

# SECURITY, STABILITY & RESILIENCY OF THE DNS REVIEW TEAM (SSR RT) DRAFT REPORT

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Webinar  
Friday, 11 May 2012

# SSR Review Team (SSR RT)

- Affirmation of Commitments (AoC) mandated
- Designated in October 2010, first met in December 2010
- Composition
  - SO/AC representatives
  - Independent experts
  - Designated nominee of the Chair of the GAC

# Mandate

9.2 Preserving security, stability and resiliency: ICANN has developed a plan to enhance the operational stability, reliability, resiliency, security, and global interoperability of the DNS, which will be regularly updated by ICANN to reflect emerging threats to the DNS. [...] Particular attention will be paid to: (a) security, stability and resiliency matters, both physical and network, relating to the secure and stable coordination of the Internet DNS; (b) ensuring appropriate contingency planning; and (c) maintaining clear processes. Each of the reviews conducted under this section will assess the extent to which ICANN has successfully implemented the security plan, the effectiveness of the plan to deal with actual and potential challenges and threats, and the extent to which the security plan is sufficiently robust to meet future challenges and threats to the security, stability and resiliency of the Internet DNS, consistent with ICANN's limited technical mission. [...]

# Draft Report

- Published: 15 March 2012
- Translations: 5 UN languages
- 28 recommendations
- Out for public comment
  - Deadline: ~~8 April 2012~~ 14 May 2012
  - Comments welcome during reply comment period
  - Comments received from major key constituencies

# REPORT STRUCTURE

- Findings
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- Decided for middle-grain level vis-a-vis broad strokes or fine-grain
- Attempted to balance short-term interest with long-range strategic perspective for all stakeholders, adapt to changing weight in their present and future roles
- Report is NOT an IT security audit

# Main findings

- ICANN appeared to be performing within acceptable parameters at the time of the study. We may urge to revise this conclusion depending on the solution and explanation of the TAS incident
- Clarity of process satisfactory, improvements possible, adaptation to moving targets necessary
- Balance required between openness and needs for confidentiality esp. regarding security issues is ongoing challenge and process
- Need to define Risk Management Framework; work undertaken for the purpose, including Board Working Group and community's DSSA
- Consideration of TAS incident necessary; this is an ongoing process and no final finding nor recommendation has been made

# Recommendation 1

- ICANN should publish a single, clear and consistent statement of its SSR remit and limited technical mission. ICANN should elicit and gain public feedback in order to reach a consensus-based statement.

## Recommendation 2

- Once ICANN issues a consensus-based statement of its SSR remit and limited technical mission, ICANN should utilize consistent terminology and descriptions of this statement in all materials.



## Recommendation 3

- ICANN should document and clearly define the nature of the SSR relationships it has within the ICANN community in order to provide a single focal point for understanding the interdependencies between the organizations.

## Recommendation 4

- ICANN should use the definition of its SSR relationships to encourage broad engagement on SSR matters using this to create an effective and coordinated SSR approach.

# Recommendation 5

- ICANN should publish a document clearly outlining the roles and responsibilities for both the SSAC and RSSAC in order to clearly delineate the activities of the two groups. ICANN should seek consensus for this across both groups, recognizing the history and circumstances of the formation of each. ICANN should consider appropriate resourcing for both groups, consistent with the demands placed upon them.

# Recommendation 6

- ICANN's definition and implementation of its SSR remit and limited technical mission should be reviewed in order to maintain consensus and elicit feedback from the community. The process should be repeated on a regular basis, perhaps in conjunction with the cycle of future SSR reviews.

# Recommendation 7

- ICANN should build on its current SSR framework by establishing a clear set of objectives and prioritizing its initiatives and activities in accordance with these objectives. This process should be informed by a pragmatic cost-benefit and risk analysis.

## Recommendation 8

- ICANN should continue to refine its Strategic Plan objectives, particularly the goal of maintaining and driving DNS availability. It also should establish more direct connections between specific priorities and projects in the SSR Framework and the Strategic Plan.

# Recommendation 9

- ICANN should develop a roadmap that leads towards more forward and widely adopted certification of its SSR-related processes in line with industry best practice.

# Recommendation 10

- ICANN should continue its efforts to step up contract compliance enforcement and provide adequate resources for this function. ICANN should also develop and implement a more structured process for monitoring compliance issues and investigations.



# Recommendation 11

- ICANN should finalize and implement measures of success for new gTLDs and IDN fast track that expressly relate to its SSR-related program objectives, including measurements for the effectiveness of mechanisms to mitigate domain name abuse and consumer confusion.

# Recommendation 12

- ICANN should support the development and implementation of SSR-related best practices through contracts, agreements, MoUs and other mechanisms.

# Recommendation 13

- ICANN should encourage all Supporting Organizations to develop and publish SSR-related best practices for their members.

## Recommendation 14

- ICANN should ensure that its SSR related outreach activities continuously evolve to remain relevant, timely and appropriate. Feedback from the community should provide a mechanism to review and increase this relevance.

# Recommendation 15

- ICANN should publish information about DNS threats and mitigation strategies as a resource for the broader Internet community.

# Recommendation 16

- ICANN should continue its outreach efforts to expand community participation and input into the SSR framework development process. ICANN also should establish a process for obtaining more systemic input from other ecosystem participants.

# Recommendation 17

- ICANN should establish a more structured internal process for showing how activities and initiatives relate to specific strategic goals, objectives and priorities in the SSR Framework. It also should establish metrics and milestones for implementation.

# Recommendation 18

- ICANN should conduct an annual operational review of its progress in implementing the SSR Framework and include this assessment as a component of the following year's SSR Framework.



# Recommendation 19

- ICANN should establish a process that allows the community to track the implementation of the SSR Framework. Information should be provided with enough clarity that the community can track ICANN's execution of its SSR responsibilities, while not harming ICANN's ability to operate effectively. The dashboard process being used to track implementation of the ATRT recommendations serves as a good model.

# Recommendation 20

- ICANN should increase the transparency of information about organization and budget related to implementing the SSR Framework and performing SSR-related functions. Information should be provided with enough clarity that the community can track ICANN's execution of its SSR responsibilities, while not impeding ICANN's ability to operate effectively.

# Recommendation 21

- ICANN should establish a more structured internal process for showing how organization and budget decisions relate to the SSR Framework, including the underlying cost-benefit analysis.

# Recommendation 22

- ICANN should publish, monitor and update documentation on the organization and budget resources needed to manage SSR issues in conjunction with introduction of new gTLDs.

# Recommendation 23

- ICANN must provide appropriate resources for SSR-related working groups and advisory committees, consistent with the demands placed upon them. ICANN also must ensure decisions reached by working groups and advisory committees are reached in an objective manner that is free from external or internal pressure.

# Recommendation 24

- ICANN must clearly define the charter, roles and responsibilities of the Chief Security Office team related to implementing plans that are designed to address longer-term risks.

## Recommendation 25

- ICANN should put in place mechanisms for identifying longer-term risks and strategic factors in its risk management framework. This process should be informed by insights from research, business partnerships, ICANN supporting organizations and other sources. ICANN should publish information about longer-term risks, recognizing the sensitive nature of some of these factors.

## Recommendation 26

- ICANN should prioritize the timely completion of a risk-management framework. This work should follow high standards of participation and transparency.



# Recommendation 27

- ICANN's risk-management framework should be comprehensive within the scope of its SSR remit and limited missions.

# Recommendation 28

- ICANN should continue to actively engage in threat detection and mitigation, and participate in efforts to distribute threat and incident information.

# Links

- Draft Report

<http://www.icann.org/en/reviews/affirmation/ssrt-draft-report-15mar12-en.pdf>

- Public comment

<http://www.icann.org/en/news/public-comment/ssrt-draft-report-15mar12-en.htm>

- Announcement

<http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-15mar12-en.htm>

# Seeking your input

We are all ears!

Alternatively...

[ssrt-draft-report@icann.org](mailto:ssrt-draft-report@icann.org)

By 14 May – 23:59 UTC