BRENDA BREWER:Good day, everyone. Welcome to the SSR2 plenary 126 on the
29th of October 2020 at 14:00 UTC.

Members attending the call today include Jabhera, Alain, Denise, Kaveh, Kerry Ann, Ram Krishna, Lauren, Russ, and Danko. Observer Dennis Tan.

Apologies from Boban. Attending from ICANN Org, we have Jennifer, Steve, Brenda, and technical writer Heather. Today's call is being recorded. Please state your name before speaking for the record. And Russ, I'll turn the meeting over to you. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Hello. So the first thing on the agenda is to talk about the time of the meeting. Europe has already changed from daylight savings time to standard time, and this weekend, the US will join them.

Last year when that happened, we shifted the call so that it remained at the same hour that it was before the shift. That would be 10:00 Eastern for me. And the leadership on the call Monday suggested we do the same here. That is, we do the same this year as we did last year. Does anyone have any concerns with keeping it at the time before the shift in your local time zone?

Okay. I'm not hearing anyone object, So Brenda, we'll ask you to send out updated, time adjusted invites because the UTC time obviously will change. Just so that we can keep it the same as it was.

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record. Okay, today we have two big report outs. One big, one small in terms of pages. The abuse subteam sent text yesterday. I know I've been spending time with it. I got through a little over half of it. I hope other people had time to go through it as well, and then a couple days ago, Naveed sent updated text based on his action item from the last call. I hope people have taken a look at it. My reading of it is he just did his homework.

So I'd like to turn it over Laurin or Denise to go over the abuse readout.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: As Denise is not saying anything, I guess it's me. It makes sense insofar that I was the last one to touch the text. We resolved some kind of lastminute issues on Tuesday night. So this is some important disclaimer where this pertains to the last recommendation on EPDP and policy. So this was the last change we made, so there might be more discussion there. Just up front, this is clearly where even the subteam needs to look at more.

> Anyway, first of all, the structure of the abuse section has changed considerably. What we have done which just seemed the most functional was to split it up in kind of generalized, overall findings, it's called, if you look at the report document on Google, and then follow this up with the recommendations and then essentially kind of go through one by one what it's about, and not just provide recommendations but also provide a finding summary as well as a statement of the status quo, what we expect from the recommendation

and when we would like to see it completed. This is to essentially match our goal of providing smart criteria.

I will put a pin in this because this is the second one where input from the whole team will be particularly important and necessary. We just have to discuss and think about by when can this be realistically completed without kind of giving too much time to a process that doesn't need that much time, but also, kind of putting in some buffer, making it a realistic timeline.

So that is all under the recommendations which is kind of the second big [addition.] Yeah, I think now I can talk about it more generally. Brenda, I'm not sure if you'll be able to kind of follow this with scrolling, so I will try to call out the section numbers.

So overall findings related to DNS abuse. We're essentially talking about a variety of issues. Everyone who has been on this team for a while that is all of us—know what this one is about, what we're talking about. It's about cybercrime, it's how certain safeguards that should have been there in the new gTLD program have not really been achieved, at least they're not effective, and essentially, issues around SSR that have been identified beforehand, like for example by the CCT review. And then we go into the data problem. This is one of the focus areas, so we're talking a lot about DAAR and how DAAR from our perspective lacks certain data points, fails to publish information that might be relevant, and so on. More on this in the recommendations.

We then want to add a summary of the recommendations to kind of give an overview, if you want, of what we want. We haven't done that

yet because we still need to kind of discuss this as a team and find consensus on the text and what we're doing. We also have a section on RDAP. We're not really talking much about it in the recommendations. We're just saying, well, implement the SSAC guidelines. It is more about us saying, yes, this is a relevant discussion for SSR, but yeah, it is already being looked at by a lot of places. So we kind of said, okay, there is not that much point in us giving additional detailed recommendations.

Okay, so also, because I'm already talking for like eight minutes, Denise and actually Kerry Ann is also on the call, please jump in if I miss or forget something. You're also welcome to kind of add your own point of view here as well, obviously.

So section two recommendations. This is where a lot of changes have happened. So we're starting with the abuse definitions. We have a finding summary where we're essentially saying a lot can be done without these abuse definitions, but it would be a nice one to have so that discussions and whatever else kind of refers to the same stuff, people have the same idea of what things are. That's always helpful.

We're starting, however, with asking ICANN Org to post a website of their working definitions, because there are some. For example, in DAAR, there is a variety of things and then the CCT review for example had some definitions, so we believe it would be worthwhile just to have them in one spot so that even without them being final definitions, there is a way to say, okay, this is what people are talking about.

We're then calling for a subsequent community working group to essentially establish and involve these definitions. And then we're saying, well, the board and the organization should make sure these definitions are consistently used, otherwise it doesn't make sense.

ICANN Org actions. Here, we have made significant changes to what you will have seen before. I can see someone is fixing a typo. So here, we changed to instead of saying use SLAs, we have defined an SLA. The reason for that is that we want to actually think about, okay, what can we recommend? What works? So here, we kind of went to actually proposing something very specific.

As you can see, there are a lot of percentages, and I have not, when I edited this, added the question marks everywhere. So this is a key one where it's essentially about something we've discussed before. If your portfolio has more than a certain percentage of domains that are seen as malicious, security threats, whatever lingo you want to do, you first get a warning, and if it's too bad, Compliance should open an investigation and take action.

So I have question marks when it comes to the days. Imagine the question marks to be there for the percentages. Those were essentially pulled from us looking at some of the most abused contracted parties and as we state in the text, for now we have chosen them to be quite high, meaning that this addresses the issue that, A, such systems can be gamed, and to also avoid that minor fluctuations or other issues would lead to people being accused of something and then compliance action starts.

Furthermore, we ask for sanity checks by Compliance to make sure it's not being gamed before you start hounding people, and we also clearly

state that contracted parties should have an opportunity to essentially refute these claims. For example, if you have a very small registrar and the other registrar really hates you and they game the system or whatever, this might go out really quickly because your portfolio is small. So we tried to put safeguards in there so that that doesn't really impact as much.

In terms of the contract negotiations—I forgot to remove something we're saying that when it comes to contract negotiations, ICANN Org should include a kind of negotiating team that includes abuse and security experts who are truly external. So someone who really kind of has security, stability and resiliency-in mind and is independent from the ICANN process. That's a key one there.

Compliance enforcement. Obviously, all of this is pretty useless as long as the Compliance team doesn't do anything. And we have seen that a variety of reports and sources point towards Compliance not enforcing things they could actually enforce. So we're just saying here, okay, direct the Compliance team to monitor and strictly enforce the things that relate to SSR, have kind of external audits of this function, a bit like in the section on risk and internal security, that is something that is done in a lot of places so it's nothing out of the ordinary.

And number five, the numbering is really weird, so we have one, four and five. We're asking ICANN Compliance function to create a public report on what tools they're missing to enforce security. So we have had two discussions, I believe, with the Compliance team, and we were told "We don't have the tools to really do this," so it would be good f or them to say what the tools are that they would need in the future to do this.

DNS abuse portal. Here, we identified the issue that reporting abuse can be pretty complicated for the one reporting it, and this goes for other compliance as well, so here we more generally speak to compliance. And what we're saying here is what would be really useful—and we have discussed this before—is to establish some kind of portal where you can make those centrally and they automatically get distributed to the appropriate parties. ICANN should kind of host it, but it's not about them having all the content because there's a variety of issues associated with that, but only, it should collect some metadata, and that metadata should be shared. So for example, it would allow us, SSAC, the ICANN community and so on, to for example see how many complaints are going into the system, how many are about XYZ, etc., so you have a bit of an overview what is actually going on.

And then we're going into data analysis and research. The first recommendation is about DAAR where we're essentially saying, okay, DAAR should develop further, it should kind of inform the community, inform policy, inform action. One of the key things is obviously to release information about certain aspects, so for example, abuse concentration in certain contracted parties. It should also involve more openly sharing data with researchers so that essentially, there is a bit of a check on the DAAR methodology and data, essentially making sure this is verified. This is obviously pretty relevant because we're talking about using SLAs based on ICANN's DAAR system, so having a few more eyes on that would be helpful.

Data access. The findings here involve what we've already said before, this is extremely relevant. We're speaking to two things. That is, CZDS on the one hand with their operational/technical—I don't know what to best call it right now—barriers like renewing your access takes time and then you kind of have time periods in your data that are missing. Stuff like that. So we're saying, yeah, please deal with this.

Then it's about RDAP where we're essentially just pointing to SAC 101. As I said before, we kind of concluded that adding a lot of recommendations on this would not be helpful because there's enough talk already.

This is the new part now, so this is where we're talking about policy. Here in the findings summary, we first recognize that a lot of anti abuse work can be done by the organization, by the board, without a policy process. However, based on the public comment, we're essentially saying, okay, if that doesn't work, if that doesn't bring the—if you get stuck, essnedtially, do create a temporary specification and then create an EPDP to create a policy.

And as I've said before, this one is a bit fresh still, so yeah, the subteam would have to kind of look at that one in more detail as well as the whole team. and if you look at it, I'm already kind of, from today, propose to add a clause here in addition. I will not talk about that because I'm just reporting out.

Yes, as I can see in chat, this has been to the SSR2 e-mail list. Everyone is invited to read, to comment. Please always use suggest mode and comments, because otherwise, it will be difficult to track everything. Okay, after this lecture, thank you very much for listening for that long, and happy to—

RUSS HOUSLEY:So Laurin, there are a couple places where the abuse team or youhighlighted a need for discussion.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. That is correct.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I think we should probably at least touch on those places.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And I put in one comment on the top of page three. This set of recommendations is the highest priority in our report. I've got a problem with that sentence. While I agree that these are high, I have a real problem thinking that the c-suite, DR, CR, all of that is lower. I think they kind of are at the same level. But I'd like to know what other people think.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. I will just take my hat off. I'm not reporting out anymore. I did reply to this comment. I feel they're very high priority, but something like the CSO/CISO position would rank similar. Again, because there is a strong relationship as well between this part and that part.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, indeed, there are a lot of cross fertilization between our recommendations, and that's why I think saying something like this in the middle is problematic. My recommendation would be to just delete this sentence, but I'd like to hear from others. I'm not seeing any hands. Just speak up, people, if you have a thought.

DENISE MICHEL: I'm comfortable with the sentence, but certainly look forward to hearing others' comments on this.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I probably support Russ just to say that we didn't take the approach in all the other sections to state this, and we had made a decision I think earlier on that once we have the report completed, we would then—we had this whole discussion going back and forth as to whether—I think Ram as well was involved, like should we rank high priority or not? I don't know if this is how we start saying it, and I think if we leave it in, it might end up being like a legacy sentence when we'd probably take a different approach in terms of how we indicate our priorities for the sections of the recommendations. So that's my only objection, that I don't know if this is how we want to actually state that we prioritize recommendations. And I know the team on the whole wanted to look at all of them and decide on that prioritization at the end. I think, yeah, I

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just remember there was a lot of talk about this earlier on, so it's just, do you want to start doing it for this one like this? I agree that it is important though and one of the higher ranked recommendations when we get to that stage.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Danko.

DANKO JEVTOVIC: Thank you. My comment is not on the priority. I would agree that this is of very high importance, especially given the current discussion about DNS abuse in the community that is like the most energetic discussion during the last couple of ICANN meetings.

> But I wanted to ask Laurin to make a few comments that I believe can be important in how these very good and important recommendations about abuse could impact the future work and how to make them operational. So I don't know if this is the right moment or because you started to go through the specific parts.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, and then we'll go down and talk about the parts that are highlighted as needing discussion.

DANKO JEVTOVIC: Yeah, because I didn't highlight anything in the document. But anyway, first, the DAAR is a very important project and I believe highly in DAAR

and its ability, but currently, the DAAR is not the tool that is used by Compliance, it's just a general reporting tool.

So maybe the team would like to make it clear that the fundamental role of the DAAR has to be changed. and I'm not sure how much that can be accepted by the community. And that leads to the question of the tools for compliance in general, the process, how is that set up.

My understanding and the information we as the board get by overseeing the Org and Compliance is that Compliance is doing their work according to the PDPs, policies that we have, and especially the contracts. And they're not lacking tools to implement what's in the contracts. But the comment that Compliance is lacking tools to implement, to do more in the DNS abuse is, in my opinion, very reasonable, but the question is, what are the goals and what do they have to do? This goes back to the recommendations by this review team, and of course, back to the policies, but the challenge of these recommendations that I see, how to implement them, is about the contracts and the PDPs.

First of all, the board doesn't create policies, so I don't see how the board can create a policy or force it in any specific way. The suggestions for contract negotiations, [you sure] would be taken very seriously, but the problem is they're voluntary contract negotiations. So the Org doesn't have contracting power to put something in the contract that is not accepted by the other side. That's why the PDP process is there. So GNSO for the PDP process can create a policy that is automatically applied through the contracts. So in my opinion, the significant challenge will be what of the recommendations can be implemented in the way that I understand is recommended in this document, and what of those recommendations will have to go through the full PDP process? And my reading is that if the report takes these valid recommendation in the good directions, there is more better chance that the community will accept them, create them as policy, and they will be implemented.

If the recommendations go directly to something that is—a different kind of process in the contracting process, we might have a problem there, because the full setup is created in that way that the policy cannot be jumped over and avoided. So I don't know how to change that direction easily, but I see this as a challenge. Thank you for [listening for all this block.]

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Go ahead, Denise.

DENISE MICHEL: Thanks, Danko. It would be helpful to just get a few bullets from you in the e-mail list to make sure that the abuse subgroup addresses all of your points. And there are some members who aren't on the call, and it's 7:00 AM here so I'm not sure I'm going to remember everything you said. I want to make sure that we have an opportunity to address your points.

> So the Compliance indicated that they have and can use abuse reports to assist with their work, so we're following up on that and making sure

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that they're much more purposeful in using abuse data, particularly abuse data that indicates systemic abuse on DAAR. There's a wide difference of opinion in terms of what requires a policy for ICANN Org action and what does not. We've seen in discussing this and receiving comments from a wide variety of ICANN groups that the overwhelming majority of declarations that a PDP is needed to, say, do something like define abuse. Those come from the contracted parties. We've also observed that I think the recent EPDP on access to WHOIS is indicative that the PDP process does not seem to yield a timely or useful result when it comes to understanding, acknowledging and dealing with things that relate to abuse and abuse mitigation. We've also noted many instances in the past where ICANN Org has taken action or addressed things in guidance or contracts based on general policies that come out of the GNSO council. The new gTLD program is an example of that.

But the reason I think the abuse subgroup put language in here that also acknowledges that there may at some point be activity in the abuse area that ICANN board feels requires a policy development process, we've included recommendations on that. Overall, the approach the abuse subteam has taken is that there are a number of activities and tools right now that can be used to a much fuller extent and much more effectively by registrars, registries, and ICANN Compliance and ICANN Org. And that should be done.

And in addition to that, improvements should be made, and if some of those improvements are deemed by the general counsel of ICANN to fall within the picket fence and require a PDP, then the board should require that and provide the appropriate oversight structure to the extent it can help ensure that these items are appropriately addressed. The abuse subgroup has, in our research, found that in the application of abuse definitions in different areas like DAAR and other things we've indicated in the report, policy development process is not required, and we've also suggested in evolving the definition of abuse to keep pace with current and future changes in DNS abuse that a cross-community working group and board leadership is needed. I'll stop there, but I think the abuse subgroup would welcome an opportunity, Danko, to address other questions you have if you'd like to shoot us an e-mail.

DANKO JEVTOVIC: Thank you, Denise, so much. Thank you for speaking so detailed at 7:00 AM in the morning. I understand the challenges of different time zones, as you know. Board is very thankful to this team for the hard work you're doing, and especially to the DNS abuse subgroup because this is really current discussion and we really value the input that is coming and that you're bringing.

> I will try to write a bit of my comments and list most important points in an e-mail, but I believe that I didn't say anything actually new or different than it was already in the comments that were better structured than my saying.

> I agree that always more can be done, and in this way, your recommendations are more than helpful and that will lead the way how we could all do better. And as [inaudible] said, the contracted parties and of course the Compliance and the board really wants to define and move that.

But I would just add, without opening any more questions, that in my opinion, the main challenge in the current DNS abuse discussion is not to define what the abuse is but to understand what can we do about it, what is in the ICANN mission and ICANN remit. And as you said, in the picket fence. This is now the mission. And this is something that, of course, there are different opinions and ways.

My—maybe the only really important point actually has been already addressed in your recommendations, is that not a lot of things can be done by strong arming contracted parties through contracts, because the negotiations are voluntary, and if something has to be enforced, probably, it will come to PDP. But I of course am not the person who will by myself make any decisions on that, and this is something that we had really to look into it. Just my point was how to structure these good recommendations so that they will really have the better impact on our SSR mandate. So Denise, once again, thank you very much.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Matogoro.

JABHERA MATOGORO: Yes. Thank you. I really appreciate the good work that the team has done on the—but I heard an observation on—I remember we had discussed about DAAR recommendation. And Zarko is having something on it, and Laurin also mentioned a number of issues from those recommendations, and we removed it out. I'm wondering why we are now including again on this subgroup. Is there anything new that we did not capture on the previous recommendation that we agreed to remove it that's now necessary to include in this section? Any other observation that the team is bringing onboard so that—I see otherwise, most of the text I see were previous capture and we agreed to remove the DAAR recommendation from the previous reports. Maybe I can get clarification on this thing. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I noted in my read that there was one sub-recommendation that had an underlined new colon in front of it, which is in the DAAR section. It's number two, and it is on page 19. I didn't see any others that were new. Did I miss any, laurin or Denise?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I don't think so. DAAR is really kind of KC's territory. She's unfortunately unable to join today.

DENISE MICHEL: But it would be great if we could get an e-mail that includes what [inaudible] think was dropped or what should be included if there are specific changes. If we could share those in an e-mail, I'm sure the abuse subgroup can follow up on that. Thanks.

JABHERA MATOGORO: Maybe if it's a recommendation from KC, because I think KC was also one of the members who recommended that the DAAR report was not necessary to be included as [the number of achievement] that has been obtained. So maybe we can try to see if she might have noted

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something that was previously not there, because I remember the original text of the DAAR recommendation, I wrote that from the activities that we assigned previously, before the Marrakech meeting, and we were also with Zarko and he also had a number of observations on the DAAR. Later on, we agreed that we think DAAR recommendation was not necessary to be included. So if KC might have observed something new, then it's better the team highlight and make previous check and see what did we not capture on the previous recommendation and what new have been added on the recommendations that we're putting.

I also had another observation on the heading. Especially, I see data something and research. I remember we had data analysis and research. I remember we also had a recommendation on—was it research something? Then that we were recommending ICANN to follow up on academic or technical conferences to be included on some of the issues especially related to SSR.

So the heading might confuse. So if we have something on a separate recommendation and we have some similar text on another page, we might have a kind of duplication, so we might need to check the correlation so that we are consistent and remove the duplication. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. That has been noted before, and I believe Heather recognizes the gargantuan task she has to identify those for us to resolve. But this report is just getting so large you can't keep it all in your head. But we

did that once and I think after this restructuring, we will have to do it again. So I fully agree with that. Danko.

DANKO JEVTOVIC: I personally support the evolution of DAAR and I believe it's a really important project, so don't take my previous comments on DAAR that I don't see the importance of that and possibility to grow. Thanks.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Thank you. I hadn't taken them that way, but being explicit is good. I don't see any more hands, so Laurin, can you take us to the first point you want to discuss?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay. As I've said before, the key thing we have to discuss multiple times for sure is, particularly what is at the end of each finding summary is really relevant for everyone to look at, because this applies to the smart criteria. So this is really about, okay, what do we see as the status quo? What is the problem with it? What do we want the recommendation to achieve? Who has to take action for the recommendations, and by when should it be completed or seriously in works or whatever else?

> We have 14 minutes left. So I very much doubt we could go through all of these because this is once per recommendation. So I guess what we can do is we can kind of talk about one as a template and then ask people to just do it in the Google doc, because yeah, there are quite a few of those. Does that make sense?

RUSS HOUSLEY: There's a couple here where you say we really need to talk about this, like with a comment, "discuss." Like the one on page 14.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, so essentially, I stopped writing "discuss" every time for these paragraphs, but I meant essentially all of them. But let's look at page 14. So what we're saying here, the [inaudible] is an obstacle to progress and that ICANN Org as well as others—maybe might want to add that should be playing a stronger role in getting to clarity and transparency. And then we're talking about org, add transparency to this debate by establishing a website that documents kind of working definitions so that we just have an overview of what people think are relevant terms to be defined and talked about.

> And then essentially, the outcome of the recommendation would be that when we take into account number two, that essentially there would be an accepted and community [vetted] description of the terms and a regular review and update if required of these terms. This would enable the community discussions, but this would also enable, for example, government actors to define codes of conduct around DNS abuse, so it would be helpful beyond just the GAC as part of the community.

> This would also mean you could communicate clearly, that the interpretation of policies [inaudible] pertinent agreement documents would be enabled. So it requires action from the ICANN board, the org, this is particularly point one, and also from the GNSO. This refers mainly

to point two wand then we're saying, okay, this is considered achieved when the documentation is made available and when a kind of process for updates is established—this relates to ICANN Org—or after the community has agreed on definitions and created a review mechanism. This would be related to two.

The recommendation is attainable, you can do this, and we're saying for number one, right now, this is one of the key things we have to talk about, are these timelines realistic? So [collating] this by June 2021, that should be doable. And then the community process [inaudible] CCWG we're saying in 2022 right now.

So the question is, is this a good representation of what we think is the status quo, where we want to go, who has to act, and is the timeline appropriate? And essentially, the discussion would be the same for each and every recommendation in the stack.

RUSS HOUSLEY:So I think you're asking two questions. One, do we have consensus on
these recommendations? And two, are the deadlines reasonable?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: More or less. I think calling for consensus might be a bit early.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I understand that, but that's where you're going.

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- LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. Essentially, does this make sense, I think is the better term for now. So, are we fine with where we want to go, what are our objectives? The next steps would obviously be before we call on consensus, is the actual recommendation text representative of our objectives? Does it need additions, changes, deletions, whatever to kind of match the outcome we want? Or is the recommendation the correct one and the outcome is not described well? That might also be [inaudible].
- RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm not seeing any hands and I'm not hearing anyone trying to speak, so I'm assuming that people are comfortable with the approach taken here. Is having the website created within six months and the community process done the following year the right kind of deadlines? Silence says okay.

Since we're down to ten minutes, I would like to do a couple more of these just to get a feel, but it's clear that this is going to spill over to next week, so we probably should spend a minute or two after the next one to talk about what kind of cleanup is going to happen in-between. And I don't want to have the document shift too much while people are reviewing it more wholly for next week. At the same time, fixing the missing letters is not a bad thing.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. So this is a bit of a document conversion issue. Essentially, I think we would be doing well if everyone commented in the text and made suggestions by next week. So as long as the changes are tracked, we can see what people are proposing. What I've been doing so far to keep the document clean is when I have kind of change requests instead of actually suggesting in text which makes it look really messy, at this stage, I just put comment boxes. Maybe that would be an option to kind of keep the document clean but allow people to propose edits and read other people's proposals without the document becoming a rainbow of colors and strike through again.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, I think if things are truly editorial and Heather looks at them and it makes sense, she can accept the ones that ...

DENISE MICHEL: I agree with that, if we could of course give Heather editing rights so she could continue to make the more straight forward corrections and add footnotes. And then allow everyone else to make comments and suggestions but not change the text. So we have a stable version. I think that would be great, and if we could commit to getting any additional comments or suggestions people have on this text by, say, close of business Pacific, Tuesday, to give the abuse subgroup time to address it before Thursday's call. How does that sound?

RUSS HOUSLEY: That makes sense to me. Anyone on the call unable to get this read and comments in by Tuesday? Okay, great. Laurin, we have just enough time to do the paragraph at the bottom of one more, I think.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Will do. So I will also quickly add I wrote all of those, and I tried to not kind of be argumentative, but it is a first stab, so I really hope people will read it and comment on it. I'm sure there's stuff in there that isn't great.

So with the findings summary for the Org actions, number one for the ICANN SLAs—p.s., we should probably add findings summary and then what they refer to, because this is right now confusing. So here, it's really about, okay, we note that ICANN Compliance reported to us that they do not have the tools to act upon contracted parties.

There are quotes on this, they're in the text above. And we do have research that suggests that some registrars and registries are contributing to this problem in an exceptional manner. [They have outsized fractions] of their portfolio that various monitoring services, academics, etc. see as kind of malicious security threats, whatever wording you want.

So we think that what ICANN should try to establish here is a service level agreement that is specifically between them and the contracted parties, which is to kind of keep abuse below a certain percentage as a service level. So this is only within ICANN and the contracted parties. That's really important in that case.

We're aware, as I've mentioned before, block lists and similar data feeds are not always correct and that they can be gamed. That's why we're proposing high marks for notification and enforcement, and we're proposing sanity checks on both sides, should something happen. So if ICANN comes to you and they're wrong and you can demonstrate that they're wrong, then obviously, nothing's going to happen to you.

The outcome we want to see is that ICANN Compliance is kind of empowered to deal with the worst offenders, so if you go to, I don't know, just pick one out, Spamhaus, look at kind of their most abused registrars, you will see that those have percentages of what they see as malicious domains far above the 10% mark, and that isn't very different when you go anywhere else.

And then the outcome is essentially empower Compliance to deal with the worst offenders. Reading it again, I think we might want to clarify that this is really what we want here and we don't want kind of some crazy regime where everyone is afraid. And then we're saying this recommendation requires action from ICANN Org, can be achieved when the SLA is entered into all relevant contracts and agreements, and obviously, this recommendation is attainable but you can only do it over time so either when you renew or when, say, a contracted party would be like, "Okay, we're happy to do this from now on."

So that's the text. As I note myself while I read through this, I would make some additions and changes to what I've written. But I think the best way to do this, considering we're nearly on top of the hour, is where we want to go and have some fun with it, write your comments and tell me where I wrote stuff that doesn't make sense.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I agree. Everybody tell Laurin where he wrote stuff that doesn't make sense. Seriously, please go through, put your comments. High-

level comments like the ones Danko made should probably just be put as comments at the top of the document because they kind of affect the whole thing, or like the DAAR comment which only affects that section where he's saying, be explicit about expanding the role of the ways that the DAAR output is used.

So with that, and only two minutes left, is there Any Other Business that we need to deal with before we break up?

All right then, everyone, thank you very much, happy reading, and let's see if we can get to a place where we can have a complete draft report by the end of the call next week. Thank you.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Thank you all.

DENISE MICHEL:

Thanks, everyone.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]