

## CWG IANA Transition Design Teams – Status 9 March 2015 (updated)

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<a href="#">Design Team A</a>	IANA Service Level Expectations
Lead	Paul Kane
Status <sup>1</sup>	Step 10, Priority 1 (Final)
Note	Template (scope) still needs to be refined as agreed during last CWG call

<a href="#">Design Team B</a>	Appeal Mechanism for ccTLD Delegations / Redelegations
Lead	Allan MacGillivray
Status	Step 7, Priority 1 (Final)
Note	Call for volunteers underway

<a href="#">Design Team C</a>	CSC
Lead	Dona Austin / Staffan Jonson
Status	Step 7, Priority 1 (Final)
Note	Call for volunteers underway

<a href="#">Design Team D</a>	Authorization Function
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0, Priority 1 (Provisional)
Note	

<a href="#">Design Team E</a>	SAC 69
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0
Note	As a first step, staff will review draft proposal against SAC69. Based on that review, next steps will be determined.

<a href="#">Design Team F</a>	Relationship between the NTIA, IANA and the Root Zone Maintainer
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0, Priority 1 (Provisional)
Note	

<a href="#">Design Team G</a>	IANA Intellectual Property Rights, including the IANA Trademark and Domain Name
Lead	Greg Shatan
Status	Step 3, Priority 2 (Provisional)
Note	

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex 1 for DT step-by-step process

<a href="#">Design Team H</a>	.INT Operations
Lead	Elise Lindeberg
Status	Step 0, Priority 2 (Provisional) Note:
Note	Further details need to be provided and template to be completed

<a href="#">Design Team I</a>	Competition policy and Conflicts of Interest
Lead	Christopher Wilkinson
Status	Step 3, Priority 2 (Provisional)
Note	Requires resolution of DT C

<a href="#">Design Team J</a>	CSC/MRT confidentiality and the perception of conflicts of interest
Lead	TBC
Status	Consider merging with I, Priority 2 (Provisional)
Note	

<a href="#">Design Team K</a>	OFAC Licensing
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0, Priority 2
Note	Legal issue? See also SSAC 69 review

<a href="#">Design Team L</a>	IANA Function Separation Mechanism
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0, Priority 1 (Provisional)
Note	Pending legal advice

<a href="#">Design Team M</a>	Escalation Mechanisms beyond CSC
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0, Priority 1 (Provisional)
Note	

<a href="#">Design Team N</a>	Periodic Review of IANA Functions
Lead	TBC
Status	Step 0, Priority 1 (Provisional)
Note	Cross-reference with CCWG to avoid potential overlap

<b>Design Team A.</b>	<b>IANA Service Levels Expectations</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.4.2 Accountability functions which require IANA to report on specific aspects of its performance.
<b>Summary Description</b>	Section C.4.2 of the IANA Functions Contract for NTIA outlines the requirements for the monthly performance progress report. The transition proposal will need to detail how these requirements are continued and/or modified post-transition. Currently, these reports are public and list the current SLEs - these can be found at: <a href="http://www.iana.org/performance/metrics/20130915">http://www.iana.org/performance/metrics/20130915</a>
<b>Detailed description</b>	<p>This design team is expected to provide the following deliverables to be included in the draft transition report following CWG agreement:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Review the IANA functions and their current SLEs</li> <li>2. Document, list and detail how these current SLEs should be modified, <u>if at all</u>, as part of the transition proposal to address any gaps or issues that were identified</li> <li>3. <u>Document and detail escalation steps that should be available for direct customers in relation to these SLEs</u></li> <li>4. <u>Document and detail how future review of SLEs is expected to take place</u></li> </ol> <p>Following the completion of this specific task, this DT may continue if directed by the CWG Co-Chairs (in the same, or in a slightly modified composition) to address other elements that closely relate to the SLE namely escalations <u>if the escalation steps identified under 3. are not sufficient to remedy the issue</u>, documentation, reporting and collaboration.</p>
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	3 gTLD registry representatives (note, the RySG has already proposed the following names: Jeff Eckhaus, Jeff Neuman, Elaine Pruis) 3 ccTLD registry representatives, Jay Daley, (AP Region), Patricio Poblete (LAC Region) and Paul Kane (Europe).
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	Paul Kane
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 10</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Final)</b>
<b>Mailing list archives</b>	<a href="http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/dt1/">http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/dt1/</a>
<b>Wiki Page</b>	<a href="https://community.icann.org/x/CA4nAw">https://community.icann.org/x/CA4nAw</a>

<b>Design Team B.</b>	<b>Assessment of the Level of Consensus within the ccTLD Community in Regard to a Possible Appeal Mechanism for ccTLD Delegations and Redelegations</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.1.3 – Independent Appeals Panel

<b>Summary Description</b>	The focus of the Design Team will be assess the level of consensus within the ccTLD Community in regard to a possible appeal mechanism on ccTLD Delegations and Redelegations.
<b>Detailed description</b>	<p>On January 30<sup>th</sup> CWG RFP3 reviewed a detailed document (available <a href="#">here</a>) summarizing the status of the IAP proposal and information flowing from the survey. During the RFP3 discussion, it was noted that the IAP is in response to a request from ccTLDs. RFP3 concluded with the following 'Request/Action:' "ccTLD members and participants in CWG to come up with a consistent proposal on IAP" (see <a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52232278">https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52232278</a>)</p> <p>Later that day, January 30, the CCWG of Accountability sent a <a href="#">letter</a> to the CWG indicating that it has begun to elaborate is own work and that it will include consideration of binding redress mechanisms. It has subsequently established an 'Appeals and Redress' work stream. In their January 30<sup>th</sup> letter, the CCWG also said that it has no intention to give an accountability mechanism decision-making powers relating to the (re)delegation of ccTLDs.</p> <p>The survey that the CWG undertook in January indicated that at a high level, there appeared to be a consensus on the desirability for such a mechanism, but when issues such as who should have standing to appeal, e.g. managers, governments etc. the level of consensus was considerably reduced. In light of this, it is proposed that a Design Team assess, likely by means of a survey, whether there is any reasonable level of consensus in the ccTLD community for a ccTLD delegation and redelegation appeal mechanism and whether there might be design attributes that might lead to an acceptable level of consensus.</p>
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	It is proposed that the Design team be made up of two to three ccTLD representatives and one or two GAC representatives. The DT will investigate the potential to include an expert that may have been identified to work with the CCWG on Accountability.
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	Allan MacGillivray, CIRA - .ca, supported by Maarten Simon SIDN - .nl
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 7</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Final)</b>

<b>Design Team C.</b>	<b>CSC</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.3 – Administration / oversight of Statement of Work (SOW)
<b>Summary Description</b>	This design team will develop proposed language for inclusion in the draft proposal relating to section III.A.1.3 – Administration / oversight of statement of work.

<p><b>Detailed description</b></p>	<p>NTIA currently provides and ensures the administration and day-to-day oversight of the statement of work. It was agreed that these functions will have to be replaced following the transition.</p> <p>Building on the 1 December Draft Transition Proposal (section 3.4.2.1) and taking into account the work undertaken by RFP3 in particular the functional analysis of the CSC, the design team is expected to describe the:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Role and responsibilities of the CSC in relation to the administration and oversight of the statement of work;</li> <li>b) Identify and list IANA reports that are currently provided to the NTIA or provided as a result of the IANA Contract and specify and list those that are expected to be provided by the IANA Functions Operator post-transition;</li> <li>c) Specify an instruction for CSC, describing a process how, post transition, the CSC will review these reports, and</li> <li>d) Specify an instruction for CSC, describing a process how, post transition, the reporting requirements will be reviewed.</li> <li>e) Specify an instruction for CSC, describing remedial action in the event of poor performance of IANA against specified SLAs.</li> <li>f) Specify an instruction for CSC, of what is not mandated or out of scope.</li> <li>g) Consider whether it would be appropriate for the CSC to be an initial point of escalation for TLD operators who are experiencing IANA performance issues.</li> <li>h) Consider the extent to which the CSC could engage with IANA on emerging issues, that is those issues that are currently unforeseen, that impact registry operators and IANA services.</li> <li>i) Composition of the CSC taking into account the agreed role and responsibilities of the CSC by the Design Team.</li> </ul> <p>The Design Team will work on the assumption that the status quo should be maintained as much as possible throughout the transition, while a process / mechanism should be put in place that will allow for review and possible changes to the reporting requirements based on that review after the transition on an ongoing basis.</p> <p>Following the completion of these specific tasks, the DT may continue if directed by the CWG Co-Chairs (in the same, or in a slightly modified composition) to organizational structure, confidentiality and possible conflict of interest concerns.</p>
<p><b>Proposed Membership</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At a minimum two gTLD registry representatives with operational knowledge of IANA Functions and current</li> </ul>

	reporting requirements <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At a minimum two ccTLD registry representatives with operational knowledge of IANA Functions and current reporting requirements</li> <li>• One IANA staff member (current or former)</li> <li>• One non-direct customer representative with operational knowledge of IANA Functions and current reporting requirements</li> <li>• One liaison from NTIA to verify NTIA's current responsibilities</li> </ul>
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	Donna Austin / Staffan Jonson
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 7</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Final)</b>

<b>Design Team D.</b>	<b>Authorization Function</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.2
<b>Summary Description</b>	The NTIA currently approves all change requests for the root zone and root zone WHOIS databases made by IANA. Should this be transitioned and if so how?
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Expressions of Interest Received</b>	Danny Younger (At-Large)
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	TBC
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team E.</b>	<b>SAC 69</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	Not a direct requirement of the transition proposal
<b>Summary Description</b>	Ensure that proposal is in line with SAC 69
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	TBC
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	As a first step, staff will review the draft transition proposal against SAC69. Based on that review, next steps will be determined.

<b>Design Team F.</b>	<b>Relationship between the NTIA, IANA and the Root Zone Maintainer</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.2.1
<b>Summary Description</b>	The IANA functions contract describes and uses the current tri-party arrangement to get changes to the root zone and its

	WHOIS database implemented. A revised mechanism for getting these changes implemented post transition will have to be developed assuming that the NTIA is no longer part of the process and that the Root Zone Maintainer, currently Verisign, continues to perform that function.
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	TBC
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team G.</b>	<b>IANA Intellectual Property Rights, including the IANA Trademark and Domain Name</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	Issue not in transition proposal 2.0
<b>Summary Description</b>	<p>The Number Community has proposed that the IANA trademark and the <a href="http://iana.org">iana.org</a> domain name be transferred to an independent entity, such as the IETF Trust. This Design Team will review this proposal and provide a report back to the CWG discussing issues and pros and cons of this proposal and providing a written draft recommendation to the CWG regarding how to deal with this proposal.</p> <p>The Number Community has also stated that it would be preferable if certain data associated with the IANA were in the public domain. The team would examine this proposal, and would also determine what if any other IPR is involved in the NTIA-IANA relationship. The team would provide a written draft recommendation regarding these points in a second deliverable.</p>
<b>Detailed description</b>	<p>The proposal submitted by CRISP on behalf of the Numbers Community contains the following paragraph:</p> <p>With regards to the IANA trademark and the <a href="http://IANA.ORG">IANA.ORG</a> domain, it is the expectation of the Internet Number Community that both are associated with the IANA Numbering Services and not with a particular IANA Numbering Services Operator. Identifying an organization that is not the IANA Numbering Services Operator and which will permanently hold these assets will facilitate a smooth transition should another operator (or operators) be selected in the future. It is the preference of the Internet Number Community that the IANA trademark and the <a href="http://IANA.ORG">IANA.ORG</a> domain name be transferred to an entity independent of the IANA Numbering Services Operator, in order to ensure that these assets are used in a non-discriminatory manner for the benefit of the entire community. From the Internet Number Community's</p>

	<p>perspective, the IETF Trust would be an acceptable candidate for this role.</p> <p>The ICG has issued a question to the Protocol Parameters Community, asking (in essence) whether this proposal was acceptable. The Protocol Parameters Community responded that this was not inconsistent with their proposal. The ICG also issued a question to the IETF Trust, asking whether the IETF would be willing to take on this role. The IETF Trust responded that it would be willing to do so. As of today, the ICG has not issued a question to the CWG regarding this proposal.</p> <p>This proposal may raise various operational and legal concerns. It does not appear that the CRISP Team, the ICG or the IETF Trust have examined these concerns. This Design Team will review this proposal with regard to how it could work and with regard to operational and legal concerns, and will provide a report back to the CWG discussing issues and pros and cons of this proposal and providing a draft recommendation to the CWG regarding how to deal with this proposal.</p> <p>The Number Community has also stated that it would be preferable if certain data associated with the IANA were in the public domain. The team would examine this proposal, and would also determine what if any other IPR is involved in the NTIA-IANA relationship. The team would provide a written draft recommendation regarding these points in a second deliverable.</p>
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	<b>Greg Shatan</b>
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 3</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 2 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team H.</b>	<b>.INT Operations</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.4.1
<b>Summary Description</b>	<p>The contract foresees that the IANA functions operator operates the .INT TLD within the current registration policies for the TLD (act as the registry operator). The contract specifies that ICANN is to “develop and undertake an open process, that will include the current registrants of .INT, to identify a new registry operator and transfer responsibility for the .INT registry to it. Upon designation of a successor registry operator by the above process, IANA shall cooperate with it to facilitate the smooth transition of operation of the INT TLD. Such cooperation shall, at a minimum, include timely transfer to the successor registry operator of the then-current top-level</p>



	domain registration data". With NTIA withdrawing from the IANA Functions Contract the section "upon designation of a successor registry by the Government" would no longer be valid post transition.
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	<b>Elise Lindeberg</b>
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 2 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team I.</b>	<b>Competition policy and Conflicts of Interest</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.3
<b>Summary Description</b>	<p>Without prejudice as to what specific new institutional structure, or none, emerge from the IANA/NTIA transition, the resulting power within the decision-making entities is a relevant consideration. At least in Europe and the United States, if not elsewhere, each recent attempt at de-regulation, self-regulation and hands-off public policy has resulted in questionable outcomes, not least in the financial sector, resulting in a global recession. This has inevitably and rightly led to greater scrutiny of the relevant institutions within each sector, including the Internet.</p> <p>Accordingly the Design Team would review, discuss and quickly conclude as to the merits or otherwise of a balanced and independent stakeholder composition of the relevant entities (existing or future). The Detailed description below illustrates the scope of the issue.</p>
<b>Detailed description</b>	<p><b>CSC/MRT confidentiality and the perception of conflicts of interest</b> - Developing conflict of interest requirements for the CSC like body. Most discussions have proposed that the membership of a CSC type body have, as a minimum, significant representation from registries. Is this desirable in a context where members of the CSC will be provided with access to information that is confidential and sensitive with respect to all registries?</p> <p><b>Detailed description:</b> IANA confidentiality and the perception of conflicts of interest - The oversight manager (MRT?), or a subset (CSC?), could be placed in a privileged position (as is currently the case with NTIA) with respect to accessing IANA performance information, issues with specific requests or security matters. This was not an issue with the NTIA given that it is part of the USG and is not involved in any commercial activities related to the DNS. Transferring this responsibility to representatives of registry operators at a minimum creates the potential for conflict of interest situations in that they could</p>

	gain access to sensitive or confidential information of their competitors or use their position to negatively influence requests from competitors. The reverse situation is also a concern in that members of the oversight manager if composed of registry representatives could be perceived as being in a potential conflict of interest situation given they could use their position to influence requests from their respective registries. As such the CWG should decide if those individuals that will be responsible for the regular monitoring of IANA performance and interfacing with IANA on a regular basis to discuss and resolve any potential issues or escalating them can be in a conflict of interest position. If the recommendation is to avoid conflict of interests for those individuals it would then be important to decide who should carry out these responsibilities.
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	Convener: Secretariat (ICANN) Members: one Large Registrar, owning several gTLDs one Small gTLD Registry, independent of any Registrar one ccTLD one independent Internet user (At Large or equivalent) one delegate from one GAC member with practical experience in anti- trust/competition policy.
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	Christopher Wilkinson
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 3</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 2 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team J.</b>	<b>CSC/MRT confidentiality and the perception of conflicts of interest</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.3
<b>Summary Description</b>	Developing conflict of interest requirements for the CSC like body. Most discussions have proposed that the membership of a CSC type body have, as a minimum, significant representation from registries. Is this desirable in a context where members of the CSC will be provided with access to information that is confidential and sensitive with respect to all registries?
<b>Detailed description</b>	IANA confidentiality and the perception of conflicts of interest - The oversight manager (MRT?), or a subset (CSC?), could be placed in a privileged position (as is currently the case with NTIA) with respect to accessing IANA performance information, issues with specific requests or security matters. This was not an issue with the NTIA given that it is part of the USG and is not involved in any commercial activities related to the DNS. Transferring this responsibility to representatives of registry operators at a minimum creates the potential for

	<p>conflict of interest situations in that they could gain access to sensitive or confidential information of their competitors or use their position to negatively influence requests from competitors. The reverse situation is also a concern in that members of the oversight manager if composed of registry representatives could be perceived as being in a potential conflict of interest situation given they could use their position to influence requests from their respective registries. As such the CWG should decide if those individuals that will be responsible for the regular monitoring of IANA performance and interfacing with IANA on a regular basis to discuss and resolve any potential issues or escalating them can be in a conflict of interest position. If the recommendation is to avoid conflict of interests for those individuals it would then be important to decide who should carry out these responsibilities</p>
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	TBC
<b>Status</b>	<b>Consider merging with DT I</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 2 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team K.</b>	<b>OFAC Licensing</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	To be added
<b>Summary Description</b>	IANA requires OFAC licensing to operate with certain countries or territories. Would anything change post transition? If so what and how would it be addressed?
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 2</b>

<b>Design Team L.</b>	<b>IANA Function Separation Mechanism</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.1.1
<b>Summary Description</b>	Should there be a mechanism to move the IANA Functions away from ICANN and if so what should that mechanism be? (note: given the NTIA requirement for complete and implementable transition proposals a proposal which has such a mechanism would have to include a significant level of detail to meet this requirement).
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team M.</b>	<b>Escalation Mechanisms beyond CSC</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.1.2
<b>Summary Description</b>	Although there were no formal escalation mechanisms described in the IANA Functions Contract for the NTIA any new arrangement will require these. How should this be coordinated with the CCWG?
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Provisional)</b>

<b>Design Team N.</b>	<b>Periodic Review of IANA Functions</b>
<b>Draft Transition Proposal Reference</b>	III.A.1.4
<b>Summary Description</b>	<p>Regardless of the model selected to implement the transition the SOW will have to be reviewed on a regular basis. This requirement brings on several additional requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What period (duration) should be covered by the first SOW post transition?</li> <li>• What should be the standard period for reviewing SOWs post transition?</li> <li>• What should be the process for reviewing or amending SOWS (including approval by the community and acceptance by ICANN)?</li> </ul> <p>The current definition and operational parameters (including the format of request and reporting requirements) for these functions in the IANA Functions contract and IANA Response have to be reviewed to ensure they meet all the post transition requirements.</p>
<b>Detailed description</b>	
<b>Proposed Membership</b>	
<b>Proposed by / Lead</b>	
<b>Status</b>	<b>Step 0</b>
<b>Determination by CWG Chairs</b>	<b>Priority 1 (Provisional)</b>

## Annex A – DT Step-by-step process

<b>CWG IANA Stewardship Transition Step-by-Step Process for a CWG Design Team</b>	
Step 0	Issue identified
Step 1	Proponent / Lead completes the template (see Annex I) with all of the minimum required information; proposed title, summary description, detailed description, proposed membership (description of expertise required, e.g. ccTLD registry rep, technical expert) and reference to relevant section of the draft transition proposal
Step 2	Proponent / Lead submits the completed template to the CWG mailing list
Step 3	Co-Chairs of CWG review template for completeness and may ask proponent / lead for additional details prior to further review
Step 4	Co-Chairs of CWG to review proposal within two working days of receiving the proposal, taking into account any comments or suggestions that may have been received on the CWG mailing list in response to the DT proposal
Step 5	Co-Chairs of the CWG share their recommendation on whether to proceed with the DT or reject the DT proposal stating their rationale for doing so with the CWG
Step 6	If the recommendation is to proceed with the DT, the Co-Chairs will assign the DT a priority from 1 to 3, where 1 is the highest level
Step 7	Priority 1 recommendations will move forward to a call for volunteers. Call for volunteers will close after two working days (23.59 UTC of the second working day)
Step 8	Volunteers for the DT are expected to share their Statement of Interest (SOI) or provide a link to the existing SOI as well as their qualification for the DT with the CWG mailing list (SOIs will also be linked on the Wiki)
Step 9	The Co-Chairs, in co-ordination with the DT Lead, will review the volunteers that have come forward and determine the membership of the DT, ensuring sufficient expertise and a balanced membership (Note: a DT should typically involve at least 5 participants, but not more than 7)
Step 10	The DT will be convened by the DT Lead as soon as possible to commence its deliberations and is expected to report back to the full CWG on a regular basis (at least once a week, during a full CWG call).
Step 11	The DT will submit proposed language for inclusion in the relevant section of the draft transition proposal, for review by the CWG, ideally within 2 weeks from start
Step 12	If generally accepted by the CWG, the agreed language will be included into the transition proposal and the DT decommissioned (unless there are other linked tasks that need to be completed)