20120504_SSR_GAC_ID693576

Alejandro Pisanty: May I please ask you to again tell us who is on the call so that everybody who's here will know?

Unidentified Speaker: Yes. Operator, could you please start the recording?

Operator: Recording is on.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes. Everybody be aware there is a recording going on. If anyone feels there's a need for stopping the recording, please state the reasons and we'll work on that.

Unidentified Speaker: This is the SSR review team GAC conference call. On the call today we have Anders Rafting, Simon McCalla, Alice Munyua, Bill Manning, Jeff Brueggeman, David Cake from the SSR review team. From the GAC side we have Syed Iftikhar and Mark Carvell. And ICANN staff we have Patrick Jones and (inaudible). Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Okay. So, if you'll agree we can probably start this better if we go very quickly to the main part of the presentation that we prepared and I think -- I hope all of you have been able to see it, in particular, Mark and -- I'm sorry for the pronunciation, our colleague from Pakistan, have you been able to go through the presentation we sent out and the recent report?

Mark Carvell: I've gone through the report but I'm afraid I haven't gone through the presentation. I'm actually in another meeting room without access to Adobe unfortunately. Sorry about that.

Alejandro Pisanty: So, let's go very briefly over what's in the presentation. It's very brief besides -- I mean it has two parts -- an introduction and a list of recommendations. Let me go through the introduction and then we'll see what discussion we need to have. First, to remind everybody, ability, security, and receiving of the DNS review team is mandated by the affirmation of commitment. We take our job very seriously because we know it's a landmark to establish the new mechanisms for accountability

of ICANN with this much larger involvement of the GAC which we think is a great evolution but we also think we have to be exemplary in our work methods and results.

The review team was designated through an open participatory process by a different ICANN contingency plus the designation of members from the chair of the GAC and the CEO of ICANN. The numbers were designated in October 2010, the first meeting was in December 2010 in the Cartagena meeting which was basically an organizational get together and I guess the work started at that meeting. The composition of the team as you all know and have mentioned partially is supporting organization and advisory committee representatives, independent experts, and designated nominees of the CEO and the Chair of the GAC. The person designated by the Chair of the GAC has been Alice Munyua and we have had participation from members of the GAC through Alice Munyua herself and through Anders Rafting from Sweden as you know.

The mandate for this group is spelled in detail in the slide presentation just so everybody has it very clear and prescient. Basically it says that the review team will see whether ICANN is performing correctly in three matters which is security, stability on resolving matters both physical and network relating to a secure and stable coordination of internet DNS, ensuring appropriate contingency planning and maintaining clear paths. What has to be seen in the review is whether ICANN has successfully implemented the security plan, effecting this plan to deal with actual and potential challenges and threats and the extent to which a security plan is officially robust to meet future challenges and threats to the SSR -- SSR is an organization we have for security and receiving of the DNS. And there's one more phrase there which is consistent with ICANN's technical mission.

With these mandates which mean basically our situation -- I mean, (inaudible) evolution of ICANN's stability, security, and resilience plan and how it also permeates other actions of ICANN, we went in to try to do this study and come up with our report. We made a few decisions, one very important and which differs from every other review to date is that we decided not to call for outside consultants to do any part of the work because we found in the first analysis that it would take long and would be so complicated to write down the rules for calling for an expert, let's say the RSD that we already haven't billed -- making half the study and we would still be waiting for someone with special -- enough knowledge of ICANN to come in. But also a little of the analysis is very important to define and I'll mention this in a second.

The structure of the report is based on -- it's marked by the recommendations but it actually has findings, conclusions, and recommendations for each of the recommendations. We decided to call for a middle size granularity. We did not to have a very broad report and we

also found that it was not practical nor desirable to serve a useful purpose to do a report that was too fine grained. We have to balance short-term interests with long range strategic perspective for all stakeholders. We have to adapt to the changing weight in different stakeholders and their roles, for example, the increasing weight and recognition and involvement of the GAC or the fact that when new gTLD processes reach operation, the registries will become many more in the future. Maybe hundreds of registries where there are a dozen or a couple dozen (inaudible) and they may have a very different weight in the whole organization.

The final caveat which is very important is that this report is not a security (inaudible). It's a review of how ICANN is performing on a broader level. It's based on information that would be compatible with a security audit for some of the operations but the security audit is not what we were charged for or what we are equipped for by the composition of the review team. I don't know if you have any comments at this point, especially friends from the GAC and of course one more point here is I'm very thankful for the presence today of members of the SSR review team and in particular of the core drafting team and I would acknowledge publically and thank you in front of this very choice set of witnesses for the enormous amount of work, commitment, and openness with respect to some of the places you come from to this review team for producing the result.

So, again, the question, Alice or Anders and GAC have any comments or questions at this point?

Mark Carvell: No. I don't really have any comments. Obviously it was important for the affirmation commitments to identify a review process on security, stability, and resiliency, and given that it's a critical part of ICANN's remit. So, that's a very important step which we welcomed and we appreciate the work that's been done in the preparation of this draft report. I take it from your comments really that the composition of the review team met all the requirements of the review. I don't know if there have been any comments in the community or as we go out to the composition and whether you needed to bring anybody from the outside with the whole independent perspective on things. I don't know if that was something that was an issue at any point, that the composition of the review team sufficiently met the requirements of the review. I take it from your comments that really there was no issue like that. But interesting to know if there was any at any point. Oh, I wish we had this person or this person or this source of expertise, perhaps from a wholly independent source that we could draw on. I don't know if that was an issue at all, but if it was it would be interesting to know, particularly as we look ahead to further reviews being conducted in the future.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Mark. It's a very important question. It's an urgent question for us, of course. I personally believe that the composition of the team was

very fortunate. We did suffer some attrition from people who for example have been under extreme, serious illness for some time but other than that I think the team composition was stellar. I'm very proud also of the way that the skill sets and the personalities and the will to provide a good result came together. For some of the skill sets, one would've said -- Let's double check we have strong skills in the audit team or strong skills in security and so forth. In project management we definitely did have them and the members of the team contributed them at the right time. So, for example, in the planning process and the scoping process, we had very good contributions of people who then stepped a little bit back because their main contribution had already been made. I think that's in general an assessment that choices the community made in the bottom up process and the choices that the ICANN CEO and the GAC Chair made in the parts where they have to do these collections individually were very good.

Mark Carvell: That's very good to know. It's reassuring that the selection process for the review composition was an effective one. Thank you very much for explaining that.

Alejandro Pisanty: (inaudible) that process in my day job I was running a roll of supervisor of a very large scale project which involved -- it was the set up of a system for online trials in the Mexican (inaudible) federal court. It's an online justice system which effects 3% of the GDP of Mexico. I have the comparison of what were the skill sets in project management and security and other things and so forth and the work was done by a major international consultancy, by Deloitte in Mexico. So, I have this comparison day by day and I'm very, very proud and satisfied by our skill set. And it's not only my personal happy feelings with the good team impression but it's a very, very objective comparison. But we're definitely very well equipped.

Okay, so that said, again as I mentioned also we hope this falls also within the skill set. I think there may be consistency there but we really did look very critically at what should be the scope of the audit, of the review, and we decided definitely that doing an in depth security audit or an HR audit and so forth would be beyond our scope even if we had a different composition of the team. They would not serve the purpose of the information or commitments which as I said we studied in much detail and we discussed every three months to make sure that we were within the right one. That was the final result of (inaudible). It would be your review of our results as well as (inaudible) we did get all those things right.

So, I'll go on next to the findings. Here in -- what I've done is to look at the summary of the findings and recommendations put together in a statement instead of going through all or a selected subset of recommendations which we can do afterwards. So, the main findings in very simple language, this is not necessarily the most formal language but it's intended to facilitate this conversation in particular with the GAC

representation. First of all, ICANN is performing in a satisfactory way with respect to the stability, security, and resiliency of the DNS. Of course improvements are possible and we have seen some sensitive points and the direction of some of these people. The clarity of process which is one of the three elements of mandates we got. Clarity of process is satisfactory. Improvements are possible.

And another very important thing is that the adaption to the whole work of ICANN in the SSR field is in constant adaption to moving targets. Framework documents like the strategic planning or the budget, reality around those political and other large scale realities which can effect the stability in the long-term, all these things are moving targets. So, one has to see and we looked into this, that ICANN has the right processes to sense the reality and adapt. We find there's a balance required. Again, this is (inaudible) send us no (inaudible) but it was important to check at the specific level we had it for ICANN. There's a need for balance between the openness and active participation, information sharing and so forth and a need for confidentiality and work under another holder under specific need to know conditions, especially regarding security issues and again, guessing (inaudible) is an ongoing challenge and an ongoing process.

One very specific finding which has a large scale impact is we identified others in the community have started the need for a risk management framework. We are very specific in our report about what should be there, what not, what's the scope and we know there's work undertaken already for establishing this risk management framework which includes the recent designation of a board working group and a community DSSA process which is more bottom up and which is constrained to identifying the threats and their potential impact to the -- more a threat landscape than for a risk framework.

And finally, as we are speaking, we have the ongoing bill weigh in which ICANN is dealing with, a DES incident with a glitch in the system for the registration of gTLD applications and we're serving that at the moment you cannot make any recommendation. My personal forecast is that we will very likely have to make a statement along the lines of ICANN having to review the processes that we have found satisfactory are in need for evolution but not (inaudible) change to review them in the light of this incident and see whether the decision making process, the human resource, et cetera, decisions are all in the right place. Those are our main findings. The report has been publishing as you know on March 15, translated. We have broader and extended the comment process to May 14. So, there still is almost two weeks now left for comments and the rest of the presentation will be going through the recommendation one by one which I don't think is necessarily the best idea. So, I would again welcome comments, questions, both from the review team and the GAC attendees.

Simon? Jeff? Bill? David? Anders? If you're on the call would you like to make any further comments?

Jeff Brueggeman: This is Jeff. I'd make two high level observations. Alejandro, you did an excellent job of summarizing our work and I just wanted to point out that we were very sensitive to the fact that ICANN has a specific technical mission as well as limited resources so we didn't want the report to just be a list of things that ICANN could be doing more of. We really tried to think carefully about how ICANN can operate within its kind of complicated operating environment and that's why I think we focused a lot on prioritization and management type issues as opposed to just creating a list of things that would be kind of additional work efforts for ICANN.

I think we're very sensitive to that. I think the other part is because security is such an inner related issues between so many different parties on the internet I think we had some recommendations that focused on the importance of relationships and things that are maybe less tangible but very important and so I think you saw that woven throughout the report as well. I think we understand that ICANN operates in a very complicated environment on SSR issues and we think we're generally doing a very good job. But we also tried to have our recommendations fit the complexity of the landscape they're operating in.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you. Jeff.

Mark Carvell: That last point is an interesting one because ICANN is an incredibly rich environment when it comes to expertise and sources of information with regard to security and stability and when you attend an ICANN meeting you're conscious that there are probably important discussions going on about security of the system and so on, but especially for us in the GAC where we're holed up in a meeting we don't get the sense of this is a real coming together of critical information which then could inform the top level of ICANN if you like about security issues, emerging threats and solutions or ways of mitigating threats.

I don't get a sense that that kind of process works or if it does work whether it works truly effectively in absorbing all this expertise from the stakeholders taking part in ICANN. So, I think that's one message, an important one from this report that maybe there should be a look at how that process of drawing on the expertise and informing the decision and development of the framework and the plan on security, how that will -- that important work will be conducted in a way that draws on all this source of expertise from the people attending the meeting and interacting with ICANN stakeholders intersession through emails and consultation processes and so on. Are we sure that this is effectively done so that strategy on security is truly enriched and takes account of all the information and proposals and thinking that stakeholders can contribute if you see what I mean?

Alejandro Pisanty: Does anyone itch to jump with a reply here or may I provide one?

Simon McCalla: Before you reply, just one observation I think and you and I talked about this in the past is this report's an ideal opportunity for Jeff and his organization to reach out into that community and to engage with that expertise and really work on the relationship side. I think we've pointed that out in a number of places about understanding and really getting to the bottom of the relationships in order to take advantage of that expertise. I think that's going to be a key part of his mission in the next year or so and I think particularly he's going to have significant extra work because you're going to be recovering from this current incident with the TAS and so you're going to have to rebuild people's trust in the security organization and then build on the recommendations in the report.

Bill Manning: I think there's another aspect there that as a review team we did not want to be prescriptive in dictating to ICANN how this outreach was to be done. We simply wanted to point out that this was an area they needed to engage. And maybe the flexibility to work out the appropriate engagement rules and processes.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, Bill and Simon. Those are very important comments. Mark, Alice, everybody else on the call, very briefly, there's a lot of engagement in this area. We interviewed extensively ICANN staff at different levels, together, separately, and we studied the documents and procedures and we've been observing, of course, these matters, some of us for many years. As Simon indicated, this process has to intensify and become clear as the build up of a formal comprehensive risk management framework (inaudible) and response to the present task incident is to understand better what is still missing in the organization.

The jury's still out on whether it is one thing that can happen to an organization or whether there was some important break down of rules or the rules were insufficient. It's not necessarily a security incident but it has a stability impact especially in the long-term until trust is regained. As Bill Manning says, we decided not to (inaudible) despite the itch many of us felt to providing advice on how to move forward and I think that proved that we made the right choice there in the comments received If you go through them carefully you will see that some communities are responding with a call for very intensive and open participation and some of them who actually are engaging actively in an open participatory process for the SSR are warning that care should be taken that these processes do not run amuck, they do not open up too much information about threats that bad players could use and so forth.

So, I think that we -- I see some indication of this approach. That said, Mark, to your comments if you attend -- this is unfortunate as you mentioned for the GAC attendees who are sometimes forced to spend a lot

of hours away from the rest of the meetings. If you attend the SSAC meeting for example, including the open ones and the closed ones for our members (inaudible) in every meeting during the review process, you can see that lots of expertise is present there. They don't need to come to the meeting who already have valuable information and insights and having shared them. As you mentioned there is a lot that goes intersession and that's a continuous process.

We also reviewed the SSAC document -- the recommendations that they have put forward. We believe they are generally right. Question one decision of the ICANN moving the SSAC responsibility of drafting the framework but that has been replaced now by a working group which is working very actively and that the SSA community process. We believe that these are on track for the needs. One more thing there is that Simon among others has mentioned there's sort of a high principle thing happening with the report as you observe the thing you're reporting, nothing changes. In this case, the SSA process has changed over the year and a half you've been working together with the ICANN team and the community.

Some of our comments came up in conversations and the next time we met the ICANN have already started processing. They were out in the community. This has been very dynamic for us. The evolution of the way ICANN deals with SSR over the year and a half of the report has been quite impressive and we believe actually the observations we were making have some influence there. The report says it's quite specific on recommendations on improvements on these processes.

One of them in particular is improving the clarity of roles and the necessary overlap of roles between the SSAC, the stability (inaudible) advisory committee and the root server system advisory committee (inaudible) very different (inaudible) and so (inaudible) recommendations (inaudible) contributes to allaying your concerns. But mostly we're not trying to allay concerns, it's trying to put them in a concrete, actionable way and I think what we'd love to see in your fresh rereading of the report after this conversation is very valuable.

Mark Carvell: Just briefly, thanks very much. That's very helpful. Within GAC consideration of (inaudible) I think the particular recommendations 25, 26, 27 are pretty important and from the UK point of view I would really want to (inaudible) 26 on prioritizing the completion of the framework. And maybe that's something we'll raise what we meet with SSAC in Prague. I don't know if it's definitely on the agenda but I find the SSAC briefings of the GAC important and useful to have even though quite often I don't really understand the detail of Patrick's reports. But I think I'll be wanting to determine the timing of the framework being completed in line with 26 in your report. Sorry.

Alejandro Pisanty: Just briefly, actually the SSAC was removed in January last year from this responsibility and it was transferred to something that was not formed at the time which is a board working group on the DNS framework. This one is chaired by Bill Graham from Canada whom you've met in previous incarnations as a GAC representative from Canada. So, that's the focus. And they are -- at the last we heard from them they were working on a very tight schedule so that a month from now they should already have some valuable stuff out there. So, it's not SSAC but the board and I think it's right if you (inaudible) interest of the GAC (inaudible) in the completion of the framework in a short timeframe.

Mark Carvell: Right. Thanks. I stand correct. Sorry. Yes, it's a board working group. We will want to get an update if it's not actually ready in time for Prague.

Alejandro Pisanty: It was not meant as a correction but supplementary information.

Mark Carvell: Okay.

Alejandro Pisanty: Are there any other comments or questions? Alice Munyua, our colleague from Pakistan -- again, I apologize to you for not having your name in my mind in a pronounceable way.

Alice Munyua: Can you repeat it? Hello?

Alejandro Pisanty: Who is this speaking?

Alice Munyua: Can you repeat the question? I didn't hear that.

Alejandro Pisanty: Is this Alice?

Alice Munyua: Yes. It is.

Alejandro Pisanty: The question is whether there are -- great to hear you. The question is whether there are other comments or questions, especially from the GAC and from the review team members on the call.

Alice Munyua: The only members on the call at the moment are the UK. So, I think I'll go to the UK and Pakistan if there are any questions from them.

Alejandro Pisanty: There seem to be no more questions from the UK and Pakistan. Is that correct?

Unidentified Speaker: There is a (inaudible) connection I think.

Alejandro Pisanty: We can hear you. But your sound doesn't come very clear. If you can speak slowly it will make things easier. It seems we don't have any more questions or comments from the GAC members. We're still open of course to knowing of them by email or any other way that you can convey them

	to us. And from the review team are there any comments you'd like to add? Simon? David? Jeff? Anders? Alice? Who else?
Anders Rafting:	Can you hear me?
Alejandro Pisanty:	Your volume is low.
Anders Rafting:	Better now? If you can hear me I just want to (inaudible) point out (inaudible) risk management. (inaudible) risk management (inaudible) part that actually (inaudible). On the other hand the review team was to (inaudible) system (inaudible) some other people. (inaudible) investing more (inaudible) conflict (inaudible) ICANN (inaudible) ICANN's ability (inaudible) possible. ICANN incorporates (inaudible) ICANN having a little (inaudible) have (inaudible) looks like (inaudible) clever (inaudible) ended up (inaudible)
Alejandro Pisanty:	Anders, the communication is really breaking down. I have collected your comment in support of Mark's concern for the urgent need for the framework to be completed, a mention of conflicting views about ICANN's role and mission which I think is -- we have collected in your report but would be thankful if you want to add something. The rest has really broken down. I don't know if you can send that by email?
Anders Rafting:	I'll do that.
Alejandro Pisanty:	I'm sorry. It's really fractional sound. I'm sorry for that. I think it's important to acknowledge that we're not hearing your completely well, at least not on my side and after you send that note, is there something that we should be discussing here right now that you would wish to put forward? Then I would ask you to repeat.
Anders Rafting:	No. (inaudible)
Alejandro Pisanty:	I understood no. Is anybody else hearing Anders clearly without the choppiness I'm hearing?
Mark Carvell:	I found it very difficult actually to catch much of what Anders said.
Alejandro Pisanty:	Yes. There's something in that channel not working. Anders, I would encourage you to send your comment by email so it can go in the record of the meeting and we make sure if there's an action item in there we'll pick it up. Of course I'm -- besides what will be in the report, I will write Bill Graham to tell him there is related sensitivity to the urgency of the (inaudible) he's coordinating so he feels encouraged that it will be well appointed. Are there any other questions or comments?
Mark Carvell:	Just generally I think the report has been very good in identifying that ICANN's strategic role is not clearly established here. Who actually have

control of the strategy and how is the strategy on security managed and how is it resourced and the budget issues relating to this. I'm very appreciative of the report highlighting this. It was quite a surprise really to me that there was such a lack of clarity of role and strategy at this time. ICANN's been around for 11, 12 years. It's quite surprising that this is the case, that there is this lack of clarity and definition of role. I think that's one point I will make in the GAC discussion on this in Prague and I certainly hope our communiqué in Prague to the board will underline the criticality of these particular recommendations about clarity and definition and accountability and the role of the CSO and the -- there's a real need for a tightening up here.

I always remember fairly early on that when I took up the GAC role, being surprising by comments that a lot of board decisions and maybe lower down policy development was done without any engagement of experts on stability and security. So, I think there's deficiency abounds. I didn't take it further we had so many other issues. But I think now this review and the report has crystallized a need to tighten up and get the lines of communication clear and the opportunity to draw on expertise to be more efficiently handled and so on. I think it's a very valuable report and there are a lot of very good and important recommendations. I guess my only question out of this is how do you look further to the further report or review in three years time? Do any of you on the review team at this time anticipate anything in terms of the long view and subsequent reports on -- and reviews on security, stability, and resiliency? Is there anything that you think -- we haven't covered it this time but we have to next time? Is there anything?

Alejandro Pisanty: Mark, trying to reply briefly I would say thanks for the feedback. It's very important for us. We feel too the need for crisper lines in definitions. Very -- limitations of scope or understanding that in some places the scope is fuzzy and not try to overreach but try to make sure on the other hand big gaps don't exist. Let's say I agree with the current representation. That's what we're seeing. It's only -- you know, the sense of the report and my perception is not clear. ICANN is a zero and it should move to 100. It's like ICANN is at 80 or 85 of the 100 and of course it's critical to move closer to that 100 and that 100 will be a moving target.

So, we'll always be living with something that's a 95 in the best of cases. That would be the very qualitative reading of what I think is in our findings and recommendations and of course it's not all across the board. Some things are dismal. Some things are pretty good to optimal, not necessarily visible and they should be made more visible or more crisp. It's very different what we want in clarity and scope and so forth and the three circles that -- things that are directly under ICANN facility, its own staff, things that happened between ICANN and the supporting organizations and advisory committees which let's say the ICANN CEO cannot just give an order and have it happen but it's an intense negotiation

process that keeps moving the goal post and the third thing which is the wide world out there which includes stuff like inter-governmental organizations trying to change their roles or worse finding ways to abuse the domain name system at the very low individual level or users without enough technological knowledge open for vulnerability. So, ICANN's actions in these fields need to be better defined and that's one of the messages we want to be conveyed.

It also links then to a reply to your second question. We've not made a detailed analysis and it's not therefore in the recommendations or the document of what should be the situation in three years. But we have discussed it all along. We tried to make the recommendations in the report clear and separate enough that the board can establish how they want to process the results of our reports together with the community. You can't really see in the community response in the few but very, very effective responses to the report that the community will try to pull it in many different ways but what we would expect to see in three years, I will speak here personally, would be more clarity about all these processes, more clarity about how the budget is assigned and a place in the budget that acknowledges maybe that there's a few millions dollars that are assigned across the board, across the organization for SSR but they're not accounted in line items.

You cannot bring them together in line items, but make a much smaller thing and to have a very clear and usable risk framework which can evolve and strong invitation for people to participate together with ICANN in the broader community to make sure threats are detected and a better educated public is able to use the internet and particularly the DNS. This is not as broad as the whole internet but to approach the DNS in ways that are protective of the DNS even in spite of what could become very strong threats and of course ICANN's action learns from itself as we've mentioned with the past incident (inaudible).

If you look, it's all over the document that the ICANN organization as a whole learn from within its own resources that you have (inaudible) to make this a continuous improvement process that's measurable and accountable. So, in three years we will expect to see -- if we were called in three years, most of us would be disappointed if there have not been a better assignment of roles between SSAC and RSAC and the various coordination between them, a reduction of the uncertainty in the budget assigned SSR, a better alignment with -- an SSR item in every policy development process and so forth. That would be disappointing if it didn't happen in three years.

Mark Carvell: Right. And of course the other factor that will be apparent in three years time will be the expansion of the generic top level domains which will start to be delegated by that time one would expect. I'm always mindful of how difficult it was to get real information on roots and scaling in the

GAC discussions on the gTLDs going back over the last two or three years and we're still awaiting information that the GAC has requested in terms of the report on the processes that will be in place to ensure that the system isn't under any stress or risk as a result of delegating so many new generic top level domains into the root.

So, that was another sort of surprise and going back over the GAC history in this area that we found it difficult to get critical information easily about -- with regard to roots and scaling. So, I think this process and the review and so on will correct a lot of that difficulty generally across the board on all these issues and absolute clarity on contingency planning. Again, that's always been a bit of a mystery to me.

Alejandro Pisanty: That's correct. We're taking note of this. I don't know if any of the review team members would like to comment on this specifically?

Jeff Brueggeman: I think you're both raising important points. We felt the report is recommending foundational issues about both the process that ICANN uses on things like risk management as well as kind of documenting the priorities and the budget and those types of things and I think by laying this foundation the next review will be able to build on that and assess what is the progress that's being made. I would say my hope and goal for the next report would be that it could be less on process and then focus more on specific substantive issues that can be identified. But in order to do that you really have to start with what we tried to lay out in this report as the foundation of the process points.

Martin Hannigan: I'd just like to concur with Jeff.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thanks, Martin. I'm sorry I haven't mentioned you before. I'm very glad to have you on the call.

Anders Rafting: I just want to add I concur with Jeff and perhaps next report we can have a more fine-grained proposals and recommendations, for example, to say that ICANN's critical routines should be regularly be tested and practiced through annual continuity and continuous exercise. They've made a couple of those, rather limited, but when the ICANN's ready to expand (inaudible) there are more and more complexities added to the root. I'd like to see some DNS (inaudible) to leave some (inaudible). It's important to repeat those exercises and report them to the community.

Alejandro Pisanty: That's correct. Maybe we're ready to adjourn this call? Yes? Mark? Pakistan? Alice? Are you okay with adjournment?

Mark Carvell: Yes. Thanks very much. I'm fine. There were some helpful points here and I (inaudible) forward look. I agree. Getting the process right, the clarifications done, and then the next review can look at some of these

specific issues. As we just said, it's quite a lot. GTLDs, DNS, IDN, so on and so forth. Very helpful call. Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you and all the others for your contributions. We will be taking careful note and making sure these things get the right weight in the final report. We're expecting to get that done by Prague, maybe we'll have a timeframe but this call was very important to define. Thanks, everybody, and we'll be meeting soon and review team members will continue communication by email and maybe call in a few days if needed.

Syed Iftikhar Shah: Hello?

Alejandro Pisanty: Hello? Who's this?

Syed Iftikhar Shah: This is Syed from Pakistan.

Alejandro Pisanty: Yes, sir?

Syed Iftikhar Shah: I have one question. Regarding the recommendation level mentioned in the report. My question is that the recommendation I'm okay with the recommendation. But I'm worried about the schedule for finalizing and implementing the (inaudible) gTLD and IDN fast track. What is the schedule for this finalization and implementation for gTLD and IDN fast track? Because new gTLD will arrive soon and IDN fast track is already in session. I mean, what is the schedule? What is the timeline? Deadline for the finalization and implementation (inaudible) for the gTLD and IDN fast track?

Alejandro Pisanty: Let me give you, if I understand all your question and my reply again subject to comment from other team members, this review team does not have control over more schedules than our own which is finalizing the report and making it public and delivering it to the ICANN board and the community after absorbing the comments, including those made in this call. We are recommending that ICANN incorporates all these SSR recommendations into all their processes, trying not to alter the schedules. We're not talking at all about the schedules for example for the IDN which is an ongoing process or the gTLD which is an ongoing process except if something very critical were found from a report that could effect those schedules. Sorry, I don't think I'm able to provide a reply to your question because it's more with the ICANN CEO and board to define those schedules if I understand your question.

Syed Iftikhar Shah: There's another question on the recommendation on seven -- recommendation seven. It's mentioned that this process should be cost benefit and risk analysis. If we talk about the cost benefit and risk analysis (inaudible) take an example that such (inaudible) most risky but requires more cost, how will you deal with this scenario?

Alejandro Pisanty: The way we arrived at this recommendation is standard in risk analysis which -- and response also to the (inaudible) in the ICANN process which is that there may be many wishes for things to happen that could enhance the security and stability or the resilience of the DNS but some of the risks that are being put forward for example may be unrealistic or very unlikely to happen or the measures to completely avoid some of the possible contingencies may be so incredibly expensive that a better management has to be done (inaudible) making them impossible.

So, this is pretty standard, just making sure that ICANN or the communities do not want to mandate ICANN to spend inordinate amounts of money or on the other hand the community does not approve budget items that are necessary because the cost involved or management of certain risks may be necessary there and members of the community would refuse to support them in the open participatory budgeting process. We are --

Syed Iftikhar Shah: My question is that we will manage the risk we may compromise the cost.

Alejandro Pisanty: What we're trying to say -- and thanks for bringing this up because we may need to make it clear is not to compromise the stability or security just because of avoiding a cost but making the right decisions in the framework and acting upon it where the unnecessary budget is supplied, the right expenses are made and of course as you mentioned there would be the fear that some risks would be run because you won't spend enough on them. So, what we're saying and we'll try to be more clear in the final recommendation is that decisions are made considering the magnitude of the risk and the discipline has to be separated into probability and its impact should it happen and also how expensive it is to manage it depending on whether you were manage it by avoiding it, by transferring it, or by absorbing its consequences in a way that does little damage and that varies very much depending on the different risks and their sources.

Syed Iftikhar Shah: Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you. It certainly does -- this recommendation has to be taken in a pure way and of course the extensive text will also be made clearer. Thank you for that, sir. Anything else? Any other participation? It's timely to thank you all for your participation and contributions. This is extremely valuable for us and we'll try to continue with our timeframe for the delivery of the report, including absorbing these comments and the others made by the community. Thanks, everybody fro0m the GAC. Thanks, everybody from the review team. And thanks, Alice, Anders, and the ICANN and GAC support staff for setting this up in such a useful way. Good-bye, everybody. Have the best of days, afternoons, evenings, or nights, whatever is facing you.