1) The CWG should not confirm that the Verisign/ICANN proposal is acceptable. It is not. Even if the current arrangement is maintained during the transition, it should not be considered as a definitive or permanent solution. Data and code used in and arising from the testing during the '3-month parallel operation' should accrue to ICANN.

The Verisign/ICANN proposal contains the following features:

(a) the Cooperative Agreement between NTIA and Verisign will continue (p.7) and

(b) changes in the RZA mechanism should be identified in advance of the transition and only by mutual agreement of all parties (p. 5). (Including Verisign).

Thus, on this basis, Verisign's position as RZM would be grandfathered and entrenched, the IANA transition notwithstanding.

It is rather inconsistent that CWG has discussed the IANA transition at great length and complexity, whilst the RZM transition has been hardly discussed at all. Whereas the RZM transition is as important as the IANA transition, both technically and politically.

2) Further to question 1), above, it would appear that the CWG statement quoted at the end of the first paragraph that “ ... any amendment to the roles of PTI and the RZM ... will require approval of the ICANN board ...” is not correct, or at least not complete. Nor is the draft reply that “ ... such proposals should be subject to wide community consultation”. Whereas, according to the Verisign/ICANN proposal, any changes to RZA would notably require the agreement of Verisign, “in advance of the IANA stewardship transition”.

3) No comment (see reply from the ccTLD communities).

4) No comment (see reply from the ccTLD communities).

5) IANA Function Review (IFR) teams: with reference to the composition of the ccTLD representation, see reply from the ccTLD communities.)

However, it is more important that the IFRs include a balanced quota of technically qualified independent members. Otherwise, the outcome of IFRs could become biased by small numbers of participating Registries. This is particularly relevant in relation to question 7) Compliance with IFR.

6) Coordination: A higher degree of coordination among the three communities might have been advantageous. ICG should ensure that a single IANA function is maintained for the benefit of all communities and stakeholders concerned. This is particularly important for non-commercial stakeholders including users' interests and for governments.

The costs of basic oversight are not negligible. Duplicating or even triplicating them efficiently would not be possible for most non-commercial stakeholders.

7) See 5) above.
8) Good question. The proposed ICG amendment appears acceptable.

9) The ICANN Board should remain responsible for the IANA functions because the IANA/PTI budget and staff will remain part of ICANN, albeit 'ring-fenced'. Furthermore, IANA/PTI does not have autonomous revenues.

10) No comment
11) No comment
12) No comment

13) .ARPA: It would be relevant at this point to recall that the question of the .INT TLD shall be referred to the GAC for advice.