

**Security, Stability & Resiliency of the DNS Review Team
Webinar Session 2 - TRANSCRIPTION
Friday, 11 May 2012 at 19:00 UTC**

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Alejandro Pisanty: So, hello, everybody. This is Alejandro Pisanty saluting everybody who's present in the Adobe Room, and people who are on phones and only voice contact. Particularly also very thankful for the breadth (ph) of members of the review team who will also be available for fielding questions and comments.

This is a community feedback webinar for the evening, let's say, or the second one in the day. In Mexico City, it's 2 p.m. right now. For the stability -- for the security, stability, and resilience of the review team, for short SSR, for Security, Stability and Resiliency, and SSR are for the review team's name.

The way we have foreseen to proceed is that I will go through a presentation that we have prepared that's available in PowerPoint and is projected in the room. Then, we will -- I'll cover this in a few minutes, and then we will be open for comments and questions. We will be taking notes, and we will be taking the comments and questions made as very valuable input for the final stage of the preparation of the report.

As has been said, we are now having the consultation on the draft report, and we intend to deliver the final report once -- considering all the input from this call, the one we had earlier, six hours ago, and all the input that has been provided in writing, through the website or otherwise, so that we can have a final report that really includes considerations that we can get from the community.

I hope you are all hearing correctly. Otherwise, I will be very thankful for any signaling by voice or on the room.

Okay, so we start the projection. The stability and security and resilience review team is mandated by the Affirmation of Commitments for reviews on four fields that ICANN has agreed in the Affirmation of Commitments to have performed. The team members were designated during the month of -- a process that tend to be in October 2010, a year and a half ago. We first met in December 2010 in the Cartagena meeting of ICANN. We are a team of representatives selected by internal processes of the supporting organizations of ICANN and the advisory councils. And also independent experts and nominee designated by the chair of the GAC and the CEO of ICANN.

Take the work very seriously for many reasons. First, because we are all serious people, very committed to our work, and also because Affirmation of Commitments is key instrument, and these reviews are a key step in establishing the multi-stakeholder model of ICANN in an increasingly balanced and participatory way where now we don't have the checklist reviewed by the Department of Commerce as previous agreements between ICANN and the US government indicated, but now we are really going to a community with the proper weights of different participants having these reviews and making sure that ICANN is performing up to par, and proposing ways to fix where improvements are possible.

The mandate of review team comes from the agreement made in the Affirmation of Commitments for preserving security, stability and resiliency. There it is stated that ICANN has developed a plan to enhance the operational stability, reliability, resiliency,

security, and global interoperability (ph) of the DNS, which we regularly updated to the ICANN to reflect emerging threats (inaudible).

Particular attention will be paid to, A, security, stability and resiliency matters, both physical and metric, relating to a secure and stable coordination of the Internet DNS; B, ensuring appropriate contingency planning; and C, maintaining clear processes. Each of the reviews conducted under any section will assess the extent to which ICANN has successfully implemented the security plan. The effectiveness of the plan to deal with actual and potential challenges and threats, and the extent to which a security plan is sufficiently robust to meet future challenges and threats to the security, stability and resilience of the Internet DNS, consistent with ICANN's limited technical mission.

That's a load of words, but it defines both broadly and with some sharp limits, our task, makes it an ambitious task. It also put some boundaries, like the last part of the segment that read "Consistent with ICANN's limited technical mission."

Moving forward, we -- as I mentioned earlier, the team was formed on the -- literally on New Year's Eve, almost on New Year's Eve for 2011, so most of our work was conducted during the year 2012. We have to scope the review, decide a level of aggregation. We had a very significant and very important decision, which was whether we should perform the review with the team members ourselves, maybe with some limited internal (ph) assistance, or go like other reviews have done and ask for external assistance in the form of consultancies, which were either made under contract or pro bono.

After analyzing several angles of (inaudible), estimating costs and times, we concluded that our best fast-forward for this round of the review, let's say, and for this team was to go into the review with our own forces and knowledge and experience, because, among other things, the full review will take a lot of time to explain to potential participants to start up (ph) a request for proposal. It will be extremely expensive and complex. Seems most of the available expertise will go more to an in-depth technical review, but would very likely leave more strategic levels, which we were -- with which we are also concerned.

The work was conducted through interviews, both voluntary and people we called on. We had -- and many of you attended -- working sessions (ph) in the ICANN meetings where we could exchange views with the community, and those were with specific groupings like the (inaudible) -- the advisory committee, the server system advisory committee, the ICANN (inaudible) team, the chair (inaudible) in particular generous in providing of his time and views. And in several rounds of work, we defined fields of interest, the questions to be asked there, the documents and interviews that will be required for each.

Then, we went into very intensive and documentary analysis. We have several rounds of documentation provided by ICANN. And (inaudible) here for the documents and interviews with ICANN's staff and the Board members, there's an important consideration. We did -- we had the option on whether we would work only with information and opinion that could be made available publicly, or whether we needed to go through some confidential input, which would require nondisclosure agreements. We started the registration (ph) for nondisclosure agreements on other places where -- with the employers of many of the review team members. Never have gotten the nondisclosure agreements in place by the time we needed to end this work.

And they will actually reduce the quality and impact of our report since we would very likely be obliged to say -- to come to the community and tell the community through our report, "Well, I know something that I cannot tell you about, but it's good," or, "I'm hiding a secret about something very dangerous. Let me go to work and fix it." And we thought that this is not consistent with the openness, accountability, and transparency that we owe to the community, and therefore decided to stretch the limits of interpretation and

of knowledge of available (inaudible) that could be made without this nondisclosure agreement. And we believe that we still have been able to assess with significant quality the SSR situation in ICANN.

In our next slides, I describe briefly a few more points, which are beginning to be an introduction to our report. The report -- the main reading of the report is structured around the recommendations. Each recommendation is supported by a number of findings, conclusions about the findings, and then the recommendation.

As you can see in the report, we opted for a middle size grain level of analysis. We could do either a very broad strokes analysis and come up with five major recommendations, but we found that those would lack enough detail for implementation and for (inaudible) three years from now when the SSR team contribution is reviewed again. It would be extremely vague and open. It would probably create many rounds of discussion about how to actually interpret the recommendations, and then start working on them.

But we decided not to go to a very broad strokes level, and there was the possibility, a very strong temptation to do the review -- to perform the review and make recommendations at the very fine grain level, which would become -- go almost into the micromanagement. It would be very hard at that level to see the big picture emerging. And again, the assessment in three years would almost go to the individual's level of work, and the risk there, which we decided to avoid, was losing sight of the forest for the trees. We think that the comments that we have already received, the feedback from the community, validates, to a reasonable extent, this level of graininess of the approach.

Another important demarche (ph) is that the report is not a security audit of ICANN. This is not particular an IT level, system-level security audit. A completely different level of expertise and setup would be required for that. Parts of it are performed and -- or are going to be performed by ICANN or for ICANN. And what we have to see is the level at which the results of such an audit are handled were such analysis requested, and what consequence is made of the results. So I'll repeat, this is not the place where you will find whether non-trivial passwords are used in routers or stuff like that.

So I will pass -- I will go on now to the main findings of the report. The main findings of the report are as follows. To the depth and extent we were able to observe, and it includes several iterations and changes in the object of study as the study took place, that ICANN appears to be performing within acceptable parameters for the functions that enhance, (inaudible) or -- and move forward security, stability and resiliency of the DNS.

After we published the draft report, ICANN ran into the TAS incidents and incident with our system that records -- that registers the requests for new GTLDs -- the proposals for new GTLDs. That incident is still being dealt with, and will be assessed. And we, of course, have to stay open to the possibility that the -- throws light into some of the internal processes of ICANN and decision-making that we considered acceptable.

The second point of this slide, clarity of -- as you noticed in the Affirmation of Commitments as for RT chapter, ICANN is required to provide clear processes for the analysis and management of SSR. We found it satisfactory. We have pointed some possible improvements. And we have also pointed to the fact that all of these are, including the clarity of process, are moving target processes, but seem clear-cut one day, may seem a lot less clear once new variables or new participants emerge. So we have pointed some ways in which this could be adapted to the future evolution of threats and other components of the environment.

When you do that, you also find that, in many of the recommendations, we recommend that the processes be participatory (inaudible) machinery that ICANN has already established. I would not only say bottom up, but also from the edge inwards. But there's a caveat that some of the public comments actually have emphasized. There may be

some limit as to the openness and the participation there if some information is needed -- needs to be kept confidential, or the disclosure itself of this information may be harmful, at least until certain measures have been put in place. So we are emphasizing that this whole thing, the balance between openness and the needs of confidentiality, especially concerning (ph) security issues, will be an ongoing challenge and an ongoing process.

Other various conclusion from the report, which (inaudible) really floating around for some committee members, is a need for ICANN to define a risk management. This includes, of course, (inaudible) analysis of threat landscape, and it's an integral risk management framework. When we started the SSAC, the Stability and Security Advisory Committee of ICANN, still had this task on its plate.

The ICANN Board actually removed it a little bit more than a year ago, at the beginning of 2011, and started the creation of a Board working group. And in parallel, the community started a bottom-up process, a highly participatory process as well, called the DSSA, which has been evolving, especially in the identification of threats, and it's not only the identification of threats of lists or inventory, but also the characteristics of these threat include the likelihood and the impact where they do materialize.

This also shows that our review process has been a detonator of some internal processes for ICANN and have been in gear with processes in the community.

And as I mentioned, a task incident will have to be considered. This is an ongoing process. We don't know yet the final findings and recommendations, so we are not able to assess them at this point in time. We are aiming to deliver our report in time for the ICANN meeting in Prague, so we will have to consider until the very last minute before delivering whether we have information on that incident that would take us to reassess, as I mentioned, some of our statements.

Otherwise, we are pretty much on track. We have already been analyzing and considering how to respond some of the community comments. We certainly look forward to the comments that we will hear today, and to incorporating them, or their consequences, in the final report. And of course, the comment process is still open till the 14th of May. We made sure to extend the comment process as far as possible, as long -- to make it as long and rich as possible for community members to participate.

So with that, I will leave my presentation, and I will ask what some of the review team members would like to add comments or corrections or start the discussion in any other way. And after that, I will open it to the community. I'm certainly welcoming several more participants, and thanking you all for being here.

So, Simon, Jeff, other members of the review team who are present in the call, would you care to add some comments?

Jeff Brueggeman:

Alejandro, this is Jeff. I was just going to reiterate, I think you did an excellent job summarizing the approach that the team took and the overall conclusions in the report. And as you said, I think we were very careful to take a balanced approach here, recognizing the scope of ICANN's responsibilities and the practical challenges that it's dealing with as an organization. So we were careful not to just have the recommendations be a list of additional things that ICANN should be doing, but really tried to structure it as helpful, constructive recommendations on how to approach SSR issues through good process, and then some specific recommendations, as you said, for areas where we think some additional focus and progress could be made.

Alejandro Pisanty:

Thank you. I joined that call for them, for participation now. Simon, any comments?

Simon McCalla:

I'd just echo what Jeff and you have already said. And I think probably worth mentioning that I think, throughout this, we tried to make sure recommendations were implementable

and were trackable, and something that was achievable by Jeff and the team, so that -- in order that we could see definite and strong progress. So that was always at the forefront of our mind when we were making those recommendations. So that's my only comment.

- Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Simon. So now we're totally open to comments from the community participants. I -- recognizing the -- in the list of participants, I can see in the attending (ph) list in the Adobe Connect room several people who have been with us all along, and particularly I look forward to your very knowledgeable comments, as well as questions and comments from everyone. I'm sorry, I have (inaudible) Martin Hannigan and a member of the review team present. Sorry, Martin, for--.
- Martin Hannigan: --It's quite all right. Thank you for acknowledging me.
- Alice Jansen: Alejandro, this is Alice (ph). This is just to notify participants that we have opened their lines on the bridge so they can comment and provide input on the recommendations and report. Just a quick reminder that you should identify before you -- all right, can you hear me okay?
- Alejandro Pisanty: I am hearing you okay. I am hearing some voice which is not coming through clear. So there's something -- I'll repeat what Alice Jansen (ph) said. The lines are now open for input. We beg you to identify yourself as you begin speaking. If you have an open telephone and are speaking about something that's not the conference, there may be a side conversation (inaudible). So let's go by names on the list of participants that I can see in the Adobe Connect room. Cheryl Langdon Orr, do you have any comments?
- Alice Jansen: Alejandro, Cheryl is listening via the Adobe Room. She's not on the bridge.
- Alejandro Pisanty: Okay. Okay. Do you have any comments that you want to make in writing, and I will read for everybody before responding, Cheryl? And in the meantime, I will go to ask Chuck Gomes whether he can hear me well and whether he wishes to make any comments at this point.
- Chuck Gomes: Thanks, Alex, I appreciate that. Can you hear me okay?
- Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, very well. I hope the rest of the people are hearing you, as well.
- Chuck Gomes: Good. Okay. My only comment is to compliment and thank the review team for the long, long hours of work on this. I did review the report when it first came out and thought it was quite thorough and fairly clear, so I do not have any questions at this time.
- Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Chuck. I have now a comment I can read from Cheryl Langdon Orr, or who it says, "Not really", so if I understand well, she's not putting forward comments at this point.
- Emily Murray? Emily Murray, do you have any comments that you would wish to convey, either in writing or otherwise? Hopefully by voice?
- Alice Jansen: Alejandro, Emily does not seem to be on the bridge, so Emily, if you have any comments, please feel free to insert your comments in the chat box.
- Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Alice (ph), and she has just put -- typed a comment that says, "I do not have any comments. Thank you for asking." Ms. Fatima Cambronero, any comments? I have the initials H-A-N for a participant. Jacques Latour? Jacques Latour has typed, "No comments." Julie Hammer ?
- Julie Hammer: Thank you, Alejandro. Our coordinator (inaudible) response comments, so I don't have anything additional to add here.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you. I have a comment from Abronero (ph), who says, "Who do you think it's necessary to define risk management?" We are not asking ICANN to define risk management, but we are in agreement with many other members of the community, and ICANN's staff and Board themselves, asking that ICANN establish a risk -- a DNS risk management framework. This is not only a risk management framework for internal operations that's already existing in a very large part, but it's defining the level of risks for the DNS and to put them into a risk management framework.

This means identify the likelihood impact (inaudible) measures to avoid the risk, transfer the risk, absorb the consequence of risk, maintain contingency planning, maintain business continuity for each of these risks in an integrated and balanced manner. And as we mentioned in the report, once this is done, we also would like -- are strongly recommending a cost-benefit analysis are made for the risk management measures. I don't know if this satisfies the question, if this fulfills the expectation of the question. The typing says, "Yes, thanks."

Cheryl Langdon Orr is typing, "I am pleased with the details and recommendations of the review team, and thank you for your work, and particularly for the integration (ph) of our ongoing DSSA work. The DSSA has focused (ph) overlap with risk management, as well as mitigation advice. And I guess I was also very glad to acknowledge that this has been a source of good information and of excitement, of integration to continue the work to have this happening in parallel and in good gear with DSSA 18.

Next from Kristo? It says, "No comments, thanks." Mikey O'Connor (ph)?

Unidentified Participant: So we talk into this thing, and that (inaudible) that one now. That's from him, and--.

Alejandro Pisanty: --I'm sorry, who is this speaking? I cannot hear you very clearly. Can you speak both loud and slow? Well, in the meantime, I'll ask Mikey O'Connor again, Mikey, if you have any comments here?

Mikey O'Connor: Thanks, Alejandro. I sort of want to join the -- this is Mikey O'Connor for the transcript - - I certainly want to join others in hats off on a great job. These security projects are very hard because there's, in many cases, doing things for the very first time, and that's always harder than the task that will be in front of the next people that do this. So a great job on that.

I made comments through the public comment process. I won't repeat any of those, but one of the things that I think would be an interesting thing to explore as you wrap up your report is the resources problem. And I think it would help the community if that could somehow be acknowledged. There's an awful lot of work to be done, and not very many people, especially on the ICANN side, who really have the cycles to spare to do all this work. And I think that we need to make sure that they get the help that they need and that the community does, too, but especially folks like poor old Patrick (ph), who seems to get every job from all of our committees. I think we need to stand and take our hat off to Patrick, and then try and get him some help pretty soon, because there's a lot to be done and not much in the way of resources to do it right now. But fabulous job, folks. Thanks.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks for the comment, the contribution on resources. And I certainly would recommend that everybody read your public comment, because it's very enlightening and provides a lot of useful stuff that will go into our final report. It will certainly shape it even if it does not go in literally.

I have comments on the chat, in writing, that say -- this one from Kristo, who says, "No comments, thanks," one from Cheryl Langdon Orr, who's cheering, "Good point, Mikey, and shout-out to Patrick," Patrick Jones, as well, with three smiley emotics (ph).

Philip Marano, a comment?

Alice Jansen: Alejandro, this is Alice. Just to let you know that (inaudible) in the Adobe Room.

Alejandro Pisanty: He's there right now? Svitlana?

Alice Jansen: Chuck (ph), is there any additional comments you'd like to--?

Chuck Gomes: --Just wanted to follow up with what I said. I'll add to the others in thanking Patrick specifically for all of the work he has spent on this.

But one of the things I want to be more specific in terms of my compliments to the team, all of the review teams have a challenge of avoiding mission creep for ICANN. All of us that have been around for a while, we know that ICANN has a limited technical mission. Certainly security, stability and resiliency is a number one priority, so it's extremely important. But even in that area, it's real easy to make recommendations that would go outside of ICANN's mission, so I compliment you for trying to keep a good balance there. And as you wrap this thing up, I'm sure you will continue to do so, so thanks.

Alejandro Pisanty: Well, certainly be happy to join others in thanking Patrick Jones, Denise Michel (ph), Jeff, Rod Beckstrom (ph), Alice Jansen, Olaf Nordling, and a few others whom I may be omitting right now, for the very (inaudible) quality response, very prompt and timely, creating documents almost out of the blue for specific requests we made.

As I mentioned, things we're changing as we were doing our work, and, immodestly, we would like to attribute some of the changes to responses to our work, but certainly they were going on. So thanks a lot to everybody.

I have a comment in writing from Svitlana Tkachenko, which says, "No comments." And from the participants, I have not asked explicitly Alain Berranger (ph). Do you have any comments you would like to make, Alain Berranger? To the review team members present in the call, or staff members, Denise Michel, Patrick Jones, Alice, all of -- others want to add any comments now?

Patrick Jones: Alex, it's Patrick. I just wanted to add a thanks to the review team for the hero (ph) work, and that -- and you've already seen from our upcoming FY '13 framework that we really made an effort to take the early feedback from the review team and improving the next version of our document that I was hoping would be out by now, but I'm aiming for next week. So included with that will be a -- hopefully a very clear statement of ICANN's (inaudible) agreement in SSR, and that's in response directly to recommendation one.

I know it's still -- the document's out for comment for a few more days, so we wanted to at least take the initiative and show that we're looking at the recommendations and beginning to take on the ones that we could do now.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, Patrick. And yes, we've seen the -- actually, as you mentioned, this is one of the points that proves that we've seen documents, attitudes, and the work itself evolve as we were involved in this process, and would hope that we are making contribution in that sense.

From the written comments in the chat, I have a comment from Cheryl from a few minutes ago. "Yes, indeed, helping ICANN stick to its knitting in this effort is essential. Good point, Chuck." Cheryl (ph), "No comments, thanks." Alain Berranger, "Apologies for lateness," but Alain Berranger, still, if you have any comments you were prepared to make, there are (inaudible)--.

Jeff Brueggeman: --Alejandro, this is Jeff. I was just going to add to Patrick's point is, while the report is in its final stages, really the issues and the work continues, both in terms of the next round

of the SSR framework that's coming out, as well as how the implementation of the recommendations of the SSR review team will fit with what the DSSA working group is doing in other things. So I think really, in some ways, this is just the beginning of the discussion on how to address the resources issues and the priorities in all of those things that we have -- are touching on in the report.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks. I fully agree with that. So I have a statement of "No comment" from HAN and from Alain Berranger. So maybe -- well, again, I will ask if there are any more comments by members of the review team, Martin, Simon has already said none, Jeff's already made some. Anybody else? Then I think it's fair to say that it's a good thing to close the meeting. It's the hour plus 42.

I'm very thankful for everybody's participation, everybody who submitted comments in writing or (inaudible) submitted them in writing and attended this meeting, I'm really, really very thankful. I'm saying this for sure on behalf of the whole review team. Our sense of the community being (inaudible) for serving the community has been priority (ph) and given us a great energy for focusing our -- the best of our skills available for the report.

Thanks, everybody, and please remember, we continue open for comments through May 14th. This is a few more days. But after what you have heard, others you have heard, not only us, you measure -- be getting more ideas, and we'll be very glad to take them into the process for the final report.

So thanks, Alice Jansen and team in -- that have supported the review team also for setting up this meeting, and I wish everybody a great weekend.

Alice Jansen: Thank you, Alejandro.

Jeff Brueggeman: Thanks, Alejandro.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, everybody, and -- nice evening, afternoon, whatever you are facing now. Bye.

Unidentified Participant: Bye.

Unidentified Participant: Bye.

Unidentified Participant: Bye.