



Leverage the DNS and unique identifiers (such as botnets, denial of service attacks, social engineering attacks) for fraud, malicious conduct or route-hijacking attacks

- TLD and registrar failure
- Natural disasters
- Authority or authentication compromise
- Government interventions
- Terrorism
- Facility security

- Acts of war/terror
- Natural disaster
- Physical disasters

- Kaminsky
- Kaspureff

- Botnets
- DDOS attacks

- Fast Flux
- DOS
- Hackers
- Man in the middle

IDN attacks (lookalike characters etc. for standard exploitation techniques)

- DDOS
- Hacking/penetration
- Data poisoning (MITM, Cache)

Reflection attacks

IPv6 -- Spammers hopping from IP to IP -- causing huge numbers of lookups -- volume related threats (perhaps unintentional) -- also may break normal DNS caching (which assumes repeated requests for the same thing)

- Issues around reverse DNS for SMTP servers
- Botnets
- Collateral damage
- Load

- Spoofing
- Alternate DNS roots
- DNS blocking
- State-sponsored
- Hacktivism

<http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac040.pdf> and <http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac044.pdf>

RFC - 3833 -- user, app, OS, ISP, DNS, registrar, registrant, registry -- threat analysis to the domain name system - <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3833.txt>

- Operational errors
- Managerial choices/issues
- Implementation errors (hardware and software)
- Bugs

- Single point of failure
- Supporting infrastructure (insufficient SLA's, support, etc)
- Homogeneity (software, hardware, etc) -- small gene pool, one vulnerability could have broad impact
- Poor design (hardware and software)
- Vulnerability of DNS software, OS, etc.
- Scalability issues
- Content provisioning exposure -- eg Akemi -- if credentials leak, there's broad exposure -- registrar account credentials
- Split DNS
- DNSSEC private key exposure

- Bad players
- Organized crime
- Geo-political groups
- Rogue elements
- Nation states

- Layers
- Temporal
- Direct vs indirect

Needs to border DNS

so the several recent papers by eff, zhang and others on isp monetizing synthetic return/content modification

No single authoritative DNS (eg alternate root-servers), lack of DNS response integrity

alternate root, strings appearing in other configurations not supported in the global root

Possible extensions of carrier-grade NAT

- Question from the group: "What is the perspective of threat description?"
- Picture +
- Registrant <--> Registrar) Compromised credentials (Phishing, Key logger, social engineering, a.o.)
- Registrar <--> Registry) Compromised credentials, DDOS
- Registry <--> DNS) DDOS
- DNS <--> End user) Spoofing, poisoning
- ALL) MIM (Man in the middle)