BRENDA BREWER: Good day, everyone. Welcome to the SSR2 plenary call number 131 on the 10th of December 2020 at 15:00 UTC. Members attending the call today include Boban, Danko, KC, Kaveh, Ram Krishna, Russ, Žarko, and Laurin. Apologies from Scott. From ICANN Org, we have Brenda, Jennifer, and Steve; and our technical writer, Heather. Today's meeting is being recorded. I'd like you to please state your name before speaking for the record. Russ, I'll turn the call over to you. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, thank you. So, the first thing I want to do is remind everyone about a message that was sent to the list by Jennifer, just letting everybody know that there is an opportunity coming up after we turn in our final report to be an implementation shepherd. Basically, what happens, as I understand it, is that the implementation shepherds field calls from the board, and then from staff, as they digest the report and try to implement it.

So, if you're interested in helping them get it right in this way, please take a look at your calendar for next year and take a look at whatever you need to do in terms of coordinating with management to see if you have the time available to help in this way. My understanding is that we'll just be, in the next year, asking who wants to be implementation shepherds and then passing those names along to ICANN staff.

So, the next thing on the agenda is for Heather to walk through the open issues that she has not been able to resolve on the mail list and see if we

can sort them out so that we can have a report in near final form for the team to review next week. Turning it over to Heather.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Great. So, I've spent some quality time with this document over the last week or two and it's shaping up pretty well. There's not actually a lot of massive, open issues for consideration. The one that I wanted to go ahead and start with, because it's the biggest one on the plate, is the question about the baseline security practices recommendation. Just to give you a sense of how I've been working, as I've gone through the document, I format all the footnotes.

And the footnotes are, of course, what we're pointing to to say, "Here's our justification and proof of what we just said in whatever sentence we're adding a footnote to." And in validating that, "Okay, this footnote contains the information that supports our statement," I discovered some interesting issues with the baseline security practices recommendation.

Specifically, that the way the findings read, it starts with that there are threats to the Root Server System, and those have been documented and shared by ICANN Org. Okay, that's good. The original citation was not particularly helpful with that because it pointed to a review of RSSAC. But other footnotes were useful, particularly RSSAC037 and 038. RSSAC037's section six has a whole list of scenarios of things that could cause problems in the Root Server System.

So, that then caused me to go look for, well, what's the status of the board's response to RSSAC037 and 038? Which is when I saw that the

board has done things in this space, and it has probably done things late enough that the review team didn't see it when they were creating this recommendation.

Specifically, the board has created a Governance Working Group, an RSS Governance Working Group, late last year. That Governance Working Group has kicked off. They have a Wiki page, they have a charter, they have a timeline. And given all of that, I am unclear as to what is left for SSR2 to tell ICANN to do here. Or is this one recommendation that has been overtaken by events and should be removed?

We've been discussing it a little bit on the list, and that's kind of where we are now. I think Naveed has said that more pressure needs to be put on ICANN to make sure that the Governance Working Group includes SSR, but that was already somewhat in the RSSAC037 and 038. So, for me, it's unclear what is the appropriate thing to do, here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, on the mail list, I saw Laurin and KC advocate just removing this, and I saw Naveed say, "No, they're not focusing enough on SSR." What do others think?

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Russ? Can I say something?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sure, go ahead.

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NAVEED BIN RAIS: I just want to explain my point on that because I research a lot on RSSAC037 and 038, so I had a look at that. Actually, I was part of the team who wrote this recommendation and this was updated quite late, actually. So, I believe whatever we are presenting here as nothing to do with what the Governance Working Group is doing. What they are doing is just making sure that the governance framework, what we call "the Strategy, Architecture, and Policy Function," and the other bits, which we call "PMI" [inaudible]. So, that is established and in place.

But when I studied that, I found that there was no specific emphasis on the security aspects of the root server. So, KC pointed out on the list— and I read that, because of our time difference, quite late, actually. So, there are mentions of security, resiliency, maybe, that number of times in the document.

That does not mean that they have considered that. These are general terms. What we have to know is whether they are emphasizing on the chain management, on the verification process, on the root server protection itself, how that will be incorporated, and that does not include the security framework in itself in the new proposed governance of RSSAC.

So, the purpose of this recommendation was not to actually replace or asking ICANN to implement RSSAC037 or 038. It is not that. It is that, when they are implementing that, they have to consider the security, stability, and resilience aspects related to the root server and to make sure that they are incorporated within the framework, because 037/038

are quite high level, and that's why they need this Governance Working Group.

We don't know what they will come up in the end, so I see no reason for eliminating this recommendation. This stands as we thought, as of today. Even if some implementation or some working group is ongoing, we don't even know whether they will focus or what they will produce out of it.

So, what we are proposing is just asking ICANN Org to oversee and make sure or pass it onto the Governance Working Group in whatever form. Somebody could better rephrase these terms than what I could do, I believe. But to make sure ICANN Org passes this message to the Governance Working Group or whosoever will implement later on to include the relevant aspects of SSR. That's the purpose. I think this is quite important and relevant. So, this was my point. That's why I oppose removing this recommendation.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin, I see your hand.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, I just wanted to quickly add I didn't just say "remove it," I was more saying we have to kind of assess where we are because certain action has happened. And reading it, it sounds more like these actions haven't happened yet.

So, I think we just have to see how we can reparse this in terms of text, so that what Naveed was saying is clarified, so it's clear that we're not … We know where it stands right now and we're just saying, when you do

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this, do this. So, I think we might just want to cut, maybe, some text in the recommendations to not make it about the RSSAC037 so much but more about, "When you create a governance model, take into account these things." That's one.

The other one I'm wondering about is, if this is already kind of in the making, is it correct to ask ICANN Org to do that, or is it actually RSSAC more than ICANN Org? Just checking that point off, as well.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Danko?

DANKO JEVTOVIĆ: Thank you. I have a short, a bit more general, comment. The recommendation to include SSR importance in all of this work is, of course, crucial. But the issue is that ICANN is managing the L-Root server, so ICANN manage Root Server System. It's a Root Server Operator.

So, this process of creating the governance structure for the Root Server Operators is not something that is under ICANN's mission directly. So, in a way, a message to include SSR considerations can be, of course, passed to the body that will create it, but it is not ICANN's job.

And this process with RSSAC037 and 038 is a complicated process that will be some time in the making and will cost millions and can potentially create another legal entity. So, it's a complicated thing. So, I would say that, from the implementation point of view, it will be best to implement recommendations that are related to the ICANN-managed Root Server

System and to the global governance of the system, and not something that ICANN impose on the other Root Server Operators.

In my understanding—I was techy, but some years ago—this has created such a system on purpose because we highly value independence of the Root Server Operators because they're using different software, different systems, and different internal policies, and that creates stability for the Internet as a whole. So, there is no initiative in the ICANN environment to somehow put ICANN on the top of the Root Server System. We are just one of the guys. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin, I see your hand.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah, I was about to ask if that was an old hand.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: It is. You can just read my comment in chat.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, I think we've heard some interesting political realization or realities that ICANN is responsible for one root server and we need to make sure that the recommendation is either focused at that one or is something that falls otherwise within ICANN's remit.

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HEATHER FLANAGAN:	KC has her hand up.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Oh, go ahead.
KC CLAFFY:	Yeah. I'm going to, again, disagree with Naveed. I don't think there is anything in this recommendation that isn't already covered on page 21 of RSSAC037, where it says explicitly the responsibility of the [architecture string] of this SA … Whatever they're calling it, this box on the workflow of the governance model, that's about best practices for root server operation based on industry practices for capacity, design, and availability of root servers, support availability, performance, scalability, and security.

The only different thing in the recommendation that we're saying is these best practices, which they already have in the framework, should include change-management verification and sanity check. I don't even know what that means. Obviously, the root servers already do change management. I don't know what they want verified but it seems to me it falls under the existing aspirations in this architecture stream, which is design, capacity, availability, performance, scalability, and security.

So, if we want something else—and this is orthogonal to the issue, as Steve says—ICANN has no authority to ensure anything in this space. I think what's happening now is a huge advance over what has happened over the last 20 years. So, I think we need to be specific here about what problem we observe. What is the evidence for the problem that we

observe that we are trying to aim a recommendation at? Otherwise, I don't see what ICANN is supposed to do with this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm assuming, KC, that [inaudible] that you just spoke. I'm hearing no one else. I'm hearing people leaning toward removing. Naveed, have you been convinced by what they've said?

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Do you hear me?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I do now.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah. So, actually, that depends on how we would want to put that. That depends on how important we consider these aspects are. So, something is there. I agree that ICANN Org itself does not directly have an influence on the Root Server Operators, but now we are moving toward kind of a different governance, kind of an independent governance model, for the Root Server Operators, and I think it is a very important time in terms of highlighting this aspect and saying that this aspect is important.

Nobody should be ignoring these aspects while implementing that, whether you want to target it to the RSSAC directly, to the working group directly, or to the ICANN community to oversight that, or to recommend, or whatever, I don't know. I am just thinking aloud on that. But I believe

that this aspect is really important. So, to make sure that this eventually happens.

As I said, I don't know what is the status of the current working group. I would be for rephrasing the recommendation but, still, I'm not really convinced of removing that altogether. But if others think so and if you have majority on that, I have no problem with that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Naveed, can I ask you, Naveed—

RUSS HOUSLEY: Wait a minute, Kerry-Ann has a hand. Kerry-Ann is next.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: In that case, I'm just saying, if you want to remove that, then it better that we kind of shift that toward some kind of suggestion rather than recommendation. That, I don't know. But I want this to be registered, somehow, somewhere, that this is very, very important.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Kerry.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Thanks, Russ. And the latter part of what Naveed said is what I was going to suggest, where we have some of the other sections that relate to DNS, we could probably put this as a general observation. While we're not

making a recommendation on it, I think how Naveed has put it, and even how Danko explained it, it's a matter that the recommendation, the authors …

When it was crafted, it was really geared toward that, "Hey, this thing has happened. Yes, there is a governance model. But at the end of the day, we think that the SSSR considerations need to be …" Not drilled down into, but at least making sure that the Root Server Operators are thinking about it.

I think the point that Danko made, that everyone uses different systems … But at the end of the day, there should be that basic security procedural thinking that they should all be adopting, no matter which system they've adopted and not trying to break the Internet by implementing a standard that not everybody can implement.

But I think the point that Naveed made at the end, that if not a recommendation, at least state it closer to where it's most relevant, as some of the general observations that we noticed. We noticed that RSSAC had this proposed governance model. It's still not clear how well the working group is going, but ensuring that that concept of, "This thing is out there. We think SSR considerations on this are critical." We're encouraging—[inaudible] but at least encouraging ICANN Org to continue to liaise with the Root Server Operators to ensure that they're considering this in the implementation of their security infrastructures.

I think that way would probably be better. And I agree that I don't think it should be completely deleted because I still believe referencing other processes outside of us … While we can't duplicate what they've done

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because it wouldn't serve ICANN Org any good to have several people saying the same thing if it has already been said, I think it's important for them to realize that, "Hey, these people have already said this, and we noticed that this is something well said, and we want you to continue doing it." So, I think there is merit in that part of it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Kaveh, go ahead.

KAVEH RANJBAR: Yeah. I think most of it was said, but just to make it very clear. What is expected here, I think, is rational. I understand it and it is contributing to the SSR in general. But it's also very clear that this is not within the control or remit of ICANN and this is very clear in the charter of RSSAC and the relationship of Root Server Operators with ICANN.

And it would be strange if we, basically, mandate an organization to do something which is not in their control, correct? As long as the wording is clear there, no matter what form is is— recommendation, suggestion, or whatever form—it should be clear that you can ask your organization to try to do that within their power but they have a limited voice in that setup, and that is a feature of the system, actually, that it's not owned by any single entity, including ICANN, or control.

But of course, they have a voice, at bare minimum, as one of the root operators, one of the 12 organizations. So, if it's framed in that way, then it makes full sense. But please keep in mind that, in none of the scenarios, ICANN as an organization or the community has control over the Root

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Server System. They have full control over root zone and compiling of the root zone, but how that root zone is distributed via the Root Server Operator and Root Server System is outside of the control of ICANN. ICANN is one of the 12 players. So I think, if that's considered, then whatever statement is made in that framing can make sense.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I don't see any more hands.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: One of the points that … Yeah, sorry for jumping in. One of the points that remains relevant with the ICANN as Org is its authority over, for example, its own root server. This is one part of the recommendation, as well, to encourage ICANN to put these in place as an example of other root servers to follow, and that I see in the last line of the recommendation itself.

So, that could be, also, an important aspect when … As I said, I agree that ICANN does not have that kind of influence on the Root Server Operators, but keeping in mind that it has its own root server, as well, so it can play its part to have all these implementations take place, whenever that happens, within the governance or whatever. I'm not sure what kind of form that could take.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So Heather, I'm hearing that we need to say something but that we don't need it to be a recommendation. All of our suggestions are about how to make future review teams work more effectively, so this doesn't feel like

it belongs in a suggestion either, because those suggestions are aimed at ICANN.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I thought we had a suggestion about privacy stuff that wasn't about future review teams. Maybe I'm wrong.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I don't think so. Not last I looked but I have to admit it has been a little while. So Heather, you obviously have been there recently. Are all of the suggestions about review teams?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So, how do we saw something that's, "Hey, don't lose sight of this ball. Make sure it doesn't get dropped," without making it a recommendation because it's outside of ICANN's remit?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Well, one thing we could do is … If you could scroll up to the top of page 32, please? Top of page 32. More.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's what I'm seeing.

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HEATHER FLANAGAN: There we go. Perfect. Okay. Yes, good. Well, it also just told me my Internet connection is unstable so it may have just been slow for me. One of the things I haven't finished yet is there needs to be something of an introductory paragraph under "additional concerns regarding the global DNS." You know, the thing that sets to context: why does this section exist as it is?

I have that for every other section. I haven't written it for this. I could put something along the lines of that the RSOs need to make SSR one of the founding principles for their discussions in here, in that introduction. This is important. While we're focusing specifically on things that ICANN needs to do, there should be a message to the entire community, particularly the RSOs, that SSR is important. Something like that. Does that sound like a reasonable approach?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Does anyone have concerns with that?

NAVEED BIN RAIS: One of the things … I'm not sure whether this is relevant to what we're talking about but, since I see this name collision in front of me, actually, if you remember, there was a separate Google Doc when I was working on this Recommendation 28. This was previously Recommendation 28, I believe.

So, I updated the text a little bit based on the comments coming to me from KC in that document. So, I will just suggest to have a look back at

that and update this text, here, because that would be a more updated version of it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Just to clarify, you just changed topics to information on name collision, right?

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: This is in front of me. It's name collision. So, that's why I'm talking about it. What I see on screen is this, here. Yeah. The text, I'm just saying the text can be updated from that Google Doc, actually.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I would appreciate some assistance in figuring out which of the half-a-million Google Docs are out there you're talking about.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah. I can actually send a link to that, or it should be with … Somewhere else.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: If you could send me a link, that would be—

NAVEED BIN RAIS: I can just put it here in the chat, actually.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Great. Brenda, could you scroll up just a touch, please? Perfect. Naveed, just to be clear, the paragraph I was talking about that would include something about RSOs needing to build in SSR to their founding principles would be above name collision as the introductory paragraph to additional concerns regarding global DNS.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

KC CLAFFY: Guys, I just still want to say somebody is going to have to write a sentence on what is the problem that we're trying to solve. I'm just wincing at the implication that the root servers haven't been one of the most secure, stable, and resilient aspects of the Internet for the last 25 years. So, fine if we want to put this in as a suggestion, but someone has to say what is the problem that we observe that we're trying to solve.

And it's that, "Well, things are changing now, and so things might not be stable in the future"? That's fine, but make it clear that we don't see a problem now, we're just anticipating something in the future so ICANN has some context in which to receive this, because I don't.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. Well, that's actually something that's easy enough to say, that we don't see a problem here but there is some concern that that could change and we just want to make sure that the RSS GWG and their constituents just keep this in mind.

KC CLAFFY: Yep.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Or maybe we say, "As the process is being adopted, please make sure you don't lose sight of this because the governance model is changing and we don't want it to have a technical SSR impact." Okay. I think that provides a way forward. Oh, Žarko.

ŽARKO KECIĆ: Yeah, I just wanted to comment on that. We are just seeing that those people who are working on this issue don't think about security and stability of root servers and they will do just policies and other stuff. Somehow, I don't like that idea to put that. Think about this, please. I agree, I would also like to hear what is the problem with root server.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: Anybody else have a view?

NAVEED BIN RAIS: I don't think the remit that SSR2 is working in is only to highlight the problems. What our role is beyond seeing the problems and highlighting is to point out to some direction, or some consideration, or some potential problem, or some emphasis, or something. This all can be included in a review process.

So, I don't think that we have to point out and find some problem before we can suggest anything. We are just being careful and want the future process … It's a [inaudible] that is taking place. We just want proper security framework. Again, I am saying there is no proper security framework within the RSS-proposed governance framework, as it says.

So, there are a bunch, and pieces are there that are relevant to security, but there is no specific portion of that document that specifically talks about security, stability, and resilience. We just want the relevant stakeholders to be mindful of that. So, I believe this is also one of our roles.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm not seeing any hands.

ŽARKO KECIĆ:	May I add just …? Yeah, Naveed. Okay, we are addressing no current problem but we are seeing some problems, and I don't see any problem. That's one thing. And another thing, the team that working on governance process and what we are saying, "Oh, you don't know what you are doing. Please consider SSR into your work," and I believe they will do because they are reviewing RSSAC037 and 038 to document and, in 037, there are clear security issues. So, I don't see what we are addressing with that recommendation, or suggestion, or whatever we call that.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	So, Naveed, I'm hearing Žarko and KC push back pretty hard on you.
NAVEED BIN RAIS:	Yeah. That's a viewpoint, actually, and we differ in the viewpoint. Again, we might have to rephrase whatever is written. That, I completely agree with it, and somebody can do it pretty well, I'm sure. But the thing is, does that require, this governance, the framework of the RSS, a specific security aspect to be handled?
	As I put it, I think very clearly already, I agree that the security word might be there and security aspects might be there in those documents, but I don't see a component of security existing there. So, that's my point. But this is just a viewpoint, and that depends on what we believe is important and how the overall … Because it has been a while since I saw the whole document.
	It depends on what is the tone of our current draft and what is the tone of our current document. So, if there is a place of anything like that, I

would say please don't remove it. If you say that there is no other place in the draft for anything like that and all other things are very, very specific, very proper, highlighting the problem, suggesting a solution in a proper way, and not showing any concern or any other thing, then I would say just remove it. So, that's why. I think we just differ in the viewpoints.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Steve?

STEVE CONTE: Thanks. Kaveh, I want to put you on the spot and ask you to wear your RSO hat. I'm hearing a lot of things on this, too, and what I'm hearing still is that this is a message for RSSAC. And so, as our resident Root Server Operator, I'm curious of Kaveh's thoughts on how the messaging that is taking place here … How best to frame it so that the RSSAC would take that into consideration during the GWG sessions but also moving forward after the RSSAC037/038 has been implemented.

KAVEH RANJBAR: Yeah. So, I have said the thing is … It's a bit complex, correct? Because RSSAC does not represent Root Server Operators. RSSAC is formed from delegates by Root Server Operators but it does not represent them. So, it's not like if RSSAC makes a decision it means that Root Server Operators are going to abide by them. As you know, there are very different organizations, from the U.S. Army, to universities, to not-for-profits, [bottom-up, like us]. So, very different organizational structures, and

RSSAC even cannot and is not … This is very clear in the charter. That's one.

And on the other hand, even if RSSAC is set to do this, RSSAC can only say, "Okay, we advise Root Server Operators to do that." But even looking at the charter of RSSAC, it is chartered to advise ICANN Board and, possibly, the community, but that's all. It doesn't mention advising Root Server Operators. So, that's one.

And also, to add a bit more complexity to that, RSSAC is not represented in GWG by design. GWG has three representatives from three separate Root Server Operators but RSSAC is not represented there as RSSAC because RSSAC just advise the board that, "If you want proper governance to the Root Server System, you have to form GWG, which is larger than ICANN, to just facilitate it, make sure community is involved with at least these parties, and now it's even larger, and make sure that you design something that has these 11 values, or sees this 11 values. Whatever it is, you have to make sure these 11 values are met."

So, that's how it works. Sending this back to RSSAC might not … I mean, I'm sure RSSAC would receive it and, at best, there would be a statement supporting it from RSSAC, correct? That we would support such a thing. But I think it's already there in the form of 037/038.

So, my suggestion is, if you want to keep it, like say something about it, recognize ICANN's remit at least one of the operators, so they have a voice in the whole system, plus as a player who is, basically, active in composing the root zone, so they have a different type of relationship with IANA and Root Server Operators via IANA.

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So I think, recognizing that, they have a good say. But I just want to say it's not under their control. So, if the advice is formed like that, recognizing ICANN's remit and asking them to act within their remit, then it can be effective advice. That would be my suggestion.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Heather, do you know how to implement that suggestion?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No, unfortunately not.

KC CLAFFY: Well, as I think Naveed alluded to earlier, the last sentence of the recommendation says that the thing that ICANN can do is act as a role model with L-Root. My counter to that is they already are because they have a website about what the L-Root is doing. So, if anything—

RUSS HOUSLEY: I would add "continue," even, then. "Continue to."

KAVEH RANJBAR: Yes. To be honest, I think that that's the most sensible approach. Because if you recognize L-Root operations and then lead by example, as with the L-Root, or continue leading by example, as with L-Root, then I think that makes a lot of sense. And then, they have all the cover to make any changes in that space.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That, I know how to implement.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: I don't remember the whole context because it has been a while, now, working around this recommendation. But I think one of the parts of that recommendation was also to ask ICANN as a Root Server Operator, the L operator, to publish certain things related to their doing of, or working with, the SSR.

I don't remember what kind of publication we expected that to happen, but it certainly meant that that was not, or has not, been published, or is not done as of now. So, I think I'll have to go back to the initial questions and answer that we had with the initial document, the [three-year-old] document, to see the context of all of that. But one of the things I remember was that, as well.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: KC did post a link to dns.icann.org/imrs, which contains a lot of their documentation on metrics, stats, telemetry, and usage following root server principles, as defined by RSSAC037 guidance on how to host an IMRS inside your network, things like that. Maintenance windows.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think that was not available when we last visited this topic.

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HEATHER FLANAGAN: So, again, it sounds like we have been overtaken by events, and we knew that would happen, given the length of time that the report is going on. But at least, based on all my research so far into the citations and everything, this is the only one where it really seems like there is not much left here.

I appreciate the concern that we want to make sure other Root Server Operators look to ICANN, that there may be problems in the future, that we want to future-proof this particular area to a certain extent. But I also have to point out that's not really something that we have been doing in this document.

I think, even as Naveed pointed out, it has been much more a, "Here's the gap, we're proving the gap, here's how to close the gap," and that's not what this particular recommendation of the baseline security practices is anymore. So, at this point, I still don't know what to do with this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I think, what I've heard, the only thing people are comfortable with is saying, "Continue to lead by example." I'm seeing no hands. I want to warn you, Heather, we only have ten more minutes. I understand this was your biggie, but are there other things you want help on?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: The only other thing—and this is now a heads up to members of the risk sub-team—just so you know, I have gone through your "smart risk" spreadsheet and turned those into the kind of summaries that I have

been putting in the other recommendations that say, "This recommendation can be considered effective when," "known to be implemented when," "must be done by," in that very same formulaic structure. It doesn't necessarily make very interesting reading but it certainly offers clarity and hopefully a help to future SSR review teams, should they actually ever happen.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And certainly, "continue to lead by example" doesn't have any of that structure. Laurin.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Unfortunately.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. So, this is a quick note to the other members of the risk sub-team. So essentially, I wrote a basis and then Heather wrote it over and made it sound proper. Heather, if you could send that to the risk sub-team, or to me and I can forward it on, so everyone can have a look that the work we did is reflecting what the team wanted—I think it does—just to make sure. Is that the one in chat?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yep, that's the … You should recognize this was originally the global DNS section but now it's general.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay, cool. I can forward this to the group so everyone can have a look if they want to.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. That is the language that's currently in the body of the document. If there is anything egregiously wrong, please highlight it in the smart criteria table and I will go fix it in the doc itself.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Thank you.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: And just to remind everyone, the purpose of that table is to just give a really short summary. It's not trying to replace the recommendations. I'm not going to put the summary in any kind of table for ICANN or others because we don't want to necessarily distract them from the recommendations themselves, but it is the hope that by having that there it will help future review teams.

In terms of when I need feedback by, as soon as you can possibly get it to me. Because remember, I'm getting you a final draft by the close of business on Sunday, which sounds kind of funny, but before the weekend ends. That's when I need to be done and hand this over to you. So, any text revisions I would want to have before then.

EN

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right. Just remember that, a week from today, we have a two-hour call so that we can go through that and deal with anything that bothers anyone. So, it's really important that we all have read that document prior to the call and come with our comments. Hopefully, the comments in the Google Doc, but at least have the points that you want to discuss with the team.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Laurin, you have your hand up.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Old.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Or not.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Whoops. It was old, sorry.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Fair enough.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I'm not seeing any other hands. Heather, any other issue you want to raise?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Do I know what I'm doing with that one recommendation yet? I'm still at a loss as to take it out, or not, or rewrite it. What exactly do you want done?

KC CLAFFY: I agree we're not at a point where she can do it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, I hear most people saying "remove it" and some people saying that, at most, we could say "continue to lead by example," which doesn't follow our smart format, but it's not clear to me that we have consensus.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So, I'm wondering if Naveed can take a whack at rewriting this recommendation to address his concern, either as a recommendation or a suggestion. And especially if he wants to focus on what L-Root should do, go to that webpage I posted and say, "What is the gap?" What is insufficient about what L-Root is doing now that you want addressed, that you want us to recommend addressing, or suggest? Either way.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, Naveed, I think, since you're the only one speaking up for it, if you're not going to be able to put the time in to advocate for it, it's pretty clear what will happen.

NAVEED BIN RAIS:	Yeah, I'll try to do that. I'll try to rephrase that. As I said, I'm not sure how good I'll be at that, but we can discuss that in the next call. By the next call, I think we should decide what to do with that.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Yeah. I think you are in the position of convincing the rest of the team to join you. So, if you would put some text on the mail list to keep that discussion going, I think that's where we are.
NAVEED BIN RAIS:	Sure.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Okay. All right. Is there any other business we need to deal with today? All right. Then the last reminder is we're going to get a full report this weekend, review it by the call next week. We're probably going to need to take another pass at prioritization and remember that we have not yet had the team review the public comment response.
	So, we're probably going to have to have one call in January to do that. I'm looking at the 7th of January for that call, just because it doesn't make sense to have calls on Christmas Eve or New Year's Eve. So, does anyone have known problems with Thursday, January 7th? Please speak now if you do.
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:	Žarko has his hand raised, Russ.

EN

RUSS HOUSLEY: Ah, go ahead.

ŽARKO KECIĆ: It is Christmas in Serbia.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Ah. So, we should push it an additional week?

ŽARKO KECIĆ: If possible.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

ŽARKO KECIĆ: I would be thankful.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Then we will do that. Let's plan on the 14th of January for that call.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Shall we make it a longer call, or you just want to do one hour?

EN

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Speaking for myself, I would really like it to be a longer call. We can always hang up early.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. That's what I was just about to say. Let's plan for a two-hour call because we do need to finish the public comment when we have that. So, Brenda, I think you know what invites to send out based on that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is the same time as now, but two hours.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Correct. Correct. Same start time, go for two hours. Okay. I think that wraps it up. Thank you very much. I'm looking forward to putting this to bed. I'm sure you all are, as well. All right. Thank you very much.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]