YEŞIM SAGLAM:

Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to everyone. Welcome to the At-Large Consolidated Policy Working Group Call taking place on Wednesday the 3rd of August 2022 at 13:00 UTC.

We will not be doing a roll call due to the increased number of attendees, as well as for the sake of time. However, all attendees, both on the Zoom room and on the phone bridge, will be recorded after the call.

And just to cover our apologies, we have received apologies from Vanda Scartezini, Judith Hellerstein, Mouloud Khelif, Alberto Soto, Gopal Tadepalli, Alan Greenberg, Cheryl Langdon-Orr, Holly Raiche, Greg Shatan, Yrjö Länsipuro. And from Sarah Kiden is a tentative apology, as she might be joining slightly late.

As usual, we have Spanish and French interpretation provided on today's call. And our interpreters are Claudia and Marina on the Spanish channel, and Aurélie and Isabelle on the French channel.

And before we get started, just a reminder to please state your names before speaking, not only for the transcription but also for the interpretation purposes as well, please. And our final reminder is for the real-time transcription service provided on today's call. And I'm going to just copy and share the link here with you right now. Please do check the service.

And with this, I would like to leave the floor back over to you, Olivier. Thank you very much.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Yeşim, for this introduction. Welcome to this week's Consolidated Policy Working Group Call. I've just managed by the grit of my teeth to be on the Zoom as well. So, that's great.

We've got a short agenda today, but it is an important agenda because our main stars of the day are Jim Galvin and Matt Thomas, speaking to us about the Name Collision Analysis Project Study 2, the NCAP Study 2. That's something that's eagerly awaited by our community, and we're going to have a full presentation about this.

After that, we'll have some very quick, very short, workgroup and small team updates. We are in August, after all, and it is traditionally the summer recess. We'll have, also, a quick rundown on the policy comment updates.

But after that, an important bit of business which is the ICANN75 ALAC topics and questions for the joint session with the ICANN Board. And the preparation, of course, needs to be done as soon as possible because September is just around the corner for us.

That's today's agenda, and I open the floor for any comments, questions, additions, deletions, amendments, etc. I'm not seeing any hands up for this, so the agenda is adopted as it currently is listed on your screen.

And beyond that, we can now look at our action items. There was only one, and that, of course, is the setting [inaudible] call.

YEŞIM SAGLAM:　　　　　　Olivier?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND:　　Is there someone else now?

YEŞIM SAGLAM:　　　　　　Yes. Christopher Wilkinson.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND:　　Oh, yes. Christopher Wilkinson has put his hand up. Thank you, Yeşim. Christopher, you have the floor.

CHRISTOPHER WILKINSON:　　Hello, good afternoon. Thank you. I think I'm fully connected up. Can you hear me?

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND:　　Yes, very well. Go ahead, Christopher.

CHRISTOPHER WILKINSON:　　Good. Just a minor point, but under ICANN75, I plan to participate in the follow-up to the ICANN71 EURALO discussion on geographical names, and particularly on geographical indications. I've proposed to do this because the CCNSO seems to have taken the dossier over and is actually organizing a session in ICANN75 on geographical indications. So just to let you all know this. Although it's been very quiet for more than a year, this topic seems to have legs. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks for this, Christopher. Is there any action that you would propose the ALAC to take?

CHRISTOPHER WILKINSON: Well first of all, no, not just now. Secondly, I've asked the CCNSO to brief me as to exactly how they plan to handle this. And I'm planning to share that information first of all, of course, with the panel that we convened last year. But if it turns out to be positive and productive, I will certainly share it with CPWG.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks, Christopher. Understood. Thank you for this quick update, and we look forward to further ones in the future. I'm not seeing any other hand, so that means we can proceed forward. The action item, as I mentioned earlier, there's just one. I don't believe there's going to be any comment on it. You can see all of the other action items from previous weeks have now been completed.

And we can go to the NCAP Name Collision Analysis Project Study 2 with Jim Galvin and Matt Thomas. Welcome, gentlemen. Well, it's not the first time that we see you guys here, but you have the floor. The slides are up and everything is ready for you, so proceed forward. Thank you.

MATTHEW THOMAS: Thank you very much. My name is Matt Thomas, and I am one of the co-chairs here today with James Galvin. And we're happy to give you a

project update on where the Name Collision Analysis Project, the NCAP, is and where it's going. And we hope to give you a little bit of relevant background, tell you where the discussion group is at with regards to the action items in Study 2 and the tentative outcomes that we're going to have from that.

So today's agenda will be a little bit of an introduction of background around exactly what is the NCAP project proposal and what we have already conducted in Study 1 and what we are currently working on in Study 2. That will get us into our completed work, our findings.

And ultimately, probably the most important part is the proposal of the workflow going forward in terms of what we believe is a sustainable, repeatable, deterministic process to allow ICANN to do name collision assessments going forward. Then we'll open up the end of the session with some Q&A. Next slide, please.

So let me just start off with a little relevant background. And maybe I'll speak a little bit more about why name collisions are important and how they impact end users in the community at large. So I'd like to just step back from this slide a little bit more and just do a refresher on what exactly is a named collision and why you should all care about it in terms of end user impact.

So a named collision is an attempt of a DNS query that was intended to be resolved within an internal private space, but that query leaks that network and goes into the public DNS and is resolved there.

Now, many strings such as things like .corp and .home are common suffixes that are used in corporations or end user devices in your home

network systems. So queries for those types of strings are unintentionally being leaked out into the public DNS. And currently, .corp, .home, and these other strings do not exist in the Root Server System. So the response given by the Root Server System to those queries is, "I don't exist. I'm a non-existent domain." And those machines that are relying on .corp and .home are implicitly relying on that negative response.

And what happens in the name collision scenario is that when a .corp or a .home or a .-other string becomes delegated and, subsequently, other second-level domains underneath of that become registered, requests for those original queries that were reliant on that non-existent domain response are potentially receiving a different response because that name does now exist in the public DNS.

And that leads to scenarios in which malicious or nefarious things can happen. There can be disclosure of PII. There can be man-in-the-middle attacks. And there are other security threats that surround the name collisions.

So that's why it's important that before new TLDs are released out for public general availability and delegated into the Root Server System, that a named collision assessment is conducted to understand how, and, or if that string is currently being used within private context. And what are the potential risks of that being delegated? And what potential harms might come from that?

So the main NCAP project is really designed to provide some guidance that the ICANN Board specifically asked SSAC to conduct some studies

and analysis to provide some general advice around name collisions. And they specifically asked for two different things. One, they wanted some advice straight up for the strings of .home, .corp, and .mail; and then some more general advice in terms of a set of questions that they presented to the NCAP group.

So our group right now is working through that in an inclusive manner to open to the community. And our group right now consists of roughly 25 discussion group members, of which 14 are SSAC work party members. And there are also 23 current community observers. Next slide, please.

So here are some links for some relevant information, if you'd want. We have our specific Board resolutions given to the NCAP, as well as our project charter and the project proposal. And then there's also the community Wiki that contains all of our discussion group recordings, presentations, reports, and whatnot. So I'd encourage you all to take a look at those if you'd like some more additional details. Next slide, please.

So the NCAP studies were actually designed to go in three different studies. The first one was termed the Gap Analysis. And this was already conducted. And it was to have two main objectives: 1) to properly define what a name collision is; and 2) to create this cohesive, exhaustive body of knowledge around name collisions and to perform any kind of Gap Analysis of understanding of name collisions that are already documented and going forward.

Study 1 then informed our Study 2 that we're currently working on, which came up with a few specific items that we're working on. And one of those is, what are determining the suggested criteria that undelegated strings should be considered a string that manifests name collisions? In other words, a collision string. And what are the criteria for that string to be not delegated? And what criteria would allow that string to be taken off of a name collision string registry or list? So, what kind of mitigations or remediations.

After Study 2, there is Study 3 which is an analysis of mitigation options. And that will follow here as we conduct the conclusion of Study 2. Next slide, please.

So Study 1, as I already mentioned, this really was a bibliography or a collection or a comprehensive review of all things named collisions related. That informs our Study 2 goals in which ... We originally had three goals, one of which was including building a data repository. Upon further investigation during Study 1, we just realized that really wasn't an obtainable objective. So that was no longer included in the study. But the two main goals of Study 2 right now are to understand the root cause of most named collisions and to understand the impact of those named collisions.

And so to get to those goals, we have a set of tasks that we are doing. The first of which is conducting a Root Cause Analysis. And this Root Cause Analysis is really focused on an examination of the name collision reports that ICANN received during the 2012 round for name collision problems that occurred after delegation of certain strings, and them being reported to ICANN. There were roughly, I think, 47 reports filed.

There is a technical investigator who was contracted with to do a scientific study and examination of those studies. And he is producing a report for the Root Cause Analysis.

The second thing we wanted to do is conduct an impact analysis which we're now terming a perspective study. And this is really kind of a study to look at, going forward, what are the implications of measuring name collisions using various different types of data such as DNS data at different perspectives within the DNS hierarchy? And that's to inform how complete a name collision assessment can be via the different parts of the workflow, as we'll describe later in this presentation.

And then finally, all of these reports along with answering the Board questions as well as a case study that explicitly looked at the risks surrounding .corp, .home, and .mail will be collectively taken and presented out into a public consultation in Study 2. And as I mentioned before, Study 3 will come next. Next slide, please.

So just going a little bit faster here. Understanding, like I mentioned before, Study 2 is really focused on the root cause and understanding the impact. As I mentioned earlier, we'll also be doing all of that in Study 2, along with a couple of other studies that I mentioned previously. Next slide, please.

So, what have we completed to date? Next slide, please.

So far, we have produced three major reports in Study 2. The first one is the case study of .corp, .home, and .mail, as well as .land, .local, and .internal. Those three additional strings were added into the report because they receive more than 100 million queries per day at A and J

root servers. So we just wanted to have a little bit of additional data to compare and contrast the risks of those strings.

We have also completed A Prospective Study of DNS Queries for Non-Existent [Top-Level] Domains. This was what I was mentioning before. A study to help inform, when we do name collision assessments, what are the impacts of using a telemetry data from various different components of the DNS hierarchy, and what are the guardrails of what kind of measurements and insights we can get from those types of measurements?

And then finally, we have the Root Cause Analysis report from the technical investigator that was looking at those 2012 named collision reports that were received by ICANN. Next slide, please.

So what are the key takeaways that we've seen so far? Well, from our case study that looked at .corp, .home, and .mail, we've already seen that the impact has increased. The things that we have termed as critical diagnostic measurements have also helped us understand the impact of name collisions. These critical diagnostic measurements, or CDMs that we like to call them, are ways that quantitatively give insights and ability to assess the potential impact of name collision strings.

We've also continued to see that DNS Service Discovery protocols and suffix search lists remain to be the main leading cause as to why name collisions exist in the current public DNS.

The Perspective Study of DNS Queries has given us some insights and takeaways, as well. It shows some of the similarities and differences between each root server identity and the whole of the Root Server

System itself, which helps inform what kind of static analysis that can be given to applicants in advance of their application as well as helping inform the completeness of any measurement taken from Root Server System data.

And then the Root Cause Analysis report has also showed us that the private use of DNS suffixes like we've seen with .corp, .home, and .mail is very widespread and continues to grow. And that there was definitely some impact felt from a certain subset of delegations in the 2012 round.

But overall, I would say all three of these reports continue to highlight one thing, and that's very clear: that name collisions are and will continue to be an increasingly difficult problem to deal with. Next slide, please.

So a little bit more about the findings. Next slide, please.

So like I mentioned before, name collisions are a difficult problem to deal with. We have our critical diagnostic measurements as a way to assess name collisions. And this is one of the best quantitative measurements that we have to date. We've also noted that there is a qualitative component to name collisions, and that has to be dealt with on a one by one basis.

And we've also noted that mitigation and remediation is problematic, especially as the volume and diversity of CDMs increase. So, as more networks and more recursive resolvers increase their leakage of name collisions for a particular string, it becomes increasingly difficult to remediate those collisions within the public DNS.

We've also identified via some of the case studies and the perspective studies that there are some opportunities for already-existing measurement platforms to extend their insights into name collision measurements and to provide some guidance to applicants a priori their application for existing name collision risks or impacts. Next slide, please.

So I've mentioned before that there are these critical diagnostic measurements that we rely on to assess name collisions from a quantitative perspective. And this is just kind of a brief overview of some of them.

First, we have query volume. But volume in itself isn't a holistic measurement of the risks imposed by a named collision string. There are many other things on a diversity perspective that are very important to observe, measure, and quantify. Those include network diversity such as IP address distribution, ASN distribution, various other properties of the DNS queries that are coming up such as query type, what are the types of labels [in the] second-level domains—the first label within the thing?

And then there are also the more qualitative components that involve a little bit more investigation, like open source intelligence gathering techniques, to really understand the root cause of why these collisions are coming out. Next slide, please.

And with that, I'll hand it over to Jim, who's going to walk us through the workflow and, I think, talk a little bit more about some of the interesting components. Thanks.

JIM GALVIN: Thanks, Matt. And thanks to everyone for joining today for this discussion. I'm Jim Galvin, one of the co-chairs with Matt Thomas on the NCAP project.

So just to emphasize a particular point and maybe give a slightly different spin on what Matt said, there are a lot of technical details about what's going on with named collisions. And as Matt described, users really will care about name collisions, not because users care about name collisions and not so much because users care about all of the technical details behind it. But users care because of the confusion that you will experience.

So it's not so much that users are going to understand that it's name collisions that are impacting them and they're going to do something about it. I think the issue here is recognizing that we should be glad that the ICANN Board and the community of people who are looking to create more TLDs are concerned about the experience that users will have as a result of these new TLDs.

And Matt has gone through and explained in some detail the kinds of things that users can experience. And as a result of that, we can actually see that in some of these measurements that can be taken. And so we can assess... The user community in particular, that's really the principal

assessment that we can make. We can get a sense of how they're experiencing name collisions.

So one of the questions that we step back to look at in looking at this is what problem are we trying to solve here on behalf of the Board? And it really is about as Matt said, trying to create a repeatable, sustainable process for assessing these named collisions. We really want to know how people are going to be affected by them. And it's not just that users experience confusion, obviously. It's that registry operators are going to experience issues with trying to have domain names. Because if they're creating any level of impact on the Internet, that's a problem.

And the Board framed this in terms of wanting to be able to identify what it called collision strings. And so our job was to try and find a way to think about what this meant and what assessment we could do. I think the principal thing is that name collision assessment is a risk management problem. I think that's probably the most important conclusion that we've come to in all of this.

I think that, up to this point, a lot of the discussion and presentation tends to focus on this idea that the judgment about what's a problem is based on the high end of impact to life and limb. You know, what's the harm to life and limb? And the reality is, one of things we've discovered, is that there's just all kinds of harm here. There's all kinds of impact. And the broad set of people that are affected is kind of interesting.

And we've also figured out that you can't always see name collisions. You won't always see them. And even if you try to measure them, you can't always see them. You don't see them unless they leak, which

means something is basically wrong somewhere. An individual enterprise is allowing the names to get out, and thus the Internet sees them. And that's a name collision.

I mean, if they do it right and the leakage is an accident, then you won't ever see it. You can't even measure it all upfront. But nonetheless, as a risk management problem, the question here is, what can we do that ... How can we improve, if possible, the process that was used the last time? Next slide, please.

So our goals here in all of this in recognizing that we're trying to manage a risk management problem is, can we assess named collisions? What can we do with that? Even though we can't fully assess them, we always know that you can never see everything. Can we at least get a look at some level of them and get some sense of it? And then, can we set up an opportunity for recognizing if there are things to do about it?

I mean, let's be honest. We've had 10 years of delegations here. Strictly speaking, no actual mitigation or remediation has been done, and the Internet still functions. But in fairness, there's been a lot of impact. The Root Cause Analysis report actually showed that. People were affected. Enterprises were impacted by name collisions. And they did range from being fairly significant—certainly from the point of view of those impacted—to relatively minor and mild, straightforward kind of things that could be fixed. So it really wasn't all that big of an issue.

So what I'm going to focus on here in the rest of these slides ... There's a lot of details in the slides, but I'm going to focus really on three things. And so we'll skip through a lot of the detailed slides. And if you want to

go back over them, we can certainly do that. But where is this process different from what was done in the 2012 rounds? What are we looking to do differently that is going to improve things and set us up on a better path?

So the important thing here, the first two things to talk about is that we've identified in this workflow that there are two new roles that are needed in order to help in conducting assessments. So let's go to the next slide and talk about the first one.

There needs to be a group of technologists, there needs to be a set of experts—which we are calling a Technical Review Team—that needs to exist. And this needs to be a neutral team. And they need to be experts in the areas that you see listed here. Not just in DNS protocols, but other protocols. And in particular, they need to be data scientists. This is a very specialized group of people that need to exist in order to be helpful and look at the CDMs that we want to carefully define and demonstrate that can be used to see some assessment.

So this team would have four responsibilities. Of course, they would obviously assess the visibility of name collisions. So they're going to be looking at the CDMs. And they have to take all of this technical information—this detailed data that's going to be visible about what's there—and they've got to reduce it down into something that a non-technical Board can take advantage of.

Not that no one on the Board is technical, but you understand that they're not going to look at this from a data science point of view. And someone has to be able to turn this into, "What are the risks here" and

explain that in a way and make it visible in a way that the Board can use to make its judgment on what to do going forward. So they have to assess that visibility. They've got to look at all those findings.

Ultimately, when mitigation/remediation plans are developed, those are likely to be fairly technical, too. What exactly is a registry operator going to do going forward? And someone has to be able to summarize that and create a statement of the risks associated with that.

And then, of course, another key thing is emergency response. Although it was assumed back in the 2012 rounds that there would be an emergency response if it was necessary, and that if something really bad happened, they would pull back a TLD, remove it from the root zone, and go forward. And just take it back and then reject it and not allow it.

That was never actually documented and never actually written down exactly that process and what that would mean. And we think, obviously from a repeatable, sustainable point of view, you've got to have documentation there about how that's going to work and what that means.

There are people who depend on the root zone. Matt hadn't talked about this too much, but let's think about the global public resolvers—the Googles and the Microsofts and the Neustars and others, the Cloudflares. They depend on knowing what the root zone looks like. You have to set up an emergency response procedure. It has to be known. It has to be visible. People have to know what to expect and when to see that.

The infrastructure has changed from there to 2012, so it's important to get that written down, too, these teams will manage that. So that's one. Next slide, please.

These neutral service providers are the people that we're suggesting need to exist in order to conduct the collection of the CDMs. In the 2012 round, what was done is the registry operator conducted a controlled interruption cycle. And that was done by them after the TLD was granted to them. So a decision was made that it could be delegated, but we had not assessed name collisions yet. The assessment of name collisions didn't happen until after it had been delegated, after it had been granted. You have to be very careful about terminology here.

So after the registry operator was granted the TLD, then they would test for name collisions. One of the things that we are proposing here as a mechanism for better managing the process of taking back a TLD, is that you should really make the assessment of name collisions part of your due diligence process. So it really ought to happen before you grant the TLD to a registry operator.

This also has the feature that if you do this, you can assess them. And all of that can start immediately as soon as an application is submitted. It doesn't have to wait for process. And therefore, if it's just part of the ordinary due diligence, it happens in parallel with all of the rest of the due diligence going on and then it's all done. And then at the point that the TLD is granted, the registry operator gets to just move forward. There's no further delay once you get through all of that.

So we believe a neutral party to do this. And the other reason for a neutral party is to make sure that you can actually get the valid data. And they need to work with the Technical Review Team, whatever that is. These are functional roles. The details of their implementation, of course, have yet to be decided. But we describe them functionally here—the responsibilities and the precise things that they have to be a part of. So next slide, please.

This is the workflow which looks rather like it did in the 2012 round. An applicant selects the TLD. They submit an application. And then the last step is the Board getting the final package. What we've done is insert two particular steps, explicitly, which is what we're calling a Passive and Active Collision Assessment.

So, what we've developed along the way here is to realize that as a risk management problem and assessing name collisions, that it's possible to do three separate name collision assessments and look at the risk of name collisions in an increasingly more risky way. So you can start small with very low risk, essentially none. Then you can add a little bit of risk of something really bad happening but getting a really good picture what's going on. That's Passive Collision Assessment.

And then you do something very much like the controlled interruption that was done in 2012. We're calling it Active Collision Assessment. It's a little bit different. But then you do the impactful disruptive version of assessment, and that's the final check to see what's there. So, I'll quickly go through some of these. Next slide, please.

Applicant Selects Label. What we're observing here is that the applicant also gets an opportunity to get a leading indicator of possible name collisions. We're imagining—and in fact, it already exists today because ICANN OCTO has already gone and done this—that ICANN will present a statically available website. And this is their ITHI set of data that's out there. It gives you an indication of the NXDOMAIN queries that are seen at their particular root server. So the applicant gets their first opportunity to see if their string is likely to get additional scrutiny. Next slide, please.

Once the applicant submits their application, then you get to see right away that the Technical Review Team is going to do the first assessment. The Technical Review Team is going to look at that same data that the applicant looked at, and they're going to write a summary of what that shows, if anything. And that's a critical thing.

Obviously, if it looks like, ... If you look at, even that data today, you're going to see things like .corp and .home there. And so those are the special case strings which are likely to be considered high risk. And so they become something which has to be dealt with as a special case. And the details of what that looks like are yet to be determined in the working group. We're not quite done yet, but the direction we're headed in is ...

There's the opportunity, if something gets called out at this stage, for the Board to reject that application at that point. If they're not going to reject it at that point, then you would go on to step three. Next slide, please.

And step three is where the Passive Collision Assessment is done. This is something new that we have created. And we have observed that it's actually possible to add the TLD to the root zone. So, delegate the TLD. This is not granting it to the registry operator. This is just putting it in the root zone, making the zone empty. But now you can collect CDMs.

This is a step which is minimally disruptive to existing clients. Remember, as Matt was explaining before, clients expect a certain kind of behavior from the DNS infrastructure. And that is, if they're using a private name like .corp and .home or any of the others, they expect that root servers are going to admit that that doesn't exist. This is a way of putting the name out there and then, by making it an empty zone ... No wildcard or anything else. Okay?

So it's not controlled interruption that was done in the 2012 round. But by putting an empty zone out there, you allow for a client to still get an NXDOMAIN query, an NXDOMAIN response. They just get it one step later because the TLD now exists. So the next query that they make to get at the second level name, then they get their NXDOMAIN. But it allows us to see whether or not the name is in use. And that is critical.

And another critical reason why this step is important is because root name servers do not, anymore, know about name collisions all by themselves. One of the things that has happened in the last 10 years is that DNS infrastructure looks very different today than it did in 2012. In particular, you've got global public resolvers. Global public resolvers hide name collision data. They hide it until the name is delegated.

That's why this step is useful. It pulls named collision information out of the rest of the infrastructure into the root servers so that it can be seen. And that's why this step is valuable. It's low risk because it still gives you similar behavior, but it also gives you a peek at things. And that's important. So again, TRT conducts it. Next slide.

Then we go to something called Active Collision Assessment, which is the much more disruptive and much more impactful version of collision assessment. This is where we do put things into the TLD zone. Now, we don't do the wildcard version of things that was done in the 2012 round. We're specifically suggesting that you actually put a live IP address and you actually collect more than DNS queries.

And this is important because it gives you a better picture of what the name is being used for. While it's interesting to know that there's high volume or there's high diversity, you don't really know what the name is used for. So you don't know how impactful that is. You learn more when you understand that they're making web queries or they're making other kinds of queries to the data. Other kinds of services are using that name. And that gives you some information about the impact. Next slide, please.

And that really is the workflow, and that's the difference. You know, those key differences. We're suggesting that all of this happen before granting of the TLD. We've added a new kind of collision assessment, and we've also created these teams so that we can get a good, solid technical assessment of these things.

And now I see you've already jumped to the next slide. So, yeah, we just wanted to end with this particular link. There's still an opportunity to join the discussion group. I appreciate that we're actually finalizing our initial draft of the final work report. We're hopeful. Our expectation is that the final draft will be released very shortly after ICANN75. We're hoping that our work is done before ICANN75.

So we'll be giving an update very much like this one with some concreteness to our findings and proposal. And then afterwards, it'll be released for public comment and we'll have an opportunity to look at it. So, I hope that was helpful. Next slide, please.

Back to you for any questions. And we'll be happy to take those.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks so much, Jim and Matthew.

JIM GALVIN: Who's going to manage the queue. I guess I should probably ask Herb.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah. Do you want to manage it yourself? Or do you … I guess you're probably old enough to manage the queue yourself. We can give you the queue for this. You're mature enough so that—

JIM GALVIN: Okay.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: There you go. You have full control over the people putting their hands up.

JIM GALVIN: That sounds good. We'll take care of that. So go ahead, Jonathan. You're up first.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks a lot, Matt and Jim, for this presentation. And I know you guys were working hard, so I really do appreciate the time. We're trying to get spun up on this so that we're not under the gun for public comment when that time comes. So, thank you.

I guess my question is whether or not the team found these results to be surprising. We have some history of folks treating the issue of name collision somewhat glibly in the past. That it was much ado about nothing when it was first discussed. And nothing came about after the round, etc. And these results really do seem to indicate that it was a worthwhile pursuit.

And I'm wondering if the level and the impact analysis came as a surprise to the group or if there's still dissension in the group about whether or not, when taken in total, this is considered to be a significant problem.

MATTHEW THOMAS: Jim, do you mind if I go ahead here?

JIM GALVIN: Yeah. Go ahead, first.

MATTHEW THOMAS: Jonathan, thanks for that question. That's a great one. And I think that's an important piece of conversation that we need to have around framing name collisions in terms of the risk management assessment. The risk management problem that name collisions needs to address is finding those outliers. It needs to be finding the .corps, .homes, and .mails. There's the vast majority of strings that have very low-level CDMs that could very easily be delegated with minimal impact and/or risk, as we've seen from the 2012 round.

I think what's important in this name collision project, in Study 2, what we've identified and learned, is that it's truly a matter of risk management in terms of, how do we identify the next .corp, .home, and .mail? And how do we that in a way that is sustainable/repeatable/deterministic and prevents us getting into a scenario where we have .corp, .home, and .mail lying around in this state of confusion and being able to bluntly say, "This poses too much risk based off of what we've learned at this time without doing further risk and mitigation."

Jim, do you want to add anything else?

JIM GALVIN:	Yeah. I'll add a little bit of personal perspective from my point of view. My thinking about named collisions has evolved a great deal as a result of being part of this project. I think that the transition to viewing it as a risk management problem really was a big deal. I see that as a very significant conclusion and a very important way to characterize this.
	I want to be very cognizant of the fact that the numbers with respect to name collisions ... You're right. People have always been glib about it, and one of the reasons for that is because it really only takes one. At some level there's a position you can take that says, "The numbers don't matter." If your only criteria is life and limb, the numbers don't matter because it only takes one. Which means it doesn't ... Whatever they are, you have to reject anything which has name collisions.
	Well, clearly that's just not a place to be. You do have to accept the risk that you could always have significant harm. Okay? But that's why we're trying to change the dialogue into a risk management problem. You have to address the impact. You have to accept the fact that they're going to be there. You're going to go forward. For the most part, you're just going to go forward with everything. And you're just going to have to react to whatever happens.
	And the best that you can do with assessing is get an idea of how many different people, how many different regions, how widespread this particular name collision is. And that will, at a minimum, intuitively give you a sense that there's some greater risk. And yes there is, in terms of some impact, the greater risk of some impact. But in the end, it doesn't really change your life and limb impact. So that's not the right way to think about it and make it into a broader problem.

And I think wrapping our heads around that and really changing the scope and messaging to that was a pretty significant change in my mind. I'm not convinced that the entire discussion group is on that path yet, but that's where I hope we get to in the community at large, too. Thanks.

Christopher, you have your hand up. Go ahead, please.

CHRISTOPHER WILKINSON: Thank you. Good afternoon again. I must express a certain skepticism. Look, first of all we've known about this name collision issue since the 2012 round. We've just spent several years in SubPro, courtesy GNSO, preparing and organizing for the next round. I put brackets around my other concerns about the status of the next round, but in this particular area I see no reason whatsoever why this issue should have come up in such great detail and concern at this incredibly late stage.

My first group of questions would be, how long would it take to implement this quite complex system, and how much would it cost, and who would pay for it?

The second concern around which you've hinted at, actually, is that in my simple view of the world, 80% of the name collision issues are fairly self-evident, will be identified very easily, and could be acted on and should be acted on—not by the Board. They should be acted on by the evaluation panels in the selection process for new gTLDs.

All of this stuff about risk assessment and risk management really applies only to perhaps the 20% [tail], which some of you have

recognized is likely to exist. But the issue and the management of it really has to be circumscribed in a sensible way. You can't possibly apply the whole of the apparatus of risk management that you've just described to all of the potential applicants.

Elsewhere, somebody said the data privacy aspects are still being negotiated. No, they're not. The data privacy aspects have been decided by the [EPDP]. We know what the data privacy aspects, and there's no future for another round if the data privacy aspects are not integrated into the application process. I would seriously advocate taking data privacy out of your processes.

And finally, you will rely on the concept of a neutral party. We need a small technical advisory group which would give an opinion and a recommended solution to problems that arise at the level of the evaluation of new gTLD applications. [Not enough]. Thank you.

JIM GALVIN: Thanks, Christopher. You bring up some excellent questions and some excellent points. Let me come at this with a short, technical response which says that NCAP is focused on the technical side of responding to the Board in how to assess name collisions and what to do with that assessment.

You're right. There are some real questions that come out of SubPro. There are some real questions that are related to privacy. You know, there are some real questions about whether or not this should be applicable to all TLDs. From a technical point of view, we think all strings need to be tested. From a technical point of view, there is a risk with

every TLD which is granted. And so we believe that from a technical point of view, that risk needs to be known in advance.

I mean, ultimately, the ICANN Organization, through the Board, owns the responsibility of what happens given that a TLD was granted. So they need that information. It's really out of scope for us in our group to really respond directly to many of the questions that you have, and I think these are issues that At-Large could look at itself and then respond to and see how to go with those.

Matt, did you want to add anything?

MATTHEW THOMAS: No.

CHRISTOPHER WILKINSON: Just a brief addition. Many of the issues are not technical at all. They're cultural, linguistic, and commercial—a footnote.

And secondly, unless there is an organized basis of supporting the staff, I doubt if it's appropriate to kick this ball into the At-Large field. We may have views about it, but there is no scope in At-Large to compete professionally in terms of time and travel. There's no scope for having a balanced discussion just by saying, "Let At-Large deal with it." No. I would really recommend that you withdraw that. Thank you.

JIM GALVIN:	Okay. Thanks, Christopher. Just a quick time check for folks. We have five minutes left ... Or, no. I guess we have an hour and a half. I don't want to take too much of your agenda. I don't know if there's a line here about how far you want us to go, but I'll keep going until somebody jumps in and says no.
	Michael, you're up next.
MICHAEL PALAGE:	I do want to hold my place in line, but I want to defer to Justine, please. Please take her first.
JIM GALVIN:	Justine?
MICHAEL PALAGE:	[inaudible].
JUSTINE CHEW:	I don't know why I'm being taken first. Olivier and Jonathan are ahead of me. And I lowered my hand earlier because I was actually looking at the time as well. So, why don't you go ahead?
MICHAEL PALAGE:	Okay, thanks. So, Jim and Matt, thank you. Sorry, I joined late. So apologies if my questions were perhaps answered earlier. Jim, you had mentioned that you wanted all TLDs to undergo this testing. Does that

	include ccTLDs that would be added as well? Or is this just gTLD specific?
JIM GALVIN:	Whether or not it applies to ccTLDs, I think it's something for the Board to answer. We're only answering the question of how to manage the risk of name collisions, so I don't have an opinion on that.
MICHAEL PALAGE:	Okay. I guess I would agree with your previous comments about all TLDs because I think when you said "all TLDs," you did not make a distinction there.

Second question, if I could, regarding the Board retaining the ultimate authority from a risk assessment perspective. Perhaps you can comment quickly regarding special use for private use TLDs such as .onion that were previously exempted or blocked from delegation. In light of the growing proliferation of blockchain domain names, which I believe now have been made a permanent item within the one ICANN Board committee, how do these potential alternate delegations almost, if you will, create or foster potential collisions?

And I guess what would be really important for the Board—I see Avri and yourself being two Board members on the call—is what happens when someone plays by the rules and goes through a decade of policy development and, unfortunately, may potentially be blocked because someone voluntarily created a risk or a conflict? And is that at all being

accounted for in your work? And if not, where should that be accounted for? Thank you.

MATTHEW THOMAS: Thank you. That's an excellent question. I think I would just kind of reiterate what Jim had previously stated—that this is a process for assessing name collisions for any TLD and that special criteria or measurement for that really isn't appropriate.

Understanding the impact and the root cause and ultimately understanding those two factors will lead to a better informed measurement of potential harm is the, I think, ultimate goal coming out of this. I think it ultimately then relies upon the Board's acceptance of risk based off of those CDM measurements in doing it. I think the string itself is somewhat agnostic, and that this process applies to all of them.

Jim, do you want to add anything else there?

JIM GALVIN: Yeah, I'll just clarify. I did say all TLDs. I think it's an excellent mechanism for all TLDs. Whether or not it is used on ccTLDs is not within our scope to decide. So I think that's the right way to think about that.

And there are two dimensions to name collisions. I'll frame it in this way, what Matt was saying. Name collisions exist as part of our DNS naming infrastructure and what we do, and we're focused a great deal on trying to manage that side of things. So we're trying to manage the presence and existence [of] proposing a process for name collisions in

that space. But it is also true to acknowledge that there is an interaction with other naming systems.

That's a different type of named collision and we will say something about that, but ICANN doesn't control that. So we're only responding to what's within ICANN's control and making it aware that those other things exist. And what ICANN does with that is entirely up to it. It's not within the technical scope of what we're doing. Thanks.

Jonathan, you're up next.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, Jim. I'm wondering, and I guess you're going to get to mitigation later, or risk management. Does that mean things that a new registry should do to manage the identified risk that doesn't rise above the level of preventing it from being delegated? Is that what we mean by that, or is there another effort?

And part of why I asked that is that there's also sort of a supply—I don't know what to call it—a client side component of this, which is the leakage of which you speak. Is there also an education campaign or something that needs to happen? Or do the main tool developers like Microsoft with Active Directory, etc., do they need to manage this process differently? Or do corporations need to be taught to use less common words? Is there another side to this problem that will change the nature of the risk over time, or is it really just a delegation problem?

JIM GALVIN:
So, let me just comment on two things, offer two comments. One is that the study of mitigation plans and perspective remediation plans is actually part three of the Name Collision Analysis Project, overall. The project had three main parts. Part one was the setup. Part two is the analysis and being able to assess them. And part three is, okay, now what do I do about them?

So what we've done so far in part two is provide an opportunity and a slot by which a mitigation and remediation plan could be developed. And then that would need to be assessed. And that would also presumably have to be approved by the Board as part of approving the granting of the TLD.

So the next thing, then, is what could you do for remediation and mitigation? Well, that's what we're ultimately going to get to in a Study 3, but the observation to be made here is that that's going to be a little hard to even predict even today because one of the things we've learned going along here is that the DNS infrastructure has changed. What you can or cannot do as a result of that is also going to change with time.

So I'm not sure where all of that's going to go, but, yes, everything has to be looked at for name collision. And this is why the CDMs need to be expanded beyond DNS. You need more information about how the name is being used so that you can think about what you might want to do or could do in terms of remediation and mitigation.

Matt, did you want to add anything?

MATTHEW THOMAS: Yeah. I just wanted to touch on one other point there. And that was, Jonathan, about your client side comment. And I wanted to note that in the 2012 round, controlled interruption was the mechanism that was used as a way to disrupt and to notify impacted parties. And that relied heavily on a clever mnemonic string of the answer 127.0.53.53 in the DNS, and was hinged upon the hope that system administrators would see this and do some Googling for it and find this information about it.

What we're proposing in the active collision assessment is still to do that disruption and notification to the end clients, but in a little bit more straightforward manner that is tailored to a broader set of protocols like HTTP, web protocols, and mail and stuff that give back a much more clear notification to end users and system administrators that say, "Hey, you're experiencing a named collision issue during the active collision assessment period."

And, of course, you brought up the concept of additional outreach and education. That will be one of, I think, our recommendations: that additional education out to system administrators on how to properly configure their networks to use fully-qualified domain names; that preventing those will help name collisions going forward; that suffix search lists are a serious problem of many of the name collisions and that might need to be addressed in various different ways, especially when things like suffix search lists are being packaged in common softwares like DNS masquerade that are ultimately put into home consumer devices like routers that has a very long tail of being able to remediate those.

I will note that we had some presentations that I gave for outreach and mitigation efforts that did remediate hundreds of millions, if not billions, of queries to the Root Server System for name collision TLDs, and that the criteria that allowed for the success of those was looking at those CDMs. And those CDMs where the diversity was much more contained allowed a very targeted outreach to particular vendors or network operators to be able to identify and notify them to be able to remediate that leakage of name collisions.

Others had some more of the qualitative components that allowed to do outreach to network manufacturers or equipment manufacturers, who said that they'll address the problem. But that's a long game where you're [inaudible] [over the long run]. So to your point, I think it's a long game there, but the advice is sound in terms of additional education and outreach.

JIM GALVIN: Thank you, Matt. That's an excellent point with respect to notification in the clients. And I'll tidy all of that up and wrap that up in the following comment at large. I think that there's an opportunity there that At-Large could look at in terms of the users. You know, users use clients. And so clients behavior in this space and a desire to create that education so that users understand and can motivate clients being better prepared and better functioning in this scope of name collisions and the fact that these things occur. So that's a space to explore. So thank you.

Michael, I'm assuming that's an old hand. I'm going to go on to Justine. Go ahead, please.

JIM GALVIN:

Thank you, Jim. And thank you, Matt, for coming along and explaining this NCAP Study 2 to us. Before I ask my question, I just want to make a comment about what Christopher put forward earlier. I don't think ... Well, I certainly didn't hear Jim or Matt say that this is a question that they're kicking on to At-Large to do something about. My take on this is that this is a Study 2 NCAP study that was ...

Or the NCAP study was commissioned by the Board as something that SSAC is addressing directly with the Board in terms of the Board questions. And while we were participating in SubPro, I certainly didn't get into the level of technicalities as I did on the NCAP discussion group. So I would say this is really a matter of technicality, really, and not just commercial and language, per se.

Which brings me to my actual question, which is, Jim, you noted that within the discussion group there is still, I would like to use the word "resistance" to this new proposed workflow. And, personally, I think that this workflow is a good idea. I tend to be risk-averse, so I see the value in this.

Would you say that the people who are sort of not sold on this idea seemed to hold the line that there was nothing wrong with the existing name collisions occurrence framework, so why are we going all out to change it? And isn't what you're proposing making it onerous? Is it worth the value? Is it worth the effort? Would you say that the kind of

data that we are seeking, that is being sought with this new workflow, in particularly the CDMs, is of a better value than what would have been collected using the existing framework?

And also, it predates the lifecycle process because you talked about the existing collision framework being something that is done post granting of the TLD, whereas this proposed new workflow is something that is done pre granting of the TLD. And I think that is something critical that we should [know, though.]

So my question is, what would you say, what is your opinion in terms of the value of the data that's being collected using this proposed workflow as opposed to the existing name conditions or current framework? Thank you.

JIM GALVIN: I'll give a couple of quick overarching comments, and then Matt can add to this, of course. I think what I would say, speaking personally, is that I don't see strong resistance in the discussion group to the specifics of what we're proposing. The resistance, I believe, that's in the discussion group is about named collisions and controlled interruption and stuff in general.

And you're right. There are still people in the community, I think. Even when controlled interruption in the 2012 round was first proposed, it wasn't widely supported. I think that people do like to land on the fact that, "We have 10 years of having done controlled interruption and nothing bad happened. Why are we bothering?" And they have a valid

point at face value. I don't want to dismiss that out of hand. It's always a good discussion to have that thing in the group.

You know, the details are what we're proposing, I don't think that there's a lot of resistance or traction that's objecting. There are certainly some discussion points that are still in progress. But I do want to believe, and it would be my opinion, that we do have pretty good consensus, actually, on the path that we're proposing. To the extent that one agrees to a name collision assessment, we've got pretty good consensus on what we're doing here.

The second thing that I would say is that we spent a lot of time learning from the experience of what happened over the last 10 years. Going back to why was the problem first motivated, considering what were the original motivations for controlled interruption in the 2012 round, what it was intended to do. And then we evaluated how successful it was or wasn't. And then we thought about the broader problem, what we're trying to accomplish here.

And so what we're proposing is an evolution. We're accepting the fact that you have to assess name collisions as a risk management problem. They're there. You have to do something. So, we're providing mechanism for doing something and we're improving what was done before. We're not eliminating it. We're not replacing it. We're not suggesting something wildly different. We're just trying to make it better because that's what you do. Right? You learn from your experience. And so we've tried to learn from what's happened over the last 10 years. And that's what we're proposing.

So that's sort of my view in the large about what's going on. And I'll let Matt add to that.

MATTHEW THOMAS: My two-finger on that is that I think that is the high-order bit that we're trying to achieve with the NCAP, is to develop an agile process that allows the assessment and name collisions going forward in perpetuity and to provide the mechanisms and the framework for evolution of how to address name collisions going forward in a different world of what the DNS will look like in 10 years from now.

And on that point, yes, the data is significantly different in terms of what happened in the assessment in 2012 versus now. Like Jim mentioned before, a lot has happened since 2012 in the DNS. We've had consolidation of name servers. We've had the introduction of large, public recursive resolvers. We've had very fundamental changes in the DNS protocol itself—the introduction of DoT encryption. We've had things that suppress the fidelity of the data that can be gathered at the Root Server System, like QNAME minimization and Aggressive NSEC.

And so it's the desire to have a framework that can go forward the next 10 years and be able to incorporate the next 10 years of DNS changes but still be able to do this name collision assessment in a sustainable, repeatable manner. Thanks.

JIM GALVIN: Thanks, Matt. Olivier, you're the last one in the queue. It looks like you get the last question.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Jim. And, yes, I think I deliberately put myself the last one in the queue just also to close off the queue and not let anyone after me because this has been a really, really thrilling discussion that we've had here.

First, I really want to commend you guys and the whole team for the trip. And it feels like an absolute journey from 2012 until now, and the debate level of the discussion having moved on so much, the amount of knowledge on the scope of the problem and even sort of the walk towards having solutions and mitigating factors, and so on.

When one remembers the early discussions when the SSAC rose the issue and pointed out the issue. And some in the community were saying, "No, there's nothing going on. Just move on. Move on. Forget about it." And this has really moved on a lot.

There is one thing that I did hear that we had here which did cause some concern for me, which is that, originally—of course, this was all about DNS—one of the things that was pointed out here, or one of the questions that was asked was whether this could also ... Well, this clearly is detection on one side and mitigation on the other. And whether alternative routes—DoH, DoT—any of these alternative naming systems that could introduce some conflicts or some collisions, would these need to be detected or not?

And, Jim, I'm not sure whether I heard you correctly, but you said, well, you're going to look at it but in a different angle. Or could you just explain this, please?

JIM GALVIN: I suspect maybe the point that you heard … I was making a comment that one of the things we've discovered as an engineering principle in examining the presence of name collisions and realizing not only has the DNS infrastructure changed, but we've realized that there's no guarantee that you can ever see all of the potential name collisions that might happen. And that's an important realization, an important point to understand.

It's possible that an enterprise could be perfectly configured and they could have all kinds of private use names going on internal, and if they're perfectly configured that never leaks out and it's never exposed. So that's a potential for a name collision, and there's no way to see that. There's no way to know that that's out there. Okay? If the name doesn't leak, then you don't know.

And in that case, what happens is, you'll never know. The name is delegated. And the only people that will ever know is that internal enterprise. And they'll only know because, internally, they'll give priority to this new TLD to their internal use. And the external TLD will never be visible to them, and they'll never see it. And they may or may not ever see that, and may or may not ever realize it.

And that's an important thing to understand about the DNS infrastructure. That's just something you don't control. That kind of stuff happens, and that's what people do. And that's okay.

So, I hope that was the point that you were confused about. It's kind of a subtle point. But if there's something else, if you want to add to that, please.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Yeah. Thanks, Jim. Basically, I had understood that perhaps you were not considering looking at every instance of collisions, including the alternative DNSes and the alternative naming systems that are out there such as DoH. But I think that what you're saying is that, actually, as far as detection is concerned, you will indeed try, but to the extent that is possible.

JIM GALVIN: So I think now ... Yeah, so maybe what you're asking about is the fact that other naming systems exist in the world. Blockchain is sort of the canonical favorite example now. So it's a whole different naming system that's out there, and it exists. You know, we don't have—"we" meaning the royal ICANN community and such—we have no control over those things.

But they are there, and our users in our naming system and using the Internet as indexed by our naming system—websites and other kinds of things—we're impacted by the presence of these other naming systems. It creates confusion for our users. So that is an example of a name collision.

It is an interesting question as to what we can do about that. And we certainly can't do anything about them. Is there anything we can do on

our side about that? Don't really know yet. I mean, that would be part of a Study 3 if that happened, if we got into that. But in our scope, we can only observe that those are there and make that known. And the assessment might make them visible.

So we just need to characterize that and see it. That would be an opportunity for a registry operator to potentially try to go do something there. And again, I don't know what they would do at this point. But that opportunity opens ...

I don't know, Matt, if you want to add anything to the technical side of that or whatever. Please.

MATTHEW THOMAS: Yeah. The only technical thing I would say is that I think our scope and remit here is really tied with the global public DNS, as prescribed in something like ICP-3: A Unique, Authoritative Root for the DNS. And that's really the namespace that we're focused on doing name collisions and doing the assessment on the impact felt within that kind of scope and remit.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Okay. Well, thank you—

JIM GALVIN: Yeah. Excellent point about ICP-3. Go ahead, Olivier. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much, gentlemen. We're running out of time, but this was a fascinating session. And it's really great to have you being able to shed some light for our community. And of course, this is recorded so I'm sure many more people will be also watching this in the recording. So thank you for joining us.

And now, unfortunately, we have to move on rather fast even though we do have a quite empty agenda. The next thing we now have is the workgroup and small team update. Now, it's my understanding that the great majority of them, in fact all of them, there is no real update. We've got nothing for the RDDS Scoping Team. Nothing for the SSAD ODA. Nothing for the IDNs.

And the Transfer Policy Review, if I understand correctly, has just had one thing, which is the ALAC Draft Comment on the Transfer Policy Initial Report Phase 1A, which is worth mentioning. Am I missing something, Jonathan?

Oh, I see Steinar's put his hand not up. Okay, great. Steinar Grøtterød.

STEINAR GRØTTERØD: Yeah, hi. Just very short minutes from yesterday's call on the Transfer Policy PDP Working Group. We continued to discuss the Change of Registrant Data Policy. Today, we are now trying to find out by using different scenarios what is a material change that will result in the transfer lock due to the Change of Registrant data? Because, per today, a material Change of Registrant data results in a 60-day transfer lock. The registrar may enable an opt-out for the transfer lock, but not all registrars do this.

So the discussion is whether the 60-day lock is reasonable, whether there should be a lock or not, or whether the lock is too long. And the majority of the registrars, in the way I read the discussion, are in favor of removing the transfer lock after a Change of Registrant data. But there is no consensus in the working group.

My input to the working group is that we propose a security mechanism in Phase 1A. That's the Transfer Policy, but the inter-registrar Transfer Policy process. And these security mechanisms make a transfer lock not needed due to the Change of Registrant data.

But what I will do is distribute background documents and questions to be discussed at the CPWG mailing list in front of the meeting on August 24th. And this is because I have occasion ... Only next week, there will be a meeting in the PDP. And then they go into a three-week vacation period for the PDP. So that's the appropriate time to take the discussion within the CPWG.

So that's all. Saving time. Thank you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thanks very much, Steinar. Let's open the floor for comments and questions.

JONATHAN ZUCK: To answer your question, Olivier, I don't think that there were other things that you missed. So I think it's a light day. That's why I wasn't too worked up over going long on the other presentation.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Oh, no. I was extremely upset. Extremely upset. But it didn't show. Oh, sorry. No, not at all. It was great.

Let's move on to Item #6, then. The policy comment updates with Jonathan Zook and Chantelle Doerksen. And whoever is providing an update is muted at the moment.

CHANTELLE DOERKSEN: Jonathan, if you want, I can jump in.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yeah, go ahead.

CHANTELLE DOERKSEN: Okay, thank you. The only recently ratified public comment that we have is, of course, the submission on the Transfer Policy Initial Report. That due date has been pushed out to the 16th in case there are any extra items that might need to be discussed. I think they did that because of the summer holidays. But the comment that the ALAC has worked on has been ratified.

In terms of what's upcoming, we have the Registration Data Policy Implementation in August. And then a few that will probably open in September after ICANN75. And I will stop there.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks a lot. Yeah, and we'll probably have a report next week on the Registration Data Policy Implementation. So I think that's it for this update, Olivier.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Jonathan. We're now on Any Other Business, Item 6. And we can then come back to you, Jonathan, for the ICANN75 topics and questions.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Yeah. So we're a little short on time at this point, but it's kind of an open discussion about what our agenda should be for the ALAC meeting with the Board. If you recall, last week we kind of went over that spreadsheet that Board staff have provided us to see the status of different aspects of our advice. The huge lion's share of those open advice items are part of Subsequent Procedures. And so many of those issues are part of the ODA assessment that's currently taking place.

I know that we're thinking that one of the questions to the Board will be, "What, if any, additional clarifications and things like that are needed from the At-Large community?"

Justine, did you have other thoughts on the specific status updates that they've made with respect to Subsequent Procedures that we may want to raise with the Board? Sorry to put you on the spot.

JUSTINE CHEW: No, no worries. I haven't fully thought this through yet, but preliminary I think I need to examine the work of the SubPro ODP Team and what they're producing in terms of the ODA. My understanding is that the ODA is expected to come out sometime this month.

So that gives us an opportunity to examine what it is that they are making assumptions for and possibly advising the Board on. Because, as far as I understand, our advice to the Board on Subsequent Procedures which contains, as they categorize it, 40 recommendations. And that's the 40 recommendations that are categorized as Phase 2 in the Excel spreadsheet that we just talked about last week. [inaudible].

But in any event, I think there could be potential for us to examine the outputs, the ODA, and to see whether we need to revisit any of the ALAC positions or recommendations. And then, in conjunction with that, also go back to the Board and say, "Well, the ODA is out."

Do you have a timeline for when you're going to respond to the ALAC advice? Because we're still waiting on that, number one. Number two, as you said, possibly any further clarification needed? Number three is, possibly given the ODA, we might want to amend some of our recommendations and even possibly look at what other constituencies are saying.

So, one idea that I brought up before, earlier—and of course, this is subject to discussion—was that if there was something, new information, that we could rely on in order to change our recommendation or change our position, whether it's in compromise or not, but make it more aligned with the positions of other constituencies

in order to help the Board work towards a more well-accepted, across-Board, community-wide accepted position rather than have one constituency saying something and then another constituency saying the direct opposite.

So those are my preliminary thoughts at the moment. I do need some time to put more meat to the bones and to refine that approach, possibly. So I would welcome ideas. But, yeah, I do need time to think about it a little bit more.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thanks, Justine. I think that's fine and warranted. I think we have until the 9th of September to finalize these questions. So, we do get an ODA report in August. That will help a lot to bring some clarity, at least, to the environment in which the Board will be addressing our advice. So I think that can be it for now. We're running over time. But we'll keep this conversation going.

Olivier, I think I can return it to back to you.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much, Jonathan. And we therefore open up the floor, also, for any Any Other Business. Anything else. I'm not seeing any hands up at the moment, so that takes us to Agenda Item 7. And that's, of course, our next meeting.

YEŞIM SAGLAM: Thank you. So as we're rotating, next week's meeting is on Wednesday, the 10th of August at 19:00 UTC.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Thank you very much for this, Yeşim. I wonder whether that is correct. I thought that there was going to be a … Was there not going to be a collision or something with this? 19:00 UTC clashes with SO/AC chairs call.

YEŞIM SAGLAM: Correct. But because Jonathan said that he will need to be an apology next week, just regardless of [inaudible]. So I think we agreed to stick to our usual time.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: Sorry, I didn't read the line. I didn't hit my head that I was going to fly solo next week. Jonathan, any other things that we need to cover today? 19:00 UTC next week it is. Is there anything else we need to cover?

JONATHAN ZUCK: I don't think so. It was a good discussion on NCAP, for sure, so I'm glad we did it.

OLIVIER CRÉPIN-LEBLOND: It was an excellent discussion. And thanks very much to our interpreters, of course, and to our real-time text transcriber. A great

service. Do remember, after you've closed the Zoom window, to answer the questions about that service so that we can continue having it.

And I just hope that everyone's really enjoyed the call today. So thanks for attending. It's been really, really interesting. Have a very good week. Continue with the discussion on the mailing list. And, Jonathan, have a have a good break next week. As well as everyone else. But a very good morning, afternoon, evening, or night, wherever you are. Goodbye.

YEŞIM SAGLAM: Thank you all. This meeting is now adjourned. Have a great rest of the day.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]