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Heather Dryden: I will be the Co-Chair for this session with the Chair of the Review Team, Alejandro Pisanty, so if you could please.

Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you very much, Heather. Thanks, members of the GAC for receiving us, for opening your doors to us. Also present in the room are a large fraction of the Review Team; many of them are sitting on the end and a few are in other places. For the sake of time I will spare the reading of a roll call. If I can have the next slide please?

Thank you. I will briefly describe to you the status of the Review Team's work at this point. As you know the Team for reviewing ICANN's compliance with its functions of preserving and enhancing the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS was mandated by the Affirmation of Commitments. It's in this way substituting for the oversight function that was previously asserted under the MOUs and similar consensual instruments with the United States Government, and also this means that the Team was formed following a very specific recipe on roles so that different fractions of the ICANN community provided members. And the GAC provides leadership through Heather Dryden, through her designee Alice Muyua, and through the participation of the member Anders Rafting of Sweden.

We were chartered in the middle of last year. The team composition was announced around September. We first came

together in December of 2010. Previous to the meeting here in Singapore we met in December, 2010, in Cartagena and then in March, 2011, in San Francisco. We have suffered some attrition; some of the members who were originally appointed to the Review Team have not been able to continue to work with the Team. Other members have not been able to continue in leadership positions that we have internally but continue to serve with the Team, and we're looking in some specific cases where there were designations to have them replaced.

The Team decided to work on this review, doing basically two things – one of them is analyzing, screening, and evaluating what is stated in a documentary basis, which starts from the bylaws and goes through important places like contracts which have significance for the security, stability or resiliency or all three of them. And we have been conducting and will be conducting a much more intensive program of interviews with different participants, both individual and corporate, which also have a bearing or an opinion on these issues.

We have grouped the issues that we're analyzing, and therefore the documents and these different people and instances, in three sets of issues. One set of issues is governance which means basically what are the rules, policies, etc. which have a bearing; define the scope, define the action and maybe define also the risk management rules in general for ICANN in terms of stability, security, and resiliency of the DNS. The second one, which looks at the implementation of these rules – how these things are actually

being carried out, how they are working in reality; and the third focuses on contingencies, which means mostly looking at how new threats are recognized, how sensitive the systems in place are to actually discovering these new threats and creating reactions to them, and to things like business continuity and in general the contingency aspect of risk management.

These document basis I've mentioned classified by these three criteria have been submitted to some preliminary analysis. Preliminary means not in-depth analysis for each document since it's a very huge basis – it's probably more than 100 documents that have this type of relevance. So the first thing has been to thrash among this set, decide which are the documents that we really need to analyze and not waste time in documents which have very little significance. On the other hand, documents may be relatively of little bearing on the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS in themselves but they form part of a system in which they may become significant.

And we will be, during the Boreal summer, from now to October we are planning to intensify this work. Tomorrow we'll have our first drafting session in which we'll begin to establish what are the null hypotheses for statements about each of these documents and to further test them and explore them; and finalize a set of interview questions that we have to standardize according to different methodological views of how security audits are conducted and without going too much into a technical detail which may be irrelevant for the large-scale picture that the ICANN

community needs. Defining the scope of the review is a constantly iterative exercise, and as mentioned the metrics are basically methods of inquiry, document analysis, some of the collective decision making methods and the interviews.

The next one, very briefly I will just show you the next three slides. First the one that's upcoming with only trying to show you the headers of these three slides, which are the three sections in which we believe this final report will take shape. One of them is the scope of ICANN's security, stability and resiliency responsibility consistent with the limited technical responsibility of ICANN and divided into three spheres which is what ICANN actually controls, what ICANN only influences, and the very broad set of operations and actions going on in the DNS that are outside ICANN's control and very marginally in ICANN's influence, and therefore can mostly invite a contingency type of reaction.

Second, this set, we are looking at the effectiveness of implementation of the security, stability and resiliency plan; and in the next one we are looking at the risk landscape and contingency planning – as I mentioned, how the risk landscape is established, identified and so forth, and how planning goes for it and so forth; and when there have been chances to test this contingency plan, how they do come out.

The kind of questions we are looking at in the next slide – we are providing you this not necessarily for study. We don't intend for you to study these questions right now; I'll tell you what I think would be most productive. But the kinds of questions we will be

asking is for each party whether they believe that ICANN has a clear remit code for the security, stability and resiliency of the DNS; what's your understanding of it; whether you believe this remit is correct, whether this remit is appropriate or whether it should be reduced, or if it's too broad in your opinion; or on the contrary if it's not covering enough let's say risks or people, how it should be enhanced.

The next one will be asking each of these parties that we interview whether they think that ICANN clearly states its goals in security, stability and resiliency, whether they track its performance against those goals; whether this is reflected in the budget and so on. You have several more slides which I won't show right now. The presentation's available for you. These are example questions. They are not definitive in any way for three reasons: first, because they are still under discussion; second, they only cover one of the three aspects – these are more the governance related ones, they are not the implementation or the contingency ones in particular.

And the third reason they are not definitive is the most important one, and the reason to be here, which is we need to interact with you in the coming weeks, with the GAC, in order to know what specific kind of formulation interview questions could elicit a response that's the most open and thorough from governmental parties. If we go and ask a head of state whether they believe that ICANN's budget has been properly marked and followed we may be asking the wrong question to the wrong person, and we will get no answer, no promise for a reply and so forth. So we want to

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work with you in a way that really leads for this to be most productive.

And therefore we will also look, the other most important outcome for us from this meeting and the coming weeks of interaction, is to make sure that the SSR RT – the Security, Stability and Resiliency Review Team – is focusing on the right priorities, whether from the GAC’s point of view in particular: let’s say the most hot button issues are still within what we’re scoping, whether the scope has shifted. We are reminded, I’ll bring this to the table, that the initial terms of reference for the review were established around a year ago. A lot of things have happened since then. There may be new risks; there may be things that you think have lost priority against others that have gained so. And those are our main concerns for this meeting.

I’ll stop there and open it up for whatever the Chair decides to do.

Heather Dryden:

Thank you very much for that presentation. Are there any questions or comments coming from GAC members for the Review Team? Italy, please.

Stefano Trumpy:

Thank you, Alejandro, for this description of the work of the Review Team. Let me say that looking at the public policy aspects no doubt the question of security, stability is a very important one, very central I would say. It is, looking at the questions that you

pose, I could say that we obviously are – at least I am speaking for Italy – in favor of a limited role of ICANN and that is confined to the security of the DNS. But this is in any case large enough because on one side there is the promotion of DNSSEC and there is the idea of setting up this DNS Cert, and the activity of DNS no doubt is central also in the analysis of the Certs because in the end the registries are a partner that is very important in any kind of tracking of what's happening there.

And also ICANN has a special aspect – at least there is one organization that centrally organizes the questions concerning the security and stability aspects of the DNS. While the security is a very huge, very large spectrum of different organizations and there is not efficient or centralized coordination, so I think ICANN could be seen as a good example of something that actually functions and so I can imagine that there could be a temptation to invite ICANN to enlarge its aspects on security. Okay, these are considerations just to encourage this very, very important work that the Review Team is conducting. Thank you.

Heather Dryden:

Thank you, Italy. Jeff?

Jeff Brueggeman:

Thank you. I was just going to elaborate on one point that Alejandro made that I think might be of particular interest to- Oh sorry, Jeff Brueggeman with AT&T, a member of the Review Team. I think we have heard a recurring theme as we have talked

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to the community about recognizing ICANN's limited role; at the same time, as Alejandro described, there is an element of ICANN being part of a much larger group of organizations and entities that can help secure the DNS. And I think that includes cooperating with governments and law enforcement as a key component of that.

So again, that's an area where striking the right balance between not extending ICANN's role but recognizing that there are things that they can do to be viewed as a credible partner with government and security is something that would probably I think be of value to the Review Team, to get your insights and thoughts on. Thank you.

Heather Dryden: Thank you. Sweden?

Maria Häll: Thank you very much, Heather, and thank you very much also for this presentation. And I absolutely agree with my colleague from Italy that this is a very, very important area. Could you please go back to the previous slide because I have actually two questions, because the first – this is question three and four, I would like to see questions one and two please, if somebody could jump back... Thank you very much.

I wanted to ask a little bit about security and stability. I understand that this is focused on the technical aspects on the security and

stability of the DNS system, but I wonder whether you are actually also looking upon the security and stability for the organization. And you, Jeff, from AT&T, you little bit touched upon it because security and stability is a little bit wider – it has to do with cooperation with other stakeholders and it could have to do also with security and stability for the organization itself.

Of course that is going to be a very large scope for the Review Team of course, but in some way or another these things hang together in a way. So I just wanted to know if these aspects are going to be in the review. Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty:

Thank you for this. This is one of the very important questions which define the scope of the work of this review team. There's absolutely yes, the answer is yes. We intend to look at the most significant factors that affect systemic stability of the organization. We do not have the constitution, the forces or the budget to go into let's say a detailed analysis of the activity logs of the routers of every registry. That activity is mostly performed by consultants which are hired by the companies anyway. We have to look more at whether say ICANN in a much larger way has the processes to make sure that the companies are operating in secure conditions and that the risks of all layers are being managed.

And as you mentioned there's always a concern for the stability of the organization, its components, its ability to perform its roles in general; and in particular what we are charged with is to review its

ability to perform its role with respect to these stability functions. And again, we are not equipped nor budgeted nor have the time... I mean we could extend this forever but we don't intend to extend this forever to do a detailed political analysis of those factors but they will certainly be there.

When you look at these questions, and I would like to focus your attention again on what these questions mean at this moment: these are the questions that we will be asking for people we interview. We have the picture that we will be interviewing something between 20 and 50 entities. Some of them will be ccTLDs, some of them will be gTLD registries, some of them will be government representatives or the GAC as a body; some of them will be people who are knowledgeable with the system who have built it over many years. And we will be asking them these questions in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the risk management process.

I have to remind that risk management, better than security, means identifying the risks, preparing a reaction to them, transferring the risk – for example by insurance or by spreading it amongst several parties; identifying when something's actually happening, detecting, mitigating, creating business continuity and so forth. So what these questions are asked to do is not asking them to you right now, but to give you a taste of the interview we will be conducting with, for example in your case, a representative of your government or with a representative of the root server that operates

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in Sweden to ask them whether they believe these things are well defined.

And there will be many more operational-like questions, and there will be of course questions that will explore things like you've mentioned – “What do you see as the main threats within your scope?” So for some of the operators the threats that we're asking about are very much IT technical kind of threats, denial of service attacks; and for other parties it will be the stability of ICANN as an organization as you mentioned.

Heather Dryden: Thank you. I have Malta next.

Joseph Tabone: Yes, thank you very much, Chair, and that was a very, very informative and reassuring presentation. Actually my question really follows on Maria and relates to this very first question. I think that you've answered it to a certain extent, but I wonder whether what was posed there is a rhetorical question. I realize that security is a very, very broad aspect in this, but is the question really lack of clarity in terms of ICANN's responsibility as far as security and stability. I think if you can elaborate on that... Thank you.

Alejandro Pisanty: Very glad to, sir. In fact when I mentioned in an earlier slide that defining the scope of the review is an iterative process, it starts

because defining the scope of ICANN's work in security and stability is an ongoing work all the time. Let me put this in the way of an example that will probably be clearer.

The DNS, Domain Name System is a very large, widespread system. It's distributed globally. There are hundreds of thousands of domain name resolvers, name resolvers in every organization. One could ask if you really wanted to know everything that could affect the Domain Name System's security, stability and ability to rebound from damage – which is more the resiliency side – you have to ask whether these 250,000 or million or whatever the number is of domain name servers – you can't even know actually how many there are – how they are managed or whether they have good software, whether the software is patched and so forth.

So we know that's beyond the scope – we know that's beyond the scope. The [L server] that's run by ICANN is within the scope. The 13 root servers seem to be within the scope. Registry/registrar contracts seem to be within the scope. The contracts that ICANN has with companies for escrow of registry and registrar data are clearly within the scope. How much do we have to look at the ways every individual ccTLD managers manage their domain name resolution or the domain name registration and changes?

That is on the border of what would be or not be within scope theoretically, and it will also be defined in practice by trying to get a review of looking at the 20% most significant information that allows for us, for the community to make 80% of its decisions; and

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a very, very pragmatic approach. I don't know if this leads to a reply to your questions.

Heather Dryden: Thank you. Jeff, did you want to comment? And then Kenya.

Jeff Brueggeman: I just had an additional comment in response to Maria's question. I think that we also were driven by the fact that the Accountability and Transparency Review Team to some extent was looking at some of the organizational stability in that institutional confidence sense, so when we looked at our mandate under our Review Team we felt that it was more focused on security issues. But that said we are looking at ICANN's direct operations in that area including budget and staff and all of those direct functions, so I think we are somewhat looking at it but not taking on too broad of an issue here.

And I also think we feel like our job is not to do a security audit of ICANN but really to look at the process and the structures that they have in place and say "Are these the types of things that are addressing the problems?" And if we see something that raises a concern it's likely to be a process question for us.

Heather Dryden: Kenya, please.

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Alice Munyua: Thank you, Heather. Yeah, to follow up on what Jeff is saying here and Alejandro, I think the issue of the scope of ICANN's limited technical mission has actually been an issue that has been brought up by other stakeholder groups, and I think it's one issue that our team is going to be analyzing rigorously to ensure that we come up with recommendations as to how ICANN deals with it. Because you can't escape the fact that yes, ICANN's mission is very limited technically but it impacts on quite a number of other areas, and so the Review Team is going to be looking at that issue as an area that's a challenge as well. Thank you.

Heather Dryden: Thank you very much for that, Kenya. We are close to the end of our time so unless there are points that people particularly want to make... A quick one, Italy? A short one? Okay, please.

Stefano Trumpy: If ICANN dedicates enough money to the theme of security – this is a very important one – but ICANN is a company that provides services, and the provisional services is the basis for funding. So the real thing that has to be convincing towards the users of the services is that the security is maybe 10% or 12% of the cost that they pay for the addresses in numeric or alpha-numeric. So this is a critical issue to try to make the users evaluate which is the right percentage, and then push ICANN to do this.

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Alejandro Pisanty: Thank you, Stefano. The thing we're meaning to obtain from this session is exactly that kind of point of view, and we'll need to also find out whether these are individual country representatives' views or they are more broadly shared. I guess we will work with the GAC representatives in our Team and with the GAC leadership to refine this aspect, but certainly I have no bias about that issue that you mentioned. What we need to know is that that question is important to you. And I'm sorry, I'm not playing psychoanalyst and asking you why you think that point of analysis is important. We really believe that we need to know from you the ways you need for us to throw light on the issues.

Heather Dryden: Thank you. Kenya?

Alice Munyua: Yes, just to reemphasize Alejandro's point in terms of how important it is to get a response from GAC members regarding some of the gaps and how we move forward, and especially ensuring that this review takes into consideration government input so that ICANN's security/stability activities are taken seriously is very important. And perhaps we can discuss that further within the GAC. Thank you.

Heather Dryden: Thank you, Kenya. I think that's a good proposal. It's often the case that there isn't clarity for governments about precisely what

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ICANN's role is and should be related to security, stability and resiliency. So that's an important aspect for us to clarify and to do our utmost to be clear on.

So okay, let me then draw this session to a close and let us agree that we will do what we can to provide inputs and feedback to the Review Team. And as you know, Alice, Kenya is our GAC representative on that Review Team so she can certainly assist with that I think. So thank you very much, Alejandro, and to all the members of the Review Team here for your work, and we look forward to working with you as your work develops.

Alejandro Pisanty:

Thank you on behalf of the team members.

Heather Dryden:

Thank you. So for the GAC if you could just stay seated, I just want to have a quick discussion with you about the communiqué and then we can take a break and then we can come back and actually determine how we're going to proceed to work on our communiqué.

Okay. So I understand that a first draft was circulated to the GAC list, oh, okay – it hasn't been circulated to the GAC list. A first draft went to the topic leaders and to the vice-chairs at the end of the day yesterday. I don't know whether you've had a chance to look at that version, and I understand that a further updated version

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is now available taking into account that we've had meetings following yesterday.

So we can either take some time now where those that have lead or particular interest in certain topics actually look at the text and work with the Secretariat, not in this format but in groups or some such thing; or we can take an alternative approach. Or we can of course go with the version that we have prepared by the Secretariat projected and go through our usual process to finalize that text. But I'm looking for guidance. If it's not available we can take a break and we can sort that out. Yeah? Okay, I'm not really seeing thoughts.

Okay, so let's have the coffee break but the break is with the aim of working out how to deal with the communiqué, and so I'll be looking for comments on that. Could the Secretariat circulate the latest version to the list? Okay.

Jeremy Beale:

Sorry. What we've got is a virgin, and I'll say for me it's still very much virgin territory of where we got to, I think where we got to the end of the last session. Obviously I haven't been able to incorporate anything from this session yet. I've had a bit of feedback already on what I circulated to the team leaders last night – thank you very much for that – and that's what it will be. So it's been a little bit of sort of fiddling with but basically right open for you to deal with, minus this session.

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Heather Dryden: Okay. So the Secretariat will circulate that to the list now. Let's have a look and determine what's the best approach for finalizing the text today if we can, okay? So let's have a break and try to reconvene in 30 minutes, but if we need longer to sort ourselves out that's fine. UK, please.

Mark Carvell: Could we also have hard copies? I mean I like paper. I know I shouldn't say this in this environment.

Heather Dryden: Yes, when we reach that point of finalizing the text then we should have hard copies of that, certainly yes. European Commission?

William Dee: Yes, thank you, and thank you, Jeremy, for taking that initiative. Following the discussions we had on gTLDs yesterday, I know some of us had already been working on a first draft for the gTLD bit actually. So I wonder, looking at my colleagues I wonder whether we might ask you to put that in that part, actually. I haven't had a chance to read through yours yet, actually, but I think because we're maybe a bit more advanced in terms of building consensus on that one, if we could substitute the text we were working on actually for that, champ, before you circulate it to the rest of the GAC and print the copies it'd probably save a bit of time. Thank you.

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Heather Dryden: Yes, that can be done. Okay. Kenya?

Alice Munyua: Yeah, not about the communiqué but following our meeting with ALAC there was a suggestion regarding the possibility of having a joint statement, and I was wondering whether that could also be circulated. I've already passed it on to the Secretariat. It's just a page and I think the idea is to just have consensus, whether we need to have that joint statement at the Public Forum tomorrow or we don't. So if that's okay, Heather?

Heather Dryden: Let's have hard copies of that as well circulated so that when we reconvene we decide how to address that. Okay, alright. So the Secretariat will circulate the latest version using text on gTLDs that has been prepared by a number of you in the GAC. Okay, alright. So in 30 minutes we'll try to reconvene, okay? Thank you.

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