

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute					
Question 1								
Do you believe that the transition from the NTIA should happen (Please provide the reasons for your answer)?			Yes	No	Not Clear	Yes with Reservation	No Answer	
	Malcolm Hutty:	It would be desirable that the transition should happen with all the points that are necessary before transition being properly covered. But that is contingent support based on getting it right. I think that transition failing to happen is a lesser evil than getting it seriously wrong.	1					
	Xiaodong Lee:	I believe that transition should happen as two reasons. They have no reason to reject the hospitality of NTIA. Second one is we want to prove that the multistakeholder the governance model is successful. And to be, you know, reasonable and deployable and to be used in the future so ICANN, therefore the naming and addressing (unintelligible).	1					
Response (JR): Do you have any view on the timing?								
	Xiaodong Lee:	If I speak as a community member as the CEO of CNNIC, I prefer to finish that as (unintelligible). But now it is a very, very, you know, impossible to finish that before September. But I do hope we find some method to make it time short.						
	Bill Gibson:	My view on the timing is this: It's better to get it right than to get it right away.	1					
	Matthew Shears:	I'd like to think that we're all working to this target date. That is our first and foremost responsibility. So whether or not we need to compromise I think is a separate issue but certainly we are in favor of the transition; we are in favor of working to that target date. And I think that's what we should all be doing.	1					
	Andrew Sullivan:	I would like to ask a question of those who say it's more important to get it right than to get it by the date, why they believe that if they don't get it by the date they're going to get it at all. I think that's an important consideration that maybe some people have not taken into - have not internalized and so I would like people to consider that.			1			
	Martin Levy:	We talk about times I just want to remind people that it is 231 days until that date specified by the NTIA. It's actually 231 days and one hour and 11 minutes if you want to be accurate. Just keep that in mind when you think about what we're doing. That's not many days.			1			
	Milton Mueller:	I just want to point out that this question, one, we're probably asking the wrong crowd. There's a lot of people in Washington DC or in the United States that may have a different perspective on it and the people who participate in ICANN are probably committed to the idea of a global multistakeholder private sector based institution for global governance. And there's a lot of people who are not. Sure, if people here don't want the transition to happen it would be useful information to know that. But I wouldn't feel too confident about obstacles arising based on our positive response to this question.	1					
Response (JR): That's a fair point, Milton. But nevertheless it's - asking this group doesn't mean we've got the world's view but it does mean we've got this group.								
	Eric Brunner-Williams:	I don't think a transition should happen as, one, the IANA functions contain both USG property and significant government interest which may not be disposed of except through a surplus property process; and, two, the existing contract was led competitively for a finite period. Transition transforms this.		1				
Response (CG): In the public comment period that we did in the first of December, there was one comment that said they didn't want it to happen. There was another one but it was kind of a special case but there was only one comment in the public comment period that said they didn't want it to happen. But I just want to call that to your attention. There is analysis and summary of the public comments that's out there as well.								
	Nominet:	Yes. This has been a long term objective and we welcome the opportunity to move forward. We would also note that, now that the process has launched, it will be important for the multi-stakeholder community to develop a timely and credible proposal. However, there are two caveats: i. The proposal should be as practical and as simple as possible and should be focussed on the important operational role of the IANA functions operation. In this respect, it must "Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services;" and ii. It should not introduce uncertainties in the future operation of the service. In other words, we should focus on ensuring operational excellence and the IANA functions operator role should not depend on unrelated or tangential issues.	1					
	CDT:	Yes. It should happen, in the timeframe anticipated, and result in mechanisms or a model that provides the same level of certainty, stability, predictability, security and resiliency that the current external oversight model does.	1					
	Informal SSAC Response	Yes, because it is important IANA function oversight is moved from US Government to the communities that do set the policies by which IANA operates.	1					
	Richard Hill:	Only if adequate separation and accountability are in place. I associate with the comments made by Jordan Carter at: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-February/001685.html And with the comments made by Milton Mueller at: http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-February/001779.html	1					

RrSG:	Yes, the transition of stewardship of the IANA functions from the NTIA should happen. The transition is required for the following reasons: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In order for the internet and the structures that govern it to continue to grow and mature ● To foster global trust in the domain name system ● To ensure that no one government should has a special relationship with the IANA functions 	1					
InternetNZ:	Yes, given that NTIA has put the question on the table. The Internet's DNS should not be the responsibility, or under the control, of one government. For a considerable time this transition has been on the Internet community's agenda, and the multistakeholder model has matured to the point where a transition should be sustainable. There is one major caveat: the transition must lead to an "as--good---as" or improved situation in respect of the stewardship framework compared with today. A transition that makes the IANA functions less robust in the long run, more open to capture or weakens customer control over IANA functions, is not desirable. Fundamental to avoiding these problems is embedding a model of shared or distributed stewardship, where no "single point of failure" or new monopoly of DNS stewardship is created.	1					
EURid:	We believe this is something the ccTLD community has been pushing for over a decade and look forward to further contributing to a proposal that should be kept simple, concrete and, most of all, should guarantee secure and reliable services to all the IANA customers.	1					
ISPCP:	Yes the transition from the NTIA should happen to the benefit of the international Multistakeholder community, in a timely and organized manner. However, it is essential that proper accountability is in place before transition occurs.	1					
ALAC WG on IANA:	Yes, this is needed, due primarily to two reasons: a. the NTIA has always maintained that this transition was on its agenda. b. With the politicisation of all matters Internet Governance, this is probably overdue by now. The stewardship that NTIA undertook is (perhaps unfairly) seen in many countries as undue influence from the US government over what goes and what does not go in the Root. c. This is an opportunity to strengthen global multistakeholder oversight of this aspect of Internet Governance.	1					
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	Yes, provided that ICANN retain the IANA functions and ICANN performs its responsibilities while remaining accountable to the multistakeholder community.	1					
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	No. As an observer this is a mess, the proverbial Camel- a horse put together by Committee. Moreso the Board fails in transparency, accountability and all the ways they are profiting behind the scenes		1				
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	Yes provided sufficient accountability mechanisms are put in place beforehand.	1					
IPC-COA:	Yes, if accompanied by significant enhancements in ICANN's accountability to the community (at least work stream 1 enhancements must be in place) and guarantees of respect for the rule of law (including protection of copyright and other intellectual property rights).	1					
NCSG:	Yes. Unilateral US government control of the IANA functions contract is not compatible with the multistakeholder model	1					
cc_TLD_1	Yes, because it is a process that the NTIA itself has initiated and advocates (NTIA always cast this long process as a "transition"). Moreover, much water has passed under the bridge since ICANN was first established. The model has matured, as have the organisation and interactions with / between stakeholders. This is an evolutionary step and we can (finally) move away from spurious claims relating to the unique empowerment of one government.	1					
cc_TLD_2	Yes, we support the transition of the NTIA's stewardship role over the IANA Functions. The transition of NTIA stewardship is an important step in the evolution and maturation of the multi-stakeholder model. Notwithstanding, we think it is imperative that the transition be done right. This includes development of a sound transition plan that meets the needs of the customers of the IANA function; addressing contingencies, concerns, and potential issues related to the transition through stress testing; and ensuring that the requisite "Workstream 1" accountability mechanisms identified by the CCWG Accountability are in place prior to the transition.	1					
cc_TLD_3	Por los mecanismos de control y transparencia que son urgente para la Comunidad	1					
cc_TLD_4	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_5	The internet has grown beyond what was envisioned at the early years and the DNS industry has also prospered beyond what one country (e.g. the United State) alone would superintend by looking after the IANA functions and its Operator. The age of e.everything has strong impact on the economy Nations. Thus, the Internet Governance, going forward, should be the the affairs of all stakeholders. If the Multi-stakeholder approach is to be fully implemented, the internet community and stakeholders not one government should perform the oversight role of IANA function	1					

cc_TLD_6	The transition is intended to ensure that the oversight & accountability of the IANA function is free from the US governmental authority, and resides in a multi-stakeholder environment, which is a good thing because the bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach to internet governance and policy has proven to be a great success within ICANN. The transition will help internationalize ICANN in that it will do away with the negative perceptions that ICANN is but an agency of the US government, and will promote the openness of the internet. Importantly, the ICANN community should guard against using the transition process as an opportunity to explore new, unwarranted and radical IANA accountability & operations models. The transition should debate should focus on replacing NTIA as a matter or priority, especially considering the inherent timelines. It should not seek to review the overall current ICANN role in the IANA contract, but should seek to maintain and review it at a later time when we don't have time pressures. Also, IANA customers are well defined: TLD operators, RIRs, etc. The transition should really prioritize what IANA customers want, and not what secondary IANA service beneficiaries (who have no direct relationship with IANA) want. Also, the transition should not make a mistake of treating TLD operators the same, and especially should not compromise the autonomy of ccTLDs from ICANN.	1					
cc_TLD_7	The entire process in our opinions seems rushed....Are the requisite frameworks/resources in place to ensure a smooth transition..ICANN???		1				
cc_TLD_8	To ensure privatization on DNS and no one country having undue advantage over others	1					
cc_TLD_9	It is what the NTIA wishes provided the conditions of transition are met.	1					
cc_TLD_10	No Answer					1	
cc_TLD_11	Not at this time, the process has not taken into account full consultation and consideration of the transition to the internet community.		1				
cc_TLD_12	Besides the opportunity of converting this into a multistakeholder process, I think our community is having enough time to work out a consensed proposal, so we all are going to look bad if we fail to do the transition	1					
cc_TLD_13	No Answer					1	
cc_TLD_14	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_15	In my view, both ICANN and the multistakeholder model are mature enough to step in and take the responsibility and the service (role) delivered by NTIA.	1					
cc_TLD_16	The multistakeholder community has grown enough in maturity to supervise indirectly the overall NTIA functions, in place of one government in particular	1					
cc_TLD_17	The current control of USG bears risks to the long term coherence of the Internet - and wastes a lot of resources as it is discussed over and over again. Operationally the NTIA oversight is not harmful, and there are certainly possible scenarios that are worse.	1					
cc_TLD_18	I think, it is time that the NTIA hand over its stewardship to other hands	1					
cc_TLD_19	IANA stewardship should be neutral to any government.	1					
cc_TLD_20	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_21	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_22	IANA should be independent of any government.	1					
cc_TLD_23	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_24	No		1				
cc_TLD_25	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_26	No		1				
cc_TLD_27	Would relieve the pressure form certain countries looking for multilateral solutions and nothing a transition now would be seen as a failure of the multistakeholder model	1					
cc_TLD_28	It is important that IANA will be a neutral organization	1					
cc_TLD_29	It is all natural that all the functions of Domains and numbers should be under the multistakeholder hat.	1					
cc_TLD_30	stewardship of the global DNS should be the responsibility of the multi stakeholder community	1					
cc_TLD_31	It is natural development of global internet	1					

cc_TLD_32	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_33	It's working, more or less.		1				
cc_TLD_34	I do not see the need for a rush			1			
cc_TLD_35	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_36	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_37	the worldwide current is asking for that, all of effective actions need to be accompanied by democratization idea	1					
cc_TLD_38	To remove the control of one government over the entire internet.	1					

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute					
Question 2			Yes	No	Not Clear	Internal Accountability	External Oversight	No Answer
Are you comfortable with ICANN as policy-maker also being the IANA operator without the benefit of external oversight?								
	Sivasubramanian Muthusamy:	I'm very, very comfortable with ICANN as a policymaker and being the IANA operator. And I believe that as a multistakeholder organization it has the inherent capacity to create its own internal accountability mechanisms. So there's no need of external oversight.	1			1		
	Xiaodong Lee:	First I'm comfortable with ICANN as policymaker. I think it was proved to be best practice in the past 16 years. But second, I'm not comfortable ICANN be the IANA operator without the extra oversight. I think we need to get the community expertise to make sure that the IANA function have the service level agreement to the community.		1			1	
Response (JR): Xiaodong, can I just clarify that in your view an effective SLA would comprise some or all external oversight?								
	Xiaodong Lee:	Yeah, I think it's - we need to make sure and have a service level agreement but how to make sure that it is reasonable for the service level agreement and how to make sure that it was implemented rightly.						
	Donna Austin:	I've got a transcript from some of the discussion we had in the Registry Stakeholder Group about this question during the week. And I'd like to channel Bret Fausett who's actually gone home. He said, "[...] Am I comfortable with ICANN as policymaker? I'm not comfortable with ICANN processes being applied to the IANA processes because ICANN processes don't work and IANA processes work. So to the extent, I'd like to see that sort of separation maintained. If anything I'd love to see ICANN work like IANA works because IANA works."		1			1	
	Peter Dengate Thrush:	The answer is yes. I think the first part is that there is an issue that needs to be teased out in relation to policy and operation and we're going to talk about functional and structural and other separations that deal with that. The starting point is what's the internal oversight? And when you look at what we've done in building an ICANN starting really here in Singapore in 1999, we now include so many parts of the global community and the global Internet community and those that use the Internet that it's hard to imagine, you know, where you would go to find any body relevant outside. Just a quick list, it's not intended to be a summary of the structure of ICANN. But starting personally with the ccTLDs, we needed 30 ccTLDs to get the ccNSO off the ground and we got that and now we've got about 130 of the ccTLDs and we've had further CCs joining the ccNSO here in Singapore. We started off here in Singapore I think with about 30 or 40 GAC members and now there's about 150 and we've welcomed new governments, the government of Ireland and others have joined us. The governments are well represented, ccTLDs are well represented. I can remember the day when it was one registry and one registrar. We now have several hundred of the registries and all the registrars. So as you go through the Internet structure and the Internet user base you see that what's inside is extraordinary. And the question really is, is that sufficient given its understanding and its connection to the Internet to conduct appropriate oversight? My answer is yes because that is the body - those are the skills, those are the people and I haven't even mentioned all the At Large structures representing the user base and the non commercial users, everywhere you look in ICANN we have tried and I think reasonably well succeeded to bring in to the debate and bring in to the oversight process those people that are important.	1			1		
	Avri Doria:	On this one the general trend in NCSG answers is that we're not comfortable with the ICANN as policymaker without something. So we're not saying we must have an external oversight, what we're saying is if we don't have the external oversight then we need an at arm's length relationship that enables there to be agreements very similar to protocols and numbers have.		1			1	

Stephanie Perrin:	<p>I don't quite understand what we mean by external oversight because we seem to be confusing it with having a healthy robust multistakeholder participation.</p> <p>Yes, we have many, many stakeholders within the tent, keeping each other honest. That's not the same as having a totally independent body that has a look because there's always capture within a group.</p> <p>And the purpose of having external oversight is to have somebody, and they don't have to be expert in the actual functions of IANA to do decent oversight. They're looking at process and procedures and at the risk of sounding like a quality auditor, that's more or less the function that they're doing.</p> <p>So I think you do need external and I'm not comfortable with ICANN. And that's not a comment on ICANN as a multistakeholder, that's a comment on ICANN growing into being a more accountable organization. We're on a path, we need to keep on it, and that's why the external oversight is so important. You may get through some kind of a hybrid model in the mean time because we're on a maturation curve, but we need that.</p>		1			1	
Response (JR): There's a significant parallel track of work going on, on accountability. So in one sense in my opinion one has to continue to look at this both of those tracks and see does that question get answered by both rather than just by the work of this group. But nevertheless we feel it's an important question to ask and relevant to the transition.							
Martin Boyle:	<p>I think for me (unintelligible) answers are conditional answers.</p> <p>Firstly, ICANN as policymaker and the IANA operator, yes, so long as this is actually quite clear that the IANA function operator part of the business is exactly that, it's the function operator. It doesn't define the policy.</p> <p>We need to get it right, it is our responsibility to get it right. Whether that is external or not I think has to be decided. One of the major problems though I think we have is to try and make sure that is accountable to the people, the organizations that it needs to be accountable to. And for the moment it does seem to me that ICANN does provide a forum and we should be looking at that forum carefully.</p>	1			1		
Milton Mueller:	<p>I think people are kind of expounding on their solutions and talking about what forms of external oversight. But I understand you're saying external oversight here means NTIA.</p> <p>Take away NTIA are we comfortable with ICANN being policymaker also being IANA operator? My answer to that is simple: No. And I think most of the people in Non Commercial Stakeholder Groups who have discussed this would also say no.</p>		1			1	
David Cake:	<p>I don't think anyone feels that we should have no oversight at all or can ICANN manage to construct a sufficiently separate internal oversight mechanism so as to be effective.</p> <p>I don't think we can. We can try to create a mechanism within ICANN that is sufficiently separated from the same mechanisms that created policy in the first place. But I'm not sure we can (unintelligible) if it's going to be oversight it has to have some separation from what is going on and it's very difficult to say if we can build that separation strongly enough.</p>		1			1	
Russ Mundy:	<p>It's very, very easy for people to get that what we have right now works extraordinarily well. Okay. It's functioning and it's past, it's efficient. When you take away the NTIA's contract then you say what pieces have we really taken away for those things that are being done right now?</p> <p>We really may not need a huge amount of oversight type of activities because when one looks at what the NTIA does right now it's not a huge amount of things.</p> <p>So when you look at the multistakeholder approach think about how ICANN has orchestrated it you may or may not agree that it should be part of ICANN. But I think one of the things I'd like to ask that people really think hard about is the multistakeholder way of thinking and doing things maybe done within ICANN or within a different organization but we've had pretty good luck with ICANN over the last 15 years.</p>			1			
Bertrand de la Chapelle:	<p>When we talk about ICANN we need to always keep in mind the different dimensions. ICANN is not so much the policymaker as the GNSO is the policymaker for the names.</p> <p>Having been on the Board, the concept is that the Board validates what the GNSO does. And in this regard ICANN the policymaker, being theoretically the GNSO validated by the Board, is not the IANA operator.</p> <p>The functional separation that has been introduced by the last contract, can be strengthened.</p>			1			
Seun Ojedeji:	<p>One could say the need for audits just like what Stephanie said could be required at some point but that could possibly trigger it. It's not a yes or no response to this particular question. But if it is a matter of whether we need a standing external oversight it would be an outright no from me, personally. But do we need a (unintelligible) oversight I think is a yes.</p>	1				1	
Xiaodong Lee:	<p>I think is (unintelligible) that the community have a concern about ICANN because of the transparent and accountable issues. But we never find another one which is better than ICANN in the past 16 years.</p> <p>The second one is ICANN is the operator for IANA for the past 16 years but we need to clearly note that the function of IANA now is the big difference whereas before because of the new gTLD opening.</p> <p>In the future that be a lot of TLD to be added into the IANA. So IANA now is really like a registry of root servers. So it will have the same function and the same concern, same security (unintelligible) as a registry of root server zone. So how to have the oversight. I think it's not (unintelligible) at this time what is external or internal. I prefer that the IANA function need to be separate from ICANN.</p>			1			
Nurani Nimpuno:	<p>Very clear suppression of operation and policymaking; those two things need to be very clearly separated. And when looking at the policymaking we need to ensure that that structure is bottom up, mature, robust and is trusted by the community.</p>		1				

Kurt Pritz:	<p>There's really two questions up here for me. One is am I comfortable with ICANN as policymaker also being the IANA operator. And the answer for me is yes. It's easy to say there should be more separation but I don't think we really understand what separation exists.</p> <p>And in my opinion part of the reason why IANA works so well now is ICANN has a broad breadth of expertise and on complex questions having to do with different regions and handling different countries it's very helpful to walk down the hall and ask somebody a question. So I would be careful about arbitrarily increasing separations without knowing that the separations that are already mandated and in place work.</p> <p>Without the benefit of external oversight I think there should be an external or some sort of backstop and not necessarily oversight. So where NTIA provides significant value to me is in backstopping IANA decisions if they're controversial. Think about some controversial delegations. NTIA could point to IANA and say they followed their processes and IANA could point to the NTIA and say they verified that - and that cut off, for me or helps avoid for me a lot of the controversy around these decision</p>	1			1		
Peter Dengate Thrush:	<p>The question was posed in a unbalanced way in suggesting that there is a benefit of external oversight. If you take this question any further I suggest you take to the word "benefit" which is pretty loaded. What you mean is the presence or even you could say the absence of oversight.</p> <p>What's important about oversight is that it be independent, that it be objective, that it be reviewable, that it be accountable.</p> <p>So where it sits whether it's external or internal is actually not a terribly valuable issue. If they're external but completely corrupt I don't really want them. If they're external but have values that I know don't approve of, I don't care that they're external, that doesn't bring me any benefit whatsoever.</p>	1					
<p>Response (JR): When I read it, it was pretty clear to me that what this meant was a question around, you know, assuming IANA is within ICANN the question related to external oversight or as you, perhaps more effectively put it, independent oversight of ICANN. But I do notice that some of the answers referred to oversight of IANA.</p> <p>And so I think that's a subtlety in there. It's what is the form of oversight - independent oversight of IANA? And there's Kurt's point about backstop. So we need to tease apart the oversight of IANA and what form of oversight is required and in addition should IANA be part of ICANN what the independent or external oversight of ICANN is.</p>							
Nominet:	<p>The current contract from NTIA requires ICANN to keep its policy (and gTLD-operations) roles separate from the IANA functions operator role. This should remain the case.</p> <p>We would see oversight as being our role as the community with two levels of accountability:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. The IANA functions operator's accountability to its customers – the gTLDs and ccTLDs, the RIRs and the IETF. This is operational accountability for the quality, security and trustworthy nature of the service and is a direct customer-supplier accountability relationship (in the same way as the IANA functions customers have accountability to their customers); and ii. A general accountability of good stewardship to the wider community. This does not displace or replace accountability to the customers, but is nevertheless an important part of the transparency and accountability of a fundamental part of the Internet's core infrastructure. <p>We see no overriding reason why, for TLDs, either these functions should not be carried out within the ICANN community where most of the main stakeholders (both direct and indirect) already engage. In fact this has advantages as interested stakeholders do not have to fit in additional meetings and regular updates can be scheduled at ICANN meetings.</p> <p>That is not to say that accountability discussions could not be organised in conjunction with other stakeholder groupings and we would highlight IETF, RIR, NRO meetings where customer communities are active, as well as the IGF for wider stakeholder engagement.</p>				1		
CDT:	<p>No. Everyone says that they are comfortable with the performance of the IANA functions operator at the moment but that comfort is due in part to the role of the NTIA (administrative and stewardship (through the contract and the AOC)). We cannot afford to assume or hope that an "internal" model without appropriate external oversight will provide the same performance and comfort. The only way to ensure that there is adequate separation between policy-making and policy implementation in a model that does not have such oversight is to fully separate the two - structural rather than functional.</p>		1				
Informal SSAC Response	<p>Impossible to answer as "ICANN" is not specified well enough.</p> <p>I am comfortable with ICANN ccNSO and gNSO being policy makers while the IANA Function at ICANN Corporation is implementing the policy developed by the PDPs.</p>	1					
Richard Hill:	<p>No. Again, I associate with the comments cited above, and I refer to the JNC submission at: http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/msg00009.html</p>		1				
RrSG:	<p>Yes, provided appropriate accountability measures are put in place, including the potential for separability. ICANN must be accountable to the global internet community in order for it to remain the IANA functions operator.</p>	1					

InternetNZ:	<p>Policy---making and registry operations are two separate functions and should always be split. The role of ICANN for ccTLD managers is to facilitate the community development of necessary global policies. This is similar in some ways to its role for the other IANA customer groups – policy authority for those sits outside ICANN.</p> <p>ICANN does not and should not have a general policymaking role for our community. Its role is very circumscribed and must remain so.</p> <p>We do not think there is an inevitable conflict between ICANN being the hub for domain name policy, but this requires clear separations that cannot be eroded over time between ICANN the policy---maker and ICANN the IANA functions operator.</p> <p>We support the models the names community is developing in the sense that they all include a requirement for “separability” of the IANA functions operator from ICANN as policy---maker. A workable model of separability is a bottom line for ICANN remaining the policy---maker and the IANA functions operator. This applies regardless of any improved general accountability settlement for ICANN.</p>		1				1	
EURid:	We recommend the policy function to be kept separate from the operational function. However, we believe that any function must foresee accountability mechanisms to ensure the reliability and quality of the functions.	1					1	
ISPCP:	The ISPCP is satisfied with ICANN being the policy-maker and the IANA services operator as long the IANA related policy development is totally separated from the operation. Community oversight is needed to ensure separability of the IANA function from ICANN in the situation where IANA fails to provide services as committed to the community.	1					1	
ALAC WG on IANA:	Yes but only provided the the internal accountability mechanisms and right processes are in place to recover from the unlikely scenario that ICANN goes rogue, and provided there is a satisfactory internal separation between policy and operations.	1					1	
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	Accountability vis-à-vis external oversight should be addressed within the CWG-Accountability. To this end, an external contracting company is not necessary as part of the IANA stewardship transition, in particular because the IANA functions work well at present.	1					1	
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	Not at all. ICANN first of all has not been "just" a policy maker. How can you be a policy maker when you are selling/auctioning and collecting the money from the auctions. A non-profit means just that non-profit not accumulating profits that are exponentially increasing. Moreso ICANN has failed to protect Trademarks, devastating people's businesses etc		1					
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	Yes, provided there is accountability to the community.	1					1	
IPC-COA:	Yes, if accompanied by significant accountability enhancements as noted above.	1					1	
NCSG:	No. Further, while everyone says that they are comfortable with the performance of the IANA functions operator at the moment, that comfort is in part due to the role of the NTIA (administrative and stewardship (through contract and AOC)). We cannot afford to assume or hope that such an “internal” model without external oversight will provide the same performance and comfort. The only way to ensure that there is a adequate separation between policymaking and policy implementation in a model that does not have external oversight is to fully separate the two structural rather than functional.		1				1	
cc_TLD_1	A yes or no (black/white) answer to this question is difficult, depending upon a number of contextual factors. Yes, ICANN can be the policy-maker (noting that this specifically ccTLDs and gTLDs when it comes to IANA-related issues) and also the body tasked with the role of IANA functions manager. However, this response is qualified and based upon the need for separability and IANA independence that the community is currently working towards a model for	1						
cc_TLD_2	We are generally comfortable with ICANN continuing to serve as both a convener for the policy making processes for the GNSO and CCNSO and as the IANA operator. We note the key distinction that ICANN is not in its own right the policymaker for ccTLD and gTLDs, but rather facilitates policy development through the applicable multi-stakeholder process. The acceptability of ICANN continuing both of these roles is not condition-free. It depends upon continued insulation of the IANA functions from the ICANN policy process and development and implementation of a sound transition proposal by the CWG IANA and an accountability framework by the CCWG-Accountability. These outputs must meet the needs of the customers of the IANA functions in terms of operational performance and transparency and provide for overall organizational accountability, respectively. We believe that some external oversight over the performance of the IANA functions is still desirable, but that this oversight could take a variety of forms. We strongly support the formation of a Customer Standing Committee to regularly review the performance of the IANA Functions against established service levels and the continuation of existing reporting and transparency requirements to facilitate third party monitoring of this nature.	1					1	
cc_TLD_3	Es importante crear un organo de vigilancia a lo externo para transparentar todo los procesos entre partes relacionadas.		1					
cc_TLD_4	No		1					
cc_TLD_5	Yes and No As long as there is a separation between policy making function and operational function, within the ICANN Structure that would enable the ccTLD as IANA direct customer, to interact directly with the operator without the ICANN Board intervention. As long as the oversight is done by the direct customer and affected persons in hte IANA Function	1						

cc_TLD_6	<p>This is a tricky question that is not easy to answer on a yes or no basis. The status quo is that NTIA is an external overseer, and has performed that role well. Based on this, there is no justification why this model (of having an external overseer) should be changed. In fact, the NTIA IANA transition announcement last year showed that the NTIA is confident that an external overseer is an effective model, hence the NTIA is looking for a multi-stakeholder, non-governmental body to play that role. We are therefore comfortable with retaining an external overseer who will play the current NTIA role (including setting performance targets for ICANN) and even have power, at the remotest of possibilities, to take away the IANA function from ICANN. Judging by the NTIA requirement, if a possibility of doing away with an external oversight were to be explored, one is tempted to explore the possibility of having the IANA oversight function allocated to the IANA customers. Who better provides IANA oversight and assess the efficacy of IANA's performance than the IANA customers themselves? If such an approach is agreeable, ICANN can then set up an equally and geographically representative panel of IANA customers to play the oversight function. Of course, the success of such a panel (call it an "IANA Review Panel") would depend on the accountability measures compelling the ICANN Board to accept the decisions of the Panel. In addition, the ICANN Board can set an appeals panel (call it an "IANA Appeals Panel") from outside the ICANN community to which parties aggrieved by IANA and the IANA Review Panel's decisions may appeal. The appeals' panel decisions would become final and binding. This approach could allow ICANN to establish the IANA function as a separate subsidiary with a separate budget, but such structural separation is not a must.</p>		1			1	
cc_TLD_7	No		1				
cc_TLD_8	ICANN must get the consensus of members on major issues or major decisions	1					
cc_TLD_9	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_10	No		1				
cc_TLD_11	No		1				
cc_TLD_12	I could say yes in a first moment, but I would rather be able to work some form of external oversight.		1			1	
cc_TLD_13	No		1				
cc_TLD_14	No		1				
cc_TLD_15	Mature management requires acceptance of external oversight; this is very important function which supports growth and development.		1				
cc_TLD_16	structural or operational separation is necessary to insure that policy making is not influenced by execution contingency. Furthermore, policy making as well as operations (execution) has to be oversighted		1			1	
cc_TLD_17	We could live with it, although we'd prefer to have some oversight. This oversight could be part of the ICANN arena but would have to be outside of the control of the ICANN board.	1				1	
cc_TLD_18	for a ccTLD ICANN is not the police making organisation, therefore I think the operational part of IANA is well located within ICANN, but there should be an external oversight body or organisation		1			1	
cc_TLD_19	Yes, if both policy-making and IANA operation have enough accountability to the community and the community has enough power to redress the unfavorable activities of ICANN.	1			1		
cc_TLD_20	As long as there is a multistakeholder oversight and a possibility of later separability	1			1		
cc_TLD_21	Only if ICANN accountability is improved = there is no need for oversight. Yes there is already a separation between policy making part for TLDs and IANA operations but can be improved too. e.g. IANA can be operated as a sister or a subsidiary company of ICANN but some process separation should be in place.	1			1		
cc_TLD_22	We didn't experience any problem with ICANN and IANA until now.	1					
cc_TLD_23	No		1				
cc_TLD_24	No		1				
cc_TLD_25	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_26	No		1				
cc_TLD_27	As long as ICANN is in both roles under the oversight of the multistakeholder community as is what the CCWG currently strives for	1					
cc_TLD_28	I am sure that ICANN is able to manage the accountability with the communities' support	1					
cc_TLD_29	This is a multistakeholder environment, and will have the oversight built in to it.	1					
cc_TLD_30	ICANN should outsource the IANA operation so that there can be a choice of operators that can meet the SLA.		1				
cc_TLD_31	No		1				
cc_TLD_32	Yes	1					

cc_TLD_33	ICANN is desperately lacking transparency and accountability.		1			
cc_TLD_34	No		1			
cc_TLD_35	Yes	1				
cc_TLD_36	Yes	1				
cc_TLD_37	From the time where you want to lock any operation without opening, it's a bad thing		1			
cc_TLD_38	There is a critical need of separation of policy making and policy implementation (operations)		1			

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute					
Question 3			Yes	No	Not Clear	Yes, w/ Reservation	No, w/ Reservation	No Answer
Should registries, as the primary customers of the IANA functions, have more of a say as to which transition proposal is acceptable?								
	Donna Austin:	Yes, in the Registry Stakeholder Group we do think that's the case. But we'd qualify that with the fact that it's also - one of the requirements that NTIA had put in those four dot points that this solution had to be acceptable, sorry, to the registry operators. So it's in that broader context as well.	1					
	Malcolm Hutty:	No, the criteria is that transition must be acceptable to a broad consensus of the community. If there is any substantial element of the community to which transition is unacceptable then transition - then that proposal should not be accepted. So if a particular proposal is unacceptable to the registry community it should be unacceptable. If it is unacceptable to others it should also be unacceptable. The registries should not be able to dictate a solution anymore than one should be imposed upon them.		1				
	Alan Barrett:	I would urge you to please try to be consistent in your use of terminology. Here you are saying should registries, as the primary customers of the IANA functions... I think you're referring to domain name registries, not registries in general. There are other kinds of registries as well. And, you know, you're the customers of the names part of the IANA function.			1			
	Xiaodong Lee:	Registries means the Internet registries or TLD registries? So in a registry for IP address and TLD registry for domain name. So my answer is yes, especially for the ccTLDs I know that so many ccTLDs is NGO. Also the (unintelligible) of their community. So my answer is yes.	1					
	Milton Mueller:	I think the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group was pretty unanimous. However, we'll say that we interpreted this as applying only to names; when we say registries there we think domain name registries and when we talk about IANA functions, because we're working on the naming part of the proposal, so everything else is not referenced. So our answer to this was pretty much what someone else just said, the proposal has to be acceptable to all stakeholder groups. There are certain parts of the solution in which you might want registries to have more of a say. But holistically as to which transition proposal is acceptable the registries cannot and by the NTIA's criteria have anymore influence than any other stakeholder group.		1				
	Eric Brunner-Williams:	It would not be sensible to ignore the existing registry operators. However, to privilege the incumbents is formalizing an informal agency capture.				1		
	Bertrand de la Chapelle:	I support what Malcolm Hutty was saying regarding the final validation of any proposal and no particular different weight in terms of who accepts and who does not. What I think we're talking about is not so much the final validation stage but the development and the weighing of the different options. It's important to distinguish the validation phase in the end where nobody has a particular different role and the discussion phase where the position of the registries is clearly to take into account with a qualitative weight.		1				
	Martin Levy:	I want to expand on what Alan just said about the different type of registries and just, again, maybe for the record, point out that from the protocols point of view one of the three stakeholders within - or users of the IANA functions, the RFC went for review and was published and technically the IETF for the protocol side is done. From the numbers side, one of the other - the other 1/3 of the users of the IANA functions, the CRISP team, is for all intense and purposes, done. And this has gone to ICG. The third users, yourselves, are not done. I don't know how to put it any other way. But, you know, this is - this is a great set of questions on the Board here but I'm going to go back to my previous point about the amount of time left and just point out to you guys tick, tick, tick. This has to get going, guys.			1			
	Martin Boyle:	Really, as this is such a critical operational process there is no solution if it does not get good registry buy-in. That doesn't mean to say that we shouldn't also be looking at the wider support of the community. And I would be very concerned if the community and the registries were diverging in their areas of interest. Something is going seriously wrong because if it doesn't work for the registries then the solution is going to be broken.				1		
	Seun Ojedeji:	While I agree that maybe some level of registry consideration should be given but I think we need to be careful about setting precedence. I happen to participate in the RIR process in developing the proposal and was also following the IETF. I don't run a registry; I don't run an IP registry. And my feedback was taken as an individual. So please, let's not do something different from what other communities have done especially in the process of taking feedback and treating them fairly. I think that is very important.		1				

Russ Mundy:	<p>I hate to say it but I want to lighten the tone a little bit, reminds me of 1984. All stakeholders are equal except some stakeholders are more equal than other stakeholders. So I think the real answer to this truly is no. But there's a possible exception; and that exception would be if some part or some elements of the proposed solution had a (unintelligible) flaw to them.</p> <p>In the case of a particular activity I think that's the only time when the registrars, if you will, might get a bigger say if there was something technically broken about what was being proposed. Otherwise all stakeholders should be equal.</p>		1				
Greg Shatan:	<p>If there is concern about a plan that will lessen the operational excellence of IANA and the registries identify that and they express a reservation because of that clearly we should all be listening to them.</p> <p>If there is some other reason that doesn't have to do with operational excellence that the registries might prefer a plan - one plan over the other then no, there's really no reason to favor their opinion in that sense.</p> <p>And of course I would note in the sense this is also a red herring since this needs to go to each of the chartering organizations, some of which include only registries; some of which include registries, registrars and non contracted parties; some of whom include no registries.</p>				1		
Nominet:	<p>As noted above under 2. above, we believe that there are two distinct types of accountability. For i., where accountability is against performance, we believe that this should be predominantly an engagement between the direct customers and the IANA functions operator.</p> <p>However, even for ii., where decisions need to be made by the community, we do not believe that it would be appropriate for the customers' views to be ignored or overridden.</p>				1		
CDT:	No. No one stakeholder or community should have greater say than any other in determining which transition model is acceptable. A greater say for the registries would undermine the multi-stakeholder model.		1				
Informal SSAC Response	<p>The registries are not the primary customers of the IANA functions.</p> <p>The IANA functions include many other things like IP Addresses, Protocol Parameters etc.</p> <p>The balance in who has what say regarding instructions to IANA should be set by the design of the PDPs that control the IANA functions which include ccNSO and gNSO.</p>						
Richard Hill:	Yes, for what concerns names. See the JNC submission cited above.	1					
RrSG:	<p>Yes, this is reasonable for the Names component of the proposal. The variety of Registries (ccTLD,gTLD, brand, etc) and their reliance on the IANA functions gives them a unique and important perspective. Perhaps a better way to recognize the registries in the assessment of the transition proposal is to acknowledge that their perspectives are the most crucial to a successful transition.</p> <p>Registries need to define and assess the operating and escalation procedures, SLAs and dispute mechanisms they need to interact with the IANA functions operator successfully. These are operational elements the Registries deal with regularly and they are therefore ideally placed to determine if the proposal is adequate.</p>	1					
InternetNZ:	<p>Yes, when it comes to the customer service role of IANA and the risks to that from capture or poor performance (which are a fundamental risk for registries).</p> <p>To serve the public interest, the ICANN community and the IANA functions operator must deliver completely reliable registry services to TLDs. There is 100% alignment of interests between registries and the IANA functions operator here, but the same cannot be said for other stakeholder groups. Therefore it is vital that the requirements of customers are fully met in determining an acceptable transition proposal.</p> <p>It is also important that this be, insofar as possible, a consensus perspective of the customers – both between the communities that use IANA functions, and within them as well. We note the Names community has some way to go to arrive at such a consensus.</p>	1					
EURid:	As primary customers of the IANA functions, the registries should be directly involved and eventually, more engaged in any transition proposal. We fear that few of the ccTLD managers are participating proactively in this process.	1					
ISPCP:	No! Firstly we challenge the perception of registries being the primary customers (at most up to 1/3). This is a community-wide approach where no priority should be given to any single part of. Registries should have a major voice in the setting of SLA's for root zone management.	1					
ALAC WG on IANA:	No. Registries should have more of a say in the operational oversight of the IANA functions but the NTIA has explicitly asked that a solution be proposed by the Global Multistakeholder community and that is understood by our members as a balanced global multistakeholder community, free of overreaching influence from a single stakeholder group.	1					
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	The entire community should have an equal say with respect to CWG-Accountability. We are indifferent on the subject with respect to CWG-IANA, provided that the proposal does not create any venues to re-litigate decided policy matters.	1					
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	No not at all.	1					
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	No	1					
IPC-COA:	No. Registries should have a significant role in oversight of the IANA functions relating to domain names after transition. However, the transition proposal itself needs to be acceptable to all stakeholders.					1	
NCSG:	The NTIA has made it clear that all major stakeholder groups, including registries, need to accept the transition proposal. Registries should have an influential role in any oversight mechanisms of the namingrelated IANA functions, but need not have a privileged role in the selection of proposals.	1					

cc_TLD_1	Again, this is a tricky question, depending upon the context applied. Yes, essential customers of IANA, such as registries, should both have a significant role in choosing a transition proposal and being involved in the structures that succeed the current role performed by the NTIA. But lets not forget the numbering and protocols communities.	1					
cc_TLD_2	One criterion described by the NTIA was that the proposal must meet the needs of the customers of the IANA functions, which for the naming functions refers to ccTLD and gTLD registry operators. Registries' businesses are uniquely dependent on the continued operational performance of the IANA naming functions. As such, we believe that any proposal must be deemed acceptable by ccTLD and gTLD registry operators.	1					
cc_TLD_3	Que es necesario evolucionar a las tendencias del mundo, IANA ha cumplido satisfactoriamente su periodo, no obstante es necesario crear externamente un ente contralor externo para transparentar los procesos	1					
cc_TLD_4	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_5	For the naming community, ccTLD Registries as the primary customers of the IANA functions, should have more say as to transition proposal. Having dealt with the IANA functions over the years and recognising the impact a wrong proposal would have on the every existence (commercial and sovereignty) of the cc Registries, call for greater consideration of their views in whatever transition proposal that would be put forward.	1					
cc_TLD_6	Yes, definitely. In terms of operational performance, IANA customers should have an imposing say because they are the customers. It will not make sense to have a non-TLD operator having an equal say to IANA customers when it does not have a (direct and clear) customer relationship to IANA. At a secondary level on matters of non-operational policy relating to IANA (e.g. addition of new gTLDs), the broader internet community may enjoy equal voice with IANA customers.	1					
cc_TLD_7	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_8	Registries need to protect their interests and thereby protect their constituencies	1					
cc_TLD_9	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_10	No Answer						1
cc_TLD_11	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_12	I understand we have created commisions that intent to represent our interests. While more people is involved, it is more difficult to reach consensus.		1				
cc_TLD_13	No Answer						1
cc_TLD_14	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_15	The registries are key clients of IANA and focus mainly on technical aspects including service level. The scope of transition proposal is much wider.		1				
cc_TLD_16	Registries are not the primary customers of all IANA functions. They are essential customers of the naming function. They have to be listened carefully, and yet they are not the most important stakeholders as stakeholders has to be taken on equal footing.		1				
cc_TLD_17	I don't agree that registries are more important. They are only more complicated.		1				
cc_TLD_18	the IANA part is very important for all ccTLD's and therefore there voice should be heart	1					
cc_TLD_19	Yes, especially for the technical aspects of the IANA functions.	1					
cc_TLD_20	But only in relation to the technical performance	1					
cc_TLD_21	But the end of the day it is negotiation and coming to a mutually acceptable agreement with other customers of IANA.	1					
cc_TLD_22	Registries should verify the acceptability of the transition proposal.	1					
cc_TLD_23	No Answer						1
cc_TLD_24	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_25	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_26	No Answer						1
cc_TLD_27	There is a direct dependency with regard to the IANA services. So proposals should only be acceptable and presented to the NTIA if these proposals have the support of the registries. This is however already part of the NTIA criteria, so should not be an issue.	1					
cc_TLD_28	We are the organizations that needs the IANA's services	1					
cc_TLD_29	CC and g-Tlds should have more saying about oversight and control over IANA. But the decision should be clear multistakeholder - all have same saying.		1				

cc_TLD_30	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_31	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_32	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_33	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_34	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_35	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_36	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_37	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_38	Registries are more linked to IANA as far as day to day registry operations are concerned. Again, registries are entrusted by their communities. However, since registries are not the only customers of IANA other parties should be given weight (RIR, IETF).	1					

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute				
Question 4 & Question 5							
4) What does functional separation of IANA from ICANN mean to you? (this is not referring to having another operator than ICANN performing the IANA functions but rather the internal separation between ICANN and IANA in the context where ICANN is the IANA operator)			Yes	No	Not Clear	No Answer	
5) Do you believe the IANA function is adequately separated from ICANN under the current arrangements (internal separation)?							
Response (JR): We've got 4 and 5 on this slide but let's start with Question 4 which is: What does functional separation of IANA from ICANN mean to you? And here we are not referring to another operator other than ICANN performing the IANA functions but rather the internal, that is to say functional separation, in the context where ICANN is the IANA operator. Any comments or questions on this? In fact, we could deal with both 5, which is perhaps why we put these on the slide together. Do you believe the IANA function is adequately separated from ICANN under the current operation? Is the current functional separation adequate?							
	Xiaodong Lee:	For the Question 4, first the meaning for me is we need to balance the policymaker and the technical operation. And also (unintelligible) VeriSign or other registry operators to make sure that the root server is stable, I mean, the database is stable.			1		
	Bertrand de la Chapelle:	Follow up on my first intervention earlier on, this notion of functional separation is related to three layers. One is the people who actually do the processing of the request for changes and also supervise the technical automated mechanisms for changes. This is ICANN - currently ICANN staff but it is in a specific department just like I would say the GDD has been set out by the specific department. I think the IANA functions are separated in the same way. There is the head or the person who manages this department, currently Elise Gerich. This functional separation could go one leg up with something that we more or less call the CSC today but I would call the trustees group. And this was ensure a vertical separation of operations. It could even be another building or whatever. The notion being that ICANN is an umbrella thing that has different functions and one of them is to manage the gTLD program in its implementation; another one is to provide support for the policymaking by the community and another one is the IANA function in itself. And so in this regard it is one step removed from structural separation but it would limit as much as possible the responsibility of ICANN and the Board in particular regarding the IANA to very limited aspects. And one thing that could be explored is the conditions of selection of the person, the role that Elise Gerich plays today, who has the right to weigh in on how it is chosen. That's an interesting question.	1				
	Malcolm Hutty:	Imagine the situation where the decision had been taken to engage in structural separation and that it was met with the objection for practical technical reasons because of how it is so intertwined with ICANN; that actually can't be done. To me functional separation is having arrangements where it would not be met with such an objection. And therefore it would answer Question 5 in the affirmative; it is sufficiently separated because we're capable of having these discussions right now.	1				
	Martin Boyle:	I certainly see this question very clearly but being about the separation between the policy framework and the operational part. This is a formal requirement of the NTIA contract. And it's something that the ccTLD community thought a long time to make sure that we did not get arbitrary decisions from the IANA functions operator that weren't backed with a policy agreement. Because it's a formal part of the contract, because it's happened, the relationship between ccTLD community and the IANA has improved. The quality of the IANA functions operation has improved. And therefore I think my answer to the question at the bottom is yes.	1				

	Kurt Pritz:	I think functional separation means that the IANA function must always make decisions in compliance with existing policy. And even if the root zone management change requestor, and a number of parties in IANA agree that a change in contravention to existing policy would be better that IANA is constrained to existing policy so they can't make policy on the fly. Martin Boyle put that much better. Another feature of separation is that IANA staff can participate in policy discussion as far as providing information because they have most often the most valuable and insightful opinions but they can not join in the debate or discussion that formulates policy. So that's a second feature of functional separation. And I said before I think the separation now is adequate and works well.	1					
	Milton Mueller:	There is a recurring problem in this dialogue when we're talking about IANA and ICANN, are we talking about it is - as it is now which means the NTIA is there and the NTIA contract is there? Or are we talking about it once that is gone? So I would have to answer the second question with another question which is when you say "current arrangements" do you mean with the IANA contract or not?						
Response (JR): My sense of the question, Milton, is that: the current arrangements or functional separation with NTIA in place.								
	Milton Mueller:	All right because I think Martin made a very important point that not only is functional separation - actually both Martin and Kurt pointed out various ways in which the current contract requires what we now have, whether you call it functional separation or not, I don't care very much. It's clearly not structural separation. So whatever kind of separation we have now is created by and defined by the NTIA contract. Could that be better? I think there could be some improvement in separation of the budget, for example. And so if you say we can just remove the NTIA from the picture and the IANA function will be adequately separated from ICANN, our answer would be resoundingly no. We need something, either structural or contractual to maintain the current level of separation and perhaps to enhance it.	1					
Response (JR): For me this is serving the purpose that we intended to do because it's teasing out some subtleties. And to my mind this will help inform the proposal such that the proposal can be more specific of the post transition arrangement.								
There's a weakness in the question and there are probably weaknesses in all the questions as I said in response to Peter's. But it is nevertheless helping to further inform the work of the group. So to that extent it's serving the purpose and so it's very useful to me and I hope others.								
	Milton Mueller:	I only just started thinking now what do we actually mean by current arrangements? And what would happen to these arrangements if the contractor is not there. So, yeah, you're right. The questions are doing their job. I'm not complaining about the question. I'm trying to go to the substance.						
	Andrew Sullivan:	To me the Question 5 here is - the critical word in it is adequately. And so I feel pretty strongly actually that the current arrangements, yes, there's an adequate separation there and therefore that is the kind of thing that we ought to be build on.	1					
	Wolf-Ulrich Knochen:	We discussed that matter in our [ISPCP] constituency meeting. And we would not have a final answer to that but we understand the question as being supposed that there is an internal solution and then the question is how is that run with regards to the IANA functions in terms of accountability and operational accountability as well. So from an operational point of view I would say - I would refer to what Bertrand was saying, it was an interesting notion with regard whether we could kind establish kind of, I would say, Chinese wall internally, between ICANN and IANA. From an operational point of view I would fully agree to that, that is viable and that is doable. From the accountability point of view, I'm personally not yet at the - in the position to say well I'm not convinced, not yet convinced that it is working that way that a community could agree to that. So that's the position what we have at the time being. And we are - what we're taking this point in this direction and putting more discussion in it.	1					
	Bertrand de la Chapelle:	In the expression current arrangements there is one thing which includes NTIA in the loop of the validation of the different changes. What I'm talking about here is the actual structure of the IANA operations within ICANN. And I take the NTIA part out of this. So if I just look at the three layers that I mentioned earlier the actual work that is being done by the staff, it can be - Kim Davies to put names on people and the team - you get the Elise Gerlich (unintelligible) and you get the next level which currently (unintelligible) CCs go to a different channel. For the new gTLDs entering in the root actually it doesn't come to the Board whereas strangely enough for ccTLD delegation and redelegation the thing comes to the Board with a certain level of ambiguity within the Board on what is the extent of this power. I think if we look at this system today the separation is, in my view, not sufficient because of this channel that comes to the Board and the establishment of what was mentioned as a sort of China wall, is an interesting approach to say the goal is to build this China wall a little bit higher and to have this trustees group playing the oversight role or the - not oversight, the validation role in the channel. And we can discuss further the extent of their respective responsibilities on the Gs and on the CCs.	1					
	Annebeth Lange:	There should be full accounting separation and personnel operation. And even if IANA is a part of ICANN it is essential for the trust in the market that the separation is absolute. So especially in these times where we are changing it is really so important to be sure that the separation is not only adequately, we must be absolutely sure that everybody else outside our community thinks the same.	1					

Russ Mundy:	<p>This is one area in particular where the multistakeholder communities need to work hard at compromise and thinking at what will be an adequate answer both in the near term and perhaps in the longer term.</p> <p>From my perspective having both read the contract, knowing a lot about the people involved in the IANA function, working with them for a long time as well as the other ICANN staff and the ICANN process and Bertrand makes a good point, there are different steps that occur for different types of things that happen.</p> <p>But I believe in particular with the term "adequate" as Andrew pointed out earlier, I think the answer to both of these questions for a near term transition approach is, yes, there is sufficient separation now and it is under the current arrangements. These may need to be changed going forward but for the near term I think the answer is yes.</p>	1					
Nominet:	<p>4) As noted under 2., functional separation is a requirement under the NTIA contract. We believe that this brings two clear benefits:</p> <p>i. It is important that the operation of the IANA functions follows, and does not try to subsume, the policy framework.</p> <p>ii. Similarly, functional separation between the IANA functions operator and the gTLD operations and contracting teams is important as there should be no suspicion of conflicting interests.</p> <p>(Currently the IANA functions operator sits in the Global Domains Division and while there is no evidence of influence, separation from this division might be worth considering: the IANA functions have a much broader scope than this one area of ICANN's interest.)</p>	1					
Nominet:	<p>5) Yes. However, as noted above, cleaner separation from the Global Domains Division could be useful to recognise the interests of the IANA functions operator's customers are not aligned to the other operational activities.</p>	1					
CDT:	<p>4) Functional separation is the current state of play. However, as noted above it resists capture, etc., in part because of external/independent oversight.</p>	1					
CDT:	<p>5) (Under the current arrangements) Yes, for so long as there is external oversight. Some combination of external/independent oversight and the ability to rebid the contract along with enhanced ICANN accountability are essential to ICANN continuing to perform the IANA functions once the USG steps back. These elements are essential whether the operator is ICANN or some other entity.</p>	1					
Informal SSAC Response	<p>First of all, there are already other organizations providing functions that IANA Function at ICANN could do (RIPE NCC for E.164 numbers for example).</p> <p>Internal separation is only needed in the cases the PDPs do not create clear enough instructions to what IANA is to make. People participating do mix up ICANN decisions (on who can be registry for a specific TLD for example) with IANA actions (to take instructions and otherwise communicate with the registries).</p> <p>So, I view the need for separation collapse into need for the PDPs to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. specifically produce instructions for IANA 2. explicitly validate that IANA is following the instructions 			1			
Richard Hill:	<p>4) A: I'm not convinced that functional separation is possible under the existing ICANN Bylaws. However, the "Contract Co." approach could result in appropriate functional separation if it is correctly implemented, for example if Contract Co. is a Swiss non-profit association with appropriate membership.</p>		1				
Richard Hill:	<p>5) Yes, because of the role of NTIA and the existing IANA functions contract. An external oversight role must persist after the transition.</p>	1					
RrSG:	<p>4) Functional separation means that if its required by the community, a new operator could be selected and implemented easily. This means that the personnel, resources and funding for the IANA functions needs to be distinct from that of ICANN. This may require a separate physical location for the functions, as well as its own technical and legal support.</p> <p>It also bears noting that this functional separation demarcates the line between policy development and implementation. Policy must remain external to the IANA functions.</p>		1				
RrSG:	<p>5) There is no clear line between ICANN and the IANA functions. IANA appears to share it's resources with rest of ICANN (including ICANN legal) and as a consequence community trust has suffered. The distinction between these two entities must be better defined and reinforced.</p>		1				
InternetNZ:	<p>4) Functional separation of the IANA functions means that they are operated, as far as possible, the same way as they would be if they were housed in an organisation that did not have the policy--maker role, with clear accountability for each customer group. That is:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) IANA is operationally independent (at least as independent as required by the NTIA contract today) with transparent resource allocation and reporting, strong service level accountability to customers, visible and accountable management and so on; b) the governance structure IANA reports to recognises its inherent conflicted nature (being the board of the IANA functions operator and the board of the policy--maker) and deals with this conflict in a transparent, predictable and open way that the community can understand and live with; c) IANA has access to and uses independent legal advice; d) The community has the same level of visibility into IANA as that available for the rest of ICANN. <p>In other words, ICANN has no special access to or influence over IANA</p>		1				
InternetNZ:	<p>5) No. There are some desirable characteristics of an internal separation model that are missing from current arrangements, including budget transparency, independent legal advice, equal visibility to the community and SLAs with teeth with its customers.</p>		1				
EURid:	<p>4) Functional separation is a requirement under the NTIA contract. We believe that a true functional separation would mean reporting to the community as a separate entity with a separate strategy, operating plan and budget, service levels, staff.</p>		1				
EURid:	<p>5) We believe that the IANA function could be further separated under the current arrangements.</p>		1				

ISPCP:	4) With an internal solution we believe that the IANA function should be separable firstly in a management and operation related way in case IANA fails to provide services committed to the various communities. In addition in order to make the provision of these services fully accountable to the related communities internally a "Chinese Wall" should be established. But the implications of such models have to be discussed in more detail prior to any final conclusions being established.			1			
ISPCP:	5) Yes	1					
ALAC WG on IANA:	4) Functional separation can be effected through having a separate division of ICANN perform the task. Although it is reasonable to share overhead services such as accounting, human resources and facilities rental with ICANN, the actual IANA operational services, both staff and perhaps technical infrastructure) should be separate and all finances should be clearly and understandably identifiable.	1					
ALAC WG on IANA:	5) Yes. The priority in any transition is to keep the operational stability and continuity of the Internet's domain name system (DNS). Under the current arrangements, such attributes have been in order ever since the creation of ICANN. Operational staff seem to be adequately separated. It is unclear if technical infrastructure is. Furthermore there should be additional clarity regarding budgets.	1					
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	4) The IANA functions contract stipulates the separation of ICANN policy development from the staff designated for IANA functions operations. Ultimately, based on current operational stability of the IANA functions under ICANN, we feel it appropriate for both policy and operations being housed within the same organization.	1					
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	5) Yes, see the above response.	1					
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	4) As I am watching the increasing chaos globally I see ICANN nudged by the United Nations instrumental in breaking down what was organized. It is chaotic what is going on and getting worse.		1				
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	5) Not at all. ICANN is supposed to be about policy. ICANN is all about profit. IANA is all about power. I have taken time to go back retroactively reading original papers. This is not the IANA/ICANN that Jon Postel had in mind.		1				
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	4) no answer 5) Yes	1					
IPC-COA:	4) no answer 5) Yes	1					
NCSG:	4) For an example of a definition of the difference between financial and structural separation see: http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/notes/PracticeNote/3286 The meaning of functional separation of IANA from ICANN needs to take account of the multistakeholder context of the ICANN community. In a corporate context, functional separation can have a variety of business objectives (eg creating a wholesale division, separating policy and operational divisions, and so on). In a notforprofit context, which ICANN is, the meaning of functional separation needs to include different objectives which suit its context. NCSG discussions have therefore covered a broad range of possibilities. For example, functional separation of IANA from ICANN might mean a wholly owned subsidiary, rather than a separate division and particularly a "hands off" separation of operational and governance functions. For example, functional separation may mean that IANA is a department of ICANN under the same management as the rest of ICANN and without a clearly separated budget or mission. Alternatively, however, functional separation cannot adequately ensure against capture without external oversight. Structural separation can be done through creation of a separate budget and day to day management responsibilities. Arms length is even a step further in terms of separate reporting lines to the oversight body. Whichever form of functional separation is considered, it must accord with the not for profit status of ICANN and the multistakeholder model.		1				
NCSG:	5) No		1				
cc_TLD_1	4) no answer 5) no answer				1		
cc_TLD_2	4) We believe that functional separation should, at minimum, encompass the following: ●Providing a stable, transparent, and predictable revenue stream for IANA operations that would continue regardless of decisions made as a part of ICANN's budgeting process (e.g. by apportioning a set percentage of the fees that ICANN receives from registry operators or from the other streams to IANA operations); ●Operating IANA in accordance with processes, service levels, and reporting requirements, and transparency procedures, etc. that are known to its customers and not subject to unilateral change by ICANN; ●Insulating IANA operations from the ICANN policy process by ensuring that groups or interests cannot use IANA to advance a policy goal; and ●Designating distinct ICANN staff to manage IANA operations and the ICANN policy processes. 5) We believe that IANA operations are generally well separated from interference by the ICANN policy process, but that separation could be further improved. Examples of how separation could be improved include providing transparency into the budget of the IANA department versus that of ICANN as a whole and by providing a stable and segmented revenue stream for IANA operations.	1					
cc_TLD_3	4) Esto significa transparentar los procesos pues ICANN siendo parte relacionada de IANA aunque las acciones se hagan transparente no deja buena imagen en la Comunidad, el seraparlos ambos definiran su estructura, politicas y normas y ello permitira verlos con mas credibilidad. 5) Yes	1					

cc_TLD_4	4) no answer 5) No		1				
cc_TLD_5	4) Functional separation of IANA from ICANN means separation of policy making (Regulation) from operations (IANA functions). I see ICANN as a regulator of gTLD Registries since ICANN issues the License (Agreement and Accreditation) to all the gTLDs but not ccTLDs. The ccTLD Registries should have direct dealings with the operator which is separate from ICANN the Regulator. 5) Since NTIA currently performs an oversight role on the IANA function through the contract it signs with ICANN the IANA function operator, there is adequate separation. However, if the NTIA gives way, the current arrangement of IANA function separation would not be adequate, a further restructuring or tweaking needs to be done to have adequate separation.		1				
cc_TLD_6	4) Functional separation means having the IANA function remaining within ICANN but as a separate function carried out by an IANA division. Such functional separation, at least for the medium term (e.g. 5 years), is feasible, provided that sufficient and robust accountability measures are implemented for the ICANN Board. The work of the CWG-Accountability will have to inform us how ICANN accountability should be enhanced. Nevertheless, nothing in the current scheme of things seems to suggest that functional separation is not feasible. Of course, if ICANN itself becomes the IANA overseer (see response to Question 2 above), it could make more sense to explore structural separation where IANA is a subsidiary of ICANN. For accountability purposes, functional separation must be such that the IANA division of ICANN does not do anything else other than the IANA function, and has a clearly separated budget. ICANN will have a lot to prove that it does not unduly interfere with the IANA division, and one hopes that enhanced accountability measures will suffice to achieve this objective. Also, having an IANA Review Panel and IANA Appeals Panel (see response to Question 2) will give confidence that ICANN will not unduly influence the IANA operator. 5) As stated above, the separation is adequate because there has been no evidence of it being compromised, but enhanced accountability measures should be introduced to ensure that the separation is even more effective. Also, structural separation as outlined in response to Question 2 above is also a feasible alternative.	1					
cc_TLD_7	4) Not clear 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_8	4) It is deemed that ICANN is a neutral entity 5) In this regards, Should ICANN not have a contract for its functions?			1			
cc_TLD_9	4) Yes 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_10	4) no answer 5) no answer				1		
cc_TLD_11	4) Limited conflict of interest and confidentiality between the IANA operations and overall ICANN (being more industry based) 5) No	1	1				
cc_TLD_12	4) IANA performs technical duties, based on policies and procedures that must be approved by the respective community (names, numbers or protocols). ICANN must follow and respect these policies. 5) As I said, I agree with this, but it would not harm to have an external oversight sometime in the future.	1					
cc_TLD_13	4) no answer 5) no answer				1		
cc_TLD_14	4) - Presence of SLA's: - Mechanisms to redress 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_15	4) We have dedicated resources, management system, metrics, procedures and processes exclusively assigned to IANA. 5) From my perspective, the mentioned separation works, however we have never tested any bad scenarios (bad things never happened, at least for the last 2 and half years; from the moment I joined the ccTLD), however I would like point out that it does not mean that the model with separation requirement is not needed.	1					
cc_TLD_16	4) internal separation between ICANN and IANA in the context where ICANN is the IANA operator 5) No		1				
cc_TLD_17	4) Mainly dedicated staff, up to management level. Fine grained, auditable reporting on actions. Clearly defined processes. However, care should be taken that rules are not overly restrictive, and do not prevent IANA knowledge and experience to reach the other ICANN staff. 5) I do not know enough about it to give an informed answer.	1					

cc_TLD_18	4) that different people do the day-to-day job and the police making body for IANA is not ICANN or the ICANN board 5) No	1	1				
cc_TLD_19	4) (This question can't be answered by "Yes" or "No") To separate the framework of policy-making and that of operation. 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_20	4) Means that IANA have separate personnel like own legal advice, own technicians, own leadership team and their own budget. 5) No better functional separation is needed	1	1				
cc_TLD_21	4) As stated in the previous question, IANA can be operated as a sister or a subsidiary company of ICANN but some process separation should be in place. 5) But the transition is an opportunity for improving those current arrangements.	1					
cc_TLD_22	4) We'd like IANA to be a part of ICANN. 5) IANA is quite independent from ICANN under current arrangements.	1	1				
cc_TLD_23	4) no answer 5) no answer				1		
cc_TLD_24	4) Yes 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_25	4) invalid question/answer 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_26	4) no answer 5) no answer				1		
cc_TLD_27	4) It seems logical that the IANA services are run by a separate part of ICANN as it is currently organised. We do not see any need for further separation. 5) works fine now, so why change anything	1	1				
cc_TLD_28	4) no answer 5) I think that is important to let the relevant communities the opportunity to make the right decisions		1				
cc_TLD_29	4) no answer 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_30	4) better to have IANA operator as entity separate from ICANN 5) No		1				
cc_TLD_31	4) Internal separation is fine, but then ICANN/IANA still needs some form of oversight 5) No	1	1				
cc_TLD_32	4) More transparency and openness to the rest of the internet environment 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_33	4) Separate functions must be performed by separate entities as one can not divide responsibilities. 5) No	1	1				
cc_TLD_34	4) no answer 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_35	4) no answer 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_36	4) Yes 5) Yes	1					
cc_TLD_37	4) I think this internal separation has to be clear through well established procedures 5) No		1				
cc_TLD_38	4) What is needed here is a separate Board of approval of IANA activities (and not ICANN Board) 5) Internal separation is in place only that final approval of IANA activities is coming from USG and not a multistakeholder entity.	1					

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute					
Question 6								
In considering the key factors (such as security and stability, ease of separating the IANA function from ICANN, quality of services, accountability mechanisms etc.) for evaluating the various transition proposals what importance would you give to the ability to separate IANA from ICANN (separability) vs. the other factors?			Yes	No	Not Clear	No Answer	Very Important	Not Important
	Nominet:	<p>We recognise the need to be able to transfer the IANA functions operator role from ICANN in the case of ICANN seriously failing in its performance.</p> <p>In looking at separability, we need to consider the wider implications of changing the operator: these will have a significant impact on willingness to take this step and increases the need for other remedial action.</p> <p>i. Separation is not a trivial operation and will bring substantial risk.</p> <p>ii. Running a good tendering process (including defining the terms and assessing proposals) will require a lot of effort to ensure that we have a good basis for any subsequent contract. We need to consider how a volunteer committee will be able to deliver this.</p> <p>iii. There is a very small pool of organisations with sufficient independence that could bring the required skills and experience.</p> <p>iv. In the event of the change of operator, we will need to continue to maintain direct accountability to the direct customers and to the wider community. As noted above, this should require continued engagement in ICANN (and also with the other operational communities).</p> <p>Changing operator will be a high risk undertaking, so should not be undertaken lightly and only for good cause.</p> <p>In the discussions, we have spent considerable time looking at separability, but to avoid an escalation of an issue being an abusive process, there needs to be some form of mediation process with an opportunity to remedy. We need to look in more detail at this part of the process.</p>					1	
	CDT:	This is a critical element and a safeguard against future mishaps. Yet, it is no more important or less important than the other factors listed. There is no reason why we cannot evolve a transition model that can satisfy all of the factors – indeed it is our responsibility as a WG to do so.					1	
	Informal SSAC Response	<p>If the IANA Function of ICANN is not following the instructions then an RFP must be filed for a separate group following those instructions. ICANN have already demonstrated such RFP can be hosted, run and affected for the ICG Secretariat that is now independent and separated from ICANN.</p> <p>Don't forget the financing of IANA and other bodies people ask for.</p>						1
	Richard Hill:	Separability is the key factor.					1	
	RrSG:	Separability is only one of many factors, but it remains important as it is the ultimate mechanism to ensure accountability. While the potential for separability must remain in the proposal, the other requirements require closer attention to get right. This means that operational excellence, adherence to SLAs and the security and stability of these core internet functions needs to take precedence.					1	
	InternetNZ:	<p>Separability is a fundamental pre-requisite for a viable transition model. That is why it is a principle in all the models the CWG is considering. Without it, the transition delivers weaker stewardship than the status quo and should not be progressed. It is a foundational accountability requirement and therefore essentially a gate condition.</p> <p>Beyond this gate condition, quality of service is the next requirement that helps deliver security and stability of the DNS.</p> <p>It has to be stressed that a decision to separate could only be arrived at:</p> <p>a) by agreement with the direct customers</p> <p>b) in response to failures to conduct IANA operations in a manner acceptable to direct customers</p> <p>c) after a pre-existing and comprehensive escalation process allowing the operator time to remedy poor performance has been exhausted</p> <p>Effective service level agreements form an essential part of this framework.</p>					1	
	EURid:	We acknowledge that there are multiple factors to be taken into careful consideration, and that all pros and cons should be duly evaluated in order not to underestimate the consequences of decisions made without being pondered.						1
	ISPCP:	The ease of separability is viewed as a one of the major pre conditions.					1	
	ALAC WG on IANA:	<p>Extremely low if present at all. Stability and reliability are FAR more important. And accountability and community control to correct any problem are sufficient to address problems.</p> <p>The ability to separate IANA from ICANN is important but only as a last case scenario when all other options to reconcile a malfunctioning IANA operator have been exhausted. Furthermore, this ability to separate IANA from ICANN should also be possible if, for instance, ICANN was faced with bankruptcy.</p> <p>However these are exceptional scenarios and therefore the ability to separate IANA from ICANN is much less of a priority than the more immediate concerns of operational continuity, security and stability, quality of services and accountability mechanisms that are needed from posttransition day 1.</p>						1
	IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	We would assign it a low priority, and assign accountability mechanisms the highest priority.						1

IPC-Carrie Devorah:	I would put ICANN as far away from IANA as I could. Look, if you did your homework you would see who set ICANN up and see at the loss of privacies, and, human rights in the data mining that is part and parcel of IANA/ICANN.						1	
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	Low							1
IPC-COA:	The transition proposal needs to provide a potential pathway to assigning the IANA functions to an entity other than ICANN. However, this is a lower priority than putting into place enhanced accountability mechanisms, which could reduce the risk that any separability needs to occur in the future.							1
NCSG:	Very high importance, because separability will have major beneficial effects on all the other factors, such as accountability, quality of service, security and stability. Separability increases the leverage of the customers of IANA over performance, security and stability. The ability to separate also creates incentives for governance excellence within ICANN. It provides incentives for ICANN to establish its credentials: to demonstrate it is carrying out these functions well, with a focus on continuous improvement and demonstrating this on an ongoing basis not only during this transition time. This is an important counterweight for accountability and an incentive for functional best performance.						1	
cc_TLD_1	No Answer						1	
cc_TLD_2	We feel that separability of the IANA functions from ICANN should be possible in limited circumstances, such as operational incompetence, and provided that a clear and transparent escalation process is followed and fails to address the issue under consideration. We believe that a decision to appoint a new operator for the IANA naming functions would have to be approved by registry operators as the primary customers of that function.							1
cc_TLD_3	Es necesario que el proceso de transición garantice la seguridad de los ccTLD, por ello el tiempo debe ser considerado uno de los factores de mayor análisis estimando los riesgos..		1					
cc_TLD_4	No Answer						1	
cc_TLD_5	I will give the ability to separate IANA function Operator from ICANN (Regulator) a greater importance in considering the key factors. There is a strong need to separate policy making from operation.							1
cc_TLD_6	The push to separate IANA from ICANN appears somewhat overplayed if it means removing the IANA function totally from ICANN: ICANN has performed the IANA function well so far, and there does not seem to be any pressing reason why so much importance should be attached to such separability. Also, we would need to have a clear process outlining how such separability of IANA from ICANN, if it were to occur, should occur, of course, as a matter of last resort. The argument to have it easy to separate IANA from ICANN (again, assuming such separability means having ICANN no longer performing the IANA function), therefore, ranks the least, but outlining the basis on which such separability could occur – as a matter of a remote, last resort post the NTIA oversight role – is important and should be informed by the measures inherent in the current NTIA-ICANN contract on IANA. As stated in 2 above, if any more separation is required than the present one (which is functional separation), structurally separating the IANA division of ICANN from ICANN seems the best because it will keep the IANA function within ICANN but as a separate subsidiary of ICANN. What undoes the drive to separate IANA completely from ICANN as part of the current IANA transition is that it is not clear if there is another multi-stakeholder, non-governmental, non-private sector player that can adequately play the IANA role with independence and un-bias that ICANN has shown so far. Quality of IANA services, maintaining the autonomy of ccTLDs from ICANN in their dealing with IANA (something that is happening effectively currently), separation of IANA function from the ICANN policy making roles, and ICANN accountability improvements are more important, at least at this stage, than trying to separate IANA completely from ICANN. Again, if we have sufficient accountability measures for ICANN, the separability of IANA from ICANN should be the least concern & should be used as an option of last resort.							1
cc_TLD_7	Not clear					1		
cc_TLD_8	Very important							1
cc_TLD_9	Strong important. ICANN policy making and IANA the technical implementation arm.	1						1
cc_TLD_10	No Answer						1	
cc_TLD_11	High importance	1						1
cc_TLD_12	Not the top priority. I appreciate more the quality of service, efficiency, security and stability, etc.	1						1
cc_TLD_13	No Answer						1	
cc_TLD_14	less importance							1
cc_TLD_15	Quite important, as it is a part of management system; the most of the listed aspects are related to services and overall performance. This is different agenda. .							1
cc_TLD_16	I would give a great importance to the "ability" to separate IANA from ICANN. Because if this ability would not exist, it would be a stepback from the current situation were the US government theoretically can remove the IANA function from ICANN.							1

cc_TLD_17	Medium to low. The most important part is the actual service, and that should receive all the support and resources required to perform next to perfection. Accountability and auditability would be closely related to that. Easy separability is only useful in case of ICANN's failure, and as a menace.	1					1
cc_TLD_18	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_19	(This question can't be answered by "Yes" or "No") Security and stability of the DNS and its operational arrangement are the most important regardless of where IANA function resides.			1			
cc_TLD_20	Security and stability are the most important	1					1
cc_TLD_21	No		1				1
cc_TLD_22	We don't think that they should be separated.		1				1
cc_TLD_23	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_24	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_25	invalid question/answer			1			
cc_TLD_26	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_27	Very limited to none. Oversight over the IANA function should be arranged by changes to ICANN's accountability. If the community obtains through the CCWG process the necessary mechanisms that will give them oversight over the board there will no longer be any necessity for a separability mechanism as the community that than oversees ICANN is exactly the same community that would decide on separation.		1				1
cc_TLD_28	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_29	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_30	high importance	1				1	
cc_TLD_31	It is not the top priority, but it is important. There should be a mechanism to continue IANA function in case ICANN fails for any reason		1				
cc_TLD_32	security and stability, ease of separating the IANA function from ICANN, quality of services, accountability mechanisms. All of this should be the first thing in consideration to make the transition						
cc_TLD_33	One depends on the other	1					
cc_TLD_34	I do not understand the yes/no option. To me a possible separation of IANA from ICANN is very important					1	
cc_TLD_35	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_36	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_37	a lot of importance for separability						
cc_TLD_38	We do not have any problem with the current setup apart from the approval process.		1				

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute					
Question 7								
Given the IANA functions could be separated from ICANN do you believe it would be important for the community to obtain from ICANN on an annual basis the costs for operating IANA including overhead costs? Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions?			Yes	No	Not Clear	No Answer	Very Important	Not Important
	Nominet:	<p>We believe that it is good accountability to have budget transparency. In particular, discussions about service improvement or accountability cannot be made without reference to the cost implications. This is independent of whether we are looking at separation or not. However, cost should be less of a consideration in deciding whether to change operator: this is a serious step and should not be treated like changing telecommunications or energy provider.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? We would be open to hearing arguments why this should be done. For the moment, we believe that this is an unnecessary complication. 					1	
	CDT:	Of course – whether the functions could be separated or not there should be complete transparency when we are discussing the IANA functions. That this data has not been provided to date is disappointing (although I understand that it may be forthcoming).					1	

Informal SSAC Response	<p>The PDP should decide what the rules for IANA should be, and if needed also who should take care of it. As part of that is also of course financing issues.</p> <p>Regarding separation, as long as ICANN is financing, there is no real separation. So, if the PDP want someone else than ICANN to run IANA, then the PDP must also be able to find money for the operation.</p> <p>> * Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? If RIRs or IETF want to move the functions, then of course IETF and RIR have to find financing of the (new) operator for that coordination. ICANN have nothing to do with it.</p> <p>Today ICANN have agreed to finance the IANA Function as long as it is hosted at ICANN. That in turn might be a reason for (for example) RIRs to donate money to ICANN, and for Registry operators of TLDs to do the same.</p>						1	
Richard Hill:	<p>Yes.</p> <p>Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? Yes.</p>	1						1
RrSG:	<p>As part of ICANN's overall accountability, being able to easily break out the costs associated with the IANA functions as a whole and then their discrete elements is necessary.</p> <p>a. Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? In the longer term this information could be useful, and again would serve to increase transparency. It does not appear to be immediately crucial.</p>							1
InternetNZ:	<p>Yes – cost transparency is vital no matter what transition model is progressed, and should already be available.</p> <p>• Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? Yes, as above.</p>	1						1
EURid:	<p>This has been a long-term request of the ccTLD community and we were only recently given more precise data about IANA costs. However, there are still grey areas relating to IANA costs due to the lack of clear separation. Having the full and clear picture of these costs will help the community to have a better understanding of the resources needed to manage the IANA function properly and according to the highest service standards.</p> <p>• Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? We are not able to assess the usefulness of this separation.</p>							1
ISPCP:	Yes. Annual statement of costs is considered to be a key component of accountability.	1						1
ALAC WG on IANA:	<p>As stated in replies to earlier question, the finances should be clear regardless of separability. To be able to demonstrate the value of services provided to each community, the costs should be separated out (not only by names, address and protocol functions, but other services that are delivered as well (.int management, ccTLD redelegation responsibilities, etc). If an accounting or law firm can do it, so can IANA). Shared services should be prorated over the entire portfolio.</p> <p>Increased granularity in estimating the costs per function (names, protocols, addresses) may be inaccurate due to the current expansion of the new gTLD space and the unknown forecasts relating to both protocols (http2 for example) and numbers (IPv4 / IPv6). We therefore doubt that this estimation would be accurate.</p>							1
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	Assuming arguendo that separation is desirable, line item overhead costs pertaining to the IANA functions would be an obvious necessity.							1
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	I think ICANN and the RIRs should return all funds collected during their time of oversight. There also has to be 100% written disclosure of all the entities that are connected to this from the NewNogs etc					1		
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	Yes. A detailed budget is important for credibility.	1						1
IPC-COA:	Yes and yes.	1						1
NCSG:	<p>Yes, very important.</p> <p>ICANN must be transparent about the operating costs of the IANA to ICANN. The operating costs of the IANA function itself should also be clear. Whether these are substantial or not, transparency in reporting on these is absolutely important.</p> <p>Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with address and protocol functions? NCSG does not have strong views on this it seems less important than the separation of the costs of IANA department as a whole. and may be more relevant between 1/ operations 2/ compliance and 3/policy within ICANN overall.</p>	1						1
cc_TLD_1	No Answer						1	
cc_TLD_2	Yes, we believe that it would be valuable to provide these costs as well as a breakout across the three categories of functions.	1						1
cc_TLD_3	Porque ICANN tiene el apoyo economico de la Comunidad y IANA debe ser beneficiada como parte relacionada	1						
cc_TLD_4	Yes	1						1
cc_TLD_5	<p>This would enhance the separability stand.</p> <p>Since there are all IANA Functions, such separation may not be necessary.</p>	1	1					

cc_TLD_6	<p>This will be very good for accountability, and supports the argument to have IANA as a separate function of ICANN with a separate budget – something that is very attainable. This should remain as a condition for allocating the IANA function to ICANN. Such separate cost requirement will also be feasible should ICANN decide to have a separate IANA subsidiary (i.e. structural separation).</p> <p>It would help in understanding actual IANA operational costs to separate the address and protocol costs from the naming costs. The IANA function, as a whole, requires ICANN to table separate report on IANA costs. It seems reasonable to expect that such a report will be detailed enough to clarify and distinguish all the costs of each IANA function across different IANA customers.</p>	1				1	
cc_TLD_7	Yes	1				1	
cc_TLD_8	Whoever would be responsible would want to know the cost of operations as a possible determining factor.	1					
cc_TLD_9	<p>Like with any business model, the economic costs and benefits of the existence and operations should be spelt out in a transparent manner so that stakeholders are able to assess the merits and disadvantages of each entity.</p> <p>Transparency in cost allocation is the only way to assess usefulness of any function.</p>	1					
cc_TLD_10	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_11	Yes	1				1	
cc_TLD_12	<p>In the context of an eventual separation, yes, in order to select another operator and no over pay him.</p> <p>No, I think that would be something that could create more discussion and differences among actors, and would not be helpful.</p>	1	1				
cc_TLD_13	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_14	Yes	1				1	
cc_TLD_15	<p>Yes, it would help us in understanding the value and the cost figures; the performance indicators and targets (service levels); the excellence of service and security and stability; and the overall risk of operations including financial risk, if it comes.</p> <p>No, Based on the details I have, I would not support the importance of the mentioned separation</p>	1	1			1	
cc_TLD_16	<p>In any case, it is important. Even in the case there would be no possibility for separation.</p> <p>accountability, transparency, but also the need to always improve.</p>	1					
cc_TLD_17	Not sure if I understood the question correctly. As long as IANA is part of ICANN (functionally separated or not), ICANN should provide the funds via its budget. If IANA is completely outside ICANN, ICANN should not be required to contribute - in that case the IANA customers should be able to provide the funds, possibly by reducing ICANN contributions.		1				
cc_TLD_18	<p>Yes</p> <p>Yes, because there is a need for a clear cost calculation for the founding and what part is for ccTLD's (and also gTLD's)</p>	1				1	
cc_TLD_19	<p>If IANA's budget is defined by the community, the result of the financial audit is the most important information for the community.</p> <p>No</p>	1	1				
cc_TLD_20	Yes	1				1	
cc_TLD_21	<p>Yes</p> <p>No</p>	1	1				
cc_TLD_22	<p>No, if IANA functions will be separated from ICANN then IANA auditor (oversight body) should care about the cost.</p> <p>Yes, Registries should pay for the name functions. RIRs should pay address and protocol functions.</p>	1	1				
cc_TLD_23	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_24	<p>Yes</p> <p>No</p>	1	1				1
cc_TLD_25	Yes	1				1	
cc_TLD_26	No Answer				1		
cc_TLD_27	<p>No, I could not answer this question as it is not clear what 'overhead costs' in this specific question means. In my perspective it should be clear what the costs of the IANA services are.</p> <p>Yes</p>	1	1				

cc_TLD_28	Yes		1				1	
cc_TLD_29	If the community choose to run IANA with another operator, the community have to suply funds to that operator. No, Not sure, but it seems unneccessary to split up too much. And the two has been handled as one. Very hard to find funding for protocol?			1				
cc_TLD_30	Yes		1				1	
cc_TLD_31	Yes it is important, having in mind self-growth of ICANN functions No, It seems that address and protocol function costs are not that much of an issue		1	1				
cc_TLD_32	No Answer Yes		1			1	1	
cc_TLD_33	Yes No		1	1				1
cc_TLD_34	Yes No		1	1				1
cc_TLD_35	Yes Yes		1				1	
cc_TLD_36	Yes No		1	1				1
cc_TLD_37	Why not Yes, actions transparency is mandatory regardless of the level		1				1	
cc_TLD_38	That way it will complication of a solution. Lets not re-invent the wheel. No, Another complication of a solution.			1				1

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute				
Question 8							
Could there be unforeseen impacts relative to selecting a new operator for the IANA functions vs the ICANN policy role (should ICANN determine that there will be another round of new gTLDs, how could it ensure that the new operator would accept this)?			Yes	No	Not Clear	No Answer	
	Nominet:	If there is structural separation, a condition on the new operator should be that its actions must be based on (for TLDs) ICANN and other relevant policies. There will need to be a reciprocal arrangement for the new IANA functions operator to explain possible implications of a policy decision on its ability to meet service level commitments or on its costs. (This in turn might have implications on where the burden of costs falls.) We assume that the TLDs (directly or via ICANN) will still be expected to cover the costs of the IANA functions operation.	1				
	CDT:	The operator (whether ICANN or other) is not making policy – it would be written into the contract that the operator should implement community agreed policies relating to names, numbers and protocols. If the operator were to disagree with implementing an agreed policy then that would be reason for rebidding the contract.		1			
	Informal SSAC Response	Once again, it is only possible to talk about this if one talk about the role of the PDPs. Not just say "ICANN".			1		
	Richard Hill:	If the post-transition legal and contractual framework is correct, there would be no unforeseen impacts. The new IANA operator would faithfully implement ICANN's policy decisions as it does now.		1			
	RrSG:	The potential for unforeseen impacts exists within any choice, which is why it's imperative that the CWG perform its task with thoroughness and attention to detail. Further, the IANA operator should merely be performing the clerical functions of the RIRs, ccTLDs, IETF and ICANN (with respect to gTLDs), IANA should never be a centre for policy development, lobbying or political intrigue. It should merely be performing the tasks assigned to it according to it SLAs.	1				
	InternetNZ:	Any change to any model allows for unforeseen impacts, and any viable transition must build into the model the effective management of change. This question should form part of the stress--testing the CWG applies to its preferred model (or to its strawman models). As part of any escalation process that led to a decision to select a new operator for the IANA functions, this would need to be thoroughly explored again.	1				
	EURid:	We believe that one key element of a possible separation is to make sure there is a process in place that ensures that the new operator enforces the policies decided by ICANN (e.g. including the launch of new TLDs) as far as these policies continue to be based on the multistakeholder and bottom-up approach. In any case, we highly recommend a proper risk assessment to make sure any possible contingency and/or deadlock are adequately managed and sorted out in a timely manner in the ultimate interest of guaranteeing quality services and responsiveness.	1				
	ISPCP:	The ISPCP acknowledges the possibility of unforeseen impacts. Binding agreements between agreed policy and operational aspects must be a key consideration of any proposal.	1				

ALAC WG on IANA:	A concern of our community of end users is that the selection of a new operation for the IANA functions could introduce a lot of unknown unknowns and this might affect stability and continuity of operations. Any major change such as this one would need to be performed in a cautious and methodical way. Any IANA operator would be bound to support the results of Policy actions by any of its supported communities. If/when the IETF develops any new protocol such as HTTP2 or even in the far future IPv25 (an upgradable path from both IPv4 and IPv6), IANA would be bound and required to support it.	1					
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	Separation could have an immediate destabilizing impact. It could create a power struggle with any newly created entities, potentially subject to capture. And it could also create unnecessary complexity in performing the IANA functions.	1					
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	ICANN should halt all roll outs of further gTLDs. I think ALL trademarks need to be given the chance to expunge any and all violations of their trademarks that never should have been sold as domains.	1					
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	No answer				1		
IPC-COA:	Since you have cited it, this is a foreseen impact, which should be taken into account in designing the potential pathway toward separability of the IANA function from ICANN.	1					
NCSG:	We do not foresee any likely negative impacts on the policy side:: a new operator could be contractually bound to accept changes from ICANN that were the product of legitimate policy making processes. There may be unintended positive effects, for example, a new operator might encourage ICANN to be transparent about ICANN operating costs and its processes for conveying policy decisions that must be acted on.		1				
cc_TLD_1	No answer				1		
cc_TLD_2	To the extent possible contingencies associated with the ability to move the IANA functions should be considered and addressed within the stress tests for the IANA transition.	1					
cc_TLD_3	No		1				
cc_TLD_4	No answer				1		
cc_TLD_5	At this stage of transition, there would certainly be unforeseen impacts. It would be difficult to embark on such uncertainty considering legal, security and technical issues that would need to be handled by the new operator. It would not be smooth to transit to another operator while considering another round of new gTLDs.	1					
cc_TLD_6	The danger with a separate IANA operator outside ICANN is that such an operator would face additional, unnecessary political hurdles that ICANN, as a policy body, has already managed to address. For example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Should such a separate operator be a US entity or a non-US entity? •How comfortable would the US government be with handing over the IANA function to a non-US entity? •How would such an entity be constituted? •Who will have a final say on its composition? •Should it be composed of the defined IANA customers only or should other parties be included? If they are included, on what basis? •Would governments and ICANN itself be allowed to be part of the separate operator? The point is that there are too many difficult-to-answer questions against having a new separate IANA operator. Maintaining the status quo (i.e. keeping IANA as an ICANN function), and then focusing on enhanced accountability measures for ICANN in the short term, seems more feasible to focus on right now.	1					
cc_TLD_7	Yes unforeseen impacting circumstances could arise	1					
cc_TLD_8	Yes	1					
cc_TLD_9	Given the way policies are determined at ICANN - consensus based and ground up, the new operator will have no choice but to accept it and this must be made clear in the contract of any new operator who will have studied the contract prior to accepting the role.	1					
cc_TLD_10	No answer				1		
cc_TLD_11	ICANN should not have unilateral decision in future new gTLD rounds		1				
cc_TLD_12	If everything is taken into account before writing contracts, and there is a defining body for the unforeseen, all should work well.		1				
cc_TLD_13	No answer				1		
cc_TLD_14	No		1				
cc_TLD_15	I see some risk of delay when making the decision and deployment of the new project. I believe that ICANN policy is/ will be subject of the internet community consensus and will work for public good.	1					
cc_TLD_16	There would be impacts, but I don't see how they would be unforeseen. Any operator should have to implement the policy, inside or outside ICANN, and if ICANN still has this policy role, ICANN would have the ability to demand the implementation in any circumstance to the IANA operator.		1				
cc_TLD_17	ICANN would provide input to IANA, just like the IETF or NROs. Generally speaking it should not be IANA's role to comment on that input. This said, technical comments from the IANA operator should be valuable input during any policy process.		1				
cc_TLD_18	No		1				

cc_TLD_19	(Cannot fully understand the question.)			1		
cc_TLD_20	But this can be dealt with.IANA should only be separated from ICANN in extreme misconduct.	1				
cc_TLD_21	Yes	1				
cc_TLD_22	We do not consider another operator for the IANA functions.	1				
cc_TLD_23	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_24	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_25	invalid question/answer combination			1		
cc_TLD_26	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_27	As soon as you select a new operator it is needed that the roles and authorities of all involved becomes crisp clear, defined and well documented, which it clearly currently is not. (the same question however currently applies to the rol of the RZM.)	1				
cc_TLD_28	This is a decision that must be taken by gNSO and ccNSO communitues		1			
cc_TLD_29	There has to be clear roles if separated.		1			
cc_TLD_30	There will be service agreement which specify the process for notifying the operator of additional TLDs and the cost thereof		1			
cc_TLD_31	No		1			
cc_TLD_32	Yes	1				
cc_TLD_33	10-100-1000 what's the difference?		1			
cc_TLD_34	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_35	Yes	1				
cc_TLD_36	No		1			
cc_TLD_37	No		1			
cc_TLD_38	A clear separation of duties can be determined internally (within ICANN). Let us avoid a totally new ghost.	1				

Question & Response	Commentor	Comment	Attribute			
			Yes	No	Not Clear	No Answer
Question 9						
Are there other transition models which the CWG should be exploring?						
	Nominet:	We believe that (with four different models covering both internal and external approaches to separability) we have enough to work on! We need to focus on the technical basis for the transition, as well as on practical dispute resolution and remedial action processes.		1		
	CDT:	Yes - we may be at an impasse and need to look at creative alternatives that build on elements of the models that have been proposed to date so that we can find a workable solution that satisfies the various criteria. For a different approach that looks at building parity of oversight and accountability for the IANA functions between ICANN, the IETF and the RIRs, I refer you to the recent "integrated model" that Avri Doria, Brenden Kuerbis and I have submitted to the WG.	1			
	Informal SSAC Response	It must be much more clear what the role of the PDPs ccNSO and gNSO have to be able to do further evaluation, but in short I think better steps forward include: A. Have the PDPs explicitly be the creators of instructions to IANA, and create interaction between the PDPs and IANA similar to the interaction IETF have. Specifically separate the IANA instructions from the rules for (for example) new TLDs. B. Have GAC be responsible for finding a permanent solution for the .INT TLD based on the existing rules (RFC 1591 minus the international database). C. Have ccNSO resolve the issues with ccTLD delegation/redelegation. D. Have ICANN bylaws or otherwise be changed to ensure the power stays with the PDPs.			1	
	Richard Hill:	I refer to the JNC submission cited under question 2 above; at: http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/msg00009.html			1	
	RrSG:	The CWG should be exploring any model that focuses on operational excellence, holds IANA to clear SLAs and contains a minimum of avenues for disruption. IANA should also be subject to regular independent audits and an external dispute resolution mechanism.	1			
	InternetNZ:	The CWG is debating its own four models that are very similar to the status quo in most key respects, and where the key point of debate is how to implement the principle of separability. This question could be seen largely as a technical one and best answered with the assistance of high quality legal advice. The fifth model before the CWG separates the operations of IANA functions more strictly as well as the stewardship of these functions, and so is in a sense a different class of model. Between these five models we do not propose to add any further ones to the mix.		1		

EURid:	The focus should be on current transition before looking into other transition areas.			1			
ISPCP:	No, the current options are sufficient.			1			
ALAC WG on IANA:	The time to add more models into the mix is drawing to a close. We need to start eliminating those which have little support, create unreasonable risk and instability, or are not likely to be acceptable to the NTIA and the US Congress. All transition models proposed thus far should be explored in a fair and nonpolitical way. Overall: the transition of stewardship of the IANA functions should be undertaken with the aim to keep operational continuity, security and stability, quality of services and accountability mechanisms.			1			
IPC-Brian Winterfeld:	Just the internal models that do not fabricate external oversight through any newly formed or untested entity.			1			
IPC-Carrie Devorah:	With 20+ years under ICANN's belt, I want to see a forensic accounting of funds spent.				1		
IPC-Jonathan Zuck:	No answer				1		
IPC-COA:	To our knowledge, the models proposed are sufficient, but we do not rule out the possibility that improved models could arise from the discussion over the proposed model.			1			
NCSG:	Yes we are at an impasse and need to look at creative alternatives that build on elements of the models that have been proposed to date so that we can find a workable solution that satisfies the various criteria. The CWG should be open to considering any other models proposed. One such model is the New IANA Integrated model proposed by Brenden Kuerbis, Matt Shears, and Avri Doria https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SvKDEIaeHdre3BQXHNe1K3hCA95dsFWqWaz2Kg5YZCU/edit?usp=sharing https://docs.google.com/document/d/1SvKDEIaeHdre3BQXHNe1K3hCA95dsFWqWaz2Kg5YZCU/edit?usp=sharing			1			
cc_TLD_1	No answer					1	
cc_TLD_2	We believe that the CWG should give serious consideration to recommendations that simplify or streamline the proposals currently under discussion. We believe that the interests and needs of ccTLD and gTLD registries are insufficiently represented in the proposals to date as the direct customers of the IANA naming function and we would welcome proposals that empower these communities in IANA's oversight.			1			
cc_TLD_3	Yes			1			
cc_TLD_4	No answer					1	
cc_TLD_5	No answer					1	
cc_TLD_6	However, the NTIA already has a clear view about its preferred model. There does not seem to be any reason to believe that NTIA wants to separate IANA from ICANN or wants any overseer other than a multi-stakeholder, non-governmental body. There are clear indications that NTIA will accept nothing less than what it has already stipulated.			1			
cc_TLD_7	Not clear					1	
cc_TLD_8	It is possible there are other options			1			
cc_TLD_9	The current transition models should be fully explored. The concept of a Board of Trustee is a very powerful one which merit further evaluation especially if they are to patrol the conditions of transition which the NTIA has set out.			1			
cc_TLD_10	No answer					1	
cc_TLD_11	More subsidiary approach decentralising the administration of ICANN			1			
cc_TLD_12	I do not think of any.			1			
cc_TLD_13	No answer					1	
cc_TLD_14	Anything that leads to a solution preserving stability, security, and resiliency and is simple.			1			
cc_TLD_15	The proposal should be build on the existing assets; on what we already gathered. It's a lot. The differences have to be understood and negotiated. First of all the objective of low risk should be applied. The IANA in this proposal should be housed by ICANN and separated accordingly (an independent department). ICANN accountability should be analysed and possible extension to be discussed and implemented to meet the new management model.			1			
cc_TLD_16	No answer					1	
cc_TLD_17	No			1			
cc_TLD_18	No			1			
cc_TLD_19	I have no idea.					1	
cc_TLD_20	No			1			
cc_TLD_21	No answer					1	

cc_TLD_22	No		1			
cc_TLD_23	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_24	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_25	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_26	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_27	As stated before we see enhancing ICANN's accountability as the solution for the IANA oversight transition and even think that it would be good to merge the CWG and CCWG and stop working on the separability driven CWG solutions (including the new proposal by Avri Doria c.s.).		1			
cc_TLD_28	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_29	No		1			
cc_TLD_30	No		1			
cc_TLD_31	There must be, but I cannot submit one ;)		1			
cc_TLD_32	No		1			
cc_TLD_33	Contracts with each ccTLD	1				
cc_TLD_34	No		1			
cc_TLD_35	No answer				1	
cc_TLD_36	No		1			
cc_TLD_37	Why not, we could foresee other acceptable schemes	1				
cc_TLD_38	We believe in re-adjusting the current setup rather than building afresh.		1			