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Alice Jansen: Your recording is on.

Alejandro Pisanty: Is everybody aware that this call will be recorded? And if there any objections, we'll have to find out or ask you to communicate this objection for any reason, but it goes with the rules.

So, again, this is Alejandro Pisanty. Good morning, good afternoon, good evening, whatever you are facing. This -- I'm participating in the call from Mexico City, where it is 6:00 a.m., five past 6:00 a.m.

We have -- this is a call to illicit community feedback beyond the one that has already been provided by the community in written comments on the Stability, Security and Resilience of the DNS Review Team. As you remember, this is the Review Team convened under the Information of Commitment for reviewing ICANN's fulfillment of its Stability, Security and Resilience mission. I will be calling this SSR, standing for Stability, Security and Resilience, and SSR-RT for the Review Team. Apologies for the use of jargon and acronyms, but it makes things much, much faster here.

The team was designated -- a few team members were designated in a processes that ended in October of 2010. The first meeting of the team was at the end of 2010, in December in the Cartagena meeting. The team is composed by representatives of the different supporting organizations and advisory councils of ICANN, independent experts and a nominee designated by the Chair of the GAC, as well as one from the CEO of ICANN.

The mandate of the -- I'm following the slide, so this -- the slide that has a type of "Mandate" at the top. The mandate of the Review Team refers to the function of ICANN related to preserving security, stability and resiliency as agreed in the Information of Commitments. And it says that ICANN has developed the plan to enhance the operation of stability, reliability, resiliency, security and global interoperability of the DNS, which will be regularly updated by ICANN to reflect emerging threats to the DNS. Particular attention will be paid to security, stability and resiliency matters, both physical and network, relating to a secure and stable coordination of the internet DNS; B, ensuring appropriate contingency planning; and C, maintaining clear processes.

Each of the reviews conducted under this section will assess the extent to which ICANN has successfully implemented the security plan, the effectiveness of the plan to deal with actual and potential challenges and threats, and the extent to which the security plan is sufficiently robust to meet future challenges and threats to the security, stability and resiliency of the internet DNS, consistent with ICANN's limited technical mission.

The team went to work on this. The draft report has been published. I'll give you some more details about the work in the next slide here, in the one that says "Draft Report." We're just stating a bit of the dates involved. And the draft report has been published on March 15th for public feedback. It's translated into five UN languages. It contains 28 recommendations and has been out for public comment with deadlines we've been able to extend, compressing the work that the Review Team has to do after the public feedback.

So, the extension has been made until May 14th, 2012. And as always in ICANN, comments are forever, but the ones we will be able to take into account particularly will be the ones until May 14th. That's when we will start absorbing the feedback obtained in a final way into a new version, which we consider that will -- it will be final. And that will be the version that we will be delivering to our community, and particularly to the ICANN Board and GAC as the mandate of the Review Team contemplates.

We are receiving comments very readily, even during the reply comment period. People must remember that comment periods are now structured into two parts, so we are receiving comments all along. And we have already received comments from major key constituencies, which have been made public and many of you know them and can visit them on the website for the Review Team.

We the team -- the Review Team proceeded -- included several decisions. One was whether to contract out some of the work to other Review Teams have made -- have done. We weighed this very carefully and ended up deciding that we will do the review that was available with the Review Team's own sources, considering the very diverse levels of expertise and the diversity in constituency and support (inaudible) origin. And the fact that the -- this is not a technical security audit, we are working at a higher level of aggregation.

So, we held numerous meetings by teleconference. We had intense telephone and e-mail exchanges. And we have -- as many of you on this call know, because you attended these, public meetings during the ICANN meetings to explore the issues then explore some emerging conclusions and, finally, to get feedback into the structured way that we were proceeding. And we also held interviews within individuals that we considered necessary for the report, both inside the ICANN structure and outside, about their perception and realities of ICANN's handling of this task.

And we developed an enormous amount of work with documents from ICANN, not only published ICANN documents, but documents that were provided to us by ICANN staff, particularly the security staff. Many of these documents were created upon request. And we have had further decision to make, which was whether to work with confidential information provided by ICANN on their conditions of non-disclosure or not, and we decided to not go the non-disclosure way in order to be able to keep the report open and accountable in itself. So, that -- we decided that we would not come to the community to tell them, well, I know something you don't know, which brought me to this conclusion. We know that this could give us -- could create some limitations, but to weigh them against the timing of the report and, as I said, to the public character of the report.

Further, it turned out that the non-disclosure agreement would take forever. They would have to be made individually with each member. For many of the members of the Review Team who work in large companies or in other organizations, it would be the organization that would have also to approve of the non-disclosure agreement. So, it looked like a serious nightmare. It was already taking many weeks -- actually, a couple of months to find out these things in some of the -- with some of the employers of the members of the Review Team and on the ICANN side, so we opted for this much more open way.

The structure of this -- the structure of the report basically shows a number of recommendations. These come from an analysis of issues. And for each issue we express our findings and conclusions about them and then the recommendation. We have tried to be almost didactic in as much as possible in building up each of the recommendations on the basis of our observations and findings and the conclusions, with a very diverse use of the Review Team (inaudible).

We decided for a middle level of aggregation or detail and then we will have the option of making a much shorter report with a few recommendations. They will probably be too general, but they would be at a level of broad strokes, very big picture. The alternative of a very fine-grained report with recommendations about almost individuals' actions within staff and the community. And again, we decided against that because we considered it wouldn't necessarily provide a useful -- or the most useful principle.

We also -- at looking at different issues and community participation and ICANN internal operations, on procedures and so forth, we attempted the best we could to balance short-term interests with a long-range statistical perspective for a balance of all stakeholders and to adapt this to the changing weight of the stakeholders in their present and future roles. ICANN is in constant evolution. Whatever picture we take today of who is doing what and what their impact -- that's what they refer to with weight -- what weight different stakeholders' actions or omissions can have on stability and security. That will be changing as different processes within the ICANN space takes place.

I will repeat at the end of the slide that this report structure which I've been reading now, that the report is not meant to be an IT security audit. An IT security audit will follow an established procedure and would look at whether a file level -- at the file level or at the network level things are being done in certain ways, documented in certain ways and so forth. That was not the purposes of the review under the Information of Commitments because it will still leave many open questions. Part of such security audits take place within ICANN exercises for contingency planning and so forth, which would be part of the results of those audits actually take place. So, we are looking at the higher level of aggregation of whether ICANN is managing the things that leads to and from such a report, (inaudible) if it's undertaken. If it -- if I can explain these things and some other things which are in what we would call a political space. But again, we -- our midlevel of aggregation, of course, is not considering very large scale, let's say, geopolitical kinds of actors which, again, are beyond the scope of the review and would be much more speculative and therefore, again, less useful.

Instead of reading the 28 recommendations or trying to aggregate them and then de-aggregate them, what I'm going to do now is to go to a slide that's marked "Main Findings" and here bring together the -- say an overview of the result of the report. And after that, I will entertain questions, which then, of course, can be related to the particular recommendations. I assume and think the registrars know as many of you know the report in detail and we'll work from that for the feedback after this presentation.

So, again, the main findings. The report -- the work we did, as I said, the extensive interviews and documentary analysis and visits to ICANN facilities led us to conclude that ICANN appears to be performing with acceptable parameters at the time of the study. We are looking at the consequences of the past incident, once it's solved and explained, to see whether any of those conclusions have been revised. But, as I said, we found in the many, many aspects that conform ICANN's commitment to stability, security, and resilience of the DNS, ICANN to be performing within acceptable parameters. That particular point of interest, plus clarity of process, which has been emphasized in the Information of Commitments and during the discussions with different

stakeholders, led us to conclude again that there's satisfactory clarity of process. There are improvements possible.

And something that we found during the report, even in a very vivid way, is that stability, security and resilience of the DNS contains many moving targets, many things that are changing as you observe them. Furthermore, some things change because of the observation, because of the intervention of different parties. And then, therefore, it's not only important for ICANN to establish one day a clear process for how to participate, how to contribute to the stability of the DNS, how to identify risks towards security and how to build upon what exists to be more resilient, but it actually has to be adaptable in this process. It has to create and handle processes that are adaptable, besides being clear for -- as mentioned.

There's -- all over the report we are -- in the recommendations and for different purposes and reasons we are recommending openness and participation from the community or relevant stakeholders or in the dialogue with third parties. And in all these cases it should be understood that we recommend, of course, that this openness and participative processes be balanced between the openness of information and the need for confidentiality, especially regarding security issues. And that will be, again, an ongoing challenge and process. You can see the comments from different members of the community, particularly the business constituency, has been very emphatic in adding a note to our recommendations for openness and participation in saying that we, of course, should not be recommending to open confidential information that could actually create vulnerabilities or attract attacks and that's, of course, the meaning and the balance that we have in the report.

Further, most of the parties we consulted with, we interrogated or who came spontaneously to us in public consultation, including ICANN staff, have been very emphatic underneath to define a risk management framework for the DNS, which is one of our strongest recommendations. We are recommending that this -- well, while we were doing the report, we were doing our work, some pieces of the puzzle were moving. In particular, the ICANN Board removed the responsibility of creating business management framework from the SSAC, the Stability and Security Advisory Committee, a permanent committee of ICANN, and created a Board working group for this purpose, which will be supervising the different members of the community actually do this, where we have been able to communicate with ICANN. This task has a high priority and a priority to be performed in a relatively short term, considering, again, the (inaudible) participatory process -- the nature of the process.

And also, the community established a working group, which we call the DSSA, which will be known as a DSSA. It's a very broad-based community group which has been investigating mostly the threat landscape for the DNS and making very good progress. We recognize the progress in these fronts and the few others, including ICANN's own staff operations and outreach and education for the community, management of different risks, which are identified. It's not that -- like there is nothing of our risk management framework. It's more the integration into a single one that is an aspiration. And personally, what that does, we would have to recognize that this is a personal observation, that this may never be complete. So, ICANN must -- it's getting our recommendation that they must create something to work with and then continue completing it.

During the time that we have been working with this report, particularly since we published the draft report that we are coming to today, there has been what's known as a TAS incident in the -- which is a software problem with the system for registering new gTLD applications. And we are considering looking at how this evolves, how ICANN

manages it. And we -- if this is still possible within the timeframe in which we want to deliver our final report, which have got a commitment to the committee to do so, we will look at how the incident was handled, what information emerges about its origin and see if it forces us to review and revise some of our recommendations.

With that said, I would like to first ask for other members of the Review Team who are present in this conference whether you would like to add or complete or correct something I may have said. And then, we will be managing the conference around the community participation. I think you all for your attention. Hopefully, this has been useful for you.

Simon McCalla: Nothing from me, Alex.

Alejandro Pisanty: And that was --.

Simon McCalla: That's Simon.

Alejandro Pisanty: Simon McCalla, right?

Simon McCalla: Yeah, the same.

Alejandro Pisanty: Any other --?

Jeff Brueggeman: Alejandro, Jeff Brueggeman. I just wanted to say I thought you did an excellent job of covering the review, findings and our procedures for conducting it. And I was just going to reiterate. I thought a key point of our approach was recognizing the balance that ICANN needs to strike on these issues; that it has a defined mission and remit and it also has -- we understand resources are not unlimited, so we didn't want to create a report that was just a laundry list of additional things that ICANN should be doing, but rather try to provide some combination of process and substantive recommendations about what should be the priorities and the way to approach security within ICANN with the goal of making this -- building on the strong foundation that's already there. But, I think your description was very, very helpful. Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you. I see that other members of the team present are on (inaudible). And David Cake I see in the Adobe room -- and Ondrej Filip, that you're saying that you don't have any further comments. But, if you now have any, I would be very, very glad to hear them and, otherwise, let's use the time mostly for community participation. So, I'm now opening the floor generally.

Alice Jansen: Alejandro, this is Alice. Just a note that we have unmuted all the lines now and that we invite community members to participate. So, please feel free to speak and please identify yourself before you speak. Thank you very much.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Alice. So, I'll repeat. This is a goal now for -- the lines are open and community members are invited to speak. And we are -- we have high expectations from your participation. We also -- we only ask, as Alice Jansen said, beg you to identify yourself before you start speaking.

Alice Jansen: And as always, the chats -- comments, questions in the chat box are more than welcome as well. Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, thank you. And I will be reporting those in voice for the people who don't have the luxury of the Adobe room. I am reading David Cake, a member of the Review Team, has a comment, which is to echo that the risk management framework issue was one that

changed regularly during the review period and is still changing. And I'm glad that several of the Review Team members, and I as well, think that our investigation into this has actually prompted ICANN staff action and there's been a very intense collaboration in that sense.

I see among the participants Juan Manuel Rojas. Juan Manuel, do you have any comments that you want to make at this moment? If you are able to speak.

Juan Manuel Rojas: Hello. This is Juan Manuel. Can you hear me?

Alejandro Pisanty: I hear you very well. I guess that the other participants can you hear well, but if we can get some feedback?

Juan Manuel Rojas: Okay. No. I only have a question maybe is for when do you think that final report is ready to -- because we know that you have to take all of these recommendations that people said and all of your review and make it again and work on it. That's what -- I want to ask that.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Juan Manuel. Our plan is to finalize report and deliver it by the BRAG (ph) meeting at the end of June. For that purpose, we have already been analyzing and there's already a compilation of comments and some drafting going on where -- I mean, I mentioned that we will do our formal work once the comment period is over, but of course we are not sitting lazily. And we still believe possible that we will start working from May 14th to the first week or two of June and then be able to publish the final version in time for the BRAG meeting or at the BRAG meeting. We may be meeting there to do some fine-tuning if there's -- I mean, we will be meeting there in order to be able to do fine-tuning, final language. And, of course, if the TAS incident provides us with the information to put into our report, that will be also a task until June. But, if it remains open-ended by that time, we will not wait because we don't think that the rest of the report should wait.

Is that okay, Juan Manuel?

Juan Manuel Rojas: It's okay, Alejandro. Thank you.

Jeff Brueggeman: Thank you. I also see among the participants in this call Jim Galvin. Jim, can you hear us? Can you provide us any comments?

And I will mention certainly that Jim Galvin has been a long -- has been a regular participant in our discussions. We've talked to him both formally and informally. And he has attended the public consultation meetings and others that we have had. On the Adobe Room he is saying he can hear, but is only via Adobe, not on the phone and that he has no comments.

Are there other participants that are not in the Adobe Room, but who are able to speak who would like to make any comments?

And I see in the list of participants of the Adobe Room also Dr. Steve Crocker. Steve, good morning. Do you have any comments at this point?

Steve Crocker: Had to come off mute. I hope you can hear me.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, we can hear you. Thank you.

Steve Crocker: Good. No, no comments at this point. As you know, I read the earlier report and offered up a few comments, which I hope were helpful. I'm looking very much forward to reading this carefully and, probably more importantly in my current role, stage managing the process so that it gets proper attention in a timely fashion, a good analysis and that we can not drop the ball as we accept this report and move things forward. I know it's been a long and sometimes arduous process for you guys and it's very important, so we're very appreciative.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Steve. I'll have to, again, add that not only has Dr. Crocker participated actively when we have asked him to, but he has provided us very valuable insights and interviews along the process. And the one that went formally into the process. And yes, Steve, we have already given consideration to your comments for how they will go into the final draft. And thank you also for the supportive role that the Board for you has had for our project. Steve has reflected in various (inaudible) prompt responses from ICANN staff as well.

Steve Crocker: Are you going to be in Prague?

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes. We have planned to be in Prague -- we have plans for our presence in Prague, which I as Chair and the members of the core drafting team will be there so that we'll -- it is possible to have a prompt response, even make a consultation to the rest of the Review Team, if need be, to clarify things in the final recommendations or to still take in tuning of the draft.

Steve Crocker: My nominal plan, which isn't 100 percent firm yet, is that the Board will formally accept the report in a formal action prior to the beginning of the public meetings. And that in the opening speech, this is one of the points that I will cover, that we've accepted the report and we will begin the careful analysis of the feasibility and consequences and so forth before we make a determination of exactly how to go forward. And we'll set a time scale for doing that. Let me also note that the WHOIS Review Team has also just submitted its final report and a similar process will be underway. So, on top of a few other things like the CEO transition, the gTLD program and perhaps a few other things, it's going to be a pretty busy time in Prague.

Alejandro Pisanty: Sure sounds like and thanks for telling us this in this very precise way. It fits very well with the plan; I think it fits well. And I hope you do find it appropriate that there will be a presence of the team to clarify stuff while we are there and able to meet with board members directly as well.

Steve Crocker: Again, thanks to you and the rest of your team. I know that everybody worked very hard and I'm keying the doc back into this. I noted your selection of the medium green and I saw the possibility that that reflected some of the discussions you and I had.

Alejandro Pisanty: Well, you'll be in the best position to judge whether it actually does. They can also use it -- mention of the team's work. I am really proud and thankful of the work this team made. There's tons of personal work, very high quality, very strongly committed. The core drafting team did a superb job in compiling repeated views from very disparate parts of the community, also reflected with this global team. And going, of course, with or against the seasons, personal family illnesses and so forth. And (inaudible) I want to publicly to thank all of you.

Steve Crocker: Good.

Anders Rafting: Anders here. Can I make a comment?

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes. This is Anders Rafting from the Review Team and from the GAC team from Sweden.

Anders Rafting: Yes. I just wanted to express my -- I'll call it my colleagues' gratitude to key members of the Board that so thoroughly and carefully replied on the questions sent to them that John (inaudible) and Steve and Ralph (ph). And so, these answers has been very -- have been the requisite for our success to make this report. So, thanks a lot for that.

Alejandro Pisanty: And thanks for that comment and they join your thanking them.

So, any other comments? Alice, are you getting any other input for us that I may not be seeing in the Adobe Room or through --?

Alice Jansen: No further input. Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay. Then I think that we can adjourn this meeting. If anybody was going to arrive late, it's already 40 minutes past the hour, so it's highly unlikely that this would -- to happen or have an impact. And we certainly have another call in six hours, I think, which also has a number of participants already subscribed.

So, one further call for comments before adjourning. Anybody get the feeling that this is about to finish and I haven't said what I was going to say? And from the Review Team members, Simon, Andrea, Jeff, David, Anders?

Martin Hannigan: This is -- Martin Hannigan's here as well.

Alejandro Pisanty: I beg you to repeat, please.

Martin Hannigan: Martin's here as well.

Alejandro Pisanty: Oh, Martin. Hi. I was not seeing you in the list I have in the Adobe Room. That's Martin Hannigan. And again, t hanks for your contribution, Martin. Any comments?

Martin Hannigan: No. I just wanted to thank you for your work as well.

Alejandro Pisanty: Oh, thanks.

Okay. Then I think we can adjourn this call. It's 40 past the hour, 41 past the hour. Thanks, everybody. Thanks, Steve Crocker. Thanks (inaudible), Jim Galvin, though we didn't hear your voice, but I have conveyed correctly your written statements. And everybody from the Review Team and also thanks to Alice Jansen and the whole ICANN staff for setting this up and conducting it and, of course, for the tons of very good work that you put in in order for the Review Team to be able to do its work.

Thanks, everybody, and we're adjourning at the hour past 42. Thank you, everybody.

Unidentified Participant: Thanks, Alejandro.

Martin Hannigan: Thank you.

Unidentified Participant: Thank you.