53 responses

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Summary

Introduction

Instructions

CWG Proposal Definitions of CSC and MRT

Customer Service Committee (CSC)

Multi-stakeholder Review Team (MRT)

Demographics

Name

[Bar chart showing the distribution of names]
**Customer Standing Committee (CSC)**

There should be a Customer Standing Committee to carry out the tasks as defined in the CWG Draft Proposal (see introduction to this survey). [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- **Strongly Agree**: 16 (30%)
- **Agree**: 21 (40%)
- **Is Acceptable**: 10 (19%)
- **Disagree**: 3 (6%)
- **Strongly Disagree**: 3 (6%)
- **No Response**: 0 (0%)

**The CSC should be an ICANN working group.** [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]
1. The CSC should perform the functions of the MRT, and there should be no separate MRT. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]
2. The CSC membership should include a substantial multi-stakeholder component. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 9 (17%)
- Agree: 6 (11%)
- Is Acceptable: 6 (11%)
- Disagree: 16 (30%)
- Strongly Disagree: 12 (23%)
- No Response: 3 (6%)

3. The CSC membership should be restricted to ccTLD and gTLD registry operators. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 7 (13%)
- Agree: 10 (19%)
- Is Acceptable: 13 (25%)
- Disagree: 13 (25%)
- Strongly Disagree: 7 (13%)
- No Response: 2 (4%)
4. The CSC membership should primarily consist of ccTLD and gTLD registry operators with related experts, e.g., representatives of the SSAC, the RSSAC, the RIRs, ISOC, and the IETF. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

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5. If the CSC is only tasked with monitoring IANA performance (and not with resolving performance issues), the CSC may consist predominantly of registries. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

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6. The CSC should include additional individuals outside the naming community who have relevant technical expertise. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 3 (6%)
- Agree: 6 (12%)
- Is Acceptable: 8 (16%)
- Disagree: 1 (2%)
- Strongly Disagree: 0
- No Response: 2 (4%)

7. The CSC members should be drawn from the MRT so that there is coordination between CSC and MRT on matters that are escalated. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 4 (8%)
- Agree: 12 (24%)
- Is Acceptable: 15 (30%)
- Disagree: 3 (6%)
- Strongly Disagree: 1 (2%)
- No Response: 1 (2%)
8. The CSC should have a continuous existence. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 24, 45%
- Agree: 20, 38%
- Is Acceptable: 3, 6%
- Disagree: 0, 0%
- Strongly Disagree: 2, 4%
- No Response: 3, 6%

9. Members should have staggered terms (e.g., only one-third of the members should be replaced each year), to provide continuity. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]
10. Users of the IANA naming functions should be required to go through the CSC or the MRT to address issues relating to the IANA functions operator. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

11. Users of the IANA naming functions should be able to address issues directly with the IANA functions operator rather than being required to go through the MRT. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]
12. Users of the IANA naming functions should be able to address issues directly with the IANA functions operator rather than being required to go through the CSC. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]
13. The role of the CSC should be focused on service level commitments, performance indicators and quality assurance. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 23 (43%)
- Agree: 19 (36%)
- Is Acceptable: 5 (9%)
- Disagree: 0 (0%)
- Strongly Disagree: 2 (4%)
- No Opinion: 1 (2%)

14. The CSC may go directly to the IAP (rather than escalating issues to the MRT) if there is an issue that cannot be resolved. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 3 (6%)
- Agree: 9 (17%)
- Is Acceptable: 8 (15%)
- Disagree: 14 (26%)
- Strongly Disagree: 10 (19%)
15. Assuming the MRT is not a standing committee, the CSC should decide whether an instance of the MRT needs to be created to address a specific topic or issue the CSC has been unable to resolve. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 3 (6%)
- Agree: 19 (36%)
- Is Acceptable: 8 (15%)
- Disagree: 8 (15%)
- Strongly Disagree: 4 (8%)
- No Opinion: 9 (17%)

16. The CSC may develop IANA service levels without going through the MRT. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 11 (21%)
- Agree: 12 (23%)
- Is Acceptable: 15 (28%)
17. The CSC should be a subgroup of the MRT. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 3 (6%)
- Agree: 2 (4%)
- Is Acceptable: 10 (19%)
- Disagree: 18 (34%)
- Strongly Disagree: 16 (30%)
- No Opinion: 2 (4%)

18. The CSC should be tasked with the job of resolving issues related to policy implementation, or escalating these issues to the MRT if the CSC cannot resolve the issue. [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

- Strongly Agree: 3 (6%)

19. Assuming the CSC is composed only of registry representatives, the CSC (and not the MRT) should be solely responsible for annual IANA tasks (performance review, budget review and customer survey input). [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]

20. Assuming the CSC is composed of registries and other stakeholders, the CSC (and not the MRT) should be solely responsible for annual IANA tasks (performance review, budget review and customer survey input). [Customer Standing Committee (CSC)]
Customer Standing Committee (CSC) - Comments

Additional comments about the Customer Standing Committee (CSC)

Many of these questions are challenging to answer because they assume both a CSC and an MRT and deal with issues of populating both and then dividing tasks between them. I favor a single group which combines both, but I also have reservations about the task list to be divided between them; it seems to orphan some important questions (contract mods outside of a formal renewal cycle, in response to operational needs) and over-manage others (does it really take the entire community through two committees to determine how long it should take IANA to put a root zone change in nameservers for a TLD into production?). A body to oversee IANA performance, SLAs, review budgets, etc. makes sense to me with or without Contract Co. (I prefer without); structuring and populating two such bodies does not.

auDA agrees that a mechanism similar to the proposed CSC could be useful in regard to the future management of the IANA function. However, a great deal of extra work is required to define its scope, functions and membership. auDA's over-arching view is that the creation of a number of entities (IAP, CSC, MRT, Contract Co) to replace current arrangements is not ideal. Our responses should be read in that context.

I found impossible to use the survey in a manner that would reflect my views accurately. Let me summarize them here. I think the Customer Standing Committee is a misnomer,
fundamentally prejudging its composition. I believe a small (5-6 people) Trustees Group should be established, nominated by a NomCom composed of people designated in major part by the registries, and in smaller part by other communities. This Trustees Group would be independent and assume the PROCEDURAL/CLERICAL validation/authorization role that NTIA is currently performing in the change workflow. It would monitor on an ongoing basis the performance of the IANA Department, have a say (in a way to be determined more precisely) in the nomination of the Head of the IANA Department. It would provide the annual review of performance (instead of the proposed MRT). It would also receive and treat complaints regarding performance. As a result, the ICANN Board would be entirely out of the loop of the actual change workflow, which would strengthen functional separation.

CSC membership should be rigorously globally diverse with representatives from all regions, rotating on a biennial or three yearly basis basis. Its working modalities should be fully transparent with regular periodic reporting to the ICANN community and be accountable and subject to review to ensure its continued efficiency, responsiveness and effectiveness.

N/A

All these questions has way more to do with the organisation of the CSC than with a real functional description. It is all form and a proper functional description how the elements work together. As a general comment, creating a four headed monster replacing the current simple structure seems a bit excessive.

We do not believe that a separate customer standing committee is necessary. To the extent that it is created nonetheless, we believe that it should be focused solely on operational issues and composed of technical representatives and direct customers of the IANA functions. For this reason, we don't support its creation as an ICANN working group, which would have to be completely multistakeholder in nature. Please see our full public comment for further views.

It would be useful to have a CSC that reviews and reports on the performance of the IANA function. The CSC should have members who are very familiar with IANA transactions for the naming community. This means the members have to know technical and operational details. The CSC does not need and should not have authority for enforcement, per se. It is quite sufficient for the CSC to be able to probe fully and report what it finds. There is no need for any of the other proposed structures, e.g. MRT, and hence I've answered in the negative those questions that depend on the existence of an MRT.

Q 18 - operator related policy implementation issues should be resolved by the MRT with input from the CSC as appropriate Q 19 and 20 - the MRT should be responsible for the IANA operator annual reviews with input from the CSC as appropriate

Make sure there is a very clear division of function between CSC and MRT

The composition of the CSC and the MRT are strongly linked. If the CSC should consists
of direct customers only - the MRT have to have a strong Multistakeholder component

-I believe that quality assurance and SLA’s should be a very significant responsibility of the CSC but not the only focus of the group. I would support a wider mandate for the CSC that also included responsibilities related to ensuring correct policy implementation and initiating/determining the outcome of a rebidding process (provided that multi-stakeholder participation is also provided for). -While I believe that there may be, at times, a need for other technical liaisons on the CSC, these should not be built into the de facto composition of the group, nor follow an existing ICANN structure (i.e. 1 liaison per AC or SG). Instead, the CSC should be empowered to create and appoint for these roles as needs arise.

It is difficult to provide answers to some questions because of the requirement to have an agreed set of assumptions regarding how the two committees are constituted. Responsibilities need to be split, if there is to be true separation of duties and oversight, but it cannot be said that the accountabilities are not mutual. Each committee must have a set of separate responsibilities, and in the case of the MRT, their responsibility must be to have independent oversight of the CSC. The CSC should be focused on day to day operational concerns and the smooth running of the function.

5b. We know how to do cross community groups, so it seems possible that this could be a workable methodology. 6.3 & 6.4 - The Definition of expertise may be wider than just technical operational. Consideration could be given to policy implementation experience and could include liaison to other groups.. 7. MRT and CSC may require different skill sets. 10. Should there be consideration of them going directly to an IANA customer service and escalating beyond that. And does this exclude them going directly to the IAP. I think of the CSC working more with aggregate information, overall status and statistical information than with individual issues. 14. It seems that the CSC should be able to decide that some issue is better resolved in the IAP and could pass the issue over to the IAP

The CSC or self-formed registry-operator groups should: negotiate SLAs with the IANA function and provide regular performance reports. The performance reports can trigger a corrective action process within IANA. IANA should furnish regular performance reports to the CSC; these will be the basis of the CSC report above. Their should be an independent monitor of IANA performance that should also provide regular performance reports.

I support CSC composition and role as defined in the draft proposal.

Not convinced that the CSC is required.

none

The CSC should be focused on service level commitments, performance indicators and quality assurance. The CSC membership should primarily involve ccTLD and gTLD registry operators and - if applicable - with liaisons from other impacted parties.

p1 (unnumbered question 1): this should not include ex ante assessments, but only ex-
post reports to the wider community q.1: Main role should be in preparing reports to the wider community about performance. q.2: Only as observers - this is predominantly an expert role. q.4: This should be limited to those other groups with clear technical knowledge and interest - ie essentially only the groups cited q.6: It should be clearly defined who these people are (eg in line with q.4). Experts selected through a process that has not been agreed in advance is unacceptable. q.13: As ex-post reviews. There should be no gate-keeper role. q.14: This really depends on the issue. In principle, I do not think it is a good idea: the IAP should be focussed on operational appeals, not reviews. However, it might be appropriate to identify specific circumstances, for example that there seems to be concern about the way processes are being followed. q.18: If there are doubts, these should be referred to the policy authority.

It is not possible to respond objectively to any of the questions since the underlying assumption is that the CSC and the MRT will materialise, which I very much doubt. Nearly all the questions are 'leading questions'; a survey technique to which I object. The CWG participants are being manipulated. CW

It is hard to know what the role of MRT and CSC is without knowing: 1. How are instructions created that IANA is to follow? 1a. Specifically, how is this connected to the PDPs hosted by ICANN? 1b. How much of the instructions to IANA imply _subjective_ decisions, and how much of the instructions imply _objective_ decisions? 1c. How much of the _subjective_ decisions can be handled by "expertise appointed that is not IANA"? 2. Do the oversight over IANA require continuous monitoring (as for the root zone management of today), or is oversight only needed based on: 2a. Statistics 2b. Appeals 3. What is the communication channels between IANA and the entities that can directly communicate with IANA, and who are they (registries? any more?) Given responses to the questions above, what is the role of CSC and what is the role of MRT?

The Registries could be so placed in the IANA structure, enough to ensure that IANA operations remain "dumb", performed without interruption or technical gaps, as also could play a supportive role to the extend of advising on areas where the technical expertise of the Registries are required by the IANA structure / IANA operator as also offer to make all technical and various other resources available in the case of crisis. All this could happen without any hierarchical status or formal designation.

**Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)**

There should be a Multi-stakeholder Review Team to carry out the tasks as defined in the CWG Draft Proposal (see introduction to this survey). [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]
The MRT should be an ICANN working group. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]
1. The MRT should be responsible for creating or selecting an entity for contracting with the IANA Functions Operator, only if and when it is needed (i.e., when the Operator is no longer ICANN). [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

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2. The MRT should be convened by ICANN in conjunction with the I* organizations. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

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3. The concept of the MRT could be replaced by a dual-pronged vehicle similar to that used by the addressing community [e.g., an “internal to ICANN” structure like the Address Supporting Organization (the “IANA Supporting Organization”) and an external structure like the Numbers Resource Organization (the “IANA Resource Organization”)]. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

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4. If an MRT is convened under the auspices of ICANN, it should have a legal status (e.g., incorporation) of its own. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

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5. If an MRT is NOT convened under the auspices of ICANN, it should have a legal status (e.g., incorporation) of its own. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

6. The MRT should not recreate another ICANN. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]
### 7. Adequate care should be taken to restrict the growth dynamics of the MRT. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

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### 8. There should be multistakeholder representation on the MRT. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

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9. The composition of the MRT should be weighted toward greater representation of the registry operators, as direct customers of the IANA Function. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]
10. Membership in the MRT should be restricted to the direct customers of IANA, the registries. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 2 (4%)
- Agree: 7 (13%)
- Is Acceptable: 4 (8%)
- Disagree: 20 (38%)
- Strongly Disagree: 17 (32%)
- No opinion: 2 (4%)

11. Control of decisions in the MRT should be restricted to the registries even if there are representatives of other stakeholder groups in the MRT. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 5 (9%)
- Agree: 7 (13%)
- Is Acceptable: 8 (15%)
- Disagree: 15 (28%)
- Strongly Disagree: 15 (28%)
12. There is a danger that an MRT drawn entirely from ICANN’s policy making and policy advisory organizations will politicize the IANA naming functions. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 8 (15%)
- Agree: 20 (38%)
- Is Acceptable: 5 (9%)
- Disagree: 8 (15%)
- Strongly Disagree: 3 (6%)
- No opinion: 8 (15%)

13. The MRT (and not the CSC) should be solely responsible for the annual IANA tasks currently performed by the NTIA (performance review, budget review and customer survey input). [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 3 (6%)
- Agree: 6 (11%)
14. The MRT (with input from the CSC) should be responsible for the annual IANA tasks currently performed by the NTIA (performance review, budget review and customer survey input). [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 4 (8%)
- Agree: 14 (26%)
- Is Acceptable: 11 (21%)
- Disagree: 8 (15%)
- Strongly Disagree: 11 (21%)
- No opinion: 4 (8%)

15. The MRT’s primary function should be deciding whether to renew the IANA Functions Contract and whether the IANA naming functions contract needs to be amended. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 6 (11%)
- Agree: 20 (38%)
- Is Acceptable: 13 (25%)
- Disagree: 4 (8%)
- Strongly Disagree: 4 (8%)
- No opinion: 4 (8%)
16. The MRT should have a continuous existence (regardless of how often it meets). [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

17. The MRT should be “re-created” each time it is needed. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]
18. Members should have staggered terms (e.g., only one-third of the members should be replaced each year), to provide continuity. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]
19. The MRT should be kept small in number, e.g., no more than a dozen representatives. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly Agree: 7 (13%)
- Agree: 15 (28%)
- Is Acceptable: 10 (19%)
- Disagree: 7 (13%)
- Strongly Disagree: 7 (13%)
- No opinion: 5 (9%)

20. The MRT can be larger in number, e.g., twenty or more representatives, so that broad representation can be achieved. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly agree: 4 (8%)
- Agree: 9 (17%)
- Is Acceptable: 14 (26%)
- Disagree: 11 (21%)
- Strongly Disagree: 9 (17%)
21. The composition and size of the MRT should be difficult to alter or amend. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly agree: 5 (9%)
- Agree: 16 (30%)
- Is Acceptable: 10 (19%)
- Disagree: 9 (17%)
- Strongly Disagree: 2 (4%)
- No opinion: 10 (19%)

22. The term length of MRT members should be limited to two full contract cycles. [Statements regarding the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)]

- Strongly agree: 3 (6%)
- Agree: 15 (28%)
- Is Acceptable: 17 (32%)
- Disagree: 3 (6%)
Strongly Disagree 3 6%
No opinion 11 21%

Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT) - Comments

Additional comments about the Multistakeholder Review Team (MRT)

I'm not sure of "politicizing" IANA naming functions is a bad thing - if what is meant here is healthy debate through the multi-stakeholder naming community. Which is what we have now.

-MRT needs to be structured to account for distinct needs of ccTLDs and gTLDs as direct consumers. This can be achieved in a variety of ways: expanding mandate of CSC vis-a-vis MRT, requiring approval of both bodies for transitions of IANA Functions operator, requiring approval by registry members of MRT to transition operator, weighted representation of registries on the MRT, etc.

(If the MRT is to be an ICANN WG it should be open to others as well (this is not preferable to the original framing of the MRT, however.)) Q 1 - unclear what this statement means. The MRT should meet annually to undertake the operator reviews, meet when the operator RFPs have to be issued and the responses reviewed, and meet on an ad hoc basis as needed. Q 3 - there is insufficient detail with regard to the functioning/implications of the proposal in this statement to be able to answer. Q 12 - the MRT should be dealing with operator related policy implementation issues/challenges NOT policy itself. As long as that is understood by those in the MRT there should be no politicization of the IANA naming functions. Q 17 - it is unclear what "re-created" means. Does this mean that it has to be recreated from scratch, or called to meet (in other words it is already existing but not standing) A number of these questions where answered "no opinion" does not mean that I have no opinion but that it is difficult to answer the question largely due to lack of clarity.

AS indicated above, it is sometimes difficult to pick a response without clarifying assumptions. The basic principle is that the MRT has to be neutral and at arms length from both ICANN and the CSC. There are inherent conflicts of interest which might arise if ICANN were to maintain control. I am in favour of strong separation of the duties and functions, for optics as well as practical reasons. The size has to be larger than ten, to provide for geographical and functional diversity in the MRT. Neutrality (ie representatives who are capable of understanding the issues but have no financial or reputational stake in the outcomes) should be sought to provide a mature balance to the review team. It is worth pointing out that this team has a function that is similar to an audit function, as well as the function of contracting authority. The CSC has a role that is similar to the office of primary interest in that contract. The composition of the two groups must therefore be quite different. Some of the questions did not reflect that possibility.
Registered a "no opinion" on Question 1 because I think the MRT should be formed periodically in line with a 3 year contracting cycle. Registered a "no opinion" on Question 18 because I think the MRT terms should be based on contract cycles not annual rotations, but I agree with the idea that we shouldn't replace all of it at once.

N/A

q.7: In particular the MRT should only work in direct consultation and engagement with the wider community. q.13 & 14: Understanding these as ex-post reviews. q.19: Subject to it working in direct consultation and engagement with the wider community and not able to make decisions without such engagement. q.22: Limited to three years, one third rotated off each year. Incidentally that would mean 3 people each nominated from the ccNSO and the GNSO.

There should not be an MRT. It's unnecessary, redundant and unworkable.

The MRT proposal is superfluous as it would duplicate existing multi-stakeholder bodies.

The key issue about an MRT (or whatever it is called) is linked to the issue of separability and duration of the mandate (I purposefully avoid the word Contract). I strongly believe that periodic large scale review of performance (for instance every X years) is appropriate, like the ATRT reviews in the AoC. Setting up a group on those occasions to organize and steer the review is good. With call for contributions like the invitation to comment launched by NTIA in the last IANA Contract renewal. But I do believe that systemic rebidding is not necessary. Reopening the mandate should be, as many people argue, a last resort, "nuclear option" in case of grave mis-performance or breach of trust.

In that context, I fully support the formation of such a Review Team, periodically and also potentially on an ad hoc basis, as the need may arise (in case of problem), with clear and precise triggers for rebidding. I am rather in favor of a larger group, but with a clear, well-defined mandate and mission.

We strongly oppose the creation of a multistakeholder review team as set forth in our comments. In addition, we found this survey extremely difficult to complete. By assuming the existence of all of these entities, the survey makes it very difficult to question the overall structure prepared by the CWG. As such, it is inherently designed to create results suggesting that the community supports the overall framework, which may or may not be true.

There's no need for a distinct body. The CSC could carry out the left over MRT functions, e.g. (re-)contracting and oversight.

The survey assumes the creation of MRT, that which I doubt. Nearly all the questions are 'leading questions' which is a technique that I reject. Specific amendments to some of the questions that have been requested in the CWG discussion have not been carried out. The CWG participants are being manipulated in an unacceptable manner. CW

A multi-stakeholder layer could oversee, on one level, subject to a higher level of oversight, the management of IANA functions. However there is no need to create an IANA specific Multi-stakeholder team, with or without a legal status. The ICANN
Community could organize itself even better to roughly but closely represent (or act in the best interests of) the respective stakeholders within the respective Councils / Advisory Committees / Supporting Organizations as also organize the various stakeholders to come together more and more on Cross-Community policy process, both for Names and Numbers.

It will be important to ensure that MRT members are fully committed to be active in fulfilling their responsibilities. MRT should be representative of all constituencies and have full transparency in its interaction with the IANA operator and with the ICANN Board. none

From the discussions in the CWG, the best tool to get the MRT and CSC effective and lean - and stop it from growing out of proportions and becoming "another ICANN" is clearly defined roles, responsibilities and possibly also defined meeting frequencies if there is nothing critical that needs to be dealt with/escalated.

The role of the MRT as described is a policy implementation role and should not be filled by policy makers. A backstop body, such as an MRT has two roles: 1) authorizing root zone changes; 2) finding a replacement for ICANN as an operator. The first role has not been discussed in the CWG but a multistakeholder body is probably not the correct composition for this task. Regarding the second role: the backstop body need only be organized when ICANN no longer is able to perform the role and so is not needed at this time. There should be a process put in place to create a body to find a IANA operator replacement that can be energized in case ICANN no longer performs the role.

1. This question is too ambiguous to answer. Does it mean that the MRT only makes a decision after ICANN has been replaced? Does it mean that the MRT only does an RFP if it is needed, for some definition of need? 2. MRT should be convened by the stakeholders. 3. No enough information to understand how this could work or how it could deal with separability. 4. 5. Do not understand how this works with the model and whether it is needed 18. Depends on how it is done. If the MRT is an on demand committee instead of a standing committee then there would not be members so much as seats held by various bodies than they could be able fill as they please - using their own rotation rules. 21. While there should be a stakeholder process to do it, it does not need to be difficult.

As noted in the CSC comments section, auDA does not support the development of a new, potentially unwieldy, multi-layered accountability / "oversight" structure as currently proposed by the CWG. Our overall view is that the concept of a CSC has some validity, but that an MRT-like structure does not. Once again, our responses to this narrow survey should be read in that context.

1. Unclear what this means. 4. Given draft proposal, it is unclear why there is a need to incorporate MRT. 5. Given draft proposal, it is unclear why there is a need to incorporate MRT. 22. Depends on contract+option(s) term length.

I do not think that the MRT whether associated with ICANN or not needs to be
incorporated. In a couple cases, if there was an option for 'no response', I would have chosen that. 'No opinion' has a very different meaning than 'no response'.

Q.12: I agree that it might be making the MRT political but that is not necessarily a bad thing. Q.22: Preference for staggered terms would therefore not necessarily link terms to contract cycles, but I do support limited terms.

Emphasis on previous comment that separate MRT and CSC make very limited sense to me, so it's hard to evaluate statements about how they should interact with each other or be structured in detail. When I start with the tasks that need to be performed, outside of the policy functions around the root zone and the day-to-day operations of IANA (performance monitoring, budget review, complaint escalation), the full structure of the MRT + CSC doesn't make sense. I do feel strongly that the IANA oversight function should be primarily but not solely carried out by the IANA customers; the place for broad multi-stakeholder representation is in making policy, but the business interests of TLD operators should not be the only determination of whether IANA undertakes (non-policy) service improvements that might be expensive but are needed for the security & stability of the broader internet.

It is hard to know what the role of MRT and CSC is without knowing: 1. How are instructions created that IANA is to follow? 1a. Specifically, how is this connected to the PDPs hosted by ICANN? 1b. How much of the instructions to IANA imply _subjective_ decisions, and how much of the instructions imply _objective_ decisions? 1c. How much of the _subjective_ decisions can be handled by "expertise appointed that is not IANA"? 2. Do the oversight over IANA require continuous monitoring (as for the root zone management of today), or is oversight only needed based on: 2a. Statistics 2b. Appeals 3. What is the communication channels between IANA and the entities that can directly communicate with IANA, and who are they (registries? any more?) Given responses to the questions above, what is the role of CSC and what is the role of MRT?

Thank you

Number of daily responses

![Graph showing the number of daily responses from 1/4/15 to 1/8/15.](graph.png)