
BRENDA BREWER: Good day, everyone. Welcome to the SSR2 Plenary Call #132 on the 17th of December 2020 at 15:00 UTC.

Members attending the call today are Danko, Laurin, Ram Krishna, Russ, Zarko, Norm, and Scott. And Boban is joining us right now. We have observer, Dennis Tan. Apologies from Denise. Attending from ICANN Org: Brenda, Jennifer, Pamela, Steve, and our technical writer, Heather.

Today's meeting is recorded. Please state your name before speaking for the record. Russ, I'll turn the call over to you. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Welcome, everybody, to the last of the SSR2 calls for 2020. We have a long call today hopefully to sort out a final draft of the document. I could tell that everybody has spent time with it based on the number of comments in the document. I'm hoping that they fall into two categories—ones that are editorial suggestions that we can leave to Heather to adjudicate and ones that need team discussion. We only spent time on the call with the second. To that end, I will start with my first one, just to kind of set the example.

I noticed that Recommendation 3.1 and Recommendation 4.1 overlap considerably. The first, 3.1 says let's establish the C-Suite position and give it a budget. And 4.1 says after the C-Suite position is established, give it a budget. So I'm hoping we can reduce the overlap and make only one recommendation.

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KC CLAFFY: Agree.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Agree.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Heather, can we just leave the words to you or do you want us to be more precise than that?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No problem. I got it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Thank you. The next one I want to talk about is Recommendation 18 in terms of the paragraph after the recommendation as the description of what being effective would be. That doesn't make sense to me. I guess it doesn't make sense to Laurin either, although that comment was there when I did mine.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Russ, can you give us the page number that you're on?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I can. It's 41 and it's the second paragraph after Recommendation 18.3.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It just doesn't fit the recommendation above, a way of measuring its effectiveness. Measuring the reduction in harm seems not related to the informing policy debates, which is what the recommendation is about. Does anybody have any suggestions on how to measure this effectiveness, or do we break the template and not include this paragraph? Because we're trying to inform policy discussions.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Just to jump in on this. The reason it was raised this way—and by all means changed it—is since I was trying to consider why does this recommendation exist? What do you want? What were you trying to get to? That was the one I said, did this achieve the intended effect? What was the intended effect of doing this? Why did you make this recommendation at all?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, but I'm not sure how we even measure what you suggested.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Agreed.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But I think the point is to inform the policy discussions, and then of course, I guess it's the policies that are then result—you're measuring like something way downstream, right?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: True.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Russ, this is Kerry.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Kerry.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: If I may jump in. I mean, from all the discussions for this section, I know the intended effect was that this information was more accessible to the persons who needed to create policy. So I think a measurable effect would be when the accessibility, it's probably established. Like, you could probably see more persons using this information in reports, using this information in policies because it's now more accessible. I know we could phrase it but I think the best thing is when you start seeing this data appearing more often in policy, making a policy guidance or anything like that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But it's even the discussions of the policy, this information may not actually appear in the policy itself, right?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: At least inform, raising that awareness.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Inform the discussion, that's exactly the point.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That's easy enough to change.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Super. And my last one that I want to talk about is on 20.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Page 20 or Recommendation 20?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm sorry. Recommendation 20, which is on page 43. The paragraph after the recommendation says that this should be considered implemented when there's reports on the effective propagation delay, but none of those recommendations say anything about propagation delay. So we either need to add something to the recommendation about propagation delay or remove it from this paragraph.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That's actually was one of my concerns in the recommendation as well. If you look at the last paragraph of the finding, there's the point that

there's no propagation. Understanding propagation delay is an issue, but again, we didn't have any recommendation for that. So it's like a finding which is floating out there with nothing.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Except that you said it had to be dealt with to measure it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. That's where I was getting the summaries from, not just the recommendation but from the finding itself to figure out what was intended.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So the disconnect is my issue. I want to add something to the recommendation A 20.3, or do we want to remove the propagation delay from the measure of implemented?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: And if we move from the measure of implementation, I would want to remove it from the findings as well because it doesn't do anything.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm totally fine with that.

KC CLAFFY: I just don't see the problem that we've found that brings us to the—I don't see the finding in this. It's like we found no evidence. First of all, the first one isn't a sentence, right? It's missing.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The first one.

KC CLAFFY: The first sentence in the yellow text, the highlighted text that Heather's got here, it seems to be missing a chunk of it that would make it a sentence. The review team found no evidence that the propagation delay is what?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That should say it was understood.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. But I mean, again, what –

RUSS HOUSLEY: I hear you advocating removal.

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Is anybody going to advocate adding propagation delay to the recommendation? Okay. I'm not hearing anybody advocate. Heather, do you know what to do to the two yellow paragraphs?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. That was my list. Who's next?

KC CLAFFY: I can go next. And sorry, there's so many little knits and things. A lot of mine can be handled by Heather as agree, don't agree, delete. They're just writing things. I think the first not writing thing is on page 8, and I guess we could handle 50% of my comments by just talking about the two big problems with the document that remain, I believe, are the problems that we're trying to solve are not well identified. So I know we did not agree to abide by the new operating procedures that are now a couple years old, I guess. But I think we still need to take into account that people are going to look at this and try to figure out, what problem is this thing trying to solve and how is the solution going to be measured?

So let's go to page 8. First time I say what problem. I think it's on page 8. If anybody sees something in a previous comment that doesn't seem like just an editorial thing, let me know. Nope. Sorry, it's not page 8. Where? I thought it was page 8. It's after page 8. What problem? I guess it's page 10.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. I see it on 10.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. What problem are we trying to solve with this recommendation? It's not clear for both 2.2 and 2.3. Apparently, there was some problem with vulnerability disclosure that I forgot about and it's not in this document. It's not in the findings. And related—I don't know what these anonymous metrics are about. I mean, what number of vulnerability disclosures or something. Is ICANN not already doing that? And then what is the community agreed process that's referred to there? I just got completely lost.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think it's calling for the creation of a community-agreed process. That's how I read it.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. That needs to be made clear.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I read it before your comments were there, but that's how I interpreted those words.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I could chip into that. I think what the anonymous metrics was about—I think it was supposed to be voluntary disclosure. So that’s vulnerability disclosure. That’s why the anonymous metrics would be there. I’m just trying to go back, remembering the discussion, is creating these metrics that persons could report on anonymously. And that was to encourage more reporting on vulnerabilities because it’s anonymous, and then we’ll be able to measure it based on the metrics that’s pre-agreed or published or whatever it might be. I think that’s what the anonymous metrics was about. Just going back from discussion. I think I wasn’t part of this but just remembering when it was discussed about a year ago. That’s what I remember.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Does Heather know enough to fix it? Because I don’t understand if the community-agreed process has to do with the best practices in 2.1, because we don’t reference any best practices. Are we saying they should go invent some?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Heather does not know enough to fix this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. That was going to be my question. So, let’s start with the “what” problem part because there seems to be something missing that led you to write that. That is on page 9, right, that you expected to find the problem?

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

KC CLAFFY: But page 9 is very high level.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Very high level, introducing the whole area.

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And then it jumps into a recommendation with no real findings before it.

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So that looks like there ought to be some findings before Recommendation 2. Heather, did they get reorganized and fall on the floor somewhere?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It did get reorganized quite a bit because when I did that reorg, everything else in this section falls out from this one thing. In a way, it's almost like you're just duplicating the issue over and over again. It all comes back to the fact that ICANN doesn't disclose enough information and isn't transparent about it. Everything else in the resection comes back to this one thing. And so I put it at the top because it influences everything else in the section.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So it sounds like there needs to be a paragraph after the discussion of the Bylaws and before this that says what you just said verbally.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Right. That's what I attempted with the second paragraph. If more words should be there then that's totally cool.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The second paragraph of –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Under key stability issues on page 9.

KC CLAFFY: The fundamental issue is that informs the section. There's a lot of others. But it's this high level transparency thing. And I don't understand transparency about what. 2.1 just says best practices. It doesn't even say about what. Is it about abuse? Is it about hygiene?

Then it says implement them in contract. So there was a recommendation with almost this exact wording in the CCT report, but it was very specifically about anti-abuse, as I recall.

And then the second one, 2.2 jumps into vulnerability disclosure, which we've never talked about in the report yet. I don't know that there's a problem there so I'm utterly confused. Then 2.3 –

RUSS HOUSLEY:

What you're saying is there are no findings that tell you there's a problem.

KC CLAFFY:

Yes. I would argue that that's true for 2.1 because 2.1 is hanging in the wind. I didn't make a comment on this, but I'm reading it again now. It doesn't say what its best practices are about what. It might be that this whole recommendation is supposed to be specifically about vulnerability disclosure. In which case, yes. The problem is what you said. There's no finding that there's a problem with the vulnerability disclosure. And I'm not saying there's not a problem. I'm just saying we don't document it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

Sure. And I'm not advocating for any recommendation at all. That's not my role in all of this. When I pulled this up, this did seem to be referring to everything that ICANN is doing in SSR. So it's hard to point to any one thing because in a way it's throughout the document.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Okay. I think this is the problem here. When this was written, this was specific to vulnerability disclosure, if I remember correctly. I think, Heather, you also mentioned the lack of transparency being an issue throughout the section. I agree but I think what happened here is that this got pulled up over time because it is pretty specific. At least this is how I remember the writing process. So it might make sense to reorganize this and just kind of put it elsewhere and then clarify the findings. I am not sure this recommendation makes sense where it is. Maybe it would make more sense to lead in with the CISO/CSO overall, then go for that logic and add that one at the bottom, noting that problem that information is not properly shared. I think that's important, but there are also other ones, for example, the lack of these procedures being there and clarified. I think that would be another big issue as well. So that's what I would recommend. Put at the bottom of this section and then specify the language more that it's about vulnerability disclosure.

KC CLAFFY:

But then they're just too—okay, I don't know. I don't know. There's three recommendations. One is try to get the contracted parties to do best practices related to vulnerability disclosure. The second is, ICANN should do it. And the third is ICANN should report about the effects of it doing that or something.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. That's my reading. And I feel you could say this would be part of like in a weird way via ISMS, in a way because you do this because you're playing a particular role within the DNS ecosystem. So you kind of play clearinghouse for that. I mean, at least that's my interpretation of what we wanted out of this. Maybe someone else in the Risk team can correct me. I might be wrong.

KC CLAFFY: Talk about lack of transparency. I don't understand this recommendation. Is ICANN supposed to include in the report when there's a vulnerability in Adobe Connect that is being used for conferencing and now it switches to Zoom? I don't understand.

Again, if they were a problem that we were highlighting that we're saying we're trying to prevent this problem from happening again, then it would make more sense to me. But if there's not a problem then I think the whole thing should go and let the CISO figure out that they need best practices and yada yada.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, Laurin, do you have the Risk team document at hand? Was their findings related to vulnerability?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Just a second.

RUSS HOUSLEY: This whole thing could be moved down if we have such findings.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Let me check what I have.

KC CLAFFY: Russ, we need a way to punt topics too later in the call so we can see how many of these comments we can get through, I think, rather than waiting for Laurin to find something.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. I agree. It's also not really my thing. I didn't write it, so I can't speak to it immediately. I need to look it up.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I understand. I was just pointing to you as the leader of the Risk team, but I will put too on something we have come back to. What's your next big comment?

KC CLAFFY: It's on the same page, but I have 15 comments that are the same thing, which is that the recommendation is not SMART, this sort of measurable thing. And I understand. Believe me, I understand the issue here. Because if I could have fixed it, I would have just changed the text.

So I think that my real problem is that we start out the report saying we have gone out of our way to make sure all these recommendations are SMART, when the reality is we have not done that. And partly, when the operating procedures that require that came out, we all balked and said, “Yeah, there’s no way we can do that as a set of volunteers.” So despite how we agree that this is important, I think we need to say at the beginning of the document—and I forget where it was—but we just need to say, “Look, we tried. But the reality is this is going to have to go to the implementation process.”

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: So that’s up on page 5.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I totally get what you’re saying there and it makes a lot of sense that we have come as close as a review team can, but the gap needs to be closed by an implementation plan.

KC CLAFFY: Right. So that’s the last paragraph of section right before background. And I can make a sentence if Heather reminds me. In our defense, they don’t really need to be measurable anymore if nobody else ever has to do this process again.

RUSS HOUSLEY: There is that as well.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: So if we're on that page and we're talking about that text, I also have two observations. Should I throw them in now or should we jump back to it later?

KC CLAFFY: Page 5 or is it 10?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes, page 5. I think one of the important things we should note when we talk about the 24 groups of recommendations is that the way we phrase them and the reason why they're so long is that we realized when we did SSR1 that had kind of nice and handy short recommendations is that they are simply not specific enough for anyone to really do something with them. I think we should note that and kind of say, "Look, this is a lot of text. We did this on purpose because you can actually do something with those now." Or at least we hope so. The next thing that I'm actually commenting on far, far below but I think also kind of belongs here—let me scroll to that comment.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Before we go down, Heather –

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I know this one refers to this. I just made it further down and I want to see the text. That is all. And this refers to—and this is the thing why it’s down there, because we do have the suggestion on process and methodology. There I’m essentially saying the same thing. We should clarify that our recommendations are more detailed but they still need to be operationalized in a way, and this should probably also enter the suggestion #1 to kind of say, “State in your implementation plan how you’re interpreting this. What are the kind of milestones you’re putting to get to the high level stuff you’re saying?” So this is my second point on the intro and background that I feel we should include.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Makes sense to me. Heather, do you need more?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No. I’ve drafted some text that I’m going to clean up but enough to get in there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Enough to flag it for you.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: And KC, I will reach out to you for—I agree strongly about the SMART criteria issue and we can talk about that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. KC, back to you. Or were those the two big ones that we need to discuss?

KC CLAFFY: No, that's not it. Now I've lost the freaking comments because there's so many of them. I was curious about, but not limited to, in the C-Suite position findings because it begs the question of why we picked those responsibilities.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Where are you?

KC CLAFFY: I'm on page 11, in the little highlighted piece but I don't care enough to spend time on it. That was just it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Let's move it along.

KC CLAFFY: All right. Let's keep going. I don't see anything. Okay. There's not SMART. The reports don't do this. Okay. Where is it? It's the same thing. I'll talk to Heather about it, but the actionable reports, I don't understand who they're actionable to in Recommendation 2.3. Then it said, "These reports would be most beneficial if they provided actionable information and outlined how ICANN follows best practices." Those are two different things. That's a report on something that

happened in the past and report on general how ICANN follows best practices, which you don't need to do on a periodic basis. Unless what was meant here was how ICANN did follow a best practice with respect to a specific vulnerability disclosure, which would make more logical sense in that finding and would require changing one letter to two letters. But again, I wasn't part of that team so I don't know what was meant. Just right now there's some logical breakage in that recommendation.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I have lost—originally, you said the C-Suite recommendation and now we're back in 2?

KC CLAFFY: Sorry. Yeah, we're in 2.3. Because I noticed a non-trivial comment here, but I think you can maybe fix this. Again, the second part of the second sentence here outlined how ICANN follows best practices. I don't know. I think maybe what was meant here was how ICANN followed a best practice in the context of this report that it's posting. Not a generic how ICANN follows best practices because that's not going to be a general report every twice a year or something.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I hear where you're going with that, but I think it actually was intended as a general report. It's not how they followed one best practice, it's about how they're continually improving and documenting that they're doing that.

KC CLAFFY: Okay, fine. Let's move on. I don't care enough. It was just a little confusing. Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Sorry. May I come in and try to clear this up? This recommendation was below the ISMS recommendation and so it was in context of the ISMS as I thought before. So this essentially means that—okay, this is right. This is up. 2.1 and 2.2 I think are fully about—called them vulnerability disclosure, which kind of play a role in the ISMS, at least and the way we see it, and then 2.3 would be essentially release some reports about what you're doing in security. What might make sense is if we move that one to ISMS because I think that is the context that this is in. Maybe other people in the Risk team can comment on this, but I feel this makes more sense. And this is my interpretation based on looking at the abuse document from mid-2020.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. So I'm fine with that. And maybe the Risk team can comment and e-mail us. They're not here. We can read the transcript and we can move on.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: This is Scott. I'm fine with that as well.

KC CLAFFY:

Okay. The next issue was a SMART issue. Now we're on to the C-Suite. I agree with Jennifer. I found this paragraph to be one of the most muddled in the paragraph. It did not actually justify the recommendation. I'm fine with this recommendation for the reason of it would be good to have a single point of contact and a single point of responsibility in the organization for security issues. But I actually found this paragraph to justify not implementing the recommendation because these two responsibilities for security are so different, I consider them basically externally facing like the global Internet, and internally facing like ICANN zone systems. And I see why it's obvious you would need to different people or two different units for that. I think what we're saying is that we want somebody just to be a point of contact for the organization on security issues, period. And so I just mixed all the sentences that I thought weaken the argument by being completely orthogonal to it, and again, talking about a problem that we don't find. At least it's not documented in here. There really are no findings in this section. So that's why I went quite heavy with the cross open.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

From a purely logical perspective, yeah, there was nothing in the finding that supported the recommendation. That was something I was struggling with. I couldn't point to anything that I considered really authoritative or what problem was observed within ICANN that made you guys recommend this, and where does it say anywhere that management structure makes or breaks this kind of thing. I don't think a management structure change is going to fix your problem if you've got

a problem. But I don't know what the problem is because we weren't able to show it.

KC CLAFFY:

Anybody who worked on this one?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:

I could chime in. The reason why there wouldn't be outright findings is because over the period of the review, what we've generally observed is that it wasn't centralized from just general structuring of cyber security or even information security and just how you structure responding at a strategic level and coordinating all the bits and pieces we had. I mean, I think a couple of members on the team, we kind of came up with that, a C-Suite level of person who has that overarching responsibility, not if it's just an OCTO or it's just in another section, but somebody who actually can cut across all the different divisions and being able to coordinate at C-Suite level to make decisions was necessarily and it's a solution that usually comes up in large organizations.

So the recommendation really stemmed from, how can we institutionalize something that will be able to coordinate all the issues that we're seeing, risk information is floating around, someone else has this bit of information, somebody who can make strategic security decisions with the authority, beyond just OCTO taking instructions from the Board, but more somebody with the authority sitting at that Board level to make the decisions and then push the decisions down. I know we've had a quite a long discussion that would start and when we kind

of had that based on some of the other best practices, this was what came up.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

I would love pointers to the best practices that say this is the right way to do this, regardless of whether it's ICANN just in general, that would be very helpful to point to. What we do have is something a little obscure.

The other point I would raise is later in the document we removed a recommendation because while it's really good advice, it wasn't in response to any observed problem, and that's what the SSR2 review was about is we've observed a problem, here's where we observed it, here's what we recommend for you to fix it. If we didn't observe a problem but we think that there's a really good practice, that's almost out of scope.

KC CLAFFY:

I will say we do identify a problem. Well, I mean we abstractly identify a problem which I crossed a sense out because I don't believe we can substantiate this claim, which is about this structure has led to the ineffective documentation and implementation of security control measures organization-wide. That's a strong accusation. I'm not saying it's not true. Maybe it's true. But if we say that, we have to substantiate it. What I got from the rest of the paragraph is we don't even have enough information to say that. And maybe that's a problem but how do we know it's ineffective if we can't evaluate it?

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I think we should probably start this finding section with, “We observed the SSR Recommendation 24 which established a Chief Security Office team was not implemented.”

KC CLAFFY: You mean SSR1?

RUSS HOUSLEY: SSR1 Recommendation 24 called for that. It didn’t happen.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: One of the examples of this being a best practice is observed in ISO 27001, 2, 18, 19, 17, SOC 2, COSO, NIST. Every single framework talks about management’s responsibility to elevate information security to the top. I don’t know who want to generalize that statement but, honestly, this has been a problem. Realistically, John Crain has been acting as “CISO” for years but never been given the authority.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: To add to what Scott said. A, it’s in all these standards. It also makes a lot of sense in a lot of ways. You do not want people to check on the security who are under the same authority that kind of builds the stuff. Just as an example, like the problem I feel that this one is that it’s kind of maybe so obvious that it’s hard to even talk about it. But I still feel this is an important one. I can also tell you from the prioritization

survey, this is definitely one that was ranked in the top group of importance by people. So I think we should just try to fix this text, refer to the standards and best practice documents that we're also referencing below.

Also, I feel when we're talking about like a lack of documentation and proper process and updates, if someone is actually responsible for that, you can expect them to fulfill these duties. And right now, it seems that this is what the Risk team also discussed where if you don't only have that, then it's kind of like, "Okay, who is doing what? Who is collating it?" That's why we were calling for this unified security functions that that there is someone you can go to.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:

And just to add to that, Laurin, I know it kind of varies different from how some of them would have more specific. I don't know. I know KC [inaudible] blatant accusation that this role or function doesn't exist, but what we found lacking, it's one of those recommendations where you say, "Okay. What's the overarching solution that could actually pull together a lot of the issues that we see?" So yes, we're saying to them, "Have a risk management framework." Yes, we're saying to them, "Do this for DNS, do that." So into our recommendations, a lot of risk-related and security-related things, but what we found what would pull all of these together is a centralized role. We're not saying the functions don't exist throughout ICANN. What we identified is that, Laurin, there's no one person to pull it all together, and that's how we came up with this. This was the solution that kind of supports the other recommendations. Not necessarily one that came as, "Oh, they don't

have anybody that's reporting security. They have no one on the Board that can handle risk." It wasn't that kind of recommendation but it's more, "What is the overarching solution that could pull everything together or ensure that implementation is done at a strategic level?"

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

I agree with Kerry-Ann and also the fact that right now infosec is really broken between CIO and OCTO. Russ, I know you pinged me on e-mail about this. This is the discussions I've had internally with staff through privileged access basically being on Council. So it's not something that I can necessarily call out in reference, but at same time, this is something that if we look at what's under OCTO and what's under the CIO, they both have security functions but they're completely separate.

KC CLAFFY:

In the interest of moving forward here, if someone could give something to cite that would even say like Scott's referencing a bunch of this reference here. I think it would really strengthen this recommendation, and then I would just leave it to Heather to remove sentences that don't substantiate the recommendation.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Yes. Scott, could you send Heather the list of documents that you rattled off so she could paste it in here?

SCOTT MCCORMICK:

Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. So what's next? My next thing is asking for examples. And I'm moving text. I think Heather sees some of that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. While you're looking for your next thing, Scott, quick question/request. If you actually have those documents and a lot of them are paywalled, I don't need the copy per se, but if you can give me the page number or section number where it specifically talks about that –

SCOTT MCCORMICK: I'll give you the control number. Yeah, absolutely.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Perfect. That's what I need for the citation.

SCOTT MCCORMICK: I'll send that over this afternoon. It's taking a little bit to pull together.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Thank you, sir.

KC CLAFFY:

All right, the next thing. Laurin, I guess is disagreeing with me on removing a sentence in 3.2. It's fine with me. I don't care. It just looked to me like I thought a CISO automatically it doesn't report to someone else, but fine. For what risks, yes, let's skip that. The next one is SMART on page 13. We're going to skip that. I just removed a sentence that's always redundant. If you guys are fine to let Heather decide, if that's a reasonable editorial thing.

Yeah, we have to fix. I think this is also just editorial at the bottom of page 13. It implies that ICANN didn't provide SSR2 with anything after 2012, which is not what we mean. I think we mean information that no more detailed granularity than what SSR1 got and SSR1 recommended more granularity. So that failed to be implemented or something. It's just English.

The next part is not me. So on page 15 ... Yeah. We asked about doing something, including the IS-SSR Framework, but we have said on the previous page—I'm on 4.3—that this framework doesn't exist anymore or hasn't been updated. So are we, implying that we want them to use the 2013 framework? Anyway, we just need to be clear what we mean there. That sentence is a bit hard to parse because there's a lot of comments in there, that 4.3. From anywhere within icann.org, I think it's missing some verb. Heather can handle that.

Okay. Let's keep going. I don't think I have anything on page 15. Page 16 is all English, I think. Page 17. We refer to these BC and DR plans. It would be nice to have a pointer to the recommendation where that's

going to apparently create them. That's just editorial. Publish audit summer report, what is that for? I can't see what it's pointing to. I'm going to ignore it right now. Okay. Laurin commenting that. So what's the next one?

Okay. 6.1 implement an ISMS (Information Security Management System). Yeah, that's just a writing thing, I think. I didn't understand how this was different from the other ISO things that were cited earlier. Maybe Laurin knows how to fix that because he's commenting.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Yeah. I think my comment was, yeah, these are just kind of because you commented on it somewhere else. So these things are kind of all interlocking. So you use one thing to get to the other thing, or you use one to implement something that you need for the other. So this is why it's kind of like we're referring to those. For example, I think one of the questions you had, one is kind of risk in general and one is more risk in terms of information security. That's why we're kind of jumping between those ISO numbers.

KC CLAFFY:

Maybe a sentence to acknowledge that these are tied together. Because I think a lot of readers are going to feel this is muddled.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

I agree that would be useful for someone reading.

KC CLAFFY: My next one –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Back up. Where do you want that sentence? We do have something early in the document that suggests that the recommendations build on each other. And therefore, you kind of need to read the whole thing.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Sorry for speaking of you lag. This is not about the recommendations. This is more about saying, “Look, the standards we are throwing around here are also interdependent and interact.” I think that’s the important point to kind of clarify that. So it’s not just the recommendations. It’s also the best practice stuff we are throwing around.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But I took it to mean that the ISMS that’s talked about in 6.1 is the one that we asked you to build in 5.3.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, even those backward pointers would help.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right.

KC CLAFFY: I assume that Heather is just waiting until this thing settles to have those. The same thing with section numbers, I got confused.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, section numbers would help a lot.

KC CLAFFY: All right, so my next issue is on page 19. We say that having two sites in the same country was insufficient. It was about resulting in unexpected high levels of risk. Again, is there any evidence that ICANN didn't already recognize this and is in the process? I just feel like we're looking for things to complain about here. I actually think that everybody did remarkably well during the pandemic, which doesn't mean there aren't lessons to learn, but do we have evidence there's a problem that isn't being addressed?

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's a political one.

KC CLAFFY: So we have to say for political reasons you mean?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. It's because they wanted covered by laws of more than one place.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: The idea behind this is the following. Both of these sites are in the U.S. and they're both in North America. And what we're essentially saying is there are events, and we have seen these events where essentially the same event causes both these sites to be practically unreachable or are very hard to reach. That's why we said, "Okay. What makes sense is go out of the region and go out of the jurisdiction, for one, so that whatever happens, you have a backup." Russ, I know you commented on could we just have three. I mean, sure. It's just going to be more expensive. That's why we said you can close the other one. But this was our reasoning behind this. And we have seen with COVID, right? Hopefully not coming again, but this might lead to, "Okay. No one can enter the country." Then your two sites are useless. It might happen that this would also happen to a site in a different geographical area and a third country. Yes, but the probability is lower.

RUSS HOUSLEY: My point was we shouldn't impose the answer. The point is, we want geographic and political diversity, and leave it to them to decide whether that's add a third one or move one.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Oh yes. I commented that in the thing. I think we can just change that slightly and say add one or don't close one, we don't care.

KC CLAFFY: I'm fine with that. Let's move on. Page 21, last paragraph. I feel like I've struck this through a lot in this document. It keeps coming back. But

ICANN's mission is not to ensure anything. If you read the Bylaws—and we quote the Bylaws so we should read what we write—in the first paragraph of this, it's about coordinating policies that are developed and designed to ensure, which is much different than ICANN having responsibility to ensure. So that sentence has got to get fixed and I don't care who does it. But, Laurin, when you say this is a quote, you're quoting out of context. You're forgetting that that is a freaking depending clause or whatever. I don't know what the English is.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

I did not complete my comment, I think. I added something in suggest mode. That's like slowly appearing. It's to ensure through making policy. That's the Bylaws.

KC CLAFFY:

Yeah, it's not in the note. If you read the Bylaws, we quoted above. It's to coordinate policies that are designed to ensure. That doesn't mean they actually ensure as we have seen. Those Bylaws were written by lawyers, and it says what it says for a reason. Anyway, I'm not saying the Bylaws shouldn't change, but we can't pretend that they say something they don't say. All right, so that's it for 21.

Then my next thing is just that we've got unachieved safeguards is in a big bold font that seems to be a subsection of something that's in a smaller bold font. So it's just the whole sectioning and numbering needs to be fixed, but I assume that waits until the end.

All right. My next issue is on page 23, the findings for Recommendation 8. Unless we undermine a whole argument that we really don't have science on these inferences of abuse, we say Spamhaus identifies the most abused TLDs, which begs the question of how they know. So we just have to fix that word "identifies" to say reports its inferences or something, or whatever they say and whatever they say the methodology is based on. If Spamhaus could do this, we'd all be done. We wouldn't need any lawyers or anything. So we have to fix that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Where are you?

KC CLAFFY: Right before Recommendation 8. The paragraph right before Recommendation 8, which is presumably motivating Recommendation 8. And since we have a whole recommendation or three on the lack of rigor in abuse reporting and inference, we can then put a sense in that implies, this is all straightforward. The word "identifies" needs to be fixed. I can work with Heather to rewrite it.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: KC, I propose, let's just say publish a list of what they perceive as or something like that. We just state the facts. We don't talk about the methodology. Would that work?

KC CLAFFY: Fine. Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: What their webpage says is that 10 most abused TLDs.

KC CLAFFY: Right.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, but how did they get to that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: My point is this, if you're looking for the words that they use, those are the words they use.

KC CLAFFY: No, I think we need to be looking for something rigorous here because we spend a lot of time talking about the lack of rigor in the space. Something validatable, reproducible, etc. But I think between Heather and Laurin and I, we can do it. If nobody else has an objection to turning that down, we can move on.

All right. Now what am I leaning? I don't know what I meant there. I have to go back to that. I don't know how Jennifer managed to transcribe my comments. I don't even know what they meant.

Okay. 9.2. Over 50 complaints that reports of inaccurate data. Where is ICANN supposed to get these complaints? Is this referring to the recommendation system that they're supposed to set up that

centralized reporting system or they supposed to get these from the ones that come in from registers and registries that are mandated to report them? And are they mandated to report them? I guess they are. I don't even know.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I also have a couple concerns in here. One, I kind of don't want citations in the recommendation that should have been part of the finding.

KC CLAFFY: I agree with that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: And also citation numbers like that always go at the end of the sentence, at least in the [CMOs].

KC CLAFFY: That's also fine. I usually fix up by splitting a sentence. It can be done here because the whole thing is a big run-on sentence.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: If I can try to clear that one. If I remember correctly—and I did look at the old book—these are complaints specifically to ICANN about this information. So this is not the complaints portal, because the complaints portal is forwarding complaints to relevant contracted parties. This is about people complaining about the contracted parties. So we should probably rewrite this slightly to make that clear.

KC CLAFFY:

Yeah, that totally wasn't clear to me. I don't even know how to complain to ICANN. I just send e-mail to someone I know. Somebody else complain to ICANN. Is there an e-mail address? Anyway, so that should just be clarified. And I'm fine, as Jennifer said, clarify in the findings. It said that this just stands alone but it's clear.

All right. I'm going to drop the next one, I guess. Compliance doesn't address security threats. Compliance enforces contracts. I see why this is here, but I just think it needs to be wordsmithed a bit. I don't know. I'll think about that. Maybe more effectively use the contractual levers to mitigate security threats or something. All right, let's keep going.

What did I say? Just one. A report, right. It's complete whenever ICANN provides a report. It doesn't seem to be right. It's complete when there's a process in place, but we wouldn't say that one report means the recommendation has been implemented. So I think that just needs to say regular reporting or something. Okay. The rest of it is just SMART.

I highlight something that says 2020Q1. I believe that's past. So that's just a typo. Bottom of page 24, last sentence of page 24.

After completion of EPDP. That's already completed, so that needs to be updated to match reality.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Anti-abuse EPDP.

KC CLAFFY: Oh, sorry. Right. Okay. Then that needs to be “See Recommendation N.”

LAURIN WEISSINGER: So this is a general point I have. I’m not sure if I want to put a pin in it. A lot of these timelines in the SMART stacks I feel are unrealistic. And this applies to more than one recommendation, so I’m not sure if we want to talk about it now or later.

KC CLAFFY: I think we should cover it. I’d be happy to remove all the timelines and just say let the implementation folks deal with this. But we can cover that in a sentence that I’m on the hook to write. Apparently I can’t edit the document right now. I’m on them to write about, we tried to make this SMART. We tried to put reasonable timelines in but this is not what we are qualified to be saying to do. So this should go to a collaborative process with the Implementation team, I guess.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Or recognize with the goals we have put or recognize to be aggressive.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. I think if we say that, we’re also fine. Because I don’t think some of these are that outlandish, Laurin.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Some are not. Some are. That’s what I’m trying to say.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Maybe highlight the ones that we need to tone or give more tone.

All right. Okay. I asked, this is editorial. Recommendation 10.1, we say share reports with non-participating ccTLDs. We don't mention reports yet so I don't know what we're sharing. I would remove that last sentence. If 10.2 covers that making these things—or I don't know what the last sentence is getting to. Apparently you're sharing reports with other non-participating ccTLDs that are different in granularity than the ones that you're making available to independent third parties. So I just didn't understand that sentence. What are you sharing? I don't know who wrote it. Does somebody else remember? Should we pass forward?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Are you're talking about the last sentence in 10.1?

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I thought the idea was even though some ccTLDs chose not to participate, send them the abuse reports anyway. That's what I thought they mean.

KC CLAFFY: Oh, I see. Okay. The actual individual, these reports.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes.

KC CLAFFY: Fine, fine.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: This is the idea behind it. I can confirm.

KC CLAFFY: These should share what? Say a specific abuse report, you mean the ones that are for the ccTLDs, not like other ones?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Correct.

KC CLAFFY: So [modify] that in that sentence, and then we're done.

Okay, 10.2, we say analyze their impact. We've just said that all ICANN should share is timestamps and types of complaint. How in the heck is anybody supposed to analyze their impact from that information? I'm flummoxed. I hope I'm not the person who's receiving that data.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I agree. I would just vote to get rid of it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So just get rid of “and their impact,” right?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes.

KC CLAFFY: Well, you have to get rid of the rest of the sentence. To analyze the types of complaints. Okay. It’s weak but whatever. Moving on.

Simplifies the process of receiving. All right, never mind. That’s just editorial.

Some categorical data. I think this could be—yeah, whatever. I don’t quite know what it means.

What is this? When the portal is up and running. This is this portal. Yes, never mind.

I don’t know what that is. Sorry. Yeah, back to measurability of the next one. Let’s skip it. Who decides whether they’re relevant?

All right, the next one is what is the problem? I guess our findings for this are factored out above or something. Never mind. Maybe we say the problem. We say the problem right under this heading. We need to clarify progress to what. It was progress on abuse, reduction in mitigation, but that has gotten lost in the reorganization of this report, I think. Because we’ve merged contracts, compliance, transparency around DNS abuse, and now we say persistent challenges to progress,

but we don't say progress on what. And it was specific to mitigation of DNS abuse or reduction in mitigation. The rest is just typos.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Heather, do you know what to do there?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Well, I was about to say I've lost track again of where exactly you're talking about.

KC CLAFFY: I'm in bottom of 25. The subtitle "Persistent challenges to progress." That was a subtitle when it was clear what it was a subsection of. It's not as clear now. So it's not clear progress on what. It was on DNS abuse. So I think that just needs to be clarified.

Okay. The rest is in English. Okay, never mind. I'm ignoring my comments if I can't figure out what they mean. Jennifer gets to ignore them. Keep the S. All right, I don't care about that one.

All right. Next one is page 27, last sentence that—well, the first sentence I crossed out, which is Compliance should take a more active role in articulating what it needs. That is some other recommendation. It's not 14, I think it's 9. I mean 14 is relevant, but we should say why it's relevant unless people go to 14 and say, "I don't see..."

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. That doesn't surprise me. And it's, again, one of the reasons I highlighted these things because recommendations moved around so much the number changed.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. Fair enough. But the sentence comes out of the blue. I just think it should move to the place where we talk about what Compliance should do. That was my comment. Okay. So that's editorial.

Yes. I've commented that. I think I said to add the word "reported" here. The rest of this is just editorial, so nothing else on page 27 or page 28. I just moved a footnote and split up a sentence here. Page 29 nothing. I want to make sure that we've introduced RAA before we use it but Jennifer can fix that. And then there's some English stuff. I mean Heather. I think Heather can fix the issue about EPDP—where is it? On page 28, the main paragraph here refers to the EPDP that just happened. And then the next paragraph talks about it like we haven't introduced it yet. So that's just English thing that needs to be fixed. And I think Heather can do it. Page 29, nothing. Page 30, editorial. Page 31, nothing. Just editorial. Page 32, nothing. I think I fixed, I covered all of these. I think we covered page 33.

All right. Page 35, we say we agree with CCT recommendations on policy making process. I think we need to be specific about what CCT recommendations we're talking about since ICANN already process them. Or we could drop the whole sentence as Laurin suggests. I don't know if people have comments but it's a bit vague.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Easy enough to add the pointers, though.

KC CLAFFY: If you know what they are because not all the recommendations were about policy making. And a lot of them were about policy making that has nothing to do with SSR.

This is just SMART stuff. I don't know who decides ICANN is appropriately responding, but we're going to cover that with the SMART thing. Yeah, I agree with Russ. We need a consistent way to cite section.

The rest here is just English up to page 38, 39. I think page 40 is the last ones that I typed in. I have the other ones on an iPad, which I can type in as we work on other people's comments, if other people have any comments. If not, I can just go through them verbally. Let's give other people a chance to talk or talk about Steve's comments.

RUSS HOUSLEY: In the second half, others are like the one about 2 where we really needed to talk about it.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. There's only a couple but let me go find them. Give me a minute, though. Talk about something else while I find them.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Should we go to Laurin and come back to you?

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Or I can throw in just a single comment about the document overall real quick.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sure.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I know some of you have asked for section numbers. I actually recommend against that and here's why: because we're numbering the recommendations themselves. I noticed this when I was trying to read the WHOIS RDS report and keeping track of what was a section number versus what was a recommendation number was really challenging when I was going back, trying to find things.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I see the issue but I find that it's quite difficult. Maybe we put the recommendation numbers in boxes like they did in the SSR1 report? I don't know.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That doesn't help with the referencing and finding them, like when you try and put them. Imagine what a table of contents looks like where

you're going from Section 1 to Rec 3 to Section 2 to Rec 5. It's just a very, very awkward way to approach it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I put in editorial comments the different ways you reference sections are not consistent throughout the document.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. And that's known and something that I want to fix.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I just don't like numbering sections.

RUSS HOUSLEY: In the end, I leave it to you. But I found it hard to chase those references because it forces you to go to the table of contents as opposed to, "Oh, it's three pages..." You knowing which direction from where it is.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: You might just take a quick look at the WHOIS RDS 2 report, and when you scroll through it, see what that actually ends up looking like. And if you think that that's fine and it's not confusing, let me know. I'm happy to make the change. You guys make that call. But just editorially speaking, I don't recommend it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin, you put a ton of comments in the document. Which ones does the team need to talk about?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I have a list of page numbers. Number one, page for 32.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's encouraging that we got to 32.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Oh yeah, because I already complained about reasoning on page 5 and I'll come back to the timelines. So page 32, this is where I made the comment. I feel we should pull the complaint portal down into that section. A, the section is called complaints. And B, some of the relevant text to understand that one, I feel is there. So, I'm just saying move that recommendation down because I feel that makes more sense. Heather, if it doesn't make sense when you look at it and try it then just forget about it. That's one I would bring up, but I feel it would make sense because then complaints are with complaints, and then we can maybe just kind of add a sentence or two where we kind of specify, "Look, this is about complaints going to contracted parties through ICANN." That's like one thing. And then this is complaints about contracted parties to ICANN. And then this is kind of separated and works hopefully. Does this make sense, what I'm saying? Should I move on?

RUSS HOUSLEY: It made sense to me. Heather?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That's not a problem.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Cool. Page 45 and 46. I complained a lot of times for us, but I think most of it is a golden nugget. It's not worth our time because Heather can just e-mail me and be like, "What's your problem with this?" Searching for the pages myself.

Oh yeah, page 45, roots zone data and IANA registries. It just doesn't parse. The findings are kind of disjointed. So I think we're talking about the root and the other registries. However, that is not really clear. The second paragraph kind of jumps to root and then the KPI go back to being everything. At least the way I read it, this is just editorial and we have to kind of fix this. However, because I didn't write this, I wanted to check with the team that essentially this just sounds weird and this is how we could fix it by essentially making sure we affirm to both.

Also in that finding section, access to critical data, why it's CZDS, which we're talking about elsewhere. So I'm wondering, wouldn't this makes sense if we move this to where we talk about CZDS, which has its own recommendation further up?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Just because one point refers to the CZDS, I'm not sure that means we move the whole thing up there.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Oh no, just the three lines I meant.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. That's fine. And with regards to the other suggestion that it's an editorial change, when you say that it's like, okay, is that something that I as the technical writer can do? Do I know what the research was in order to make that change? And the answer is kind of no.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: This is why I brought it up on the call. To me it just seems what happened here with the writing is that what we mean all of them, but we do not kind of clarify at all times that we mean all of them. So if you read the first one, "IANA registries include many needed parameters." I hate the word "needed" as well. They're more than that. And then the availability and integrity of these parameters are paramount, etc. And then ICANN Org may find the creation of formal key performance, in this case, KPI for the DNS root zone, which is a specific one. But then if you go down to the KPI services, we're going back to just talking about everything. So my reading was, okay, this just seems disjointed but it's not meant that way. I'm bringing it up again because someone who wrote this, who was involved, please, is this just edits or is this something completely different?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Isn't that easily resolved—Brenda, could you scroll up just a touch, please—by just adding “ICANN Org may also find the creation of formal key performance indicators for the DNS efficient”? Maybe something a little bit in the paragraph before, “The availability and integrity of these parameter registries are paramount and need to be clearly illustrated to the community through formal Key Performance Indicators.”

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. Heather, my point is the following. I think yes, I just want to make sure that I'm not misunderstanding this and there is actually a difference. That's why I'm bringing it up. I feel this can just be fixed, but I might be wrong.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Is there anyone on the team who thinks what they see Heather is doing real time is wrong? Okay. So I think the way I interpret that is that you have guessed right about what was intended and now it's an editorial process to make it read as what you described.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Excellent.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. Laurin, what's next?

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

I have one more point and that's a biggie. I've already alluded to it before. Some of the timelines I feel are unrealistic. If you look at the chat, Steve has offered some comments on this. Essentially, two of these are also my reasons here. One is by the time we submit this—and it goes through public comment and so on and so on—a lot of time will pass, and that time I think is not considered in some of those. That's number one. Number two is, as Steve also mentioned, some processes like budgeting, but also planning, etc, that's already happened. So we essentially have to add time for that as well. And then the third reason that I've put in chat as well is I don't think you can actually do this in time. I just don't think it's physically possible.

So I'm not sure what we can do or how we can deal with this. What I'm kind of coming up with is if we put all of this in a table, which we wanted to do anyway, we could send that round and then people could comment on that table if they think this is realistic. So I feel in lot of cases, we just have to add like a year to give the Board time, to have the process go through and have the Board accept, get the team together, etc. Sometimes it might be even more than a year that we need to add. So that's what I think because I don't think it's realistic now to go through each recommendation and discuss the timeline. Just the scrolling would probably kill us.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, maybe we should just add a year for staffing and budgeting and leave it at that.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I haven't reviewed everything in enough detail to say yes or no to that, frankly. I've just read through and realized the case somewhat this is really not doable.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Does anyone have a suggestion on how to deal with this comment?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Didn't KC have a suggestion about changing the timelines to negotiating that with the Implementation team?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: That would be an option.

RUSS HOUSLEY: She said that she preferred to leave it to that. But that kind of flies in the face of SMART, right?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No offense intended at all, but you guys kind of put the SMART thing in place well after you had started anyway. So you were kind of retrofitting it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: True.

KC CLAFFY: Well, it wasn't we that put it in place.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. We were trying to accommodate some of the new stuff without starting over, I guess.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Jennifer has her hand raised.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Jennifer.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Thanks. I just wanted to support what Steve has already said, and then just suggest that one thing that you might want to consider is an overarching comment in the document that the Org and Board should produce a timeline that they can then be held accountable to. So, similar to KC's comments as well, that might be one way of doing it.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I don't disagree with that approach. And it goes back to a comment I made before, which I think was the comment on 54, which is about

what we're doing is too high level for implementation. So we might use that approach. We would obviously lose time boundness off the SMART stack at all times but maybe that's okay. I just feel some of these timelines are just far too aggressive and essentially it's just going to be a 100% failure because you just can't do it. So either we change them to something more realistic or I feel we just let them go. That's the options I see.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Comments? Heather, which one is easier for you to implement?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: To rip out the timing and put in the general statement.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Anybody object to that? Okay. You said that was your last one?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: It is, but I would like to add a comment on it. We do have or we will have implementation stewards. I think this should be included in this thing where essentially we're saying, look, create an implementation plan. Talk to the implementation stewards and then they will tell you if they think that is fine. I think that would be good one to pull them in.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, except that ICANN calls them implementation shepherds.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Shepherds, sorry. Whatever.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I understand. I just want to make sure we communicate clear.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay. I also have the prioritization survey. I just want to note that before I stop babbling.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm quite aware, but I've tried to get through the issues that the team needs to discuss.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I agree.

RUSS HOUSLEY: KC, have you finished your pass to figure out which ones require team discussion?

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. The only thing left in the main document is the name collision stuff, which I also found to be muddled. Do we have name collision—the person who wrote it? I think it was Naveed. So what page is that? Somebody help me out here.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: 38.

KC CLAFFY: And I just added some comments. Let's see, 38. There's some English stuff about we refer to as study and a Phase 1 report. Both of these studies are Phase 1 reports. So we need to be more clear about what we're talking about here, the 2014 one and the 2019 one. But just focusing on the recommendation we say—17.1 bottom on page 39—ICANN to develop a clear policy. We don't say policy for what. I assume this means to avoid and manage name collisions. 17.2 was really muddled and I tried to rewrite it. It basically said the process of producing the findings and implementing the solution should be independent of any party with the financial interest. I think we mean the evaluation of the process because obviously the people who are handling the process are going to be having a financial interest in gTLD expansion. So I tried to wordsmith that and people can look at it now. Or not wordsmith but change it. That might be my last one.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: With regards to Phase 1 report and whatnot, the NCAP study—we note that we're going to call it the NCAP study—and mitigating the risk of the DNS namespace collisions Phase 1 report is what we refer to as the Phase 1 report. That's also explicitly mentioned.

KC CLAFFY: Fair enough.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Are you talking about something else?

KC CLAFFY: In the middle of the paragraph, we say “the study” and it’s right after we’ve been talking about the Phase 1 report. So I didn’t know if you’re talking about –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Good point. Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: So that could be improved. Anyway, I think that’s all I have. I had comments on the appendices. I think that’s all.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: For the appendix, I’m assuming you’re talking about the SSR1 part of it.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: To be perfectly honest, I don’t think there’s a whole lot more we can do with that at this point. Is there anything in there you can’t live with?

KC CLAFFY: It's just removing the sentences of things I think we didn't do. Like for each recommendation, the report provided a list of all documents used by the SSR2 team and answered questions by ICANN Org staff. I can't even parse that sentence. It's at the bottom of page 54. So I just struck it through because I don't think it –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So just so you know, the process and methodology for review of SSR1 recommendations was a section I was told not to touch.

KC CLAFFY: Okay, fine.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Because apparently it was very hard to drive to consensus on that. So if any changes are to be made, I need the team to be very explicit that you're okay with that.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. I don't care then. Forget it. Just leave it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You do recall those numerous iterations over this, don't you?

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Thank you.

KC CLAFFY: All done. All right, so I think that's it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Turning to other people on the call. Who has comments that the team should discuss that are not just editorial? Anyone else?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I love the sound of resounding silence.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We're going to spend the last bit on the survey if there are no more substantive non-editorial comments that need discussion.

KC CLAFFY: Well, the other thing we do have to do is how we address the public comment.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's another call.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Got it. Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sorry, but that one is scheduled for the 14th of January.

KC CLAFFY: Oh my God.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Before we get to the survey, I have a logistical question for you. We've talked about a lot of changes now in this document. What kind of consensus call are we doing?

KC CLAFFY: I think Russ should call for consensus on the substantive changes that we talked about today. And everything else in there has an English in it and people should go read it, and if they disagree that they're English then they should speak up on the mailing list.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I agree. What we're going to have to do is just put these all in a completely readable order, and then do a final call. But I hope to do that by e-mail before the 14th so that we don't have to spend any time on that call, unless somebody flags something in between that says, "This one surprised me," or something like that. But before we go to the

prioritization, is there anybody who has a reservation about the resolution to the things that were just raised on the call today? Hearing none, I think we have consensus on this set of recommendations.

Okay, Heather, the sooner you could get the thing together for everybody, but the prioritization will of course also change the document.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Russ, to note, there's a couple of review team members that are not on the call.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I will say that again on e-mail so that those people know.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: My approach to doing that would be to say, "Here's the document. Here's the result of the call. If you have any issues, please raise them now," is how I was planning to address that. Anyone think that's the wrong way?

KC CLAFFY: It's the right way.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Thank you. All right, Laurin. You have some graphs.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I do. Essentially, we did the same thing as we did in January. You did have a different design because I since changed data provider. There are two ways I can do this. I can run you through one by one—that is one option—or I can give you the summary. We can also do a combination thereof, depending on how people feel about it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We only have a half hour. I think let's do the summary.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay. I'll do the summary. Essentially, it comes down to I can see essentially three groups. So just so you know how I did this mathematically, quickly—yes?

KC CLAFFY: How many responses did we get?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: We are currently I think at 10. So not everyone has completed it. But I can only report on what I've got. So if you haven't done it, there were multiple reminders.

KC CLAFFY: You're on the call. Go do it now.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

That changes my data while I talk, but okay, do it. Essentially, I will tell you what I have currently. I can essentially break this up in three clusters. There is the very important cluster, I'll just call it, and there is a medium importance cluster, and then there is the just not-so-important stuff. So it kind of falls neatly into three.

I will tell you the ones that people do not consider that important. That means the mean is well below 3, which is the midpoint of medium, because it's a 1 to 5 scale, ranging from very low to very high importance. The ones that the team so far at least considered not that important is Recommendation 1 on SSR1, Recommendation 18, which is staying abreast of debates. Right now I do need the thing because I can't read my own notes. Please hold. Recommendation 19 is also in that group of not so important. That is the test suite for DNS, which is also mostly done. Improve the security of communications with TLD operators. 22, yes, that also is not considered that important.

Now, we're moving to our top ones. You will all be extremely surprised that the risk section generally is the very kind of important group, I'll just call it, even though it scores in the important range, but it is again we have three clusters. So this is really important one, and there's the medium one I haven't talked about yet, and the low one that is what I just described. So risk essentially everything the mean is around 4. So essentially, if you take the responses I have, we essentially arrived at yes, this is important. There's small variance in there. I won't bore you with that.

When it comes to the abuse section, the kind of important cluster includes Recommendation 9, which is monitor and enforce compliance; Recommendation 10, which is increase transparency and accountability of abuse complaint reporting; #13, which is on overhauling DNS abuse analysis and reporting efforts to enable transparency independent review; #14, which is Temp Spec; and #15, which is the EPDP. Within the abuse cluster, what seems to be considered less important and thus medium priority is Recommend 8, enabling demonstrated representation of public interest; Recommendations 11 and 12, 11 being clarity on definitions and 12 being CZDS privacy; #17 is also in the medium range.

Everything I have not talked about yet in the other section is also medium, that being 17, name collision; 20, which is formal procedures for key rollovers; 21, which is baseline security practice for roots server operators; service measurements, 23; and algorithm rollover, 24. So those are on medium.

I already said SSR1 was considered not too important. Oh well, it doesn't sound good. Not as high priority. And then to the suggestions, they all are medium. Apart from #2, which ranks as well as an important one—this is on page 51. Sorry I need to scroll down, I forgot which one it was. I think that was the one on process. Number two. Yeah, so this is on tracking—having a tool to track the recommendations.

So essentially, to sum up again, I have this all with graphics, but then it's like one by one. We do have very important, which is kind of very strongly focused on risk and abuse, which I think is expected. We have the medium cluster, which is most of the non-assigned ones. Number

two on budget and the three suggestion say 2, which is one that is regarded high priority. And then we have low priority, which is SSR1 and then three of the other recommendations. As Heather notes, I think it makes sense that SSR1 is dropping because a lot of this is kind of addressed elsewhere. And the same is true for most of the ones that are low priority in the other section as I just call it because, for example, the system to test stuff. It's already done by now probably, and we're just saying, "Look, that's a good idea, keep it up to date. Thank you." So this is essentially where this went. So the conclusion essentially would be deal with your risk management and your abuse stuff, and then do the other stuff. That's essentially what I would take away from that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Is there a simple table you could put together?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I can, but I asked people to finish by the morning. I did actually kind of put it together.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, no. That's not what I'm asking on the call.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: We can do an easy table, I think, where we just use these three clusters, yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I mean, are the clusters really obvious? Because you didn't show a graph.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Pretty much, yes. There are two that are a bit on the fence. But essentially how it works is everything I said as important cluster is 4 or higher, more or less. The thing is due to the number of responses and the spread, you get the same numbers, essentially. So everything 4 or higher is in the important cluster. Everything above 3 but well below 4 is the kind of medium. Medium to important, whatever you want to go for it. And then everything below 3 is the not-so-important. There are only two that are like a little bit on the edge. So suggestion 3 is a 3.8, so that's pretty close to 4. Suggestion 3 is that the stuff on contracting and clarifying stuff for review teams, and then the BC, DR one is—wait. No. The BC, DR one is fine. Sorry. I misread. So there's only one that's a little bit of an edge case. The rest is really like 4 and above, 3 and above, and then below 3.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So what I suggest is for the suggestions that we renumber them and we put them in priority order. So you said 2 is clearly most important. So let's make it 1 and move it to the top. And you said that 3 as the next highest.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Second highest score, yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So make that 2.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: And 1 would become 3.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So that way we can just change the intro to say, "In priority order," and be done with that one. I don't think we can do the same to the recommendations.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: No. They're too tied in.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Exactly. And they're interrelated, as we know. So, Heather, do you have a problem with the suggestion one?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No, of course not.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, fine. Does anyone else on the team have a problem with the suggestion ordering?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:

One of the challenges I had answering the question was all the discussions that we've been having kept played in my mind, like what we thought about high priority as opposed to low priority. I had to be juggling. There was no reference to kind of guide what the team finally agreed was high and what was low, because I was still struggling with. KC kind of helped us to think constantly, is this doable? Is it something that has a cost? It's like when I thought about high priority, I had to kind of make a judgment because it's high priority, because I thought it was just important and it's critical. Or high priority because I think if this is done, the other things will get done as well. So I don't know if probably the response received I think maybe all of us were on, we're using different criteria to determine high and low. So that's my only caution that when it finally goes out and we say this is our priority list, we still have to explain what do we mean by high priority because it still wasn't clear for me going into like responding to the survey. I just wanted to suggest that I don't have an issue with the approach to finalize this. But I think I would need to put a better criteria for anyone who reads it to understand why we consider this high.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Or why don't we say something more about the methodology that we use that recognizes that different review members had different criteria for importance or priority?

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

Then that just begs the question of, well, what were the differences?

RUSS HOUSLEY: But then we don't know is the point.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I also feel you can't perfectly know.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You can't perfectly know, right.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Because even if we set some kind of rules, the rules will all be interpreted differently by different people. So, I mean, I'm just calling them rules.

Another one I can add is, when it comes to the cluster of high priority, I'll just call it, that is pretty clear—and this has to do with essentially how these averages work out—if you end up like a 4 or above because very few people use the very high priority, so it really means you have a strong concentration around the high priority and very high priority votes with some medium. So I don't know. I cannot share. So, for example, I will give you #3, C-Suite where essentially you have one vote for low priority, and then you have like eight or nine people voting for either high or very high. This is what the high priorities look like and it's essentially mathematically difficult for this to look otherwise because of the relatively high score. Another example would be –

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: But, Laurin, you don't want to just pull yourselves through all that stress now, trying to do that logic. I think just easy enough to do follow what Russ suggested, just explain the logic. At least give a percent based on everyone's knowledge of the recommendations. This went out for rank and it was ranked based on where the team saw etc. But just give that context. That's the only thing. You don't have to analyze it that deeply. It was just a matter that when someone sees high priority, I would want them to know that it's high priority based on us and what we felt with the recommendations. Not just high priority because it's critical, urgent, and the Internet is going to collapse if this doesn't happen. That could be some of our reasoning, but at least put the science behind this. There has to be some context once we put that out. That's my only concern.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. Okay. Sorry, Kerry. I might have slightly misunderstood what you meant. But yeah. I think that's good. We should just say we polled this, which is probably also mentioned. We polled this before, which we then used to get rid of some. So just kind of tell the narrative.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. That's all I was suggesting is say what methodology we used rather than what our conclusions are.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Heather has her hand up.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Just a point of note that I won't be able to completely finish the document, adding the summary tables and whatnot until I have the priority numbers. So, Laurin, if you could get that to me, that would be helpful.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. I'll just send you a table.

KC CLAFFY: Is there a deadline for people to fill out the survey? If they don't fill it out today, their votes are not counted or what?

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's right.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: That was yesterday night.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Fine.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: The deadline was yesterday night. I will take today because I feel like it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. We have to. Otherwise, I can't send that note that says "This is where we got after the call. Please raise any objections."

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. So there might be small changes to the clusters. But it is it is very clear that essentially if you look at risk and abuse, this is where all the high priority is. We have a few medium priority. The other section is essentially the medium and low priority. I do not expect that this will change that much unless everyone now filling it in is contrarian to what happened before.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Heather, is that a new hand? I guess not. Okay. All right. So I think we're to the place where a table gets sent to Heather to indicate the three clusters and priority. Heather then can put together the document that adjudicates all the tons of editorial comments she got and deals with the issues we talked through on the call today. We send that out hopefully next week, which will give people over the holidays with three weeks to look at it. And then our next call is on the 14th of January. We will be dealing with the public comments document. Heather is putting that together in those three weeks. Heather, do you have a date by which they will receive it in order to do their review?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Looking at the calendar, I'm glad I don't celebrate holidays. I will endeavor to have it to you by January 10.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That would give people four days before that call to review it. Is that enough? It's basically a big table here as the public comments and how do we deal with them, right?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: A very big table. I do have one quick question for Laurin and KC. When do you turn into pumpkins? When do you become unavailable for consultation?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Never. Okay, the 24th, please. Otherwise, I'm there.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. Thank you. KC, does that apply to you, too?

KC CLAFFY: No.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Got it. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: All right. Wow. So you get them for a week. All right. Thank you all. I'm really pleased that a two-hour call was enough to get through that. And we will have a draft final report very, very shortly to make the final consensus call. We'll do that by e-mail. Thank you very much and have a wonderful holiday and stay safe.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Happy holidays, everyone. Sorry about that.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Perfect, perfect time.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: He doesn't want to leave you guys. He said this meeting has been so much fun.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Thanks, everyone. Bye.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]