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Margie Milam: Hello everyone. This is Margie Milan, and welcome to the workshop. This is the latest in the series of teleconferences for the Expert Working Group, on gTLD's Directory Services, that the purpose (ph) is to highlight the work of the Group.

The aims of the seminar is to be an interactive session with the EWG, which is focused on identifying potential risks from benefits that might result if ICANN were to replace WHOIS with the Next-Generation system as suggested by the Expert Working Group. During this interactive workshop, we will gather input on the risks and benefits that might result if ICANN were to replace WHOIS from anyone that might be impacted by the RDS, and we'll also provide you a forum to do a deep-dive interaction with the members of the Expert Working Group on the proposed RDS features.

Before we begin, I'll give you a few housekeeping tips. The webinar is being recorded, so if you have any objections, you may disconnect at this time. The session is being streamed via audio , via Adobe Connect, but if you intend to voice comments or raise questions during the question-and-answer period, please join the Adigo Bridge, as you won't be able to speak through the Adobe Connect room. If you join the Adigo Bridge, please remember to mute your phone if you are not speaking to void the echo. You can do so by pressing *6, and then you can unmute my pressing *7. If you want to make any comments, we invite to raise your hand in the Adobe Connect to be added to the queue. And if you are not actually on the phone bridge, you can use the Chat function to insert questions and comments.

And with that I'd like to introduce Jean-Francois Baril, the Facilitator of the Expert Working Group.

Jean-Francois Baril: Thank you very much, Margie, and a very warm welcome to the EWG Next-Generation, gTLD, April Workshop Webinar. It's for the replacement for WHOIS, and even more important how to impact us. Please also note that a similar webinar has been held yesterday at 7:00 p.m. UTC.

My name is Jean-Francois Baril, EWG Facilitator, along with few of my colleagues, Fabricio, Michele, Stephanie, Lanre, Carlton, and Margie, will be the next speakers.

Otherwise, this moment, having direct dialogue with the community are very, very precious for us, especially as we approach our final stage of our work. So following the Singapore EWG Workshop, we wanted everyone to have a chance to get even more familiar and comment on how EWG works. As we said in Singapore, we are currently reviewing and integrating all comments based on the different consultations with the ICANN Community. And very, very special thank you, to all of you who have responded to this different requests for bringing your input.

We want to go even further today, and especially focusing on obvious risk and benefits. So, for the agenda we will propose the following. Fabrico Vayra will refresh our memory on what are the key registrations, directories features based on the latest update. Then we will have the possibility to

spend and input during the 30 minutes of Q&A, moderated by Michele Neylon. Then Stephanie Perrin will introduce the survey we are proposing to the community on risk and benefits on the new RDS.

We will get, after that into most specifics, the first specifics are about -- is about technical risks and benefits with Michele. Then we will legal and financial issues, which will be covered Fabricio. Lanre Ajayi will tell us about operational risks and benefits. Security and privacy will be covered by Carlton Samuels. Then Fabricio will come back to explain how to efficiently see the survey in such a way, you can input on to reduce risk and of course, maximize benefits. Margie will then wrap up the session and present the next steps.

But, once again, I would like to strongly emphasize and underline that we are all actively working for better RDS to support the overall global Internet community needs. For domain names, registration data, with significant improvement on privacy, accuracy, and accountability. Starting from clean slate, approach for these replacements, redefining the purpose and the provision of gTLD registration data. And (inaudible) needs for the Next-Generation RDS.

So without further ado, I would like now to pass the microphone to Fabricio, who will tell us about the key RDS features.

Fabricio Vayra: Thank you, Jean-Francois. And welcome everybody. So, on the next slide here. So what is the RDS? The RDS is a system that we are proposing, which someone can go online and find, as example here, who owns a certain domain names, the example is Company.Com, and as you can see in the graphic. To find that out you would do a query, it would pinned to the RDS and depending on the model that you go through, either pull the data directly from the RDS or panned out to the -- say the registries who own the data.

What would b returned? You would get public, verified, accurate information about registrants and contacts for authorized users. You would also have a accessibility to some gated information, and we'll speak more about gated and public later. If you look here you'll see a little diagram that talks about the types of information that you would see. For public access you would get Company.Com, possibly organization name, and email address for contact ability. In the gray here you'll see we talk about authorized access to gated information, you might find actually the street address, city, state, postal and phone number, all of which, again, would be verified.

Next slide, please. So some of the key features of the proposed RDS, I touched on a bit in the prior slide, but we need to remember that we are talking about purpose-driven access which is much different than we have today, meaning that someone who goes in to access information would have to actually declare what their purpose is. We are talking about having information that would be validated for both the public, and especially that that is gated. We'd have systems for managed contacts so that you'd be able to manage your contacts across the entire system in one shot.

Some of the data elements as we mentioned would be public, such as an email desk for contact ability, someone shares where you can have more information outside of the gate. But gated data would be, in fact, that we normally see today as public addresses, phone numbers, all of which would be accessible to credit users who identified themselves, they stayed to the purpose and agreed to accountability. Recall that one of the things that's paramount and runs across our entire work is accountability, plus accountability for those who enter the system as registrants, something new here which would be accountability for those who access data. And so you see we'd want people who access data to real accountability.

And something that's available in our proposed model here would be that you did have privacy that's consistent jurisdictionally across by the data subject, so we'll be able to (inaudible) -- put policies around data privacy. By implementing the system we would propose that you'd have enhanced privacy, but also maximum privacy options, if you read the (inaudible), we have anonymous credentialing available as one of the options. What's good about the system, or would

benefit what we are proposing, is that it's a centralized Web portal, that implements RDAP access, which is Registration Data Access Protocol, the latest and greatest, and notice for the hours where instead of having to go registry-by-registry, registrar-by-registrar to access WHOIS data, and you'd be able to do a one-stop shop through a centralized portal.

This next bullet point about aggregate and federated, I think ties in well with the centralized portal, which is -- to remember that we haven't settled specifically on whether the data will be aggregated through the centralized portal will allow you centralized search, to a federated storage, meaning that the data, for example, would fit that, all the various registries in a central portal which will allow to either search, not actual aggregation of data.

So with this, I will switch over to Michele, to cover questions and comments period about the RDS. Michele?

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Fabricio. And apologies to the Europeans, I'm afraid the Americans are all half asleep, so for those of you who have been up for several hours. Good afternoon.

At this juncture, I think the phone lines should be open, so if anybody wants to ask question via the phone, and I know there were two people who are on the phone, who are not on Adobe, feel free to let us know. If anybody on the Adobe has any comments, or has any questions, I think most of you know how to raise your hands virtually, and ask. So I'm throwing this open. Any questions from anybody?

Wow. We are giving you a golden opportunity here to grill us on all of the work that we've done so far, and I'm not hearing -- and nobody wants to ask us any questions?

Okay. So, Steven Metalitz has put in the chat, "How does the centralized portal differ from what ICANN is already making available in beta?" Who'd like to answer that one? I'd give to -- Fabricio, go for us.

Fabricio Vayra: Yeah. So one thing that pops to me, Steve, is that I think that the centralized portal that ICANN is developing today, is just that, and has nothing else layered on top of it, whereas with the centralized function of the RDS it's just one of the functions that we are proposing, a focus of the ideas would also be certain verifications, et cetera, that would sit at the RDS level. So the centralization is akin to what ICANN is building, but it's only one of the multiple facets built into the RDS. Does that help answer it?

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Fabricio. I'll just add to that as well. It's Michele, for the transcript. The centralized system that ICANN is currently beta testing, at the moment doesn't have an y level of accountability, a lot of the kind of logging and other things that we are proposing isn't catered for. So, you know, it's not covering the same kind of thing. What ICANN has basically produced is just a WHOIS lookup tool.

Okay. The next question is from Volker Greimann (ph), and his question is, "What would be considered abuse causing removal of access rights?" Carlton, I think I'll throw that one to you. Or maybe Carlton is on mute. Okay, Carlton is obviously on mute. I'll try to address that.

Carlton Samuels: This is Carton.

Michele Neylon: Okay, Carlton. Would you like to try that one?

Carlton Samuels: Yes. So the question was, what would be considered abuse?

Michele Neylon: Causing removal of access rights.

Carlton Samuels: For the removal of access rights. Yes, bear in that we are proposing that there is going to be two kinds of access. There is one where it's public access, everybody has access to a very defined set of data items, and I would expect that netiquette would not come into play there, but then there is a gated access, that again be are assuming that the community will go along with the purpose that access with the elements will be purposeful. And so if you were to (inaudible) purpose for access and it would be -- or found to be not factual, then maybe that is abuse and your could be -- some sanctions might apply. There is a question of abuse of purpose, then the other ones may be that you are caught defacing or probably trying to create a list that would breach anybody's rights, privacy rights, for example, those might be reasons getting your access restricted.

Lanre Ajayi: Michele?

Michele Neylon: Yes.

Lanre Ajayi :   This is Lanre. Yes. I'd just like to give an example of an abuse, I think something like (inaudible) would constitute an abuse, and I think this kind of act is not allowed and it should be -- it's beginning to cost a lot on (inaudible) rights.

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Lanre. And there's another thing as well, with what we've been proposing, you're going to have rate limits. The idea being that there will be service level agreement, but would also be, if you were going to -- let's say, for argument sake that you're granted higher level of access to, let's say, potentially more sensitive data. You're not just going to walk up and get that, you are going to probably have to agree to something. So if you are seen to abuse that, let's say, abuse could be trying to reverse-engineer the database, abuse could saying that you are using it for what we would consider to be a valid reason, and it's that using it to mine data, in order to spam people.

A couple of questions here in the Adobe Chat from Theo Geurts. Question, "How is privacy being handled and does RDS display all the registrant info?"

I'm going to hand over to Fabricio in just one second, but just to let you know that one of the principles we've been putting in, in every single area possible, is that privacy, respect for privacy, and respect for the law has to be taken into consideration at all steps, it's not -- it shouldn't be an afterthought, it shouldn't something that has, that is going to -- bolted on at the end and in a hand-fisted sort of manner. So, I'll pass over to Fabricio. Fabricio, go ahead.

Fabricio Vayra: Thank you, Michele. So Theo, at the simplest level, something that would change from today, would be that everything aside from a contact, email address, or possibly the person's name or company, would be behind the gate. So without credentialing and having appropriate access level and purpose, the registrants information seen today, address phone number or things of that nature wouldn't even be shown. Once someone is credentialed, say, law enforcement or and IP owner, they get their token, the get behind the gate to access the information. What we are discussing today, is a way to implement basically localized privacy law filters, per se.

So somebody from the U.S. trying to access data on a -- data subjects from Europe, the system should recognize several levels, what's the level of accreditation was for the person accessing from the United States. And also where the subject matter is, and what laws would pertain to that person, and then also where the data fits, because it may not be where the data subject is, and now behind this, obviously you would also have what the data subject agreed to. So, we are definitely, as Michele said, trying to account for the utmost in privacy and of course what you , as a data subject, are afforded under your jurisdiction.

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Fabricio. Next question we have is from Volker Greimann, "In case of abuse are you proposing permanent bands or time limitations?"

I'll answer that. Essentially work at this juncture, we are proposing that, you know, if you were give access for a particular -- at a particular level for particular purposes, then you need to respect

that. If you don't respect that, there has to be some level of sanction. It's not up to us to decide exactly on what that would involve, so it could be permanent abuse-- it could be a permanent ban, it could be temporary ban. I mean, if you look at the way, for example, ICANN compliance has processes for dealing with reports of issues involving registrars and registries, you're not going to (inaudible) a registrar for one single complaint, and it's the same was with a lot of things, where, depending on what it is, so there is going to be -- there's lots of different ways of handling it, and that will be a matter for Policy to decide. Does anybody want to add anything to this, from the EWG? I'll take that as a no.

Okay. Moving on. The next question is from Steven Metalitz, "How would verification and validation of registrant contact data be over -- be improved over what is provided in the 2013 RAA?

Lanre Ajayi: Michele. Can I respond to that?

Michele Neylon: Please. (Inaudible)

Lanre Ajayi: Yes. I think in a proposal, initial introduction is the availability of valid data, which is not (inaudible) 2013. They are going to be valuators who are going to validate all the data elements that are submitted. Or the three levels of validation at matrix plates, as in Patrick, (inaudible), and the date of the validation. So I think the important thing here is that there are going to be different entities that are going to carry us validation, and I don't think it is available in their (inaudible).

Michele Neylon: Okay. Thank you, Lanre. And just to add to that. At the moment, Steve, all of these things are just proposals. For example, the level of validation of verification of registrant contacts, I mean, some of us feel that higher levels of verification and validation should be optional. For in the case of a big brand, let's say, for argument sake, say, Louis Vuitton, they might wish to have highly validated, high verified contact information relating to their domain names, and they might wish to restrict access to those details. In other words, one of the issues at the moment is that anybody who wants to can put in any contact details they want for a domain.

So in the case of some of the big brands, and some abuse would be where people put in contact information without actually having the right to do so. We are exploring different options here. Ultimately though, all we are doing is coming up -- that recommendations are not going to be biding.

The next question, and I'm going to try to pronounce this person's name, and I apologize in advance, because I won't get it right. (Inaudible), question, "Could you elaborate more on how you make sure verified accurate information, especially in the locations where non -ASCII languages used, like Chinese, Thai, Laos et cetera." So you're talking about internationalized domain names data, internationalized registration data. Does anybody want to tackle that.

Lanre Ajayi: Yes. I think -- my understanding of that question is that -- how would you say -- with non-ASCII is going to be verified. Responding to that, it goes o the fact that we are going to have that and they are going to validate, who approached within that real. Within the realm of non-ASCII languages. So those validate us --validate auditors that people fed into the system. So I can't see that as a problem, because they are validate us around the words, including countries that have non-ASCII languages.

Michele Neylon: Thanks, Lanre. Petinam (ph), I hope that goes some way towards addressing your query, and then one of the things we have discussed is that any replacement for registration directory services has to be UTF-8, it has to be capable of handling multiple languages and should not be U.S.-centric.

Calvin Brown is asking, "Given the alleged human rights abuses by U.S. Government, would U.S. law agencies be barred from access?" So I'm going to throw that over o Fabricio.

Fabricio Vayra: Okay. Can you hear me?

Michele Neylon: We can hear you perfectly.

Fabricio Vayra: Okay, perfect. First, I think that the systems are going to built so that -- or the proposed system would be built in such a way that just as we are taking a fresh look at the system itself. I guess everyone would get a fresh start in that the system will be build with proper checks and balances, again, this is accountability across the board, and what we are hoping to do, I guess to your question I'll make sure that there's accountability for those who enter, and that's where one -- including U.S. law enforcement, and whoever else in the world we believe might abuse the system. The system should be built in such a way, that accounts for privacy laws for everybody and creates accountability for those accessing that data.

And when those folks are abusing or misusing data, and trying to access it for the access for the wrong purposes, et cetera, the system would have the proper check and balance to actually pickup, and as we talk about, provide some sort sanction for that abuse. So I guess the quick answer to your question is, no, they wouldn't be blocked out as a start out, but they would and so would any others if they abuse the system.

And this is a great opportunity, I'm glad you asked the question. I mean this whole process is a great opportunity as a community to discuss what abuses are, because as Michele put out, you know, this is a proposal, hopefully a well informed proposal, but a proposal that the community can then take and build upon, so this is one of the big worries, definitely the survey is for you and I think that you should fill out the questions so that this can get highlighted.

And one quick add on, Michele, if you don't mind, one of the prior questions was about how you would go around validating user information. Just so you guys know, the extent of work that we have done on this subject matter. In particular or those countries that -- you know, the postal addressing system isn't the same as many other countries, that are easy to check and verify, et cetera. We have gone as far as to have sessions with the EPU (ph) about ways to actually check and validate addresses. We've sort of auctioned many actual companies who go through and do these checks to verify addresses. So it's not something we just said, hey, we want to verify addresses, and didn't do any background homework on. I hope that answers answer the question.

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Fabricio. The next question is from Theo Geurts. Question, "Does the RDS setup eliminate the scroll requirement of registrant data?" Who shall I pick on for this one. I'll pick on Carlton.

Carlton Samuels: Okay. Are you hearing me? This is Carlton.

Michele Neylon: We hear you beautifully.

Carlton Samuels: Okay. This is Carlton. Are you hearing me? Hello?

Michele Neylon: Okay. Carlton, please proceed.

Carlton Samuels: Okay. Thank you. This is Carlton. The proposal in no way reduces the RAA 2013 requirement for escrow (ph) data. As a matter of fact what we are proposing here will add another layer of protection for data recovery, and so on, from disaster. And we are actually -- the RDS, it's just way of extending the data. Please understand that not all of the data that would be collected would be available under RDS, not all of the data. There's very prescribed data print that is RDS data. Do remember that other pieces of data might be collected that would not be within the purview of the RDS.

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Carlton. Are there any other questions? And I also see there was just some little bit in the chat there, from Pitinam (ph), sorry, I'm terrible with this name, just asking about, :verifying

contact data, where the address is in English, but let's say the place is in Thailand, and as Fabricio mentioned, we have met with the universal postal union and we've also been discussing various options of how one could validate and verify contact information with a number of different providers. What we've been discussing there, and also I think just giving y8u some insight into some of the discussions, we've been having in other areas around this, there may not be a perfect solution for every single region of the world, but that's something that would have to be addressed.

So, if there is no other -- are there any further questions? If not I'm going to hand the presentation back over to Carlton. Okay. I'm going to hand it back over to Carlton. Carlton, you have the floor.

Carlton Samuels: Thank you, Michele. I will pass it on to Stephanie. Steph, you're on.

Stephanie Perrin: Hello? Am I coming through?

Carlton Samuels: Yes. Steph you're on.

Stephanie Perrin: Okay.

Michele Neylon: You're coming with some beautiful stereo work, or whatever.

Stephanie Perrin: Wonderful. Well, my portion this side is basically to introduce you to the risk survey that we have released, and that is up online at the -- I trust link is working at t the URL that you will see on the slides, if you are watching on Adobe Connect . If not it's up on the EWG area of the website. The purpose of doing this survey, and a survey is not the ideal way to do a risk assessment. Ideally in a perfect world we'd have a couple of days to meet together and have a big group and thrash out what we think the risks are, and that's a better way to think of things that aren't top of mind that you haven't, perhaps, thought of. But given time constraints, and people's time in particular, people's time. We have issued this survey to prompt people to try to assess risks that we may have not have thought of in the EWG.

To think about risks not just for you, your organization, your company, your customers as well. So, please have a look at the survey, and the findings are going to be used to refine our recommendations and as input to a full risk assessment. We are making a recommendation that there be a full risk assessment of this as it moves forward once we've given our recommendation.

Next slide, please. Okay. Basically I think this is kind f self-explanatory, we are trying to gather broad input from anyone who may be impacted by the RDS, and that does include end users. The analysis will be included in our final report. If ICANN decides to pursue the mode that we have suggested are parts of it, then the formal risk assessment would analyze the identified risks, rank and prioritize them, assess the impacts, and attempt to find litigations to those risks, and assign owners for those mitigation. So that's the sort of cycle in a risk plan.

Next slide, please. So some of the things we'd like to talk about today, in terms of the risks, may seem obvious, they are risk and benefits that the RDS implementation could have on you and your stakeholder groups. So from a technical perspective, changes to the way that you use or provide WHOIS registration data today, and what the impacts of those changes might be. Legal or financial, what is it going to cost to this, and what are the cost impacts. We've already spoken about a couple of them, verification of data costs money, there's no two ways about that, so how do those costs get distributed and how does the cost benefit scenario work out there.

Legal considerations associated with the registration data, and this was described earlier, we are trying to address these in the engine that provides the data so that there will be some things done automatically. If your customer is in a region that has data protection, then the engine should automatically sort that for you, so that you don't release personal information that's protected. Operationally, changes in the speed of access to or availability of registration data, obviously there

will chang4es if you have to b accredited to get access to the Central Registry of the RDS to get further data. And if all the data is not there and you then have to b directed to a registrar those are speed issues.

Security and privacy, changes that could affect the privacy of domain main registration data, and also of course the security. We are hoping there is going to be much greater security and privacy, but we may be overlooking some issues that might create new risks. And we are interested in finding ways to reduce risks that increase benefits. Next slide, please--

Michele Neylon: Okay, thank you, Stephanie. So now we are looking at the technical risks and benefits. And I believe at this juncture people can ask questions, or they can participate during this part of the webinar, if there's anything that isn't clear to you. What we are looking at here in terms of the technical risks and benefits, you know, things that might be better in our proposal, things that might, you might view as worse in some way. So from a registrant perspective, you might think, okay, well, using this system, I'll be able to manage my contact details more easily. From a kind of potential downside, maybe , it might that anonymous public access, that's not going to go away. From a registrar perspective, you can just think: well, okay, now I won't need to provide Port 43, public WHOIS access.

And all we've done on these slides and it's the same for the other topics that my colleague is going to go through. It's we've just come up with these potential risks and benefits, we don't know everything, which is why we are asking you all to have a look at this questionnaire, the survey. And let us know, what uses of domain registration data, okay, WHOIS , you're making and what you might see upsides or downsides to what we've been proposing.

So does any queries or thoughts o input on the technical risk and benefits? No. Okay. I'm going to hand over to -- who am I handing over to -- Fabricio, I believe.

Fabricio Vayra: Thank you, Michele. Next slide, please. Yeah, and as Michele pointed out, and we don't know what we don't know, we've put a lot of work into this over the past year and several months, and I believe that we have some great expertise from the group from all different walks of life and perspectives. But again, the report is -- and the proposal is at its best or better from feedback from the entire communities. And so there's another facet that we should all consider, legal and financial risks. Again, these are potentials, and you should really think about this slide, and (inaudible) I think it's a way to get the juices flowing as you go through the survey, or prior to going through the survey.

So, if you look at some of the examples, and for some potential legal and financial risks, and in fact questions. You know, some of the data that's really available might decrease, juxtaposed after the fact running through a validated RDS the data you received once beyond the gate might actually be more accurate. Some of the questions that we have received in the past, are what's the trade off, am I getting credentialed, wasn't that costing me time? Well, it does cost you time in front end, but add to the fact that credentialing yourself and getting the data that presumably it would improve in quality, you're ultimately reducing your overall costs and investigations, et cetera which dramatically increase -- decreasing the inefficiency costs that you are currently having today.

One thing I did want to point out before I move to the next slide, or open to question, on every one of these slides you see at the bottom here other impacts, and that's really, really important throughout the survey, which we'll go into a little bit more details in the presentations. There is always a section for other impacts because, again, even in creating the survey, we don't know what we don't know, and so, you work input into what other impacts there may be that we haven't thought about is absolutely critical. And I think we informed, the final report in helping weigh out some of the proposals that we have today, between, for example, a federated or aggregated model.

So, any questions on legal and financial risks and benefits that people would like to ask now? Seeing none, I pass it over to Lanre to discuss operation risk benefits.

Lanre Ajayi : Thank you, Fab. Next slide. The proposed RDS (inaudible) and additional benefit, and of course there are some (inaudible) operational rates, which we hope can (inaudible). To talk about benefits, there was listed on the right side of the frame, about the benefits, we think we have yet -- have professionally. Another one out of that is the fact, like have more reliable and accurate data. With the central port, that will facilitate proper speed to data. The output you get (inaudible), and uniform (inaudible), which are even more predictable. The (inaudible) of the authenticated asset to get, are also better than what we have today, in the proposed RDS.

And talking about the various responses, is (inaudible) than what we have to do, and with that slide, on the risk side, (inaudible) a number of people believe that the ideas, the way, if it's suddenly I get job -- prone to attack, and I believe that is -- that can be mitigated. Also registration (inaudible), but ideas bottleneck. Such bottlenecks include the need for accurate efficiency. These are some of the risks, after (inaudible) from similar accreditation and this might (inaudible) since the cost of the different updated, and the ideas for the paper, aggregated model, we are not (inaudible) --

Michele Neylon: Okay, Lanre has lost his phone connection, so I'll talk for him. And if anybody has any input on this, feel free t o let us know, and if you don't have anything to say at the moment, it's okay. So I'm going to hand over to Carlton, who is going look at the security and privacy risks and benefits. Carlton, over to you.

Carlton Samuels: Thank you, Michele.

Unidentified Participant: Steven Metalitz had a question actually.

Michele Neylon: On the board here? Oh. Sorry, sorry.

Unidentified Participant: Yeah.

Michele Neylon: Okay. "Does anything in the RDS proposal address speed of the reveal by credited proxy having a hard time understanding this potential benefit?" Does anybody want to address that question?

Fabricio Vayra: I'm happy to try.

Michele Neylon: Go for it.

Fabricio Vayra: So, Steve, obviously a lot of us depends on what happens in the privacy/proxy--

Michele Neylon: Accreditation.

Fabricio Vayra: --accreditation discussion that's sort of running concurrently, we are actually being very sensitive, it's one of the questions we received in Singapore and prior to Singapore was, you know, are you guys being redundant, or if overstepping or reducing value in some of the ongoing work, or another, so se are trying very hard not to do that. But some of the ways that we would -- this system would help is one, it's somewhat (inaudible) basically. More accountability again, by registrants, and so to the extent that people use privacy and proxy they would have to come accredited privacy and proxies. It would have to be called out that it was actually a privacy and proxy, and things of that nature. So it would be a lot more clear, you're not entirely sure what you're getting, what the state of rules are.

And even if t is a privacy/proxy, or someone who is just pretending to be a privacy/proxy, the system would force more clarity on that. Then, you know, we are proposing privacy/proxy and escalation process in the status update. You know, things of that nature. Things will become a

little bit more clear, a little bit more (inaudible), and force the implementation of, or running through the rules that come out of the privacy/proxy accreditation. So, all that said, it would be easier for you to identify a privacy/proxy that you're dealing with, and then hopefully easier for you to implement whatever the implementation process really is, which spending will hopefully give you a (inaudible). Hopefully that answers the questions.

Michele Neylon: Okay. Thanks, Fabricio. I think Carlton as doing the next slide, weren't you Carlton?

Carlton Samuels: Yes. Thank you, Michele. So this is Carlton. This area, security and privacy risks and benefits. This area has been one of (inaudible) conversation in (Inaudible), and we are trying very hard to grabble with this issue of privacy and security. The privacy has been ongoing, and it's been a source of great contention all around. Remember our issue is that we want as much information as possible, so the recommendations are sturdy and accurate. We have data to support the recommendations, so we have to think about how the ideas could change to protect the privacy of domain name registration. Again, if you look at the slide we have risks and bad things, worry on the left-hand side, and we have benefits -- good things on the right-hand side.

These are just some of the ones that we thought about. We think we know some things, we know we don't know some things, and this is where if you execute the survey you would be helpful indeed, in helping us fill out what we don't know validate what we think we know. So, even if you think you have a risk or worry or bad things, or no benefits or good things, we would want to hear from you. We want people to fill out the survey.

If you think your risk, your worry, is an outlier, it is unique to you, it's even more important for you to put it down. Perhaps we haven't thought of it. But all in all what we are asking for is A) recognition that the EWG understands, that their privacy concerns, we want to make rock-ribbed recommendations. We don't have all of the data, we want to validate our thinking, and so we are cloud sourcing all of the information that could be applied in these domains. It's for you to help us get a better product out and tell us what you know.

Just to, again, think of one thing. One of the things that we've always been grappling with is that the attack, security and the vulnerability of any data store to attack, and sure there are mitigating processes that we can apply to any data store online to produce the likelihood of attack, if you have some new ones, some new exploits that you want to tell us about, this is a place for you to at least give us a heads-up on what is possible. So, we are very, very keen to hear from you, especially with the business of the privacy risks, because this is probably the first but we are trying very, very hard to grapple with it and come out on a balanced approach to privacy and security. Thank you.

Michele Neylon: Thanks, Carlton. Just at this juncture here, I see there's a couple of -- a question there from Steven Metalitz, and this has more to do with the structure of the questionnaire. "I'm going to ask Lisa to deal with this one. What if we consider our list of potential to be a benefit, how could this be reflective in response? For example, item 17-G I might have to provide a valid email address in order to register a domain name."

And Lisa has responded on the chat saying, put it down as another benefit. So that's that one closed. Stephanie, do you want to comment on the privacy stuff, since you are our resident privacy person?

Stephanie Perrin;   Thanks, Michele. What kind of comment do you want Michele. I did not (inaudible)--

Michele Neylon: I want an honest one, dear. I would never try to put words in your mouth.

Stephanie Perrin;   I'd be happy to answer any questions anybody might have, because, you know, it's a little hard to comment in a void. We are attempting to up the ante a bit in terms of privacy protection with the. Understanding that it is not going to be easy to do anything automatically in a system. As, Carlton,

I think, explained very well, this is complex. Jurisdiction is complex, and individual is entitled to a certain type of data protection depending on where they live, and where they are registering. Building an engine to actually enforce that is a tall order. But right at the moment everything falls on the plate of the registrars, so this would help.

Michele Neylon: Stephanie has a question for you on the Adobe chat. She's asking, "What privacy benefit do you see the RDS having for you as a small business owner? So, you are a small business owner, Stephanie how would you see it benefiting?"

Stephanie Perrin: Okay. In terms of being a small business, this is one of the very complex matters that the RDS is not going to be able to easily solve. Depending on which country you're in, which jurisdiction, small business could regulated at the municipality level, at the province or state level -- yeah, state in the sense of a jurisdiction inside a country, or it could be regulated at the national level. We would have quite a time building an engine that reflected all of that, and there are different criteria for whether or not you're a business, or you're and individual.

So a small business could be incorporated, they could be just what we call a sole proprietor here in Canada, and because we see the Internet as the engine of growth, and many economies going away from single-jobs kinds of economies, to all kinds of people all of things enabled by the Internet, it's going to be difficult to predict. That's one of the reasons, and I think Carlton mentioned this, you self-identify, if you are someone was doing business on the Internet, and you really want it to be clear that you're in business, you can identify as a business, and not, more or less, forsake your data protection.

If, on the other hand, you're entitled to data protection as an individual, and nothing in your own regulation to indicate you are otherwise for the purposes of that distinction between a legal person, a business or an individual. Then you can self-select. The RDS can enforce every law in the realm, but we are trying to make it a little more flexible and allow people to self-identify, and that automatically then source what data gets release. Did that help at all?

Michele Neylon: Thanks, Stephanie. That's very helpful. And one of the things -- this is Michele speaking, for the transcript -- one of the things that several of us have been kind of harping all about hammering on, since we started on this journey with EWG is that, you know, ICANN needs to do a better job of dealing with privacy issues and some of us have been quite vocal advocates. So just moving on then for next section which is reducing risk, increasing benefit, and I believe we are handing here to Fabricio. Fabricio, over to you.

Fabricio Vayra: Thank you, Michele. So as the slide is perfectly reducing risk, increasing benefits is what we are trying to do here. That's an ecosystem that really survey to help reduce risk and increase benefits in our proposal. So we thought it would be helpful to actually go through a speech out here that shows some of the sample questions. And really draw your attention to these last three columns, for you to please consider these columns, and really to walk you through a way of thinking about these questions so that you can see, kind of, what we are trying to get back. As I went through the survey, the guinea pigs, a few questions that I found myself realizing that really what was happening I was being funneled through by broad stroke categories, and then funneling down to a more narrow, what's really going to happen, and what matters to me.

So if you look at the questions, they are really listed in a formal format -- the first column, kind of, what might potentially impact you? And then from there you're asked to narrow down to -- of those, what would be two of the most impactful, and then of those, what is the most likely to happen? Then you obviously have this, what's new to the RDS that will impact you? But if you notice when you think of it in a funneling way, it's really is helpful to outline, and you will see when we get to the next slide it's really helpful to highlight what's horrible risk versus what's broadly acceptable. And something to remember on how this is through the survey, we constantly ask the question of other. What are other risks or benefits that you see that possibly didn't think of, so that we can start trying to rank those.

So we can go the next slide, please? So this next slide provides an example of a risk matrix, and this isn't exactly what we will use, but it's a simple form to show how a risk matrix works. Let's take the question from the prior slide, potential security and privacy rules, (1) my registration data might be more vulnerable to external attack. If everybody were to put, yes, that might impact, but in going through the funnel, and narrowing down, nobody then picks that this is one of the two most impactful and one of the two likely to happen to me, then that question or that factor goes down the list of broadly acceptable risk monitor, to see if you will need to further reduce that risk of practicable, but I think in the same scenario, if everybody had -- it might impact you, it is one of the two things that I think is most likely to occur. Obviously that factor shoots up to the intolerable risk level, and intermediate action --

And so you can see that if we were applying this type through your questions, often what we hope to be able to identify, but the intolerable risk that will make a direct impact on what models we propose going forward. One of the questions, for example, that we get a lot around if you had a centralized system. You know, everybody said, this is likely to impact me, it's most impactful, and it's likely happened that, hey, centralized system do certain then things, then that might inform us that we either need to change or centralized system works (inaudible), for example.

So, next slide. This is all to say that we need you to tell us what you think. You've heard several say throughout this presentation, that we've put a lot of work into this, and we really do believe we bring some good expertise and knowledge, but that knowledge and expertise only goes as far who has been in the room thus far. And luckily up till now you guys have -- or the community in general has been giving this input. But the more input we get, the more expertise we get from the community the better this proposal become.

So what we are really wanting to know from all of you are, with regard to top risks, are they unavoidable, are some that are acceptable, are some of your top risks, are we able to shift those or reduce those by changing the proposals? And ultimately, it would be great to find out if there are some risks that you feel that are tolerable, considerable some of the tradeoffs and benefits that you might gain from the system.

So we have the link here, to the survey, I believe it's on the website as well. Again, please, tell us what you think. That's the whole point of this exercise in particular, this survey. Do you have any questions, or we just move into next steps?

Michele Neylon: Steven Metalitz, also a query about the previous slide. I'm just going to scroll a couple slides back. I think it's the, new with RDS, he's asking, 'Please explain purpose at far right-hand column, aren't all the benefits risks listed intended to be those that are new, or significantly changed in RDS as compared to status quo?"

Fabricio Vayra: Let's, see, Lisa is already answering, I think.

Lisa Phifer: Let's say for a moment that, for example, the first one on your registration data might be vulnerable to attack. I guess the keyword there is more, if you believe that increases the risk, but of course we know that data today is already vulnerable to attack. And I think if you look at some of the risk and benefits that are going -- and think about it, you'll find that they do already exist today. But in particular for those of you who tell us other risks and other benefits, you may also find that exist today once you think about it, and it's helpful for us to realize where risks are maybe common, but increase the benefits that may be common to that increase.

Michele Neylon: Thank you, Lisa. Then another question from Steve, "How will responses in the last column be used in the risks matrix. Stephanie do you want to jump on this question, I don't know if you can cover this one as well.

Stephanie Perrin: Well I think so because the ones in the last column, in response to Steve's question, obviously, if everything we've done have not helped to mitigate your current giant risk, we need to hear about that. So, the distinction, and I don't think that when e do the final rating of the risk here, it's going to be looked at as, okay after RDS what are our risks. We are encouraging you to think of new ones that we are obviously trying in the development of the RDS to respond the current and problems, and issues. If we haven't done that, we need to hear about it, because it's an end state, what does it look like under the new system that we'll e evaluation. I think that's the important thing, what are you left with at the end of this? Does that help?

Michele Neylon: Thanks, Stephanie. I think that's very helpful. Fabricio, do you want to continue, or I think -- or are you done?

Fabricio Vayra: I think I am done, I was going hand over to Margie for conclusion and next steps, or unless people have any other question.

Michele Neylon: Well, having seen none. Margie.

Margie Milam: Sure. This is Margie. The next steps made into the survey, obviously we would like as many people to respond by May 15. We've already received a significant number of responses, so we are very excited about the interest in the survey. If you haven't had all questions answered, and you want to learn more about the RDS, we have an introductory video on links in the slide deck where you can hear more about the RDS system. We also have a longer -- you can look for the recording of this webinar ad the webinar we had earlier and that will be posted. And then there's also a link to the initial report and the status update report as well s some FAQs that we'll put together for when we first send our initial report.

All of this input is to be carefully considered by the Group, and so recommendations. The goal here is to produce a final report for delivery to the ICANN Board in June this year. And so by the ICANN London Meeting, the final report will be ready. And it will help if that report is accepted by the Board and then served (inaudible) on the basis of an ongoing development process in the GNSO, and then so that's help, and once the work of the Expert Working Group is included in June. And then, as I mentioned we do have the materials of the slide.

And I believe this will conclude our webinar. The slides, the recording and the transcripts will be available on the announcement page shortly after this webinar. And again, please participate in the survey. It's your chance to tell Expert Working Group about the risks and benefits of how this RDS might impact you. Again, the closing date is May 15th, and you can also send input to the Expert Working Group at their email address at input-2-ewg@icann.org.

Thank you so much for your participation in this webinar