Internationalized Domain Names Expedited Policy Development Process

Continued Discussion of String Similarity Small Group Outputs



IDN-EPDP Team Meeting #49 | 26 August 2022

Agenda

- 1. Roll Call & SOI Updates (2 min)
- 2. Welcome & Chair Updates (5 min)
- 3. Continued Discussion of String Similarity Small Group Outputs (80 min)
- 4. AOB (3 mins)



Small Group Recommendation: Hybrid Model

Summary: The small group recommends the hybrid model, which is a mixed-level approach between level 2 and level 3

Goal: Mitigate any possibility of confusing similarity between one IDN TLD and another IDN TLD or any of its valid variant(s)

In practice, the string similarity review must be modified to compare:

An applied-for primary IDN gTLD and <u>all of its allocatable variant label(s)</u>

Against:

- Existing TLDs and all of their allocatable and blocked variant labels;
- Strings requested as IDN ccTLDs and all of their allocatable and blocked variant labels;
- Other applied-for gTLDs in the same round and <u>all of their allocatable and blocked variant labels</u>;
- Reserved Names; and
- Any other two-character ASCII strings and <u>all of their allocatable and blocked variant labels</u> (if the applied-for primary IDN gTLD is a two-character string)

In addition, compare:

• All of the blocked variant label(s) of an applied-for primary IDN gTLD

Against:

Existing TLDs and <u>all of their allocatable variant labels</u>

Note: Blocked variants of one IDN TLD should NOT be compared against blocked variants of another IDN TLD



Relevant Background for Consideration of Hybrid Model

- RFC 5891: Any domain name registry, including that of the root zone, should develop and apply additional restrictions as needed to reduce confusion and other problems (part of IDNA2008 standard)
- RFC 6921: Zones higher in the DNS tree tend to have **more restrictive rules**...the context is that the root zone serves the entire Internet population
- □ SAC089: Confusability cannot be considered in isolation from other issues related to security. Phishing and other social engineering attacks based on domain name confusion are a security problem for end users
- Staff Paper: Variant implementation must be done in a way that operation and maintenance of the DNS not be adversely impacted by the introduction of variants; it should avoid including variant TLDs in a manner that would create user vulnerabilities or a probability of confusion




Discussion Recap

- □ EPDP Team had **general support** for comparing the **primary** labels and **requested allocatable** variant labels
- Some EPDP Team members expressed **reservations** about including **non-requested allocatable** variant labels and **blocked** variant labels in the String Similarity Review
- String Similarity Small Team recommends the hybrid model to meet the singular goal of risk mitigation of failure modes, which are 1) denial of service, and 2) misconnection
- String Similarity Small Team believes that the string similarity review provides an opportunity to mitigate such risks as much as possible
- String Similarity Small Team did not consider implementation complexity of the hybrid model and deferred this to EPDP Team to deliberate



Denial of Service: Example & Illustration

A user attempts to visit http://example.X, reading it as being the same as the http://example.Y that, for example, he or she saw in an advertisement. After typing the address (http://example.X), the connection does not work as http://example.X is not registered.






Denial of service will likely cause user confusion and frustration but not harm



Misconnection: Example & Illustration

A user attempts to visit http://example.X, reading it as being the same as the http://example.Y that, for example, he or she saw in an advertisement. After clicking on http://example.Y, the user arrives at a site controlled by a registrant different to http://example.X.





Misconnection: Potential Consequences



Misconnection may be **more problematic than denial of service** and cause more harm to the user beyond confusion and frustration



Arriving at the wrong site, even legitimate, can result in credential compromise and accidental exposure of information



If confusing similarity is maliciously leveraged, it can be a **DNS abuse** vector. When confusion is at the top-level, the possibility of DNS abuse is **much greater** than that at second-level



Why Should Blocked Variants Be Part of String Similarity Review?


A label used in everyday life can be considered a blocked variant label by RZ-LGR calculation. End users can perceive and intend to access a blocked variant label domain name without knowing that it does not exist in the root zone

Variants are blocked by RZ-LGR for various reasons, but they still have a potential to cause confusion or even harmful consequences for end users. Reasons for blocking variants include, but not limited to:

- Apply more restricted rule to the root zone
- Reduce mutation issues
- Avoid overproduction issue
- Reduce redundant, infrequently used, or less desired characters
- Provide more flexibility for gTLD applicant
- Consider usability, correctness, manageability, and other factors



Misconnection Involving Blocked Variants: Example and Illustration





Next Steps

EPDP Team to determine if the hybrid model is the appropriate path forward, taking into account factors such as:

- ☐ Risk analysis likelihood and impact of failure modes, especially the misconnection risk
- Operational impact of the hybrid model
- ☐ Cost and benefit of the hybrid model



2012 New gTLD Program Implementation Review

- InterConnect Communications and the University College London acted as the String Similarity evaluation panel
- The panel identified 234 contention sets, composed of 754 applications
 - 230 exact match contention sets (including ASCII strings and IDN strings)
 - 2 non-exact match ASCII contentions sets (.HOTELS/.HOTEIS; .UNICOM/.UNICORN)
 - 2 non-exact match IDN contention sets, which have variant relationship (.盛贸饭店/.盛貿飯店; .**点看**/.點看)
- Evaluation results were published later than originally scheduled (forecasted in Nov 2012, but not published until 26 Feb 2013)
- Delay due to volume of unique strings 1,380 unique applied-for strings resulting in over 1 million combinations requiring review
- Results were released two weeks before deadline to file String Confusion Objection, leaving limited time to prepare an objection
- Community indicated dissatisfaction with the result in regard to singular and plural versions of strings, which were not found to be confusingly similar by the panel; several applicants filed String Confusion Objection to challenge the review results

