
BRENDA BREWER: Good day, everyone. Welcome to the SSR2 Plenary call #121 on the 16th of September 2020 at 14:00 UTC.

The members attending the call today include Danko, Ramkrishna, Russ, Kaveh, Eric, Denise. Observer, Dennis Tan. Apologies from Alain, Laurin, Jennifer, and Steve. Attending from ICANN Org is Jean-Baptiste, Larisa, and Brenda. And our technical writer, Heather Flanagan.

Today's meeting is being recorded. Please state your name before speaking for the record. I just want to note that Kerry-Ann just joined us as well. Russ, I'll let you begin the meeting. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thanks. And I think we have an observer as well.

BRENDA BREWER: Correct. Dennis Tan.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So welcome, everybody. We have a pretty full agenda today. I hope we can get through it all.

The first topic is when to hold these calls going forward. With the start of a new semester, we were going to lose at least one of the Vice Chairs to the schedule, and so we put together this doodle to see if we could find a time. From the doodle, it's obvious which of the co-Chairs we're going to lose if we continue at this time. And it turns out we'll lose a

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.

different co-Chair if we shift to the other time that was available on Wednesday. So the question to the group at this point is, should we look at times on Thursday and Friday that we could shift to with the hopes of getting a more complete set of the team? I'm inclined to do the doodle with the expanded slots on Thursday and Friday to see what we can find out. Does anyone have concerns with that?

DENISE MICHEL: Sounds like a good plan, Russ. This is Denise. Thanks.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Then Staff, could you please coordinate between you yourselves and Heather and find slots on Thursdays and Fridays that both of you can support, and then send out an updated doodle for either keeping the slot as it is, which is clearly better than the other Wednesday slot, or the Thursday or Friday options that we have? Does that make sense?

BRENDA BREWER: Yes. Thank you, Russ. I'll work on that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So with that, let's turn to Recommendation 21. Eric is here with us. Eric, would you like to take us through this, please?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Hey, everyone. Yeah, sure. So I got a quick comment from Russ—I haven't had a chance to incorporate it in—which is that the text I

incorporated is probably better suited to be in a different part, just the findings instead of the recommendation. So I have to sort of circle back and move it up. So with that sort of meta comment, I'll walk people through the text. It'll largely, if not exactly, just move to the more appropriate location, which is in Recommendation 21.2, and it's on the screen in purple. And basically, it was in reaction to—there were a number of comments that came in and KC pointed out that there needs to be some work that actually specifically points at what this change addresses in the comments. But that notwithstanding, the addition of the text was to really just outline the idea behind the formal modeling. So I'll just read the new section in totality. There's a chunk in the middle that's new but it'll sort of be silly to read that out of context.

So 21.2 says, "ICANN Org should establish a formal procedure, supported by a formal process modeling tool and language (with a citation) to specify the details of future key rollovers, including decision points, exception legs, the full control-flow, etc. Formal process modeling has shown utility in complex inter-human processes that include election security, medical process safety, and more. In these cases, the tasks undertaken by people in human space are modeled in formal process specification languages. And critical to life choices and consequences are symbolically modeled and formally tracked. This allows for quantitative prescriptions and predictions of what should be done and what can be expected to result from choices, exceptions, and successful executions. When compared to elections and medical processes, the DNS root KSK rollover presents itself as a tractable venue where security and correctness are globally critical. Verification of the key rollover process should include posting the programmatic

procedure (e.g., program, FSM) for public comment, and community feedback should be incorporated. The process should have empirically verifiable acceptance criteria at each stage, which should be fulfilled for the process to continue. This process should be reassessed at least as often as the rollover itself (i.e., the same periodicity) so that lessons learned can be used to adjust the process.”

And that was the sum total of the changes in the middle of that description with one or maybe two—I think one additional citation added for clarity. Anybody have any thoughts, comments, questions, etc.? Any objections?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Once this is broken into findings and then a short recommendation, does anyone have concern with going forward with this?

DENISE MICHEL: Looks good to me.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, Eric. So a little bit editing and I think we’re done with that. And then the public comment resolution part, I think KC already highlighted this little not done yet, right?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes. That's on me. I should have time for that in the next few days, short number of days.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Great. Thank you. Okay. Can you put the agenda back up, Brenda? The next one is 29. I believe, Kerry-Ann, you worked this one. You're going to send this one by an e-mail, not in a Google Doc. Is that right?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yeah. But KC had some significant comments on it. So both of us met last week, Thursday or Friday I think it was, and kind of went through and explained the biggest concerns she had. I don't know if KC is on the call. Is she?

RUSS HOUSLEY: She wasn't a moment ago.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Okay. All right, one of the biggest concerns she had was that the paragraph spoke to WHOIS mostly but then her concern was that because the Temp Rec is now still more applicable for WHOIS data, she thought that the sections didn't mention the EPDP or the Temp Rec as much as it should. When we're on the call, she started to check ICANN's website and ICANN still uses WHOIS references more than they do the Temp Rec references. So she offered to go through it and redraft it. We had asked her for the latest version of that section and Heather sent it for us.

The last correspondence I saw—I know KC had written to Heather just to ask for some assistance to work through that section. But I didn't see an e-mail that she had updated. She was supposed to send it around on Monday but I didn't see it. She got a bit busy. But in general, I explained to her, she was concerned about ICANN's responsibility for privacy. But what we had agreed on is that I explained to her that generally, although privacy is not a complete responsibility for all the data for ICANN, what we wanted them to do is still to monitor all the changes that was happening with the privacy considerations and ensure that [there are] best practices. She thought that ICANN's Privacy Policy on their website would capture that. But it turned out there's still a lot of obligations that they should consider generally. [I think] we had an agreement on the proposed text that she would write, but I just don't know what happened, why it wasn't circulated yet. But we have met. We had an agreed approach to redrafting the section. She said she would take a stab at it.

KC CLAFFY: Hi. I'm on here. KC is on. Sorry.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: There you go. [I tried the best I could.]

KC CLAFFY: I just got on.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Okay. So I told them that we had an agreement on the approach but I know you're going to do the text. But I don't know if you got to do the text. That's where I was concluding.

KC CLAFFY: This is on 29?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yes, 29.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. I sent mail. By the time I got in there, Kerry-Ann, I have to admit, I just realized this stuff either belongs in some other recommendation, which I moved it, or I thought it just didn't belong in the report. So I did propose to delete it but I didn't end up with new text, except what I moved to another recommendation. I thought I sent a mail on this to the list.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You sent one on 21 and you sent one on 24. I did not see one on this.

KC CLAFFY: All right. Geez. Okay. Okay, I'll go find it. Is there a link? Sorry. I don't see the chat history because when you get on late you don't see the chat history, but is there a link to this document?

RUSS HOUSLEY: This document was in an e-mail from Kerry-Ann, and then you reached out to Heather to get a fresh document to do your rewrite—I was copied on that—and then I didn’t see anything after that.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. That’s my fault. I’ll follow up on the list.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. All right, so we’ll need to return to this one next week when we see what you’re proposing in terms of moving pieces, which would ultimately lead to this recommendation going away, but we move pieces into others, right?

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I’m not sure Kerry-Ann is in agreement but I will wait to what you’re actually proposing. All right, the next one is the report out from the Risk team. Laurin normally speaks for the Risk team but he is now teaching at this time. So, I don’t know which person from the team is going to speak to this.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: He had asked about the e-mail link if any one of us could have spoken. I think don’t think I got to reply to him, but I don’t know if Heather would... He was working with Heather for the last bit of text so she may

have the link to that doc. But I don't think anyone had any objections, the subteam didn't have any objections to the text that we now have. So I think it was ready to be looked at. That's what I had recommended in my e-mail, that we could send it to the team to look at.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yep. Laurin and I have been working quite a bit on the risk text and how it would actually look in the final document. I do have several questions that go beyond editorial and they weren't sort of yes or no questions, they require discussions. I suggested to him that perhaps a meeting of the Risk sub-team might be in order to go through those because they're not things I can actually resolve myself.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Are they ones we should do now, or do you think the sub-team is a better venue?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I personally don't have a preference, one way or the other.

RUSS HOUSLEY: My biggest concern is Laurin not being here.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes, that was I think his concern as well, because he wants to be part of the conversation.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I think I would agree with Heather, but I think it's stuff that as well that we could raise with the team. Certainly if we could probably speak with Laurin and see if we could probably extract the specific stuff and send to the wider mailing list.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: If people have the capacity to handle one more Google Doc, I can provide you a link where the rewrite and the questions are located.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Why don't we do that?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. I'm putting that link in the chat.

DENISE MICHEL: Is it the same link that was included in the agenda?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It is not.

DENISE MICHEL: Okay.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is the link to where I'm working on—what I want to have as the final text.

DENISE MICHEL: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The snake is eating more Google Docs.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes. It is true. There's one sort of general substantive question about something I did, and then most of my other questions are more on page 11.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Brenda, can you bring up that Google Doc page 11?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Is that what I want you to look at? You know, what the heck. I'll go over this again with Laurin. Scroll up to page 5, please. Let me explain what I did. When I was reading through the risk text, I noticed that every recommendation you had came back to the same common thread of problems. There was not enough information. The transparency and disclosure was insufficient for you to be able to do what you needed to do. That was the very, very strong underlying thread, and you had a recommendation on that that was like sixth on the list. I moved that to be sort of the foundational recommendation for the entire section. That

has now been moved up right into page 5 and page 6. Because from that you're saying, "Okay, you have disclosure and transparency issues, ICANN. This is not acceptable." From this, we recommend to resolve these disclosure and transparency issues. We believe that the following actions, creating a CISO, how you handle the budget, conforming to known international standards, we think that will resolve this foundational issue of disclosure and transparency. So it becomes a sort of a logical thread—recommendation to solve the core problem.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That makes sense to me. But the CISO one is actually solving other problems as well.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes and no. The CISO one, when you actually look at the recommendations that it offers, it's why do you want a CISO? You want one—it should manage the function because it's going to provide regular reports. That's on page 8 in 2.2. It's for strategic and tactical risk management consolidated in an area again so that you can have the information in one place. It comes back down to that information.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's also span of control, though, I think. And maybe this is related to transparency by putting related functions all over the organization. It's hard to understand but there is a span of control aspect as well.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I agree. But I think, as you say, that does come back to your disclosure and transparency problem. My argument with Laurin was that a management structure is no guarantee for anything. You can make any management structure you want work in some way, shape, or form. And so starting with we want you to have a whole new management structure, the underlying problem is not addressed in that at all because, well, I could imagine people have said matrix management things work and there are organizations where it does. So this is your best guess to, "We think that this is what's going to work for ICANN in order to solve your foundational problems."

RUSS HOUSLEY: I understand the logic of the approach you're taking. Thank you for just reading it so critically.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Does that make sense? Because in trying to read through all of these, to find what is the single common thread of problem you're trying to solve, that's exactly what I'm also trying to do with the Abuse sub-team text. Is there one, maybe two core problems that basically feed every other recommendation that you have? I think so, though I need some more quality time with that material to pull that out in the same way I've done this. So it's very important to me to know whether this logic works for everyone.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You did get a note from Boban that he liked it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Good.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think he was talking about this, not the input to this.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I have no issues. It's hard to be sure. Does anyone else have concerns about the approach?

DENISE MICHEL: I'm sorry. I'm a little bit lost. The question on the table in terms of the page—

RUSS HOUSLEY: The rearranging that Heather has proposed.

DENISE MICHEL: And is that reflected here? You're intending on trying to—

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It's reflected here.

DENISE MICHEL: Okay.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: For most of this document, I actually have not turned on track changes. And this was something that we discussed on an earlier call. But we do want this to be as [faithful] as possible. This idea to keep track changes on, so that you could see just how much I messed with it.

DENISE MICHEL: Okay. And so we should start on page 5 with stability issues and read through page 5 to 11?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Everything I did in risk goes from basically page 5 to top of page 15.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. I mean, in principle, if you feel like it flows better, I'm also okay with the reorganization. It's particularly useful, Heather, to get your eyes on this as we want the report overall to be as accessible to people who haven't been intimately involved in ICANN as possible.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Does anyone on the call have any concerns with the approach Heather is taking here? Now is the time before she puts a whole bunch of work into it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: A whole bunch of more work into it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. It's clear you've been not just editing paragraphs.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Heather, I just had one question. Because all of the different sections have gone through so many changes and approaches in terms of you have been able to have that background info. So, for example, even an issue that when KC and I, we discovered the privacy part of it when a lot of the data was now outdated because of how long it took to publish the report. This has been worked on more recently because of the sub-team so some of the data has been updated. Would you be able to apply the same logic to all the other sections that may have outdated data or the logic has changed because we've merged and moved sections?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes, as long as the sub-teams have actually made that clear in the working documents that they have.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: But some of the sections haven't been touched and some have been merged. So, for example, what Denise is doing now with the other one, there's some significant merges. And one of the things I had highlighted

in our sub-team meeting is the need, having done those significant merges, to ensure that we have the context, again, because the context would now change if we've merged so many topics into one. Even KC and I were looking at the privacy one, she was asking why we had the title as privacy and SSR. I think security measure says that because that's a title that's legacy from like the first iteration. We've not revisited the titles. We've not revisited any of those things since all these amendments. In your professional opinion, would you have sufficient—would it be an exercise in futility where things will get too lost as you go along? Do you need to work with –

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

No. The way I've done this for risk, I did what in my field is called a very heavy edit. That means that this kind of large scale restructure, reorder, reword, control for tone, all of that, I'm anticipating doing that with every single thing as it comes into this final document. This document that's on the screen is what I'm hoping will be final and will receive very heavy edits for everything that comes in from the sub-teams, so that it needs to flow logically at the end of the day. And if I have questions, I will ask them, certainly.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I think what Kerry is saying is—and you could change the titles too.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:

Yeah. Things are changing. I mean, everything is, so much that we need to revisit everything.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I intend to do that. I absolutely intend to do that.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I support the logic. I mean, it's something that makes a lot of sense to me.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay, good.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Anyone else wants to speak? Okay. Then, Heather, it's the way forward with the Risk section. Obviously, you want to close with Laurin, but what else?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So the next substantive set of questions that I have, Kerry-Ann and I have been working on this. This is now at the bottom of page 7. There's a whole paragraph that starts another noteworthy point. And this one I struggled with a lot because it's introducing the concept of a Chief Data Officer. That isn't mentioned anywhere else.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Heather, I guess to kind of clarify the e-mail because I think when I wrote to you, I was half asleep and [wanted to just be asleep.] This was just included when Russ had seen a mention of the whole idea of

coordinating data at a high level, similar to how information security is coordinated. As what I was trying to explain in the e-mail, is not a recommendation. It was just an example. If you want to delete the title, Chief Data Officer, I think it's fine. I think it was just the point of creating a role where data is managed at the C-level equally as high. That was it. That was just the point.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I get that point. What concerns me, though, is this in the section where you're saying—

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Talking about C-levels and recommendations as to C-level—

HEATHER FLANAGAN: You want to create a position. You want to create a CISO position. And so now talking about other orgs also have a role that you don't have, by the way, ICANN have a chief data officer. It's like, "Wait, wait, wait. Hold on, you've now muddied the water. Are you subtly suggesting that they need one of these? Or what are you trying to tell them?"

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: This is just me thinking, as I said, because it came as a recommendation as I recall.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So this was in response to something you said, I guess, a while back where—

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yeah.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: How to make the Chief Information Security Officer and how it works together with other C-level positions. So do you have anything that you can add to help me figure out what to do with this?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I did not expect it to lead to the creation of yet another CC position. That wasn't the thrust of the discussion, as I recall it. It was make sure that this new position we are talking about is integrated into the decision processes that happened at the C-suite. That was what I thought we were talking about.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That's a very different thing, which is fine. I can work with that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That is the discussion I remember. That doesn't mean somebody else didn't say something about this, but this wasn't me.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. So the point you wanted was that the C-suite position needs to integrate in general decision making.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: But we have that somewhere else already, though. This was done on a response to the discussion we had where in the Privacy section we have mentioned this. They had wanted to include this. If it's not wanted anymore, I think you could just remove it then. It was just inserted for that purpose. So you could just delete that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Was it needed to address a public comment? That was my only question at this stage.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No, it wasn't.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Thank you.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: My preference is actually to delete it but that was way too big a change because I felt like I was missing something here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Heather, where's the next one you think we need to talk about?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. Page 10, and I'm glad KC is on the call for this one. At the bottom of page 10—

LARISA GURNICK: This is Larisa. KC and Denise both have their hands up. I just wanted to flag that.

DENISE MICHEL: Not me.

KC CLAFFY: Sorry. KC's hand is only you have to go back to 29. So let's not disrupt the flow here but I am prepared to go talk about 29 now.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. When we finish the risk thing, we'll do that.

KC CLAFFY: Yes.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. Brenda, if you could scroll down to the bottom of page 10, please. Yes. Okay. So you'll see a big section of text is highlighted. This text—KC proposed this should be deleted. Laurin supports that. The only reason it's still in here is because this came in after the review team declared consensus on the risk text and I started working on it. So this came in later than that and I wasn't sure—is anyone not okay with deleting that text?

RUSS HOUSLEY: We have elsewhere the budget transparency thing.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Then I'm fine.

DENISE MICHEL: I'm trying to pull up the actual section. What page is this on?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It's on page 10, the bottom.

DENISE MICHEL: Should we have other recommendations related to budget? Besides this, are you suggesting it be moved? I'm just catching up on the rationale for the deletion.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This whole recommendation is about budget transparency. So we have what's in here I probably recall it correctly. I think there was some budget in this stuff but I don't have that right in front of me. So we're focusing on the transparency here. And KC, I don't know if you had any other reasons why you thought this needed to go beyond the doc needs to be shorter.

KC CLAFFY: Sorry, are you talking to me? This is the stuff that's in yellow right now?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, it's just redundancy. Where was my comment? Where are you getting that—from a call or e-mail?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Your comment was in the original working document for this team.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. This is when I just went through for redundancy.

DENISE MICHEL: And where is it mentioned that's redundant?

KC CLAFFY: I'd have to go look. But that's where this is coming from. Heather might know—

DENISE MICHEL: In principle, I would support it. I would just want to make sure I understand where else in the report. I assume it's not verbatim, it's somewhere else in the report, but this seems like a point that should be made under budget transparency.

RUSS HOUSLEY: My memory is we did a budget transparency recommendation in Work Stream 1. I don't know where it is in the current Google Doc.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I can take the action to just verify that we've covered this. How important is including the not as new as it used to be gTLD Program?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. I don't see that—

RUSS HOUSLEY: That was part of SSR1 session at the time. I don't know where it fits now. But it was a "don't do the next round until this is accomplished" kind of structure to the SSR1 recommendation.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: What does that mean topping it here?

DENISE MICHEL: So if you look at the last paragraph on—we have a lot of justification on page 9, which seems like it would be obvious to note the recommendation here. I'm just a little confused about where else it's listed. And yes, it's an important element that the team discussed for quite a while. There's a number of security and stability requirements in the New gTLD Program that the team found had not been fully implemented and there was no information available on ownership and resources that were being applied to those security issues. That, if I recall, was the background for this recommendation.

KC CLAFFY: I don't know if we can actually go back and find out where I thought the other texts was, and also it would help because I think what Denise just said as an objective isn't outlined in the recommendation. So this goes back to the sort of how you measure that it's been done. But if they'll make sure that the people who wanted to analyze the New gTLD Program expenses can do so, that would be useful. And I guess we should remember there's also shepherds for all of these implementations, assuming that ICANN accept any of them. They can

clarify what we meant when we got to that point. But even what Denise is saying now, I didn't capture something that should be in a recommendation.

I will say that the last sentence, for example, of the yellow here, it looks to me like it's already redundant with the rest of this paragraph. So maybe it's an issue of writing clarity of how these sentences different even from each other, and then maybe tightening it to get it in one sentence with "and here's how it would be measured" at the end of it. And maybe Denise can help with that because sometimes when I delete, it's because I can't see the difference between this sentence and even the sentence right before it.

So, for example, 3.3 and 3.4 I would merge these because I don't even know what the SSR framework is, it's 10 years old. Why wouldn't we have a new one? Isn't this part of the SSR1 recommendations? I think if the point is we can't understand even how much the gTLD Program costs, that should be front and center. The objective of this recommendation is to understand how much the gTLD Program costs. Therefore, da da da da. So that whoever else comes along, or even the implementation shepherds can have [inaudible] of figuring out was this done?

DENISE MICHEL:

Right. You mean the security and stability related elements of it. Yeah, I agree that we could merge 2.3 and 3.4. We're trying to get to the point across all of the programs, including things that were covered in the previous SSR framework and security and stability related obligations in

the New gTLD Program and that implementation we're trying to get a level of transparency and accountability in ICANN budget and tracking of importing of these programs. So I think we can articulate it in a way that covers both 2.3 and 3.4 in one sub section. Also KC and Heather, should we just kick around some language and then bring—

KC CLAFFY: Sure. I'm going to copy this into an e-mail.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. Thanks.

KC CLAFFY: Danko has a question in the chat. I assume it means both. I mean, I don't think future SubPro has gotten to the point of budgeting anything. I think this is a previous gTLD. Maybe Denise can clarify what she meant.

DENISE MICHEL: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't see that. What was the comment?

DANKO JEVTOVIC: If I can jump in. The question was, is the discussion about budgeting implications in the SSR2 budgeting implications of the New gTLD Program related to this old still current one about the future SubPro? Because, of course, SubPro is nowhere near budgeting but it will be a complicated program. Still it's not fully understood if we are talking about the continuous program or we are talking about the rounds and

how it will be done, but it's rather obvious that the new systems will have to be built, that it will cost significant amount of money, and that it will influence the way how [the org] looks like and operates, including the costs that are rather difficult to separate like how many employees, coffee machines, water coolers, IT equipment, and everything. So in a way, I'm not sure how this integration of the SubPro operations will happen in the org. So in a way, it's easier to talk about the past program. But is it relevant? That was just my thinking out loud. Thanks.

DENISE MICHEL:

Yeah. It's referencing the current New gTLD Program and the team hasn't done anything with, considered or referenced the Subsequent Procedures' ongoing policy development process.

DANKO JEVTOVIC:

Okay. Thanks.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

Okay. The last question I have, which is probably a ridiculous question, is at the bottom of page 11, where we say we should thus provide security-related information and data. What's the difference between information and data here? Am I missing a subtlety?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I can only think of something snide to say. So pick one is my reaction.

-
- DENISE MICHEL: Just reading this paragraph, it seems like if you just say security relevant information, people I guess usually include the term data when they want the descriptive information as well as numbers and metrics. So I'm not sure who wrote that, but perhaps we should flag it to see if someone feels that they can use just the information but elaborate on the type of information.
- DANKO JEVTOVIC: Usually information is data with context that means something, and data is just the raw data. So in that way, data will be wider but information is, of course, more relevant, especially in security context.
- ERIC OSTERWEIL: I'm not the author of the text and I don't have any ownership history with this. But my take on it is I would read those as being very different. Information can be something very qualitative and data tends to be very quantitative. And so if you can say something qualitative like, "We had a breach," or "We had an incident," that would be a lot different than "Can you give me the data about the incident?" which would be potentially high telemetry and, like I said, quantitative. So my read of this—I think it's maybe the first time I've seen it so it's certainly not mine—is that if you can say something qualitative, maybe it's general, you should say it. And if you can actually give us data, you should do that. So I actually read it as being different. I don't know why we would worry about having them both in there, but if it was prescriptive, I'd say that it gives me more options to implement.
-

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So what the team is actually looking for is, you want the raw data as well as interpretation, right? That's what the team wants?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Again, I'm just reading it, I think, for the first time and if I've read it before, I forgot if I purged it because I hear that over sharing is a concern. Sorry. Too soon? No, but if you look at like cyber security information sharing, there's frameworks where you share incident information that are sort of like, not everyone can do that. So if I share that I had a qualitative incident that happened then I may or may not be able to do that, but I can share an indicator of compromise and that's data that's raw data. It doesn't necessarily say I've been compromised. So I think from a low level technical perspective, you'd want to keep both of those in there. They're general enough that they aren't prescriptive but there's flexibility there. So I could give you examples but I think it's—

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I don't need examples. I just needed to make sure I knew what the intent here was. That's where I was struggling.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I'm not the author so I can't give you intent.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Do you think it's clear?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: [Just to support Eric,] the information as well could also be in relation to information they could receive generally from anyone at the registrars related to security. It may not be something specific. Data would have probably sets of very specific—it's more numerical that it would be sharing and it may have some general information that could be relevant for the community from various sources. So I think the information captures as—I don't know who the previous person was before Eric—the more general thing, qualitative and quantitative.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Now that I understand the intent, I can play with the language and I do like what Denise suggested in the chat.

KC CLAFFY: That's really what we mean, like quantitative information. I don't know what that means without context.

DENISE MICHEL: Actually, I just took something I just wrote down, something that Eric said in explaining this.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, but all the stuff that Eric said, nobody is going to get from either information and data or qualitative and quantitative. If you really want to put all that detail—and by the way, I think it's all covered by the word

information so I would just take out “and data” but if you want to make sure they have exactly what you’re talking about, you have to say exactly what you’re talking about.

DENISE MICHEL:

So, Heather, do you want to ponder this and then just shoot those of us who are interested or the list? Some suggestions we can kick around.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

I will consider this one, again, now that I know intent and make some changes here, and then I think we can go through that and discuss it when we’re looking at the proper document to see if it makes sense in context. I think that’s all I want to cover on this today, Russ.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. Well, given that we’re down to eight minutes left in the call, Denise, can you give us just a view of where the Abuse team is, and then we will—oh, I’m sorry. First we need to back up to 29. Is that doable in eight minutes?

KC CLAFFY:

Yes. It is doable because basically people need to go to the text where all my comments are in the URL where I cross everything out. Because where everything I’ve crossed out, I made a comment on why I think it should be crossed out. So people have to go look at that and come back and explain to me why a certain sentence should be in there, and we

can have the sentence by sentence conversation with whoever cares about having it. It doesn't have to be on this call.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Where is the Google Doc?

KC CLAFFY: Heather is going to have to—let me go here. I'll put it in the chat.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Or, Heather, could you e-mail it to the team since you're saying let's—

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, I was wondering why it wasn't on the link. In all the other ones, the link was there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's because we didn't have it.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: All right.

KC CLAFFY: It's in the chat, Heather.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Denise, we're obviously not going to get through the Abuse sub-team. Can you at least share status with the rest of the team where that sub-team is?

DENISE MICHEL: Sure. To refresh folks' memory, the sub-team did a very extensive spreadsheet addressing every comment that touched the abuse sections of the report, providing a proposed response and action, if appropriate. Several of the comments we deemed indicative that clarification needed to be made in the document. So there's that big piece of work that everyone in the in the team has had for a month or so. In addition to that, then we've reorganized the Abuse Recommendations 10 through 19, reorganized them and streamlined them so there are fewer recommendations and grouped differently. That's the side by side that everyone has had for about a month. And of course, comments on either of those documents on an ongoing basis are welcome and encouraged. So this is a substantial amount of work for the Abuse sub-group then.

We're now moving all of this to the full report so that people can see how it flows from findings to recommendations and with the new reorganization. And Heather is helping with some heavy lifting there in integrating this into the full report language. So that's what's happening right now. And then the Abusive sub-group will need to take another path that the report language and, in particular, look at the Public

Comment spreadsheet to make sure that we have indeed covered all of the points of change and clarification that the team has recommended.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. So I guess we'll be looking at that next week. Remember, we're going to have a doodle poll to see about a better meeting time, to see if we can include Laurin and not lose anyone. And we're going to see an e-mail Recommendation 29. Please go through the Risk document that Heather sent out and see if there's any changes that cause you concern. If so, please raise it on the mail list.

Aren't there any other business that somebody would like to raise in the last few minutes?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:

Russ, I just want to jump in. I saw two hands. I don't know if Denise and KC's hands were before mine, if their real hands are beforehand.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Oh, I thought KC's hand is about 29.

KC CLAFFY:

Yeah. Mine's done.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:

Denise, is that a real hand or an old hand?

DENISE MICHEL: No. It's a fake old hand.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's a fake old hand.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: All right. So I'll use one minute. I quickly looked up what KC did because in the conversation we had, a lot of the information that was in this privacy section was based on the first iteration when we decided that privacy was a future issue. Since then, as I told you, KC and I went through, a lot of it has changed since the research done for this section, which was like almost two years ago. [Understanding my non-objection, once it is] that all the issues that we identified from the interviews we did back then in terms of how compliance is not as strong as we think it should be, which I've looked at the Compliance section and we'd need to review it some more, just to make sure that all those points are captured there. I think we're good removing the privacy as a future issue and just ensuring that the Compliance section, which, Denise, we can look at when we look at the abuse component, is captured in Compliance. Because that's the biggest issue we have. That compliance was weak and we wanted it stronger. So that's just my non objection for the deletion only because it's not as relevant, not based on KC and I looking at it together and the fact that that was a major issue to get it under a stronger component for compliance.

DENISE MICHEL: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I can see that. Maybe it doesn't belong in future, but that's a different—

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yes. I think we can delete it completely. I'm in agreement with that because it's not as relevant in future because right now, [they're two years on.]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, right. The world changed while the team was working. Okay, fair enough. Okay, well, we've reached the end of our time. Much to do in the next week. We really do need to have a full report to Heather by the end of the month so that we can complete at the end of October. So, please, the sub-groups that are still working, please, wrap it up in the next week. Thank you very much.

DENISE MICHEL: Thanks, everyone.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Bye-bye.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Thanks, everyone.

DANKO JEVTOVIC: Thank you to the team. Great work.

LARISA GURNICK: Thank you all. Bye-bye.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]