1 Summarized (if required)
1.1 RFC - 3833 -- user, app, OS, ISP, DNS, registrar, registrant, registry -- threat analysis to the domain name system - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3833.txt
1.1.1.1 Packet Interception
1.1.1.1.1 Man in the middle, eavesdropping combined with spoofed responses that beat the real response back to the resolver, etc
1.1.1.2 ID Guessing and Query Prediction
1.1.1.2.1 Generate packets which match the transport protocol parameters, predict ID based on previous traffic, etc.
1.1.1.3.1 Subset of "cache poisoning" attacks. Redirect a victims query to a location of the attacker's choosing. CNAME, NS and DNAME record types are most vulnerable. Victim issues query, attacker injects response, attacker's response injects data into victim's cache.
1.1.1.4 Betrayal by Trusted Server
1.1.1.4.1 Another variant of packet interception. Attack via the server trusted by a stub client. Accidentally (misconfigured) or maliciously delivers answers that are not what the user would expect.
1.1.1.5 Denial of Service
1.1.1.6 Denial of service amplifier
1.1.1.7 Authenticated Denial of Domain Names
1.1.1.7.1 Question is whether there is a requirement for authenticating the non-existence of a name.
1.1.2 Weaknesses of DNSSEC (vulnerabilities?)
1.1.2.1 Configuration errors -- DNSSEC is complex to implement, trivial zone-configuration errors can cause serious problems for resolvers and error-reporting capabilities leave something to be desired.
1.1.2.3 Increased load, due to increased packet size as a result of DNSSEC
1.1.2.4 Increased response-time -- also due to increased packet size which increases bandwidth and processor load
1.1.2.5 Hierarchical trust model -- similar to the broader vulnerability introduced by a hierarchical trust model, compromises of zones in between root and a particular target name can damage the integrity of DNSSEC's ability to protect the integrity of the data owned by that target name.
1.1.2.6 Key rollover -- hard to do, with attendant vulnerability
1.1.2.7 Requirement for time-synchronization -- in order to determine whether keys have expired.
1.1.2.8 Wildcard RRs in a zone - complicates authentication, inherently more complex
1.1.3 Securing DNS Dynamic Update
1.1.4 Securing DNS Zone Replication
1.2.1 SAC 40 Measures to Protect Domain Registration Services Against Exploitation or Misuse
1.2.1.1 http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac040.pdf
1.2.1.2.1 high value names
1.2.1.2.2 registrar automation patterns/behaviors
1.2.1.2.3 inadequate assessment of risks associated with loss of control of domains/registrar-accounts
1.2.1.2.4 Email is the preferred (often only) method by which registrars attempt to notify a registrant of account activity
1.2.1.2.5 Access/ability to modify contact/DNS configuration to all domains in a registration account is commonly granted through a single user account and password
1.2.1.2.6 Customers are unfamiliar with registration protection measures
1.2.1.2.7 Registrars have different target markets and service models
1.2.1.2.8 The process to restore DNS information can take a long time even when unauthorized modification of DNS information is discovered quickly
1.2.1.3 attacks against domain name registration accounts
1.2.1.3.3 ICANN, PhotoBucket, RedTube
1.2.1.4.1.1 Gain control of account user/password
1.2.1.4.1.2 Guess, phish or apply social engineering techniques on a weak point of contact
1.2.1.4.1.3 Block delivery of email notifications to targeted registrants by altering DNS configuration
1.2.1.5.1 Prevent access to domain portfolio
1.2.1.5.1.1 Registration verification
1.2.1.5.1.2 Improve password-based authentication system
1.2.1.5.1.3 Register a PC or IP address from which to administer an account
1.2.1.5.1.4 Multi-factor authentication
1.2.1.5.1.5 Challenge systems
1.2.1.5.1.6 Per-domain access controls
1.2.1.5.1.7 Multiple, unique points of contact
1.2.1.5.1.8 Change notifications or confirmations
1.2.1.5.1.9 Multi-recipient notifications
1.2.1.5.1.10 Multiple delivery methods for critical correspondence
1.2.1.5.1.11 Engaging the customer
1.2.1.5.1.11.1 Identify multiple domain account points of contact
1.2.1.5.1.11.2 • Include point of contact information administration in the Employee Resource Management process to assure that when a terminated employee’s credentials are rescinded, all domain registration point of contact information associated with that employee is changed as well.
1.2.1.5.1.11.3 • Impose a password change policy. • Periodically verify contacts. • Proactively monitor domain name registration.
1.2.1.5.1.11.4 • Assign email addresses for all registration points of contact from a different domain than the registered domain name. (Some registrants may want to create multiple domain registration accounts as an additional safeguard.)
1.2.1.5.1.11.5 • Treat transfer attempts as a security event (check and re-check).
1.2.1.5.1.11.6 • Use a separate domain for registration contact email accounts from domains used for other business purposes. For example, assign email addresses for example.info’s points of contact from example.net.
1.2.1.5.1.11.7 • Create role accounts: e.g., domainadmincontact@example.com, domainregistrantcontact@example.biz, domaintechnicalcontact@example.net. (Note that when role accounts are used, periodic checks of such accounts are strongly recommended to confirm that the role account is monitored by registrant staff without interruption due to personnel, administrative or operational changes within the organization.)
1.2.1.5.1.11.8 • Alias multiple recipients for a role account for notifications. Use this form of mail explosion to provide “blanket delivery” for critical registrar correspondence to increase the likelihood that the correspondence is received and processed in a timely manner.
1.2.1.5.1.12 Inform the customer
1.2.1.5.1.13 Measures from prior SSAC reports
1.2.1.5.1.13.1 Use a unique EPP authInfo code value for each registered domain name
1.2.1.5.1.13.2 Establish a uniform default setting of domain locks across registrars.
1.2.1.5.1.13.3 Investigate additional methods to improve accuracy of registrant records.
1.2.1.5.1.13.4 Collect emergency point of contact information from registrants, registrars, and resellers for parties who are suited to assist in responding to an urgent restoration of domain name incident.
1.2.1.5.1.13.5 Consider measures to improve authentication and authorization used in all registrar business processes.
1.2.1.5.1.13.6 Protect registrant information that can be used to facilitate fraud and impersonation, and theft of a domain name.
1.2.1.5.1.13.7 Improve auditing of resellers’ compliance with record keeping requirements.
1.2.1.5.1.13.8 Ensure that resellers understand record keeping requirements of registrars (and ICANN), and improve compliance with these requirements.
1.2.1.5.1.13.9 Provide clear and readily accessible information to registrants regarding domain locking and domain name protection measures offered by registrars.
1.2.1.5.2 Protecting DNS configuration information from abuse
1.2.1.5.2.1 Require multi-factor authentication for DNS configuration changes.
1.2.1.5.2.2 Require confirmations of change from multiple contacts using email, possibly via media other than email.
1.2.1.5.2.3 Deliver notifications to multiple contacts when changes performed.
1.2.1.5.2.4 Monitor DNS changes for anomalies or abuse.
1.2.1.6.1 SAC 40 Finding (1) Differences exist among registrars as to their vulnerability to attack and the degree of protection they provide against attacks on domain accounts. Many domain registrants do not appear to have sufficient information to assess the extent to which a registrar is able to protect its domain accounts from attack and DNS configurations from malicious alteration.
1.2.1.6.2 SAC 40 Finding (2) While there are a large number of registrars that offer consumer-focused domain name registration services, and a smaller number of registrars and “brand management” organizations that offer security services to high-profile, highly targeted domain name holders (typically as part of an overall brand equity protection service), SSAC notes that “pure play, secure” registration service providers are rare, in part due to the fact that evaluating security measures does not play as prominent a role in customer decisions when choosing a registrar as it should.
1.2.1.6.3 SAC 40 Finding (3) Registrars could make more information about their security services available to allow customers to make informed decisions. Voluntarily submitting operations to an independent security audit and publicizing successful outcomes of such audits would allow customers to choose a registrar based on security requirements as well as cost and other ancillary features (such as web and DNS hosting).
1.2.1.6.4 SAC 40 Finding (4) Registrar services (and registrants) place greater confidence on the single factor authentication for login to accounts than the method merits. This authentication method has been repeatedly circumvented using various forms of social engineering, brute force attacks, and other techniques.
1.2.1.6.5 SAC 40 Finding (5) Attackers target DNS configuration when they succeed in compromising a domain registration account. Due to the distributed nature of the DNS, the effects of altering DNS configuration information persist beyond recovery and mitigation efforts by registrars. Malicious or incorrect DNS information can persist in locations throughout the Internet for the full duration of the TTL value associated with the altered DNS resource record(s). Attackers may alter the TTL specifically for this purpose.
1.2.1.6.6 SAC 40 Finding (6) Commonly, once a user is authenticated at a registration account portal or login, the user (or imposter) has global privileges and can modify contact information as well as DNS configuration information. Making granular access controls available to customers as an optional service – in particular, the ability to limit the type of actions each point of contact is able to perform with regard to changing contact and DNS configuration information and authorizing transfers – could reduce or mitigate the risk of exploitation or misuse of domain names and name resolution services associated with those names.
1.2.1.6.7 SAC 40 Finding (7) Registration service providers rely more heavily on unconfirmed email to deliver security-related correspondence (e.g., change notifications) than email delivery assurance and security characteristics merit. Attackers often defeat this method of correspondence by preventing email delivery when they modify the DNS configuration of domains through compromised registration accounts. Offering customers choices of alternative contact media or extending notification services to include some form of confirmation of receipt could reduce or mitigate the risk of exploitation or misuse of domain names and name resolution services associated with those names.
1.2.1.7.1 Recommendation SAC007-(8): Registrars should improve registrant awareness of the threats of domain name hijacking and registrant impersonation and fraud, and emphasize the need for registrants to keep registration information accurate. Registrars should also inform registrants of the availability and purpose of the Registrar-Lock, and encourage its use. Registrars should further inform registrants of the purpose of authorization mechanisms (EPP authInfo), and should develop recommended practices for registrants to protect their domains, including routine monitoring of domain name status, and timely and accurate maintenance of contact and authentication information.
1.2.1.7.2 SAC 40 Recommendation (1) Registrars are encouraged to offer stronger levels of protection against domain name registration service exploitation or misuse for customers who want or need them. Measures enumerated in this report can be offered as optional services to customers, individually or bundled.
1.2.1.7.3 SAC 40 Recommendation (2) Registrars should expand existing FAQs and education programs they offer to registrants to include security awareness. Registrars should make information concerning the services they offer to protect domain registration accounts more accessible to customers so that they can make informed decisions regarding protective measures when they choose a registrar.
1.2.1.7.4 SAC 40 Recommendation (3) Registrars should consider the value of voluntarily having an independent security audit performed on their operations as a component of their security due diligence.
1.2.1.7.5 SAC 40 Recommendation (4) ICANN and registrars should study whether registration services would generally improve and registrants would benefit from having an approved independent third party that will, at the request of a registrar, perform a security audit based on a prescribed set of security measures. ICANN would distinguish registrars that voluntarily satisfy the benchmarks of this security audit through a trusted security mark program that is implemented in a manner similar to the way that SSL certificate issuing authorities provide trust marks or seals for web site operators who satisfy that authority’s security criteria.
1.2.2 SAC 44 A Registrant's Guide to Protecting Domain Name Registration Accounts
1.2.2.1 http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac044.pdf
1.2.2.2.1 Unauthorized access to domain registration account
1.2.2.2.1.1 Malicious or unintentional (erroneous) alteration of DNS configuration information
1.2.2.2.1.1.1 Maliciously introduced changes to the DNS name server configuration information associated with a domain name may result in the resolution of the domain name to an IP address(es) other than the address(es) the domain registrant intended. Such changes can result in the loss or disruption of the registrant’s Internet services (e.g., web or email) or the intentional and malicious redirection of visitors away from the registrant’s intended servers to an attacker’s servers, which may host defacement, phishing or other malicious or criminal activities.7 Lack of coordination or administrative error can introduce changes to DNS name server configuration information with the similar consequences as malicious alteration. Such changes can result in the loss or disruption of the registrant’s Internet applications or services, or could expose the registrant’s organization to attack.8
1.2.2.2.1.2 Malicious or unintentional (erroneous) alteration of contact information
1.2.2.2.1.2.1 Whether by error or as a result of an attack, changes to the contact configuration information associated with a domain name may result in:
1.2.2.2.1.2.2 a. The unauthorized transfer or wrongful taking of control of a domain name from the rightful name holder (domain name hijacking);9
1.2.2.2.1.2.3 b. Disruption of delivery of registrar correspondence to the domain name registrant or authorized administrators (e.g., non-delivery of email correspondence because the email address points to a non-deliverable recipient or an invalid domain);
1.2.2.2.1.2.4 c. The filing of a report of WHOIS inaccuracy against the registrant which could lead to an suspension or deletion of the domain name, or a report that falsely or incorrectly associates a domain with an abuse and causes a suspension of the domain; and
1.2.2.2.1.2.5 d. The deletion of a domain name registration by the unauthorized party (or in general, the unauthorized alteration of any domain setting accessible via a registrar’s domain account management tools, including renewal options, domain locks, etc.). Such malice or error can cause a disruption of name service, malicious name resolution, or loss of the registration of the domain name itself.
1.2.2.2.2 Failure to renew a domain name registration
1.2.2.2.2.1 A renewal lapse occurs when, by choice or oversight, a registrant allows a domain name registration to expire. A different party may register the domain name after the expiration of relevant grace periods. In some cases, the activities of the new registrant may prove harmful to the interests of the registrant who permitted the registration to expire.10 In other cases, the registrant may lose the domain name and be forced to find another domain name (thereby absorbing the costs of switching to a new domain name) or to pursue a potentially costly and time- consuming dispute resolution process to regain control of the domain name.
1.2.2.2.3 Non-renewal of a domain name associated with a DNS Name Server
1.2.2.2.3.1 Problems may arise when the registrant of a domain name A uses a DNS name server in domain B for domain name resolution, and the registrant of domain name B accidentally or intentionally allows its domain name registration to expire. In circumstances where coordination across well-intentioned parties is lost, the expected resolution of domain A may be interrupted or may become unpredictable due to A’s dependence on the name server in domain B; in other circumstances, a new registrant of domain B may configure domain A's DNS information for malicious purposes, including phishing attacks, email interception, and redirection of Internet users to different websites with different and possibly harmful content.11 While domain A can be restored to proper function by updating the registry with a new name server (perhaps on domain A or C), this can present operational challenges to accomplish in the extreme short term.
1.2.2.2.4 Registration abuse -- front-running
1.2.2.2.5 Registration abuse -- cybersquatting
1.2.2.3 Risk Management and domain names
1.2.2.3.1 Identify the value of an asset (tangible or intangible);
1.2.2.3.2 • List the ways in which that value is threatened (loss, theft, misuse);
1.2.2.3.3 • Determine how the threat can be realized, i.e., what makes the domain name vulnerable to attack or exploitation;
1.2.2.3.4 • Determine the probability or risk that each threat poses;
1.2.2.3.5 • Determine how the risk can be mitigated or reduced;
1.2.2.3.6 • Determine the cost of mitigating or reducing the risk to an acceptable level of risk and cost; and
1.2.2.3.7 • Determine the appropriate budget/priority and implement risk mitigation or reduction.
1.2.2.4 Measures to protect domain registrar account compromise
1.2.2.4.1 Protection against unauthorized access
1.2.2.4.1.1 Protect account credentials
1.2.2.4.1.1.1 Maintain a list of authorized contacts for each domain registration account;
1.2.2.4.1.1.2 2. Advise authorized contacts that they are responsible for keeping secret the account credentials for domain registration accounts, and that they must not disclose or share passwords;
1.2.2.4.1.1.3 3. Identify measures authorized contacts must take should they discover that credentials have been disclosed;
1.2.2.4.1.1.4 4. Authorized contacts must compose passwords used to access a registration account using applicable organizational policies and commonly recognized best practices for composition (e.g., length and complexity), re-use, and longevity;14
1.2.2.4.1.1.5 5. Alternatively, if the registrar supports a form of multi-factor authentication (e.g., a hardware or software token), authorized contacts must keep the token safe from loss, damage, or unauthorized use;
1.2.2.4.1.1.6 6. Use different credentials for each account;
1.2.2.4.1.1.7 7. Partition particularly sensitive or important domain registrations into an account whose credentials are held by more senior personnel;
1.2.2.4.1.1.8 8. Securely escrow all registration account credentials;
1.2.2.4.1.1.9 9. Define and implement a recovery process with detailed auditing;
1.2.2.4.1.1.10 10. Define the circumstances where recovery is permitted, who has authority to recover credentials from escrow, and who is to be notified when escrowed credentials are accessed;
1.2.2.4.1.1.11 11. Changes in personnel authorized as contacts for a registrar account should cause new credentials to be created and old credentials to be revoked. (This may require coordination with a registrar, i.e., in cases where the registrant intends to change the user account identifier.); and
1.2.2.4.1.1.12 12. Employee resource management processes such as employee termination and employee transfer should be modified to check if the employee has domain registration account access. The processes could be modeled after similar checks for employee access to other assets, such as financial accounts.
1.2.2.4.1.2 Take advantage of routine correspondence from registrars
1.2.2.4.1.2.1 Use domain name renewal notifications to trigger a review or renewal action by staff responsible for Intellectual Property and Trademark matters, marketing, or generally any group that should decide whether to renew or allow a registration to expire.
1.2.2.4.1.2.2 2. Use WHOIS accuracy reporting obligation notifications to trigger action by staff to review and then confirm or update the registration information that must be publicly accessible via WHOIS services.
1.2.2.4.1.2.3 3. Use configuration change notifications to trigger checks by technical staff to verify that the changes are authorized and correct. Registrars may issue change notifications for any of the following events:
1.2.2.4.1.2.3.1 Domain name servers. Unauthorized or erroneous additions, deletions or changes to the list of domain name servers (or the IP addresses registered for those servers) that resolve the subdomains (labels) of a domain can result in disruption of service and should be confirmed by staff responsible for managing the organization’s DNS.
1.2.2.4.1.2.3.2 b. Contact information. Changes to registrant, administrative, or technical contact information should be confirmed to prevent attempts to divert ownership or correspondence away from authorized representatives of the organization.
1.2.2.4.1.2.3.3 c. Changes to domain status at registry. Registrars and registries coordinate the state (status) of a domain name in a registry using provisioning protocols.16 Registrars publish the status of a domain via WHOIS. Changes to domain status should be confirmed to assure that the domain is in the organization’s desired operational state.
1.2.2.4.1.2.3.4 d. Changes to domain status at registrar. Certain registrars allow domain- specific settings (e.g. private registration, domain forwarding, autorenew) that are held at the registrar. Changes to these services can have both long-term and short-term impact and therefore changes should be confirmed.
1.2.2.4.1.2.4 4. Use notifications regarding changes to or pending expiration of credit card or other payment methods and associated billing information to trigger checks by accounting personnel to ensure that changes are authorized and correct, needed payments are scheduled, and scheduled payments are not declined.
1.2.2.4.1.2.5 5. Designate a responsible party for each notification or have the notification trigger the creation of a ticket in a ticketing system. Such measures ensure that no notifications are ignored or are not responded to in the necessary or appropriate timeframe.
1.2.2.4.1.2.6 6. Define required responses and establish a clear SLA for each response to each type of event.
1.2.2.4.1.2.7 7. In order to protect email delivery against disruption attacks, contact email addresses for a domain should be assigned to mail servers named outside that domain and registration account. For example, if the domain example.net is managed through an account A at registrar X, use email addresses assigned from a different domain (example.biz) managed through an account B (and possibly at registrar Y). This measure prevents an attacker who succeeds in compromising a domain account from preventing delivery of notification emails by altering DNS configuration for a domain.
1.2.2.4.1.3 Maintain documentation to "prove registration"
1.2.2.4.1.3.1 Suggested documentation includes:
1.2.2.4.1.3.2 • Copies of registration records;
1.2.2.4.1.3.3 • Billing records, especially ones that show payments have been made;
1.2.2.4.1.3.4 • Logs, archives, or financial transactions that associate a domain name with content that you, the rightful registrant, published.
1.2.2.4.1.3.5 • Telephone directories (Yellow Pages), marketing material, etc. that contain advertising that associates you, the registrant, with the domain name;
1.2.2.4.1.3.6 • Correspondence to you from registrars and ICANN that mentions the domain name; and
1.2.2.4.1.3.7 • Legal documents, tax filings, government-issued IDs, business tax notices, etc. that associate you, the registrant, with the domain name.
1.2.2.4.2 Domain name points of contact considerations
1.2.2.4.2.1 Use separate identities for registrant, technical, administrative and billing contacts
1.2.2.4.2.1.1 Identifying multiple points of contact offers an organization some protection in situations where a single contact is provided for all roles and that contact ceases to be employed by an organization, or in a circumstance where the only identified contact is not available to resolve a problem or respond to a reported abuse of the domain name. Distinct points of contact also offer some diversity in managing domain names. Each of these contacts can represent departments or divisions in an organization that are responsible for some aspect of domain name management. For example, while legal staff or an IP&T department may be best suited to manage the registrant role, IT may be best suited to manage the technical role, corporate communications may be best suited to manage the administrative role, and finance best suited to manage the billing role.
1.2.2.4.2.2 Incorporate registrar email correspondence into domain management
1.2.2.4.2.2.1 Ask your registrar for a list of correspondence routinely issued by email, and consult with your registrar to determine which of your email contacts is used for routine correspondence. Use your email system to route correspondence to the organization’s point of contact that is responsible for responding to or taking action. For example, consider whether you can route registrar email correspondence so that your technical contact receives DNS configuration change notices, your legal department receives renewal and WHOIS accuracy notices, etc.21
1.2.2.4.2.3 Identify domain name registration points of contact by role
1.2.2.4.2.3.1 In cases where a domain name is registered to an organization (business entity), consider creating points of contact that do not create a relationship between any natural person or employee. This action may help an organization avoid disputes over ownership of a domain.
1.2.2.4.2.4 Add diversity to email contacts to reduce single points of failure or attack
1.2.2.4.2.4.1 Access to all the domains in a domain name registration account is commonly granted through a single user account. This access also allows an attacker to modify contact and DNS configuration information for all domains managed through the user account. Thus, if Example Networks, Inc. manages the domains example.net, example.com, and example.biz from the same domain name registration account and that account is compromised, the attacker can alter DNS and block delivery of mail to all of these domains.
1.2.2.4.2.5 Keep key email accounts secure
1.2.2.4.2.5.1 Email is an important component of registrant- registrar communication. Key email accounts receive registrar notifications and registration account password reset/recovery messages and thus should only be accessed by authorized parties. Maintain the security of key email accounts by strengthening client authentication. Use encryption (TLS extensions for SMTP) to protect mail client-server communications from eavesdropping. Maintain secure operations at the mail server that hosts key email accounts as well. For example, mail servers that host key email accounts should be Internet standards compliant. Consider adopting some form of email reputation, data integrity or authentication system and follow best sender, forwarding, and antispam practices published by such organizations as the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (MAAWG)22 and the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)23 so that your mail servers will not be reported to spam blacklists.
1.2.2.4.2.6 Improve change control and coordination
1.2.2.4.2.6.1 Large organizations often implement resource management to deal with changes in personnel or equipment to domain registrations that must be coordinated across departments or business units. These are characterized as “add, drop, change” processes. Domain name management shares characteristics with such resource management structures. Organizations should consider the value of using registrar correspondence to trigger intra-organizational activity. For example, an organization may want to have the technical contact for a domain name notify all departments whose system configurations include name servers upon receipt of a confirmation email from a registrar when a change to DNS name servers for the domain is made. Organizations should consider the value of implementing measures to notify registrant, technical, or administrative contacts when changes are made to any contact or configuration information for any domain name registered by the organization.
1.2.2.4.2.7 Maintain accurate external contacts
1.2.2.4.2.7.1 The SSAC encourages registrants to catalog points of contact information for registrars where they have domain registration accounts and make these available to all internal and contracted parties who are involved in domain name management. Registrar points of contact of particular interest for registrants include any contact that may assist the registrant in a business, operational or security matter. The list may include general information contacts, false WHOIS and abuse contacts, and (where applicable) internal contacts responsible for your account portfolio, abuse, spam, etc.
1.2.2.5 DNS hosting considerations
1.2.2.5.1 general considerations
1.2.2.5.1.1 Protect domain name registration account access
1.2.2.5.1.2 Maintain accurate, diverse points of contact information
1.2.2.5.1.3 Internal vs external DNS hosting
1.2.2.5.2 Zone data management considerations
1.2.2.5.2.1 Understand what resource records are included in default zone configurations
1.2.2.5.2.2 Understand redirection and non-existent domain handling policies/practices
1.2.2.5.2.3 If non-existent domains are redirected to advertising pages, determine whether/how to opt out
1.2.2.5.2.4 Obtain copies of zone files for archive/restoration purposes
1.2.2.5.2.5 Use change-notifications from DNS providers to trigger requests for new copies of zone files for archiving
1.2.2.6 DNSSEC support considerations
1.2.2.6.1.1 DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) uses encryption methods to provide operational- level protection against the unauthorized alteration of DNS information
1.2.2.6.1.2 DNSSEC provides origin authentication of DNS information and thus provides protection against impersonation attacks: a recipient of a DNSSEC-signed response to a query on your domain name is assured that the resource record came from you, the authoritative provider of DNS information for this domain.
1.2.2.6.1.3 DNSSEC also provides data integrity and thus provides protection against cache- poisoning and related (e.g., Kaminsky27) attacks: a recipient of a DNSSEC-enabled response to a query on your domain name is assured that the DNS data in the response has not been altered.
1.2.2.6.1.4 DNSSEC provides authenticated denial of existence for a particular name (an assurance that the domain does not exist in the zone file). This feature assures a recipient of a DNSSEC-enabled response containing a non-existent domain (NXDOMAIN) that the domain is truly not in your zone file and thus prevents certain denial of service attacks.
1.2.2.6.2 Coordinate support between parties
1.2.2.6.2.1 Importing and exporting keys
1.2.2.6.2.2 Importing and exporting zone files
1.2.2.6.2.3 Un-signing signed domains
1.2.2.6.2.4 Importing new NS RR sets without DNS service disruptions
1.2.2.6.2.5 Sustaining DNS services until explicit instructions are received to conclude operations
1.2.2.6.2.6 Setting up DNS services in advance of a transfer
1.2.2.7 Measures to detect or prevent unauthorized change activity
1.2.2.7.1.1 Routine monitoring to detect, isolate, and identify suspicious or anomalous behavior is a common, proactive best practice across networking and security disciplines.
1.2.2.7.2 Monitoring for WHOIS change activity
1.2.2.7.2.1 Organizations and individuals should consider measures to routinely monitor registration information for all registered domains.
1.2.2.7.2.2 Compare the results against the registration data you expect to find. In particular, and for each domain name you have registered, ask the following questions:
1.2.2.7.2.2.1 • Does the date indicated as the last date on which the registration was modified match the date you most recently made an authorized change to your registration?
1.2.2.7.2.2.2 • Are the data returned in WHOIS responses for registrant, technical, and administrative contacts for this domain name complete and accurate (i.e., the data are exactly what you intended to be published)?
1.2.2.7.2.2.3 • Are the names servers listed in the registration record the exact list of name servers that provide authoritative name service for your organization?
1.2.2.7.2.2.4 • Is the sponsoring registrar the registrar with whom you do business for this domain name?
1.2.2.7.2.2.5 • Is the status of the domain what you expect it to be? (Refer to section 7.3 Setting and Monitoring Domain Status.)
1.2.2.7.2.2.6 • Do the creation and expiration dates for the domain registration match the dates you registered the domain and the date on which your current registration expires?
1.2.2.7.2.2.7 • Is the DNSSEC signing information correct? (Refer to section 6.2 DNSSEC Support Considerations.)
1.2.2.7.2.3 Inaccuracies or omissions in the data returned from one or more WHOIS services merit immediate action. Organizations can model this action after other problem resolution or incident responses your organization uses and should take into consideration factors that justify escalating the event from a trouble report to an incident.
1.2.2.7.3 Monitoring DNS change activity
1.2.2.7.3.1 Organizations and individuals should consider measures to routinely monitor the operational status and zone data published by authoritative name servers for all registered domains.
1.2.2.7.3.1.1 The objectives of this monitoring activity are to assure that name service for each domain name registered by your organization remains configured as you intended it to be and returns complete and accurate data in accordance with DNS standards and best practices.
1.2.2.7.3.2 Confirmation activities
1.2.2.7.3.2.1 Are the name servers identified in the WHOIS response for the domain name the complete and accurate set of name servers that your organization has identified as providing authoritative name service for the domain?
1.2.2.7.3.2.2 Are the name servers published in the TLD zone file for the domain name the complete and accurate set of name servers that your organization has identified as providing authoritative name service for the domain?
1.2.2.7.3.2.3 Are the name servers operational (e.g., do the hosts respond to a ping or simple DNS query)? Are they performing as expected?
1.2.2.7.3.2.4 Are all the name servers secured (hardened against known attacks)? Are all software (OS, name server) packages current with respect to approved versions (e.g., tested and approved by your technical staff), released hot fixes and patches?
1.2.2.7.3.2.5 Are the name servers responding in manners consistent with your baseline correct configuration?
1.2.2.7.3.2.6 Do all the name servers that provide authoritative name service for the domain return complete and correct zone data for all formulations of DNS queries against the zone?
1.2.2.7.4 Setting and monitoring domain status (domain locks)
1.2.2.7.4.1 Registrar status codes
1.2.2.7.4.1.1 Certain registrars permit registrants to control one or more registrar (client) status codes. The following status codes, also known as registrar locks, are of particular importance to registrants:
1.2.2.7.4.1.1.1 clientTransferProhibited. When set, the registry will not allow a registrar to accept a transfer of the domain name away from the sponsoring registrar. Certain registrars automatically keep the clientTransferProhibited status set on domain names and registrants use a third party authorization process between the “transfer-from” registrar, the “transfer-to” registrars and the registry to protect against unauthorized transfers.
1.2.2.7.4.1.1.2 clientUpdateProhibited. When set, the registry will not make changes to the registration details of the domain name. Certain registrars automatically unlock and re-lock this status when a registrant has successfully logged into a domain account. Other registrars allow registrants to unlock and re-lock this status through a domain management interface.
1.2.2.7.4.1.1.3 clientDeleteProhibited. When set, the registry will reject requests to delete a domain name from the registry.
1.2.2.7.4.1.2 The SSAC encourages registrants to make certain that clientTransferProhibited is set to prevent unauthorized or unintended transfer of a domain away from the rightful registrant to a different party (e.g., a hijacker).
1.2.2.7.4.1.3 SSAC also encourages registrants to make certain that clientUpdateProhibited is set to prevent changes to registration contact or DNS configuration information without first unlocking this status.
1.2.2.7.4.1.4 Many registrars issue notifications when certain client status codes are modified. These notifications are extremely important because they may forewarn registrants of unauthorized registration account access.
1.2.2.7.4.2 Registry status codes
1.2.2.7.4.2.1 Certain registrars and registries work cooperatively to offer registrants the ability to add server status codes (registry locks) as an additional layer of protection beyond client status codes.
1.2.2.7.4.2.2 We encourage you to consider setting registry locks as a complement to registrar locks for a second level of security against unauthorized transfer, deletion or change of registration information associated with your domain names.
1.2.2.8 Considerations when choosing a domain registration service provider SAC 44
1.2.2.8.1 Domain registration account access or activity reports
1.2.2.8.2 Per-domain access controls (or are all operations available to a single user across all domains)
1.2.2.8.3 Ability to set client and server status locks at the registry
1.2.2.8.4 Methods of communication to notify customers of changes to registration-account and domain-registration data
1.2.2.8.5 Is a form of secure email available
1.2.2.8.6 How are customers protected against phishing attacks where the attacker impersonates the registrar?
1.2.2.8.7 How is redirection/wildcarding on non-existent domains handled and can this be modified
1.2.2.8.8 What forms of DNS monitoring are available
1.2.2.8.9 What types of DNS configuration and zone checking are available
1.2.2.8.10 Are name server or zone data activity reports available to customers?
1.2.2.8.11 Is WHOIS monitoring available. How frequently does it update?
1.2.2.8.12 Are privacy-protection services available? Directly or through a 3rd party provider?
1.2.2.8.13 Are descriptions of incident and abuse-response practices provided?
1.2.2.8.14 What assistance is available for customers in cases involving domain hijacking or dispute over rightful registration? Are abuse or incident points of contact available?
1.2.2.8.15 What certifications or regulations has the registrar satisfied (e.g. PCI, ISO 27000, etc.)? What external audit services are used?
1.2.2.8.16 Has ICANN ever issued a notice of breach of agreement?
1.2.2.8.17 Does the registrar participate in the ICANN Data Escrow program?
1.2.2.9 Registry considerations SAC 44
1.2.2.9.1 There are certain service and operational aspects of registries that we believe merit registrant consideration. In particular, several of the considerations mentioned in this section relate to service offerings that can be facilitated through a registrar.
1.2.2.9.2 Are registry side locks available?
1.2.2.9.3 Describe registry infrastructure (diversity, etc.)
1.2.2.9.4 Does the registry support multi-factor authentication of registrars (e.g.tokens, passwords, certificates)?
1.2.2.9.5 Does the registry support DNSSEC?
1.2.2.9.6 What are registry policies regarding abuse and malicious domains? Is there a published abuse point of contact? Is there 24x7 abuse support available to registrars?
1.2.2.9.7 How frequently does the WHOIS service update?
1.2.2.9.8 What certifications or regulations has the registrar satisfied (e.g. PCI, ISO 27000, etc.)? What external audit services are used?
1.3 ICANN -- Building Towards a Comprehensive gTLD Registry Failover Plan (2007) -- http://www.icann.org/en/registries/reports/registry-failover-01jun07.htm
1.3.1.1.1 The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed database that translates domain names (computer hostnames) to IP addresses. Domain names are defined in RFC 1034 (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1034.txt). RFC 1035 describes the domain system and protocol (published in November 1987 and recognized as an Internet Standard, ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1035.txt). As stated in RFC 1035, "The goal of domain names is to provide a mechanism for naming resources in such a way that the names are usable in different hosts, networks, protocol families, internets, and administrative organizations." The DNS consists of a hierarchical set of DNS servers. Each domain or subdomain has one or more authoritative DNS servers that publish information about that domain and the nameservers of any domains below it.
1.3.1.1.1.1 The DNS consists of resource records, zones, nameservers, and resolvers. Programs such as BIND, that respond to queries about the domain namespace via the DNS protocol, are called nameservers.[2]
1.3.1.1.1.2 The data associated with domain names are contained in resource records. There are several types of resource records, corresponding to the varieties of data that may be stored in the domain namespace, including Start of Authority records, NS (nameserver) records, Address records, and PTR (pointer) records.[3]
1.3.1.1.1.3 A zone is an autonomously administered piece of the name space.
1.3.1.1.1.4 Nameservers load data from zone datafiles. These files contain resource records that describe the information within a particular zone. Resource records describe the hosts within the zone and delegation of subdomains.[4]
1.3.1.1.1.5 Resolvers are the clients that access nameservers, and handle queries and responses.
1.3.1.2.1 A registry is an organization responsible for maintaining the zone files of a top-level domain (TLD). "Under the current structure of the Internet, a given top-level domain can have no more than one registry."[5]
1.3.1.3.1 A registrar acts as an interface between registrants and registries, providing registration and other value-added services. The registration process occurs when a customer provides contact and perhaps billing information to a registrar (or in some cases, a registry) in exchange for delegation of a domain name.[6]
1.3.2.1 RFCs. "The Requests for Comment (RFC) documents form a series of notes started in 1969 by the research community that designed and built the ARPAnet. The RFCs series forms an archive of technical proposals, standards, and ideas about packet-switched networks."[7] RFCs are maintained by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and published at http://www.rfc-editor.org/.
1.3.2.1.1 RFC 1033, Domain Administrators Operations Guide, provides guidelines for domain administrators in operating a domain server and maintaining their portion of the hierarchical database (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1033.txt).
1.3.2.1.2 RFC 1034, Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, provides extensive background information on the DNS. The DNS has three major components: resource records, name servers and resolvers (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/pdfrfc/rfc1034.txt.pdf).
1.3.2.1.3 RFC 1035, Domain Implementation and Specification, is cited above.
1.3.2.1.4 RFC 1101, DNS Encoding of Network Names and Other Types, describes a method for mapping between network names and addresses (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1101.txt.pdf).
1.3.2.1.5 RFC 1591, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, provides information on the structure of names in TLDs and the administration of domains (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/pdfrfc/rfc1591.txt.pdf). This RFC is particularly useful in describing the role of the designated manager of a TLD:
1.3.2.1.5.1 "A new top-level domain is usually created and its management delegated to a 'designated manager' all at once ... The major concern in selecting a designated manager for a domain is that it be able to carry out the necessary responsibilities, and have the ability to do a equitable, just, honest, and competent job" (see RFC 1591, page 3).
1.3.2.1.6 RFC 1591 identified several principles for a designated manager of a TLD and identified critical functions of a registry:
1.3.2.1.6.1 There should be a designated manager for a TLD. "The manager must, of course, be on the Internet. There must be Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity to the nameservers and email connectivity to the management and staff of the manager."[8]
1.3.2.1.6.2 "The designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community."
1.3.2.1.6.3 "The actual management of the assigning of domain names, delegating subdomains and operating nameservers must be done with technical competence ... and operating the database with accuracy, robustness and resilience."[9]
1.3.2.1.7 RFC 2181, Clarifications to the DNS Specification, provides an update to the DNS specification (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2181.txt).
1.3.2.1.8 RFC 2182, Selection and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers, is a best current practice for the selecting and operating secondary DNS Servers (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2182.txt)
1.3.2.1.9 RFC 3467, Role of the Domain Name System, provides useful information on the original function and purpose of the domain name system (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3467.txt).
1.3.2.2 BCP 126, Operation of Anycast Services, specifies the best current practices for using Anycast to add redundancy to DNS servers (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/bcp/bcp126.txt).
1.3.2.3 Internet draft on ccTLD Best Current Practices (http://ws.edu.isoc.org/workshops/2006/PacNOG2/track1/day3/draft-wenzel-cctld-bcp-02.txt). This is a draft document on best current practices within the ccTLD community. As an Internet-draft, this document is not a standard and is considered a work-in-progress.
1.3.2.4 Proposed Rule on the technical management of Internet Names and Addresses (20 February 1998), the US Department of Commerce, National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) (http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm). The document defined registry requirements as:
1.3.2.4.1 An independently-tested, functioning Database and Communications System that:
1.3.2.4.1.1 Allows multiple competing registrars to have secure access (with encryption and authentication) to the database on an equal (first-come, first-served) basis
1.3.2.4.1.2 Is both robust (24 hours per day, 365 days per year) and scalable (i.e., capable of handling high volumes of entries and inquiries).
1.3.2.4.1.3 Has multiple high-throughput (i.e., at least T1) connections to the Internet via at least two separate Internet Service Providers.
1.3.2.4.1.4 Includes a daily data backup and archiving system.
1.3.2.4.1.5 Incorporates a record management system that maintains copies of all transactions, correspondence, and communications with registrars for at least the length of a registration contract.
1.3.2.4.1.6 Features a searchable, on-line database meeting the requirements of Appendix 2.
1.3.2.4.1.7 Provides free access to the software and customer interface that a registrar would need to register new second-level domain names.
1.3.2.4.1.8 An adequate number (perhaps two or three) of globally-positioned zone-file servers connected to the Internet for each TLD.
1.3.2.4.2 Independently-reviewed Management Policies, Procedures, and Personnel including:
1.3.2.4.2.1 Alternate (i.e., non-litigation) dispute resolution providing a timely and inexpensive forum for trademark-related complaints. (These procedures should be consistent with applicable national laws and compatible with any available judicial or administrative remedies.)
1.3.2.4.2.2 A plan to ensure that the registry's obligations to its customers will be fulfilled in the event that the registry goes out of business. This plan must indicate how the registry would ensure that domain name holders will continue to have use of their domain name and that operation of the Internet will not be adversely affected.
1.3.2.4.2.3 Procedures for assuring and maintaining the expertise and experience of technical staff.
1.3.2.4.2.4 Commonly-accepted procedures for information systems security to prevent malicious hackers and others from disrupting operations of the registry.
1.3.2.4.3 Independently inspected Physical Sites that feature:
1.3.2.4.3.1 A backup power system including a multi-day power source.
1.3.2.4.3.2 A high level of security due to twenty-four-hour guards and appropriate physical safeguards against intruders.
1.3.2.4.3.3 A remotely-located, fully redundant and staffed twin facility with "hot switchover" capability in the event of a main facility failure caused by either a natural disaster (e.g., earthquake or tornado) or an accidental (fire, burst pipe) or deliberate (arson, bomb) man-made event. (This might be provided at, or jointly supported with, another registry, which would encourage compatibility of hardware and commonality of interfaces.)
1.3.3 Critical Functions of a Registry
1.3.3.1 Critical Functions in ICANN's gTLD Registry Agreements
1.3.3.1.1 (i) operations of the registry critical to the following tasks:
1.3.3.1.1.1 the receipt of data from registrars concerning registrations of domain names and name servers;
1.3.3.1.1.2 provision to registrars of status information relating to the zone servers for the TLD;
1.3.3.1.1.3 dissemination of TLD zone files;
1.3.3.1.1.4 operation of the registry zone servers;
1.3.3.1.1.5 dissemination of contact and other information concerning domain name server registrations in the TLD
1.3.3.1.2.1 The number of accredited registrars for the TLD
1.3.3.1.2.2 Service level agreement performance
1.3.3.1.2.3 TLD zone file access activity
1.3.3.1.2.4 Whois service availability
1.3.3.1.2.5 Total number of transactions by subcategories (adds, deletes, modifies, checks, renewals, transfers and restores)
1.3.3.1.2.6 Daily transaction range
1.3.3.1.2.7 Per-registrar activity report[13]
1.3.3.1.3 functional and performance specifications (for example, from the .ASIA contract - http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/agreements/asia/appendix-7-06dec06.htm
1.3.3.1.3.1 DNS Service Availability.
1.3.3.1.3.1.1 Service availability as it applies to the DNS Service refers to the ability of the Nameservers, as a group, to resolve a DNS query from an Internet user. The committed Performance Specification is 99.999% measured in Monthly Timeframes.
1.3.3.1.3.2 Cross-Network Nameserver Performance Requirements.
1.3.3.1.3.2.1 Round trip time
1.3.3.1.3.2.2 Packet loss
1.3.3.1.3.3 Whois Service Availability.
1.3.3.1.3.3.1 The committed Performance Specification for Whois Service is 99.4% measured in Monthly Timeframes.
1.3.3.1.3.4 Whois Service Performance Level.
1.3.3.1.3.4.1 The Whois Service will, on average, be able to handle 50 queries per second.
1.3.3.1.3.5 Whois Service Response Times.
1.3.3.1.3.5.1 The Whois Service will have a maximum whois query response time of 1.5 seconds. Failure of the Whois Service to respond to three (3) consecutive rcPing commands initiated by the Registry Operator at regular intervals within such maximum processing time shall mean the Whois Service is considered unavailable.
1.3.3.1.3.6 Whois Service Updates.
1.3.3.1.3.6.1 The data provided by the Whois Service will be updated on at least a daily basis.
1.3.3.1.3.7 Location of Data Centers
1.3.3.1.3.7.1 The back-end provider will provide data centers for registration services, currently Afilias Limited. The primary data center is currently located in St. Louis, Missouri, USA. Back-up data centers are currently located in Secaucus, New Jersey, USA and Toronto, Canada.
1.3.3.1.3.8 Fail-over Practice
1.3.3.1.3.8.1 The registry shall practice fail over between data centers not less frequently than once every two years.
1.3.3.2 DNS data, zone file and nameserver maintenance
1.3.3.2.1 The maintenance of nameservers and DNS for domains is probably the most critical function of a registry. The DNS enables domain names that are registered to resolve on the Internet.
1.3.3.2.2 A TLD zone file contains Start of Authority (SOA) records, Nameserver (NS) records for each name server of each domain (such as NS.ICANN.ORG), Time to Live (TTL) records (the amount of time DNS resource records are to be cached), and Address (A and AAAA) records (IP addresses) for the nameservers. These records must be maintained by a registry operator according to recognized best practices.
1.3.3.3 Shared registration system
1.3.3.3.1 The Shared Registration System (SRS) is the software (clients and servers) provided by a registry to facilitate the registration of domain names, updates to nameservers, contact information and overall management of a registry. The SRS is used by registrars to connect to the registry, and "its purpose is to create an environment conducive to the development of robust competition among domain name registrars."[15]
1.3.3.4.1 Whois service consists of Port 43 Whois protocol interface and a web-based user interface to all publicly accessible domain name registration records. The Whois service contains registrant, administrative, billing and technical contact information provided by registrars for domain name registrations. A registry may operate as either a "thick" or "thin" registry. A "thick" registry is one that displays in Whois authoritative information for a domain name received from a registrar. A "thin" registry will only display the information showing the registrar of record, creation date, and nameservers.
1.3.3.5 Registrar Billing and Accounting Information
1.3.3.5.1 Registrar billing and accounting information is maintained by a registry for the registration of domain names, provisioning of services, refunds for necessary grace period deletions, transfers. Billing information includes accounts for each registrar accredited to operate with the registry, account balance information, present book entries, billing events associated with particular domains, registrar wire information or letters of credit. Registries only have the billing data in regard to their registrars and registrar accounts, and do not have any private customer billing data.
1.3.3.6 Data Security and Data Escrow
1.3.3.6.1 ICANN requires gTLD registries under contract with ICANN to escrow registry data. Registry data escrow helps to ensure continuity of service for registrants in the event of a registry failure. For the purposes of this report, registry data escrow is included with other measures employed by the registry to provide security and stability for the TLD. For more information on ICANN's gTLD registry data escrow requirements, see http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-05mar07.htm.
1.3.3.7.1 ICANN has made a commitment to Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs). ICANN's Affirmation of Responsibilities[19] states that "ICANN shall maintain and build on processes to ensure that competition, consumer interests, and Internet DNS stability and security issues are identified and considered in TLD management decisions, including the consideration and implementation of new TLDs and the introduction of IDNs."
1.3.3.7.2 The protection of IDN tables should be a priority for registries that accommodate IDNs today, and the tables as well as any other IDN-related data and registry processes should be considered in defining registry failover.
1.3.3.8.1 The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) enable DNS administrators and registry operators to digitally sign their zone data using public-key cryptography. This provides a layer of security to the zone and is designed to provide "origin authentication of DNS data, data integrity and authenticated denial of existence."[20] For registry operators that adopt DNSSEC and sign their zones, it is expected that those registries will follow the DNSSEC Operational Practices to secure the zone keys for their TLD. RFC 4641 is the most current draft of the DNSSEC Operational Practices (see ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/pdfrfc/rfc4641.txt.pdf). This is an area for further work and study.
1.3.4.1 Transition use-cases
1.3.4.1.1 termination of the registry agreement by ICANN
1.3.4.1.3 transition of registry upon termination of agreement
1.3.4.1.4 breach of the agreement
1.3.4.1.5 failure to perform in good faith
1.3.4.2.1 Lack of cooperation between the current registry operator and the designated successor
1.3.4.2.2 Data is lost or integrity of the data is in question
1.3.4.2.3 The continuing and overlapping name service arrangements, and the duration of those arrangements
1.3.4.2.4 Registrar transition -- both operational and contractual
1.3.4.2.5 Technology transition/readiness
1.3.4.2.6 Staff transition, or lack thereof, from one registry to another
1.3.4.3 Examples of transitions
1.3.4.3.1 Transition of .ORG from VeriSign to Public Interest Registry
1.3.4.3.2 Change of backend registry operator - .AERO
1.3.4.3.3 Change of backend registry operator - .COOP
1.3.5.1 Business/Financial Failures
1.3.5.1.1 As with any business, registry operators must properly manage financial assets, funding and cash flow or face potential financial failure. Businesses and entities interested in entering the registry market should study the examples set by current registry operators in order to understand the business of domain names. Business failure examples include bankruptcy, buy-out, loss of funding, liquidation, management failure, marketing failure, litigation-related or induced failure or termination of payment processing capability
1.3.5.1.2 Failure modes - vulnerabilities
1.3.5.1.2.1 Marketing Failure
1.3.5.1.2.2 Litigation-related Failure
1.3.5.1.2.3 Termination of payment processing capability
1.3.5.1.2.4 General Business Failure
1.3.5.1.3 Palage White Paper (http://forum.icann.org/lists/new-gtld-questions/msg00006.html ) recommendations -- mitigation
1.3.5.1.3.1 All registry operators be required to operate on the current EPP standard
1.3.5.1.3.2 ICANN listed as direct beneficiary of data escrow agreement, with active script verification and periodic download
1.3.5.1.3.3 ICANN access to zone files
1.3.5.1.3.4 Education on existence and function of Auth Codes
1.3.5.1.3.5 Bonding requirement
1.3.5.1.3.6 Discussion of "thick" vs "thin" registries
1.3.5.2 Technical Failures
1.3.5.2.1 Natural Disasters
1.3.5.2.1.1 A natural disaster may have a devastating financial impact on a registry, even if it has a well-developed registry failover plan. This is particularly in the case where a nation is unable to cover the costs of rebuilding key infrastructure needed to maintain registry operations.
1.3.5.2.1.2.1 A strong earthquake could cause a temporary failure for a registry. A registry located in an earthquake-prone location should have contingency plans in place to ensure continuity of operations.
1.3.5.2.1.3.1 Hurricane Katrina (23-31 August 2005) is estimated to be responsible for over $75 billion USD in damages. When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans 27-30 August 2005, it caused a temporary failure to ICANN-accredited registrar Intercosmos Media Group. Intercosmos was able to avoid a prolonged outage because it had a plan for the backup of critical registrar resources. Although Intercosmos is a registrar, it may serve as an example for registries facing potential disaster scenarios.
1.3.5.2.1.4.1 While no registries are currently located in a tsunami-danger zone, future registry operators in tsunami-prone areas should have contingency plans in place to ensure the stability of registry operations.
1.3.5.2.1.5 Blackout/Energy Failure
1.3.5.2.1.5.1 In the future, a similar large-scale power outage could impact registry operators that have not implemented protections against localized outages at registry operations centers.
1.3.5.2.1.7 Snowstorm/blizzard/ice-storm
1.3.5.2.2.1 Malicious acts
1.3.5.2.2.1.1.1.1 On 6 February 2007, a distributed denial of service attack affected six of the thirteen root servers that form the foundation of the Internet. A factsheet on the attack is available at http://www.icann.org/announcements/factsheet-dns-attack-08mar07.pdf. The use of Anycast (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anycast) by root server operators helped prevent a major disruption to Internet operations.
1.3.5.2.2.1.1.1.2 In March 2006, a distributed denial of service attack was launched on a number of root servers, registrars and registry operators. The attacks temporarily impacted accredited registrars in Germany and in the United States. http://www.macworld.com/news/2006/04/04/network/index.php and http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,125554-page,1-c,applicationbugs/article.html. Combined, the registrars had approximately 8,000,000 domain names under management (approximately 11.5% of active domain name registrations as of 11 May 2006).
1.3.5.2.2.1.1.1.3 On 31 March 2006, ICANN's SSAC released an advisory on DNS Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (see http://www.icann.org/committees/security/dns-ddos-advisory-31mar06.pdf). The advisory made a number of recommendations for Root and TLD Name Server Operators. These recommendations could also be employed by the registry operators.
1.3.5.2.2.1.2 Malicious code
1.3.5.2.2.1.3 Asset-driven criminal attacks
1.3.5.2.2.1.6 Adware and spyware
1.3.5.2.2.1.7 Browser flaws
1.3.5.2.2.2 System failure
1.3.5.2.2.2.1 A system failure -- resulting from a hardware or software failure, or configuration error -- could disrupt any or all the services a registrar or registry operator provides. A system failure is likely to be a temporary failure.
1.3.5.2.2.2.2 Applications-cluster processor fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.3 EPP/RRP server processor fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.4 Web server processor fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.5 Database server processor fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.6 Database disk drive fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.7 Database crashes
1.3.5.2.2.2.8 Authentication server fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.9 Whois-cluster processor fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.10 Billing and collections server fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.11 Internet or VPN link fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.12 Router or firewall fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.13 Physical site becomes inoperable for more than 24 hours
1.3.5.2.2.2.14 Both the primary and secondary data centers become inoperable
1.3.5.2.2.2.15 Operating system or application software fails
1.3.5.2.2.2.16 Operating system configuration errors
1.3.5.2.2.2.17 security system configuration errors
1.3.5.2.2.2.18 Name, web, database, and transaction server configuration errors
1.3.5.2.2.3 Infrastructure problems
1.3.5.2.2.3.1 Poor or insufficient infrastructure, whether within or beyond the control of the registry, may cause a temporary failure for a registry. Local infrastructure conditions should be considered in registry contingency planning. Potential infrastructure problems may include:
1.3.5.2.2.3.2 Insufficient capacity
1.3.5.2.2.3.3 Insufficient diversity and redundancy in WANs (access circuits), LAN infrastructure (switching), security systems, applications servers and storage facilities
1.3.5.2.2.3.4 Power facilities
1.3.5.2.2.3.5 HVAC facilities
1.3.5.2.2.4 Name server problems
1.3.5.2.2.4.1 The operation of nameservers is a critical function of a registry. In the event that IANA notices the nameservers for a registry are offline, IANA attempts to contact the registry and assist with restoring service.
1.3.5.2.2.4.2 Such failures could include loss of primary database server, which would result in switchover of the registry to a secondary database server. In the event of multiple database server failures, a registry could switchover to a mirror site, if one was available.
1.3.5.3 Other failure scenarios
1.3.5.3.1 Government Takeover/Coup
1.3.5.3.1.1 A change of government by takeover, revolution or coup could lead to instability or failure for a registry operator. Political instability has not to date had a direct impact on registry operations, but direct intervention by governments into registry operations could occur in the future.
1.3.5.3.2 Regulatory-imposed shutdown
1.3.5.3.2.1 A court, government or government agency could attempt to order a registry operator to halt its operations.
1.3.5.3.3 Government Seizure of Registry Operator
1.3.5.3.3.1 A government could assume control over a registry operator, either through seizure of registry operations or nationalization of operations. Re-delegation of ccTLDs from individuals to government agencies provide examples of government assumption of control over registry operations. Re-delegation of a registry should include measures to ensure stable transition of registry operations.
1.3.6 Elements of the Registry Failover Plan (mitigation)
1.3.6.1 Considerable additional study is needed to develop a robust registry failover plan. However, based on the critical functions, transition experiences and failure scenarios described in this (interim) report, registries should consider at least the following measures:
1.3.6.2 Provide for geographic diversity of name servers and have contingency plans in place. Include diversity and contingency progress and status reports in monthly reports to ICANN.
1.3.6.3 Document contingency plans, provide this documentation on a confidential basis to ICANN for review and consultation, and test the plans on a periodic basis.
1.3.6.4 Document archival and accuracy measures performed during the monthly reporting period, and information regarding incidents (e.g., problems completing zone changes, and attacks against the registry infrastructure).
1.3.6.5 With ICANN, establish a clear communication plan for informing affected registrants, registrars, users and Internet community in the event of a registry failure. Commmunicate the reasons for the failure and available options.
1.3.6.6 As part of the new gTLD process, applicants should submit a TLD transition plan which identifies the critical functions of the registry and describes how each of those functions would be transitioned to a new operator in the event of registry failure This plan may include the identification of a back-up or temporary provider. The applicant may designate this section of the gTLD agreement or application as confidential. The transition plan is to be retained by the registry as part of the registry's overall failover plan. The transition plan requirement follows the recommendations in the GAC Principles on New gTLDs related to registry failover and continuity practices for new gTLDs.
1.3.6.7 A clearly documented transition process:
1.3.7 Additional scenarios that need study (vulnerabilities)
1.3.7.1 What would happen if there was lack of cooperation between the current registry operator and the designated successor or a hostile reassignment of a registry?
1.3.7.2 Data is lost or integrity of the data is in question.
1.3.7.3 The continuing and overlapping name service arrangements, and the duration of those arrangements.
1.3.7.4 A determination should be made on the standard metric for outage of registry services in a transition from one operator to another.
1.3.7.5 What registrar testing should occur in the event of TLD transition?
1.3.7.6 ICANN's role in transition should be defined.
1.3.7.7 How registrars and registrants are notified of the transition should be defined.
1.3.7.8 Failure scenarios involving DNSSEC keys and signed zones.
1.4 GNSO Acronym Helper http://www.andalucia.com/icann/
1.5 Proposed Rule on the technical management of Internet Names and Addresses (20 February 1998), the US Department of Commerce, National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) (http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm). The document defined registry requirements as:
1.5.1 An independently-tested, functioning Database and Communications System that:
1.5.1.1 Allows multiple competing registrars to have secure access (with encryption and authentication) to the database on an equal (first-come, first-served) basis
1.5.1.2 Is both robust (24 hours per day, 365 days per year) and scalable (i.e., capable of handling high volumes of entries and inquiries).
1.5.1.3 Has multiple high-throughput (i.e., at least T1) connections to the Internet via at least two separate Internet Service Providers.
1.5.1.4 Includes a daily data backup and archiving system.
1.5.1.5 Incorporates a record management system that maintains copies of all transactions, correspondence, and communications with registrars for at least the length of a registration contract.
1.5.1.6 Features a searchable, on-line database meeting the requirements of Appendix 2.
1.5.1.7 Provides free access to the software and customer interface that a registrar would need to register new second-level domain names.
1.5.1.8 An adequate number (perhaps two or three) of globally-positioned zone-file servers connected to the Internet for each TLD.
1.5.2 Independently-reviewed Management Policies, Procedures, and Personnel including:
1.5.2.1 Alternate (i.e., non-litigation) dispute resolution providing a timely and inexpensive forum for trademark-related complaints. (These procedures should be consistent with applicable national laws and compatible with any available judicial or administrative remedies.)
1.5.2.2 A plan to ensure that the registry's obligations to its customers will be fulfilled in the event that the registry goes out of business. This plan must indicate how the registry would ensure that domain name holders will continue to have use of their domain name and that operation of the Internet will not be adversely affected.
1.5.2.3 Procedures for assuring and maintaining the expertise and experience of technical staff.
1.5.2.4 Commonly-accepted procedures for information systems security to prevent malicious hackers and others from disrupting operations of the registry.
1.5.3 Independently inspected Physical Sites that feature:
1.5.3.1 A backup power system including a multi-day power source.
1.5.3.2 A high level of security due to twenty-four-hour guards and appropriate physical safeguards against intruders.
1.5.3.3 A remotely-located, fully redundant and staffed twin facility with "hot switchover" capability in the event of a main facility failure caused by either a natural disaster (e.g., earthquake or tornado) or an accidental (fire, burst pipe) or deliberate (arson, bomb) man-made event. (This might be provided at, or jointly supported with, another registry, which would encourage compatibility of hardware and commonality of interfaces.)
2.1 US Dept of Homeland Security (DHS) Information Technology Sector Baseline Risk Assessment -- Domain Name Services
2.1.1 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/it-sector-risk-management-strategy-domain-name-resolution-services-june2011.pdf
2.2 RFCs. "The Requests for Comment (RFC) documents form a series of notes started in 1969 by the research community that designed and built the ARPAnet. The RFCs series forms an archive of technical proposals, standards, and ideas about packet-switched networks."[7] RFCs are maintained by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and published at http://www.rfc-editor.org/.
2.2.1 RFC 1033, Domain Administrators Operations Guide, provides guidelines for domain administrators in operating a domain server and maintaining their portion of the hierarchical database (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1033.txt).
2.2.2 RFC 1034, Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities, provides extensive background information on the DNS. The DNS has three major components: resource records, name servers and resolvers (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/pdfrfc/rfc1034.txt.pdf).
2.2.3 RFC 1035, Domain Implementation and Specification, is cited above.
2.2.4 RFC 1101, DNS Encoding of Network Names and Other Types, describes a method for mapping between network names and addresses (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1101.txt.pdf).
2.2.5 RFC 1591, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, provides information on the structure of names in TLDs and the administration of domains (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/pdfrfc/rfc1591.txt.pdf). This RFC is particularly useful in describing the role of the designated manager of a TLD:
2.2.5.1 "A new top-level domain is usually created and its management delegated to a 'designated manager' all at once ... The major concern in selecting a designated manager for a domain is that it be able to carry out the necessary responsibilities, and have the ability to do a equitable, just, honest, and competent job" (see RFC 1591, page 3).
2.2.6 RFC 1591 identified several principles for a designated manager of a TLD and identified critical functions of a registry:
2.2.6.1 There should be a designated manager for a TLD. "The manager must, of course, be on the Internet. There must be Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity to the nameservers and email connectivity to the management and staff of the manager."[8]
2.2.6.2 "The designated authorities are trustees for the delegated domain, and have a duty to serve the community."
2.2.6.3 "The actual management of the assigning of domain names, delegating subdomains and operating nameservers must be done with technical competence ... and operating the database with accuracy, robustness and resilience."[9]
2.2.7 RFC 2181, Clarifications to the DNS Specification, provides an update to the DNS specification (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2181.txt).
2.2.8 RFC 2182, Selection and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers, is a best current practice for the selecting and operating secondary DNS Servers (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2182.txt)
2.2.9 RFC 3467, Role of the Domain Name System, provides useful information on the original function and purpose of the domain name system (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc3467.txt).
2.3 US Dept of Homeland Security (DHS) Information Technology Sector Risk Management Strategy for the "Provide Domain Name Resolution Services" Function
2.3.1 http://www.it-scc.org/documents/IT_Sector_Risk_Assessment_Report_Final.pdf
2.4 Internet draft on ccTLD Best Current Practices (http://ws.edu.isoc.org/workshops/2006/PacNOG2/track1/day3/draft-wenzel-cctld-bcp-02.txt). This is a draft document on best current practices within the ccTLD community. As an Internet-draft, this document is not a standard and is considered a work-in-progress.
2.5 BCP 126, Operation of Anycast Services, specifies the best current practices for using Anycast to add redundancy to DNS servers (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/bcp/bcp126.txt).
2.6 DNS Security Extensions -- Securing the Domain Name System -- http://www.dnssec.net/dns-threats
2.7 http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/registry-transition-processes-28may10-en.pdf
2.8 Rossella Mattioli: out , seems covered by the ICANN Registry Agreements http://www.icann.org/en/registries/agreements.htm
2.9 This contains the link to the paper by Crocker, et. al... http://www.circleid.com/posts/20110525_experts_urge_congress_to_reject_proposed_dns_filtering_protect_ip/