**NCAP discussion group call on 14th April at 1900 UTC**

Agenda:

1. Welcome and roll call
2. ICANN Board's questions regarding name collisions: ICANN Board's Questions Regarding Name Collision
3. AOB

## Table of Contents



## Reviewed NCAP DG's breakdown of work

1. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
   We are bringing on a Tech Analyst who will review the name-collision reports that ICANN received over the last 10 years (after ICANN gets Legal consent from each reporter).

2. REFINE QUESTIONS FOR DATA COLLECTION
   We need to refine the data collection questions we will pose to entities we reach out to. Matt T. is going to do first draft.

3. RESPONSE TO BOARD QUESTIONS
   There is 1 Google Doc per Board question to keep team notes on, but will not share these outside of the DG. Amy will occasionally summarize to share on the wiki.

4. NAME COLLISION ANALYSIS AND DATA SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

## Board Question #2 Notes are found in this Google Drive document.

*#2: The role that negative answers currently returned from queries to the root for these strings play in the experience of the end user, including in the operation of existing end systems.*

Notes taken by Tech Writer Heather during meeting:

RE: the explicit dependency - the bifurcation of the stub resolvers into different app stacks has changed since 2012. That's going to have an impact going forward, and may limit the value of the information in the earlier report and research. Application logic may change based on the DNS responses.

- What is the role of the addition of applications incorporating sub resolvers directly rather than depending on recursive/iterative resolvers

## Board Question #3 Notes are found in this Google Drive document

*#3. The harm to existing users that may occur if Collision Strings were to be delegated, including harm due to end systems no longer receiving a negative response and additional potential harm if the delegated registry accidentally or purposely exploited subsequent queries from these end systems, and any other types of harm.*

Notes taken by Tech Writer Heather during meeting:

Think of this around the consequences for what happens if collision happens:

- signaling interruption (how will apps and/or program logic change)
- interception and manipulation (the name is resolving in an unintended manner, opening the door to a MitM attack, data leakage, or other issues)
    - there is research on wpad and other similar things that we can use
    - two sorts of categories here
        - disclosure of information
        - security compromise
    - are there harms that can be prevented through contracted relationships (i.e., ICANN contracted parties)? would be good to separate out the issues of incompetence from inherent problems with new gTLDs
        - harms you can do something about
            - a MitM attack by a malicious registry
            - Unclear if harms can be prevented by contracts; this doesn't directly help the impacted party.
        - harms that can't be controlled
            - a MitM attack by another registrant

- The above can be categorized as we dive into some of the details. Example: think of previous case studies, which identified some systemic vs specific issues.
- We'll need to be careful to stay focused on name collision issues; vendors not recognizing some TLDs is not a name collision problem.
    - in the case where that leads to collisions or is a result of collisions, that may well be in our remit. Think: .crypto
- The harms in the case of blockchain projects are where those projects are establishing mappings between 'names' and wallet or contract addresses. A gTLD delegated to the root name system might create a MIM. I don't want to expand the z-axis of this topic, but it might be worth having this on the radar.
- Are we giving people incentive to work around the concept of one authoritative root? If we take the view that we have to look out for the potential victim instead of focusing on the party causing the issue, ICANN would never delegate anything again and other parties would create their own systems. We can't really address the "what if" questions.
    - when we talk about mitigation, we'll have to talk about how the different elements impact the delegation decision
    - need to distinguish between causes, effects, and remedies. Also, there is more than one remedy besides "delegate/not delegate"
- As we iterate on the harms, need to be clear on "harms to whom"
    - .crypto example: people who set that up were aware of real root and how it works. They have chosen to use that string. If it gets delegated, they get harmed, but so does everyone who has registered in that namespace and who doesn't know about ICANN. The potential operator is also potentially harmed since .crypto won't work as well as other TLDs
        - Though the users/registrants who are ultimately harmed are also protected by the law (e.g., pyramid scheme protections)
        - When we're looking at victimization, and what our response is to this problem, we need to consider the principle of "buyer beware". We can't exclude the fact we'll have to call out the problem exists, even if we don't have an answer to it.

        - Laws may provide remedies, but we need to consider order at the root. The remedies may not be “let the collision live because registrants have signed up to it”
    - would be helpful, if only for our own purposes, to be clear what are known (explicit, active today) harms vs what are theoretical/future looking




https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-redirection-com-net-09jul04-en.pdf

## OPEN QUESTIONS

**During Board Question #2 Discussion:**

- What is the role of the addition of applications incorporating stub resolvers directly rather than depending on recursive/iterative resolvers

**During Board Question #3 Discussion**

- signaling interruption (how will apps and/or program logic change)
- are there harms that can be prevented through contracted relationships (i.e., ICANN contracted parties)?
- Are we giving people incentive to work around the concept of one authoritative root?
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## ACTION ITEMS

None.