1.1.1 Informality of some processes
1.2 Managerial choices/issues
1.2.1 Lack of visibility and understanding by decision-makers
1.2.2 Inadequate funding (for infrastructure, training, etc.)
1.3 Implementation errors (hardware and software)
1.5 Single point of failure
1.5.6 Infrastructure (electricity, fiber, etc.)
1.6 Supporting infrastructure (insufficient SLA's, support, etc)
1.7 Homogeneity (software, hardware, etc) -- small gene pool, one vulnerability could have broad impact
1.8 Poor design (hardware and software)
1.9 Vulnerability of DNS software, OS, etc.
1.11 Content provisioning exposure -- eg Akemi -- if credentials leak, there's broad exposure -- registrar account credentials
1.13 DNSSEC private key exposure
1.14.2 Geo-political groups
2.1.1 Threats that leverage the DNS
2.1.2 Threats against the underlying infrastructure
2.2.1 Attacks on the protocol layer below the DNS
2.4.1 so the several recent papers by eff, zhang and others on isp monitizing synthetic return/content modification
2.4.2 No single authoritative DNS (eg alternate root-servers) , lack of DNS response integrity
2.4.3 alternate root, strings appearing in other configurations not supported in the global root
2.4.4 Possible extensions of carrier-grade NAT
2.5 Question from the group: "What is the perspective of threat description?"
2.5.1 RFC - 3833 -- user, app, OS, ISP, DNS, registrar, registrant, registry -- threat analysis to the domain name system
2.5.3 Registrant <--> Registrar) Compromised credentials (Phishing, Key logger, social engineering, a.o.)
2.5.4 Registrar <--> Regisrty) Compromised credentials, DDOS
2.5.5 Registry <--> DNS) DDOS
2.5.6 DNS <--> End user) Spoofing, poisoning
2.5.7 ALL) MIM (Man in the middle)
3.1 Threats on the underlying infrastructure. May include:
3.1.1 TLD and registrar failure
3.1.2.1 Natural disasters
3.1.3 Authority or authentication compromise
3.1.4 Government interventions
3.1.5.2 Facility security
3.1.6 External events (non Internet protocol events?)
3.1.6.1 Acts of war/terror
3.1.6.3 Physical disasters
3.2.1 Cache poisoning attacks
3.2.2 Recursive vs authoritative nameserver attacks
3.2.8 IDN attacks (lookalike characters etc. for standard exploitation techniques)
3.2.9.2 Hacking/penetration
3.2.9.3 Data poisoning (MITM, Cache)
3.2.10 Reflection attacks
3.3.1.1 IPv6 -- Spammers hopping from IP to IP -- causing huge numbers of lookups -- volume related threats (perhaps unintentional) -- also may break normal DNS caching (whicha assumes repeated requests for the same thing)
3.3.1.2 Issues around reverse DNS for SMTP servers
3.3.1.4 Collateral damage
3.4.2 Alternate DNS roots
3.5 Background materials on threats
3.5.1.1 http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac040.pdf and http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac044.pdf
3.5.2 RFC - 3833 -- user, app, OS, ISP, DNS, registrar, registrant, registry -- threat analysis to the domain name system - http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3833.txt
4.1.1.1 Leverage the DNS and unique identifiers (such as botnets, denial of service attacks, social engineering attacks) for fraud, malicious conduct or route-hijacking attacks