



European Commission's Study on Domain Name System (DNS) Abuse

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8 March 2022 – IPC Membership Meeting





Agenda



- 1. Objectives
- 2. Methodology
- 3. Timeline
- 4. Definition
- 5. Magnitude
- 6. Good practices
- 7. Recommendations





1. Objectives

- categories, role of actors, magnitude) DNS abuse phenomenon (definition,
- Policies, laws, industry practices
- address it Measures (technical and policy) needed to






2. Methodology

- surveys, in-depth interviews, workshops Primary research: real-time measurements,
- Real-time measurements: analysis of 2.7 domain and URL blacklists abused domain names using reputed million incidents and 1.68 million
- Secondary research: review of third-party reports





3. Timeline







4. Definition of DNS abuse

- (e.g., phishing, malware) Limit of the (many) terminologies used so far: technical vs content-related threats – often overlap
- Our definition:

out harmful or illegal activity. makes use of domain names or the DNS protocol to carry Domain Name System (DNS) abuse is any activity that

- Our approach: bottom-up and distinction between
- maliciously registered domain names
- compromised domain names





4. Definition of DNS abuse

How do we categorize DNS abuse?

- Type 1: abuse related to maliciously registered domain names
- Type 2: abuse related to the operation of the DNS and other infrastructures
- Type 3: abuse related to domain names distributing malicious content (N.B. may take advantage of maliciously registered or compromised domain names!)





Who should take action to mitigate DNS abuse? 4. Definition of DNS abuse

Abuse related maliciously registered domain names (e.g., AGD used for C&C communication) (Type 1)

Remediation at DNS level: Domain reseller (if any) \rightarrow registrar \rightarrow TLD registry

2. Malicious content

2.1 Malicious content distributed using a maliciously registered domain name (e.g., typosquatted domain serving phishing content) (**Type 1 & 3**)

Remediation at hosting level: Hosting reseller (if any) \rightarrow hosting provider <u>AND</u> at DNS level: Domain reseller (if any) \rightarrow registrar \rightarrow TLD registry

compromised domain serving phishing content) (Type 3) 2.2 Malicious content distributed using compromised domain names (e.g.,

reseller (if any) ightarrow hosting provider Remediation at hosting level: Site operator (if any) \rightarrow registrant \rightarrow hosting

ω Abuse related to DNS operations (e.g., DDoS attack against a DNS server) 8 (Type 2) to be addressed at DNS level



Overall health of TLDs:




Figure 1: Divison of the domain namespace per TLD type

- EU ccTLDs are by far the least abused in absolute terms (0.8%) and relative to their market share (14.4%)
- In relative terms, new gTLDs, with an estimated market share of 6.6%, are the most abused the most abuse group of TLDs (20.5%)
- new gTLDs The two most abused new gTLDs combined account for 41% of all abused





the abuse occur? Malicious vs. compromised domain names: where does




Figure 6: Distribution of compromised (blue) and maliciously registered (red) domain names per abuse type


- presumably registered by legitimate users, but compromised at the hosting level. About 25% of phishing and 41% of malware distribution domain names are
- maliciously registered The vast majority of spam and botnet command-and-control domain names are

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Malicious vs. compromised domain names: where does the abuse occur?



type. Figure 7: Distribution of compromised (blue) and maliciously registered (red) domain names per TLD



Registrar reputation (maliciously registered domains):

בומופנ ווונפווומנוטוומי בווווונפט	Eaulicipad.colli licitod	and most host	Web Commerce Communications Limited dba WebNic.cc	Dynadot, LLC	Key-Systems GmbH	Hongkong Domain Name Information Management Co	Xin Net Technology Corporation	ALIBABA.COM SINGAPORE E-COMMERCE PRIVATE LIMITED	PSI-USA, Inc. dba Domain Robot	Alibaba Cloud Computing (Beijing) Co., Ltd.	PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com	NameSilo, LLC	GoDaddy.com, LLC	GMO Internet, Inc. d/b/a Onamae.com	NameCheap, Inc.	Name
1000	1000	ОЛЛ	460	472	269	2251	120	3775	151	420	303	1479	146	49	1068	IANA ID
10,097	10,007	11 051	11,700	14,835	15,056	16,000	18,497	22,139	23,485	35,242	38,804	52,188	53,185	93,905	131,925	# of domains Rate
020		15/	324	69	87	800	110	321	181	62	85	165	8	276	121	Rate

The top five most abused registrars account for 48% of all maliciously registered domain names



Registrar reputation (maliciously registered domains):

Shinjiru Technology Sdn Bhd	Hong Kong Juming Network Technology Co., Ltd	NICENIC INTERNATIONAL GROUP CO., LIMITED	Hongkong Domain Name Information Management Co	Hefei Juming Network Technology Co., Ltd	MainReg Inc.	DOMAINNAME FWY, INC.	DOMAIN ORIENTAL LIMITED	DOMAINNAME BLVD, INC.	DotMedia Limited	FLAPPY DOMAIN, INC.	Global Domain Name Trading Center Ltd	Tencent Cloud Computing (Beijing) Limited Liabi	EIMS (Shenzhen) Culture & Technology Co., Ltd	Xi'an Qianxi Network Technology Co. Ltd.	Name
1741	3855	3765	2251	3758	1917	1871	3252	1870	1863	1872	3792	3755	2485	3825	IANA ID
806	8,478	987	16,000	3,180	182	715	428	903	925	1,538	892	2,315	2,337	454	lins
601	721	726	800	798	836	907	972	1,001	1,037	1,097	1,231	2,351	2,366	6,921	Rate





Hosting provider reputation:

Spam		
AS	# Domains	Rate
GROUP-IID-01	12,282	$3,\!430$
Equinix Japan Enterprise K.K.	8,205	3,305
FEDERAL-ONLINE-GROUP-LLC	7,139	3,292
EONIX-COMMUNICATIONS-ASBLOCK-62904	9,165	3,009
Network-Transit	5,592	1979
SANREN DATA LIMITED	8,065	1,605
DataWeb Global Group B.V.	2,740	1,488
TIER-NET	2,577	1,331
SERVER-MANIA	2,133	1,312
H4Y-TECHNOLOGIES	1,332	1,275
Table 13: Top 10 AS with the highest absolute (# Domains) relative concentrations (Rate) of	ive concentrations	(Rate) of


blacklisted domains grouped by their corresponding AS size (10k, 100k) and abuse type

domains reach 3,000 abused domains per 10,000 registered Hosting providers with disproportionate concentrations of spam domain names

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5. Magnitude of DNS abuse

Targeted brands and names:



by APWG, PhishTank, and OpenPhish blacklists as phishing





protection protocols: Adoption of DNS security extensions and email

the overall level of DNSSEC, DMARC and SPF adoption remains low







6. Good practices

Туре	Good practices	Example
Preventive	Anti-abuse / acceptable use policy	PIR, Donuts, .eu, .hu
	KYBC procedure	.eu, .dk
	Employment of machine learning	.eu, .nl
	predictive technology to identify abusive registrations	
	Delayed delegation	.eu, .dk, .hu
	Cross-checks in public databases	.eu, .dk, .no
	Incentive programs (discount) to promote healthy registrations	PIR, .eu
	DNSSEC deployment and other security solutions	ty PIR, .eu, .dk, .nl, .se, .cz, .no, .sk
	Preventive blocking services	Donuts, UNR
Reactive	Regular WHOIS accuracy verification	.eu, .dk, .be, .no, .hu
	Manual content check	.eu
	Surveillance / search service	.be, .nl
	Collaborations with LEA and trusted notifiers	PIR, Donuts, .eu, .dk, .be
	Notice & take down procedures	.be, .nl
	suspension	PIR
Transparency and information	Publication of abuse metrics and statistics	PIR
	Foreseeable response time to abuse reports	Donuts
	Easy to access information on how to report abuse / abuse point of contact	Donuts, .eu, .be, .fr, .at, .uk, .no
	Adherence to voluntary / self-regulatory initiatives promoting collaborations among DNS service providers	PIR, Donuts





7. Recommendations

mitigate DNS abuse Set of 27 recommendations in 6 areas for improvements of measures to

- ≥ Better DNS metadata for identifying resources and their attribution to Intermediaries
- B. Contact information and abuse reporting
- <u>0</u> maliciously registered domain name (Type 1) Improved prevention, detection, and mitigation of DNS abuse related to
- D. content (Type 3) Improved detection and mitigation of DNS abuse related to malicious
- Ш Better protection of the DNS operations and other infrastructures and preventing DNS abuse (Type 2)
- Π. EU level DNS abuse awareness, knowledge building, and mitigation collaboration at 200





7. Recommendations

Registries – registrars – resellers:

- build standard (centralized) systems for abuse reporting
- verify accuracy of domain registration data (KYBC)
- use of predictive algorithms (or the like) to prevent abusive registrations
- identify registries/registrars/resellers with respect to concentration and rates of abuse in their ecosystems
- monitor abuse rates by independent researchers
- sanctions: revoke accreditation if abuse rates exceed predetermined thresholds
- incentives: financial rewards for lower abuse rates





7. Recommendations

Hosting providers

- identify hosting providers with respect to concentration and rates of abuse and hosting infrastructure abuse in their ecosystems
- monitor of abuse rates by independent researchers
- abuse rates not to exceed predetermined thresholds
- encourage development financial or technical solutions to effectively curb hosting and content abuse
- employ advanced prevention/remediation techniques to quickly curb abuses of hosting nfrastructure and subdomain names

Collaboration, awareness and knowledge building at EU level:

- harmonize ccTLD operation by adoption of good practices
- require cooperation with gov't institutions, LEAs and trusted notifiers
- encourage awareness raising, knowledge building to make affected parties aware of existing measures tackling DNS Abuse 20 20

Download the study here:

Main Report: https://op.europa.eu/s/vLE5

Technical Report: <u>https://op.europa.eu/s/vLE6</u>

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