performance metrics, developing the SLA which would need to be negotiated with the counterparty and should be approved by the multi-stakeholder community at least in this - for sake of argument, periodic meetings with IANA staff, in Numbers 1 and 2, where ICANN is controlling IANA, meeting annually with the president of ICANN to review and approve a rolling three-year budget.

F, across all of them is a periodic review, say every three to five years, to consider whether new or improved services are needed which would then be approved by the rest of the community before being element - before being implemented so that those could then be elemented (sic).

You know, lastly in each case the oversight committee or body would act as the final reviewer of changes to the root zone, substituting, you know, for that element of the NTIA's work.



Then Number 6, funding of the oversight committee or body, suggested that Straw-Man 1 should be funded by the registries. Under Straw-Man 2 the suggestion should be funded by ICANN. Suggestion Number 3 is also funding by the registries but through fees charged to the registries rather than because it is a body that is basically under the control of the registries as in Straw-Man 1. So there would be kind of a fee-for-service model for IANA implicit in Straw-Man 3.

Funding of the IANA functions operator under Element 7, in the first straw-man, basically business as usual. ICANN would continue to fund IANA. Second is also essentially business as usual. IANA would be funded - the subsidiary would be funded by ICANN. Under Element 3 we're back to fees for service to fund IANA Inc. as well as to fund the oversight body.

Eighth element, transparency of decision-making, is common across all the proposals at this point which would be to continue the current practice of public reporting on all naming-related decisions, make public -- you know, so these are the things that ICANN would agree to or in Straw-Man 3, IANA itself would agree to -- and then secondly to make public all recommendations, naming-related decisions; three, not agree to - not to redact any board minutes as has sometimes been the case on naming decisions.

Fourth, or D, is to have the president and board chair sign an annual attestation of compliance, fifth that there will be funding for outside legal counsel to provide essentially independent interpretation of naming-related policy and not rely on kind of ICANN counsel staff to provide opinions to IANA and ultimately perhaps to the committee or body of oversight as well.

And last, provisions regarding - it's noted these provisions regarding independence and legal advice, reporting and transparency, are intended to discourage IANA staff and the ICANN board from taking decisions that don't match up with policy.

Ninth element is the IANA functions operator. If there's a failure to perform the SLA or the IANA contract replacement would have the concept of a breach, notice of breach, and given an opportunity to cure the breach and if fail to cure, a formal performance review would be initiated. And at the end of that review either the IANA function would be given basically remedial improvements required to be implemented or an RFP would be initiated to look for a new IANA functions operator or under Straw-Man Proposals 1 and 2 the - if the breach is due to ICANN behavior and not IANA behavior as such, moving the IANA functions operator outside of ICANN and to be established as an independent entity, the separability turning into separation.

Lastly, a policy appeal mechanism would consist in each case of an independent review panel of outside arbitrators, either contracting with an outside arbitration agency to assemble and maintain a panel or the - or a panel would be assembled essentially by the oversight body to act as an outside independent review.

So that is basically the - that's kind of a review of where everything stands on all of the proposals that, you know, were put into the straw-man, again, not a - not intended to be exhaustive, perhaps exhausting.

So why don't we loop back up to the top. I see comments in the chat. It would be good to kind of get those onto the, you know, out into spoken space.

So we'll go back to the Element 1, which is the creation of an oversight body or committee. I'll open the floor to comment on these proposals or the proposal for.

I know this was talked about a lot on yesterday's call but it'd be helpful to hear what, you know, folks' thoughts are who weren't on that call or having been - had some time to think about yesterday's call.

Allan MacGillivray?

Allan MacGillivray: Thank you, Greg. Well someone has to go first.

Maybe we could just put something in the comments. I think that there was some discussion yesterday about the participation of the SOAC community in all of these oversight bodies or mechanisms. And I think under all of the options we should note that, for example, under one where does committees, you may have subcommittees or multiple committees which would kind of be functionally determined.

So for example if you had a committee that over, you know, the oversight was only on the SLA then you might have only registries dealing with that.

But if on the other hand you had a committee that is dealing with like a, you know, every five year review well then I think there's an argument for a broader community participation for example ALAC and the GAC on that. So I think we just want to note that the participation by the community could vary in all the options, you know, depend -and, you know, by using multiple committees if that makes any sense, thanks.

Greg Shatan: Absolutely Allan I think that is the case and that's kind of what's contemplated in the B-1 - 1-A-1 if you, will the idea of committees on the second row that's there.

I see in the chat that, you know, Guru asks why should there be a new entity for oversight in Strawman 3 and Strawman 3 has already an independent IANA, can't the oversight mechanism reside inside ICANN as an internal committee to sort of avoid need for funding jurisdiction for the oversight body of the governing documents, SLA, etc. can be between ICANN and the new IANA entity. Any comments on that from the committee - the working group?

I guess I will take a stab at an answer or at least a thought on that. I think it is - there is certainly a possibility that if you have an independent IANA you don't need an independent oversight body. And ICANN could, you know, be the home for that body so you avoid creating two independent bodies. I think there may be some who are - would like a degree of independence regardless of from ICANN.

But that is - it's certainly a fair point that the issue of independence doesn't have to be solved on both ends of the relationship, but more - to some extent more on one end of the relationship. So if there are no comments - more further comments on the first element let's scroll down a bit and hopefully Google Docs will allow that and it does quite well actually.

Legal status, any comments on the issue of the legal status? I don't want to go completely off onto jurisdiction. Some people, myself included could talk about jurisdiction for hours - really not a - but that's really not at the heart of our - I don't think it's at the heart of our job to do. But the idea of an unincorporated entity versus a corporate entity in California are all - versus

some other place, you know, are all, you know, certainly up for grabs at this point.

I would mention as I did on the call yesterday that unincorporated associations are often considered to be actions taken by the individual entities that make it up. You know the collective action but that there's no separate collectives. So basically every member of the committee is viewed as kind of jointly and severally personally liable and as being in essence the party - the counterparty to any contract that the committee would enter into.

That may be troublesome for some or even all participants and especially for the GAC participants for whom - even entering in, you know, being on a board of a legal entity would be an issue. To be essentially part of a collective committee would be troublesome. I think governing documents as a concept isn't particularly controversial and Board of Directors again I don't think that's particularly controversial in the idea that it would match the composition of the group itself.

So why don't we move onto the next subject I think that has some diversity of opinion which is who will the oversight body or committee or entity wherever it exists even if it is a committee within ICANN or some sort of set of entities that are kind of monitoring the checks and balances under Strawman 1 and registry operators alone would compose this group. And under 2 and 3 would be other stakeholders from within the ICANN community or as identified by ICANN as a, you know, stakeholder groups.

And (will) ICANN - also those that are, you know, to some greater or lesser extent outside the ICANN community not just ccTLDs that are not in the ccNSO but perhaps other organizations. So I would like to open the floor on

this and see what comments people have. Certainly feel free to reiterate comments you've already made on the list - Robert Guerra.

Robert Guerra: (I'm on here), it's Robert. I think one of the things that I had mentioned and I'm not sure it's - was the security stability (out pack) and how we might want to build that in.

And the second point is also recognizing that, you know, there is a - that I think someone should restate I think it was either two or three STEs are currently being used for the technical administrative role of IANA. And for some of these bodies there may be more oversight than actual people that work at IANA. And so we, you know, we need to figure out something that's light.

And so yes so to my first point I think it's just in regards to in addition to the registrar operators we might want to think about how to put in or why people think about the security instability aspect and how that would be built into the oversight body.

Greg Shatan: Are you thinking Robert that SSAC should have a role even if other stakeholder groups are not given a formal role?

Robert Guerra: I wasn't going as far as that, I'm just saying that there are security instability issues that come up.

And having that as part of the oversight body, you know, in terms of that could be part of the review of the SLA or other things that it's something that we should factor into some of the language that we're putting in. And then we'll see from there, you know, what would be the best way to bring experts in, whether that factors some other entity or technical security expert.

Greg Shatan: Right - I see Donna Austin is often typing. I'm wondering if Donna - if there's something, you know, to be said since I think you've spoken on this issue or written on this issue in the past.

I guess I would say that I have a tendency to believe the multi-stakeholder oversight body even if the oversight is a relatively narrow makes me feel a lot more comfortable in the sense it's a form of check and balance and accountability. Which, you know, allows or guards against the possibility that, you know, the interest of one stakeholder group kind of get - are allowed to kind of go forward unchecked.

I'm not saying that there's any ill intent but, you know, clearly as we've all learned different groups have different interests. And if any one group were running ICANN it would look very different than if it's - if it is what it is today. And putting aside any discussions of who runs ICANN or what ICANN is that's way off our scope. But the idea of checks and balances within the group makes me feel more comfortable.

Certainly GAC members have expressed interest in participating in any sort of oversight body. Alan Greenberg I see your hand is up.

Alan Greenberg: Thank you very much. Just with regard to that one certainly from the point-of-view of that large I don't think that is an issue that we really can negotiate.

Registries - the policy is set by a multi-stakeholder body. We could conceivably have policies related to IANA which the registries are not in support of and therefore the registries cannot be the only ones monitoring, you know, whether IANA is doing a proper job in implementing those policies.

That would be counter to their own interests if they were the only ones that were doing it - thank you.

Greg Shatan: Thank you Al - any other comments, any counterpoint to what Alan has said? I'm sure there will be counterpoints since there definitely is support for a registry operator only oversight committee.

Well if we don't talk about it here we'll be talking about it on the list and in Frankfurt I am sure. And I think this is one where there frankly will be as I say, you know, a fair degree of discussion. And while it may not be open for negotiation it is open until we discuss why it can't be or it's agreed that it isn't going to be. Why don't we move on, no further comments being seen to the - number three the documentation to replace the NTIA contract.

So if we could scroll down a bit in the view, here the documentation, you know, it's proposed as, you know, first an SLA, a more of a lightweight document, the other two more of a fully functioning IANA replacement contract. To my mind there really needs to be IANA - a replacement of some sort to the IANA contract, at least those elements that we identified as being necessary to go forward.

And there's a lot in the IANA contract as a review of the work of Subgroup 2C or review of the contract itself, you know, should reveal that really does need to be carried forward. There are obviously elements of it that are, you know, peculiar to US Government contracting that can be discarded probably very happily and others that are also excess baggage. But there's still a lot left that to my mind at least goes beyond what I would see in a service level agreement.



So in my view we would need to propose a replacement and then, you know, as I mentioned earlier on the call we need to figure out for purposes of our own workload and for satisfying the RFP at the ICT level and ultimately to the NTIA to what extent do we prepare or propose an actual contracting document versus just identifying elements that need to go into such a document.

I tend to think we don't have time to do a contracting document but if we are working on the work of RFP 2C, if we identify the elements that need to be included in any future contract to sort of a term sheet level that should be I think sufficient, certainly for our first draft as of December 1 and hopefully for all drafts.

So I see a lot of conversation going on in the chat, I don't know if there's any chance of trying to bring that out to oral discussion. I'll invite anybody who wants to - frankly at this point with 15 minutes left on the call anybody who wants to bring up anything that is kind of - that they'd like to, you know, have a (parole) discussion to put their hand up. If not obviously we will review the chat for discussion - Donna Austin.

Donna Austin: Thanks Greg, Donna Austin for the record. I just want to go back a bit if I could. I haven't been actually on the - able to speak previously.

So I don't understand the security instability issue that was raised by Robert. So ICANN reorganization will still have a role. My understanding is that the security instability in the Internet is the responsibility of ICANN reorganization. I don't see any of these with the potential exception of Strawman 3, I don't understand how that responsibility changes in any of this - in Strawman proposals 1 and 2. So if somebody could explain that to me I'd really appreciate it.

Greg Shatan: Robert since you brought that up do you want to take a crack at responding to Donna?

Robert Guerra: I don't know, I mean I think what I - (often I think about it) and send something in but I think it's just more I had mentioned that we would want to discuss it because that is one. So I'll try to send something around that we can discuss. Or I'll refer to Jaap as well my colleague as well, my colleague on the outside if he wants to comment on any - on this as well.

Greg Shatan: Oh thanks Robert, before I turn to Jaap I guess my thought in listening to the discussion was not that ICANN would be in any responsibility for security instability would be taken away from ICANN.

That it would continue its role in that area but that perhaps the oversight body would essentially be overseeing that - or keeping an eye on that as well. Although that again may be kind of outside of the scope of the oversight body since oversight of ICANN and accountability by ICANN is not - that's really what the second working group that has just been created is dealing with. And if security instability outside of the performance of the IANA functions itself is a concern that is probably not within the scope of the proposal we're working on. But that's just my thinking and I'll turn the mic over to Jaap.

Jaap Akkerhuis: Well I just wanted to comment on the current situation (unintelligible) security, stability whatever and just in regards whether the processes (are followed) hopefully.

And if we start to (turn all the functions around, that's all) people are doing is removing responsibilities then yes maybe the new oversight body getting way bigger operation role and maybe then what Robert says should be taken to account. But I don't see that happen that quickly, so I'm more on Donna's side

to say well it's the responsibility to ICANN to make sure that (very strong) stability and security somehow fixed and this would oversight body would check whether or not this has been done than really setting the operational role in this.

Greg Shatan: Thank you Jaap. I guess another way to look at this question is what does the NTIA currently - what is its role currently in securing security instability of the Internet and what would change if the NTIA and particularly the IANA functions contract went away.

Is there something that needs to be substituted, especially looking at a more minimalist approach. If there isn't something that NTIA is doing now why would we need to create some new role to replace it?

Donna Austin: Greg it's Donna again.

((Crosstalk))

Greg Shatan: Donna I'll - I guess Donna you spoke first, so I'll give it to Donna and I think Jaap has something to say as well. And then I...

Donna Austin: Yes, so Greg I think that's a really important point. We need to understand what it is that NTIA does now. We also need to understand what the consequences of any of these Strawman might be it kind of, you know, two or three steps removed.

So what is the consequence of the (unintelligible) to the current situation and ICANN's responsibilities? Because I don't know that it's necessary with the exception of three, I don't think it's the intent that this oversight mechanism would expand its mandate any further than what the NTIA currently does with

that contract. So I really want to understand what the consequence of any of this is as well.

Greg Shatan: Thank you Donna, Jaap?

Jaap Akkerhuis: Yes actually I was about to say the same. You know, the first version of the (IBC) it looked like IANA was (unintelligible) - really checking of the (proposals) that come in but now the current version received correct to see that the act of just following and just (unintelligible) whether the process has been followed without actually getting into the process itself and that's the same with the security aspect.

Greg Shatan: Thank you Jaap - Grace.

Grace Abuhamad: Hi Greg, I just want to note with a few minutes left on the call that we have also an anonymous penguin in the document starting to write out what Strawman 4 could look like.

So just a note for the record that it's being done and if anyone wants to contribute to that Strawman or to another that we can build out columns in the document. And if the anonymous penguin wants to identify himself or herself they're welcome to do that as well.

Greg Shatan: Yes that would be helpful. Looks like we also have an anonymous buffalo, anonymous platypus, an anonymous quagga and anonymous turtle in as well.

Again any changes that are made should be being made in suggestion mode so I think that - and by a real person. So if we could try to do that, you know, at least identify yourself in the suggestion please that would be helpful - not that

I'm against animal rights. The anonymous penguin is probably Avri - that is a fair guess. Any other hands at the moment on this subject?

Grace Abuhamad: I can add Greg that if anyone wants to send me - if you haven't Googled an email or a Google Docs account or a Gmail account that you would like to be added specifically to the document I can do that for anyone as well.

Right now we just have it on edit access for anyone with the link but I think when you log in just with the link you come up as an anonymous animal. So if you would like to come up as yourself please let me know and I can easily add you to the document as a direct editor.

Greg Shatan: Grace that's a good point and I think Grace if you could put that out as an email invitation - an email to the group asking them to do that as well that would be helpful.

I put this out as a link or we put this out as a link just to get it out quickly and easily. But obviously the side effect of that is that we have a bunch of anonymous animals at the waterhole and not a bunch of committee members as such - Olivier Crepin-LeBlond.

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Thanks very much Greg, Olivier speaking. And I have an overarching question with regards to those four Strawman proposals.

Now of course I understand these are all in the context of the naming part of the IANA functions, how would these relate to the other two functions - the protocols and the numbers? The - I mean is this a job for the ICG at that point to try and see how these fit together or not? Because I've somehow (ogled) some of the other proposal and they are not going to such depths of having different Strawman and all this. And many just look at having a (nuisance)

and that would be as stable as possible with as few changes as possible. So (do the) makes the choice and what goes where?

Greg Shatan: Olivier I think that's a very good point and probably a very good last point for this call. I think on one level that it is the ICG's responsibility to deal with that.

However it's - it would be rather cavalier of us to act as if we can make a decision or make a proposal in a vacuum that won't get sent back to us because it looks like it was created in a vacuum. I think that we have a responsibility to look at this and one of the things that the RFP does ask for is to identify elements of interdependence between - with our community versus the other two communities as to their use of the IANA functions.

And so that's interdependence is certainly not out of the scope of the RFP and certainly isn't out of the scope of the work of this group. And obviously I would encourage anybody to look at the other two proposals and they are rather more modes than ours in part because there is already kind of an existing structure that is but clearly, you know, provides a leading candidate for moving forward. And not the same kind of need for change maybe because they're felt less dependent on NTIA to provide, you know, certain oversight than the main community has felt.

So certainly if there's any members of the ICG left on the call they could also speak to that. Grace is that a new hand?

Grace Abuhamad: Oh no my apologies Greg, that's an old hand.

Greg Shatan: That's okay, so that's kind of my thought on that. And so we can't ignore interdependence and I think that goes to Donna's point of consequences as well.

You know, clearly ideas that have a very different solution for the different communities need to be looked at carefully as to whether issues of interdependence and reparability of naming functions from other functions is sensible or workable. Some have stated on the list their belief that the IANA group has a separable naming function subgroup within, you know, the IANA group at ICANN.

I don't know whether that's true or not - it's perhaps another point on which we need clarity because the kind of go our own way proposal names is very easy for us to get going on in a silo. But ultimately this is not a siloed - the solution cannot be siloed even if our work is a little bit siloed. So I think we've now reached 10:59, I would encourage you all to continue working in the Strawman matrix in Google Docs. To go to the pros and cons documents as well and put your thoughts in there.

To make sure if you're working in the Google Docs to work in suggestion mode and to get put in by email - by Google identity so that you're not an anonymous animal. And that even if you are an anonymous animal to make a note in the - in your suggestion margin as to, you know, who you are in real life. So I want to thank you all for continuing on the call, thanks staff for all of their ongoing support.

I wish you all safe travels to Frankfurt, hopefully you all spend the next several days doing a lot of work for this committee both behind the scenes and, you know, on the email list and the Google Docs. And I will say at this point that I think it's time to stop the recording and say goodbye.

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