RUSS HOUSLEY: Good morning. Welcome to the second day of the SSR2 face to face in Washington, D.C. The idea is to push as close to a report that's ready for public comment as possible. After lunch we'll make a call as to whether that is possible. But the first thing we need to do is prioritization. And Laurin did his homework, so we have a completely different presentation of the poll data. So I'm turning it over to Laurin. Okay, go ahead.

[STEVE CONTE]: Laurin, before you start, I just want to let everyone know we have Mr. Matagoro on the phone, so please make sure to have good microphone control today and try to keep on the mics so the whole review team can participate.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Welcome, Matagoro.

JABHERA MATOGORO: Thank you, Russ. I'm following on the discussion today. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Turning it over to Laurin. Matagoro, can you see the graph on the screen?

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record.

JABHERA MATOGORO: Yes. I see it right there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Good morning all. This is Laurin. After we tried this yesterday and I just didn't have time to do anything that is appealing graphically, we are doing this today. Essentially, I graphed it in a variety of ways and this is the most obvious and functional.

What the Y axis is the urgency. We're using the mean, so essentially adding up everything, everyone's scores and then dividing them by the number of responses, and we're doing the same with importance on the X axis. What is really interesting I think is that we see are two clear clusters. So we have one at the top, which we say, "Okay, this is both important and urgent," and then there is another one in the lower left corner where it's not considered that important and not that urgent either. What's also quite interesting is that the correlation between our idea about importance and urgency is clearly there. I can give you a quick overview of what is where.

Essentially, most of the anti-abuse compliance and contracts-related issues are in the important and urgent cluster as well as everything about security and risk management, as well as the CISO/CSO kind of structure to security, things relating to third party audit certification also up there, and they obviously intersect with the security risk management, etc., then a few of the security relevant metrics and

DAAR. What is in the lower left, so the ones that are not considered that urgent or that important, we have budget transparency. Let me just go through this correctly. So this would be budget transparency, the incentivisation for abuse and compliance. All the other ones about abuse and compliance are in the other important and urgent cluster. Then the DNS testbed, which is kind of the lowest ranked for both variables. Formal procedure for key rollover is number 19. Root zone data and IANA registry measurements, root zone data access which is an incomplete recommendation, number 23; 24, the algorithm rollover, 25 which is the measuring name collisions, and 27 which is staying informed and informing policy debates.

With that, I will end the report and I'm more than happy to share all the tables and other graphs. It just seemed that this one is one of the most informative, if you want. I know Eric asked if we could do standard deviations. These exist as well, it's just that there is considerable spread so it's not as informative as we might want it to be. So that's on giving you a quick overview of what came out of this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Naveed.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Good morning, everyone. What seems quite interesting to me is that something that was categorized as important is also almost categorized as urgent. So there's a linear correlation between the two. So I hope that what everybody thinks because it reflects. But what is not clear to me is, for example, the least performing here is 18, for example, 18 is

about DNS testbed. DNS testbed is something that is not new and this is something that is ongoing already. So I wonder why we categorize something that is already in continuity to be not important and not urgent as well. So that is something that is quite surprising to me because even if we see the recommendation, we are saying that ICANN should continue developing the DNS testbed and its regression and whatever. So something that it should continue is not as important and urgent is surprising to me.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sure. So we'll do Kerry-Ann, Laurin, Denise.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Just to go to Naveed's. But I think one of the things that would stand out to me with that point in number 18 out is what I picked up from this is that a team seems to recognize the things that are ongoing are not as urgent or as important because it's already subsisted. It's the things that are really the gaps that are not there any at all that's alarming to us are the things that need to begin because there needs to be a gap that's filled. I think those are the ones that ended up being higher than like I think 18 is happening. Is it really important and urgent for it to be implemented? No, because it's happening anyway kind of thing. That's what I picked up from seeing this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin then Denise.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Denise first.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: Thank you so much, Laurin, for doing this. It's really interesting. I see this as a good stepping off point for a discussion, absolutely not a decision. I think different people brought different values and criterias and thinking to their decisions. I think a number of people have conflated "this needs to be done right away" with "this is really important." I think illustrative of that is budget.

A foundational issue that underpins, I think, and touches really everything that occurs in SSR, we absolutely do not know how much money ICANN spends on SSR. We don't know ultimately how they're supporting it. And SSR1 didn't either and they said, "You need to change this," ICANN didn't change it, really. They did not implement that recommendation. We are again saying you need to be really clear about what your resources are and how you're spending this money. I can appreciate why that wouldn't be urgent but you know the foursquare diagram of things that are important but not urgent? I think we need to have a more fulsome discussion about things that people feel are not as important or urgent because I think there's more to unpack there.

I'm also wondering if people mark things as less urgent and less important if they didn't know more about it, or if it wasn't as

controversial and we didn't have extensive discussions about it, I think that's also something that we need to unpack.

Then finally, I'd like to remind people that this has been going on for freaking three years. There are things that we discussed in the first year that we haven't discussed as much in the second or third year. So I think that is something that we should talk about as well. Thanks.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin then I'm going to put myself in the queue. Naveed, did you want back in the queue? Okay, so Laurin then Naveed then me.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay. Now I'm not talking about data. I'm talking about my own perception. I agree we have to go through this, we have to discuss it. What I do see though is, if we look at this, there are a few where we should think about what do we want to do, and I think it might point towards us thinking about how do we want to pitch this report, what do we want to underline as being important and stuff we care about.

If we look at the stuff that we see as both important and urgent, taking into account people will have rated this differently, etc., it is very clear what this is about. This is about abuse, it's about compliance, it's about contracts, it's about how security and risk is managed, and about oversight third party audit certification and that kind of stuff, as well as a few metrics-related things. And I'm just wondering if this is maybe what we want to think about to pitch and this is what the report is about. Not to say, "Oh, let's yank everything else," but let's think about

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what makes sense as the report and if we can move things around because if we really feel something is not that urgent and not that important and there's no in discussion no good reason why this should change, and it's really a question, "Do we want to put all that text in there?" or rather just focus on, "Okay, these are the key issues we see and these are the key recommendations we want to give to fix that." That's my personal opinion about this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Naveed?

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Coming to the point I highlighted. Why I say that there seems to be a correlation is because I think it is very important to understand how people see something as important, because something important might also be understood as urgent, for example. So it's about, for example, the criticality aspect that we are discussing and we need to keep that in mind, for example, how critical something is. And it also depends upon how long it would take to implement, for example. So something that is urgent might start today but it might continue to three years to continue, and something that is important but not urgent and if we delay it for three years, it might not remain as important later.

So it's very tricky and we need to keep in mind. I would not want this to be made available along with the report or something like that. I think this should be a backup plan where if something is asked from the review team about how they think about the implementation phase of this, about the criticality of a recommendation or its importance or

urgency, then we can come up with, "This is what we did and this is what the review team thinks."

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I look at this and I see that all but one of the dots in the lower left quadrant are related to things that ICANN is already doing. So I took the mark as that means us making a recommendation is less important because they're already doing something in that space as opposed to, is what they're doing important? That's my take on this.

I suspect but would like to confirm that that's the way people scored it. Denise, you're next.

DENISE MICHEL:

I largely agree with Naveed and Laurin and Russ as well. I think this should not be used for anything and given to anyone else. It shouldn't be used for anything except what it's being used for and that is to jumpstart a discussion about how we want to prioritize – if we want to prioritize – and how we want to organize a report.

I'm also mindful the fact that over the three freaking years that we've been doing this. We've dropped a lot of issues. This is not the first time we went through and prioritized and focused in. We have dropped a lot and that's not to say that there may be some further calling or combining ahead of us. But you may, Russ, have come upon perhaps a better way to organize the report as well. Something else we might want to think about. Abuse is a crisis and a huge fail overall, and ICANN needs to jump in and fix it in some very specific ways. Then we have

more the ongoing activities, and so that might be another way to organize it.

Something else that I think would be useful for the group to talk about is the utility of being very specific in prioritization because the Board ignored a huge majority of the CCT review recommendations. We really haven't gotten an indication that they are going to treat the RDS WHOIS review or our review any different, what's the utility in having really clear "Do this one first, this one second." I don't know that that makes a lot of sense given the environment we're operating in, but it would be good to hear people's views on that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Kerry-Ann?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I think I have just one point of departure from the last point you made. I don't think the purpose of this is to prioritize and do this one first, do this one second.

DENISE MICHEL: I don't think so either.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: But I think one of the things that we'd have to be very clear is if this doesn't happen, shit will fall apart. Like we're seeing, we're forecasting that these things are so critical that if it feels and it doesn't get

addressed, I think that is the way. So even if we don't do it in terms of order and in their priorities, actually making a statement to say the things concerning X we believe are absolutely critical because in the next two years, we're projecting that if this doesn't get addressed, this will happen. I think, to me, that is the tone or that's how I took this. I did have a problem and I'm going to be honest. When I had to measure urgency and importance, because to me they're almost the same thing, urgency would mean that our report to be too late anyway, so for me to say it's something is urgent in this report that won't get published for another couple of months, it can't be that urgent then.

So I had an issue balancing out urgency and importance and I did mine based on thinking, for example, I'd lower tier the research bit, because the research is nice to have. That's how I looked at it. A research which is nice to have because then it's an reiterative process to feed policy and future planning. So for me that was tiered as not as important as you guys need to ensure that you have a CISO because your security things are going all over the place and you need to now solidify this. My two cents on how do we treat this, as I said, for me it's not a ranking as to priority. We shouldn't do it as a ranking. But it's more what does the review team feel in our gut that if these things, if the Board had to decide, "I need your top two," and I think the top two would be based on, "If you don't do this, the Internet is not going to be stable and secure." That's how I view it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Norm, go ahead.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I kind of agree with your last statement there. Just looking at the scales on here, the urgency is going from 58 up to 85 or something like that. So that tells you that nothing we do is terribly urgent. So typical of ICANN I guess. But the important scale is actually fairly tight. That's going from 80 to about 93 I think. That's fairly tight scale, actually. I don't see anything that's actually low. The lowest one is 80; that's actually fairly high. It's just not a rush to do anything.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Matogoro.

JABHERA MATOGORO: Thank you. One idea this statistics is reflecting what everyone is having in our mind. But because we are meeting face to face, we can also try to [work our] a way and see the value of each of the recommendations and then we can try to rearrange the importance [as well] as the urgency. I'm of the idea that this statistics has given us some information but we still have some mandate of reviewing and rearranging basing on the discussion we didn't have so that we put with the kind of consensus because that would be the critical point of our way forward. That's what I'm thinking of. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm trying to figure out what way to best make use of this and I wonder if the simplest thing to do is say that we have two priority buckets – high and very high or whatever labels you want to put on them – and just

leave it at that and move on. But because we are already say in the report that we dropped and we certainly did as we were going along everything that wasn't aligned with the strategic plan.

Go ahead, Denise.

DENISE MICHEL: I haven't made my mind on this so I just want to ask truly as a question if it would be useful to just quickly go through our table of recommendations and look at where the recommendation appears on the graph and resolve any questions or just make sure we're on the same page as to why we think that is the right place on the graph.

Here's a good example. If we think that abuse and abuse mitigation and those items are the most important and most urgent, then it doesn't really make sense, for example, to have incentivizing registrars and registries to deal with abuse in their own portfolios down in the left-hand corner. That would be a useful discussion because it would probably … So I could make a case, for example, that it should be up in the right-hand corner. I think that's potentially one of the most impactful things in domain abuse. But anyway, I think we have some things to talk about but what do you think?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I agree with that. Frankly, number 14 is the only one that I'm surprised at its placement on the graph and [signups].

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [Inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: No. I looked it up earlier. Okay, Laurin, would you take us through with the table quickly? Maybe we can get Steve Conte point to each one as we go through it.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay. By going through the table, I assume we just go recommendation 1 to 28 and just mention what it is every time. Is that what we're trying to do here?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: And say, "Is anybody surprised?" No, just in terms of order. Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: I'd just suggest that people pull up the –

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, please read with me.

DENISE MICHEL: Start at page 8 in the doc where the table is, where the colored table is. Page 8 in the doc.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: We're starting with number 1. Steve, if you would? Thank you. This is amazing. This is complete implementation of all relevant SSR1 recommendations. So looking at it, kind of medium, medium, medium. Does anyone see anything wrong with it? Are you surprised? I'm not. Okay?

Number 2, Information Security Management System and Security Certifications. This is established roadmap for standard and security audits. Make a plan, which ones to go for and why. Then essentially, we're getting more specific when it comes to the ISMS recommending ISO 27001, SSAE-18 or ITIL. The key thing I think as well to mention for this one is to do a full certification of this. I think this one is one of the most important I would say, probably the fourth most important-ish. In terms of urgency, it's kind of not too high. Probably it would also take quite a while to do. Everyone happy? You have to shout. This is how we do it. I won't ask. You shout it if there's something.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [inaudible]

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, that's what I mean. Yes. Okay. Matogoro, this also is for you. So if you want to say something, just speak up because I can't see your hand.

Number 3, this is also more in the middle. This is on SSR Strategy and Framework, Metrics, and Vulnerability Disclosures. Essentially, disclosed vulnerabilities in a coordinated fashion. I think that's enough to summarize this one. No one is surprised? Okay.

Number 4, this one in the lower left quadrant and this is on Budget Transparency. ICANN should be more transparent with the budgets for parts of ICANN org related to implementing the SSR Framework and performing related functions. We're also mentioning in the recommendation that various departments have insufficient resources – and this is an SSR1 follow-up where we mentioned that Rec 20 of SSR1 intended a higher degree of granularity. I'm expecting this one.

DENISE MICHEL: Budgets are boring but important, impactful. More accountability, more transparency I think is important. Also courses is part of SSR1 implementation that was not done, so personally I think if that has a higher importance, I would put that closer to where the middle one is. I'd put it closer to number 1.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I have a different take on this particular one, which is it's not all that different than number 1, right? So I asked myself what's the value of calling this one out beyond the other ones that are clustered in one? That's why I personally made it lower is I didn't see that we were going to make any significant impact on the Board by calling it out separate.

DENISE MICHEL: I think the idea of calling it out separate was they so missed the mark on this in terms of not implementing it, and collectively we had so much trouble and ultimately failed in many ways to get basic information out of ICANN on how much resource or budget they were spending on particular items. It will be a gating factor to implementation of many things that we're recommending, many things we told them that they should be implementing from SSR1. So yeah. That's why I think we decided to call it out separately.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Laurin.

BOBAN KRSIC: Hi, this is Boban. A personal view on this and why I ranked it here where it is, I decided to give the lower priority than the others because of the security and stability and the resilience of the DNS. I know budgeting and transparency is important, yes, but when I take an issue with … okay, regarding the security and resiliency of the DNS, from an operation view, it's not really critical. That's why I ranked it here where it is. That's the only thing.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. I can completely understand that. But I perhaps would raise the question of, should we not pull this out separately and just put it back into number 1, implement SSR1 and include the text there, reinforcing why it's important to do?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Zarko?

ŽARKO KECIC: I have a comment that I gave a couple of times in regard of this. This is that we have to draw the line where to start or where to stop because having transparent budget for SSR issues is critical and, personally, in my organization hiding many things in the budget in regard of SSR. Having sufficient funding for SSR functions is one thing, having fully transparent budget in regard of SSR may be a drawback and cause another problem.

DENISE MICHEL: I take your point but I would say though that this was not an issue of we have funds assigned to things we don't want to talk about publicly. Even in private, it is clear that they do not have unnecessary accounting or distribution of funds aligned with their responsibilities. So when I say accountability, I'm not saying full public disclosure. But there clearly needs to be a much better accounting alignment and tracking how you distribute the budget and how you've aligned it with your objectives. I don't think we're really in disagreement and I'm not saying there should be a full public disclosure, but when the Board or when the SSAC or the SSR team asked for how you've implemented this SSR1 recommendation and how you put together your budget and tracked it, we didn't get "We'd like to tell you everything but we can't because it's secret," we got "Here's what we're doing," and our response was, "That's not nearly enough."

RUSS HOUSLEY: I heard a suggestion that we merge 1 and 4 but highlight in the write-up of 1 the importance and significance of this. Does anyone think that's the wrong thing to do? Heather, can you just do that?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Noted.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay, moving on. Recommendation 27 from SSR1, Risk Management. Steve has already marked it. Pretty high in importance. Upper third in urgency-ish. This is about Risk Management Framework should be centralized and strategically coordinated. Articulate the risk framework and strategically align the framework against the requirements and objectives of the organization, describing relevant measures of success and how these are assessed. Then we're mentioning some stuff where this would relate to. There is one point that says it should make information pertaining to risk management centrally available to the community and that it should be regularly updated.

Any comments on that one? No? Okay.

Number 6, one of our top priorities according to the table. This is establish the CSO or CISO, should manage Security Function and oversee relevant SSR-related issues. It should take part in all relevant contractual negotiations, supply chains, service level agreements, etc.

No comments? Good.

Then we're going to number 7. That is Security Risk Management. Again, importance is over 90 and urgency is just above 77.5. Risk Management Framework should be clearly articulated, and we're specifically recommending ISO 31000. Appropriate document should be produced, etc.

No comments? Okay.

Number 8, Business Continuity Management.

BOBAN KRSIC: I wonder if we could maybe merge 7 and 5?

RUSS HOUSLEY: 7 and 5? Yeah. I agree.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Heather, could you take note?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Thank you. Okay, now it's number 8. Business Continuity Plan, so use ISO 22301 for PTI operations, etc. and probably some evidence, we're not saying publish the whole thing, and that's it. I'm seeing nothing.

Number 9, very close to 8, surprisingly. Disaster Recovery based on ISO 27031. Essentially the same thing as number 8, just with DR.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: In the interest of streamlining, Boban, would it be appropriate to put those two together? Yeah?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, it seems. Okay, number 10. Pretty important, pretty urgent – Abuse Definitions and Reporting. I'm not sure if I have to go through the whole thing because we probably all know. But essentially it's all about define DNS abuse so that there is working definition that everyone agrees on.

I'm not seeing any comments.

Number 11. Abuse and Compliance: Domain Abuse Activity Reporting. ICANN Board and ICANN org should work with the gNSO, ccNSO, etc. to include ccTLD and tracking in DAAR. DAAR report should include pricing data, should identify entities with persistently high abuse, should publish DAAR reports that identify these, and there should be some form of machine-readable formats so that people can analyze the data, and they should solicit feedback from SSAC and others.

No comments. Good.

Number 12, again one of our highest rated. ICANN should initiate the process to adopt new policies and agreements with Contracted Parties

that meaningfully impact mitigation of DNS abuse and security threats, including a variety of specific changes.

No comments? I didn't expect any.

Number 13. Is this our top running in terms of importance? No, it's the second but close. This is about Contracts and Agreements. ICANN should incorporate measures to mitigate DNS abuse and security threats per previous recommendation in contracts with contracted parties. There should be thresholds of abusive names and portfolio that triggers action by Compliance. Then we're talking about how contracts can be changed over time. It's actually a lot of explanation.

We might want to revisit and see – a lot of this is actually recommendation or like explanation or something like that. But I don't see anyone complaining about or having points about this.

Number 14 – oh, Boban.

BOBAN KRSIC: Denise, is it possible to merge 12 and 13? Because 12 is "Abuse and Compliance: Policies and Agreements with Registrars and Registries" and 13 is "Abuse and Compliance: Contracts and Agreements."

DENISE MICHEL: I'll look at how we could streamline that for sure. I mean, there is some difference but there's – I'll take another look at it. I'll take another look at it and get back to you.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: If we do merge it, we have to remember the one below – we have one that speaks incentivisation, we have one that speaks to SLA compliance, and we have another one that speaks to giving compliance the teeth that it needs to do its work. So if we do conflate it, it would have to conflate them all under one general section dealing with just SLAs, agreements, compliance generally, this kind of spread.

That's when I came up, Russ, yesterday when I said that the commenter was making was because it was under Work Stream 3. I don't know if anyone recalls when one of the compliance thing was all the way in Work Stream 3 and I was asking if we should push it up. So if we do that, like what Boban is suggesting, we should grab that and just make it one big section on that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Can I just remind everyone the microphone discipline.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: This is what I was trying to allude to, a point towards before and they said, "We have a few key issues and maybe we want to try to arrange around those." What we're saying is abuse needs to be dealt with and this is A, B, C, D that needs to be done to work. It is a question of how we do this, how we present it. This is what I was trying to say before.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: I just want to point out, if it is too late to have this merge being done now, I think in the interest of time, we should have a more weight of the criticality or the critical thing is to get this done rather than to be able to minimize it again. Because no matter how many times you do this exercise, you will always find some kind of overlap. So I think in terms of the urgency, we should put it as a backburner and get the other things done first, and then we can see if we can merge and minimize things.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, good point.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, this is probably like later. Okay, are we good?

                           14. Okay. There will probably be discussion. This is about incentives. Essentially, contracts should be changed so that anti-abuse behavior is incentivized through fees, discounts, whatever else.

                           Comments? It is ranked rather low in terms of urgency. I think it's the second least urgent, if I see this correctly, and the importance is also pretty low but not the lowest.

DENISE MICHEL: Previously people suggested that we break it out, maybe we should roll it up into the Compliance group because I think it's one of the several sort of tools or actions that we are addressing here. Some of what we're saying is not new and has been said for a decade or more in many different ways by many different entities. So this one which hasn't and

involves registrars and registries that control ICANN, making money I think has the best shot at actually getting people's attention and potentially seeing action. So I would suggest that we also take a shot at combining this with some other abuse items. What do people think?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I said earlier that I was surprised this one was down here because everything else down here is about a course correction to something that's already ongoing, whereas this one is new. So I was surprised to see it here. So I'd like to know why people put it down here.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. Actually, I rated it rather low but part of the reason for that is I don't think this will get approved as a recommendation. So I did not want to group with anything else.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay? Comments?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I don't think it's so much it won't get approved, [inaudible] are implemented. I was the one of them who put it as a lower rank and for me it was one of the nice-to-haves. It's something that makes sense, it will have impact, it has the potential to be one of the tools that could … But when I compared to all the other things that we want them to do – not just me or the Board or anyone – but I could see someone saying, "Oh my gosh, to implement incentivisation program, we're asking them

to fix other things that are more critical." I could see that I had to cherry pick. It's hard.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: For this particular one, I would be interested in seeing, for example, the confidence intervals or the standard deviation of the inputs because we might want to have or might have a big spectrum of people having different opinion on this one. But in terms of importance, it's still 84% which is quite important as I see, the only thing that people do not consider as urgent, and this is why it is on the lower end, I think.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So the spread on this is huge.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Let me look at the table. I might have trashed it. I'll find it anyway. It's 14, right? Yes, thank you. So, 14, for importance it's one of the higher deviations but not the highest for urgency. For urgency, it is really at the top. It is the second highest spread, so there was a lot of disagreement on this one. I mean, I expect it too, but you know.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I would propose that it might be worth taking confidence intervals in the sense that if there's a large standard deviation around urgency, that means some people think it's important even if others don't, and we might want to focus on which of these elements has high standard deviation. By contrast, maybe the opposite is true in importance. Maybe

if there's a large standard deviation in importance then it's not really clear everyone thinks it is not important. In either case, I think maybe actually pulling out into separate groups, those in the top like 95% with low standard deviation, who are those recommendations? And conversely, those with the greatest standard deviation, who are those? Who are those? Pull them out. Because I think if there's a lot of variability, it means we don't agree. We either need to spend time trying to figure out if we agree or we could focus on things where we already do agree. That's what I think standard deviation tells us and I think that's what's important here.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Eric, the reason why this is not in here, I might have mentioned it before you came in, it's that it's generally pretty large. I am happy to show you or to send it to you. The problem is there are differences and when I refer to it, I say, "Okay, this is the smaller group, the middle group, the high group." And this one is definitely high.

Taking into account what Norm said, which I think is really relevant in terms of this is likely to get shut down, we might want to keep it as is.

DENISE MICHEL: Why? Norm, why do you think that?

NORM RITCHIE: Because it means last money for ICANN.

DENISE MICHEL: We suggested two ways of doing it. One of the ways of doing it was raise everyone's fees and then give a discount to those that meet the criteria for acting against abuse and keeping a low abuse portfolio. Plus, they just got $20 million from Verisign. How much money do they need?

NORM RITCHIE: It was a Verisign fund. No, from what I've seen of late, I don't think anything involving money you'll get past.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I think it would be worth seeing which of these things we all agree on. I mean, right now I'm hearing some disagreement at various levels about various things, and I think if there are any, the recommendations that have low standard deviations, I wouldn't mind seeing which those are because it might be that we get through those real quick. That'll be like shortest job for scheduling. It'll be like, "Okay, are there any that we agree on?" Standard deviation which looks like this, nobody raises their hands. Maybe we're done with those and we can focus on the other ones.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I agree looking at the standard deviation as well, but just to get back on – I don't disagree with this. I just don't think it will get approved. And I think it's actually okay to have some things are going to get thrown out. Not everything we put in there is going to be accepted.

DENISE MICHEL: I agree.

KC CLAFFY: It's even I think moves us to say that we don't think this will get through the process, and yet we think we think this is the only way that things are going to improve in the security space because –

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Do you think we should write that in?

KC CLAFFY: Yeah.

DENISE MICHEL: No. I don't think we should write it because we don't know that –

KC CLAFFY: I would say this may not get approved or based on previous evidence it looks like this will be hard to get through the process but this is another elephant in the room that the community has to confront. Some of these elephant chapters … This is the thing that I think needs to be confronted. Some of these things are just incentive compatible in the current structure.

DENISE MICHEL: Well, in the current structure of the Board throwing out most review team recommendations, you can pretty much say it about the whole

report, I think, until we hear otherwise. But on this particular one, it is one that there is essentially very little process around this. ICANN staff has in the past changed fees. It doesn't have to go through the GNSO. I mean, there is surprisingly little process in modulating the fees that they're charging and using the fees as incentive. So it's a bit of an unknown.

KC CLAFFY: If there has been precedent for that, we better cite it because I'm not aware of it. I'm just not clued in enough to know what has happened in the past.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, we did. But Norm makes a good point too. It appears that it would mean a budget [hid]. There's a big unknown on this too. I don't want to overstate it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I just want to put on record, I don't believe that the process thinking we should be doing should be any at all related to what the Board will approve and what the Board would not approve. I don't agree with that being floated around because for me it's not about what the Board will approve and what the Board won't approve. That doesn't rank into our importance and urgency.

KC CLAFFY: I don't mean the Board, I mean the system.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No, even the system, it shouldn't be in our psyche when we prioritize on what is critical.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. I'm not saying it should be in prioritization.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No, but it impacts the psyche in terms of how we approach it. So I just want to put that out. I do agree that that shouldn't even be a part of our discussions.

KC CLAFFY: Psyche is pretty impacted.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: For me, it's one of the things. I just want to put it out there that it's just –

KC CLAFFY: Well, okay.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: It's just one of the things that –

RUSS HOUSLEY:	Can we have one conversation please? Eric, can we have one conversation please?
KERRY-ANN BARRETT:	KC, I don't disagree with you. I understand – it's among many other processes that happen globally that it feels like effort in futility. But I think given the exercise how we think about prioritization, it has to be based on our competence, our knowledge, and for me it has to –
KC CLAFFY:	I totally agree with it.
KERRY-ANN BARRETT:	I think we've already filtered out the things that are just not – what we do the whole thing of smart, what can be actually implemented, we already filtered those out. I think we're now down to just the [inaudible] as to what can actually be done tangibly. As you said, this can be done tangibly, and we all agree to that. So whether or not they will do it, we don't know.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Laurin?
LAURIN WEISSINGER:	Yes, I have two comments. One is let's think about what we want to do with this one. Let's find an agreement. In terms of, Eric, what you said about let's look at the deviations, I'm sending them around. But I think

this is essentially the exercise we're currently doing. Like we look at the recommendation and we check with, are we happy with where this data point sits on the scales? And if not, we have a discussion, which is what we're currently doing. So I don't see how procedurally this would be much different, but I'm sending you two more graphs so you can have a look at that whenever you need it.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Are you going to bring them up too?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: We can't put all of them up but I'll send it to your e-mail address. Okay, number 15.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Alright, I'm a little concerned that we had that much discussion and didn't come to any significant agreement in terms about whether we did not want to merge this. I think Norm made that point that he didn't want this one not being approved to drag another one down with it, I think is the way he put it. But I think that we do want to mark it, it being a thing that is not already being done as part of the upper right group instead of the lower left group in terms of prioritization, if we put anything about prioritization at all in the report.

Does anyone disagree with that? Okay. Then I guess we did come to some agreement. Go ahead.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:	15. Abuse Report Portal. In the higher importance and urgency quadrant but rather at the bottom. It's about establish and maintain a central DNS Abuse complaint portal that automatically directs all abuse reports to relevant parties. Are we happy where this is sitting? Hearing nothing, I am continuing.

Number 16. The most important, if not the most urgent: Compliance Function. Ensure its compliance activities are neutral and effective. This function should be audited externally and held to a high standard. There needs to be a variety of changes for this. In this case, there are some details in there.

Are we happy with this where it sits in terms of urgency and importance?

Okay, number 17. Abusive Naming. Again, a bit like number 15, similar in location. This is about investigate typical misleading naming when it rises to abusive naming, develop something to mitigate it. And then we're referring to the Guidelines for the Implementation of IDNs and [inaudible] to other documents.

Are we happy where this sits? Okay.

Number 18. This is the DNS Testbed. The recommendation notes that this has already started and that ICANN org should ensure that the functional testing environment exists and is maintained. Lowest priority and lowest urgency.

Okay, I'm not hearing anything.

Number 19. Formal Procedures for Key Rollovers. Also not that highly ranked in either importance or urgency obviously or relative. Establish a formal procedure, supported by a formal process modeling tool to specify the details of future key rollovers.

Are we happy where this is sitting in terms of importance and urgency? Kerry?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: This is again a question for the technical folks. I remember when we just started talking about this two years ago. This was like a hot topic. Then after the last key rollover, this kind of just fell down into tier, tier, tier, but we also say, "Oh no, the next time we need to make sure these things are there," and then nothing happened. The discussion kind of petered out around it. So I think I'm just still kind of concerned why was it such an important topic before the last delayed key rollover and then why is this just not important all of a sudden. I'm just wondering what happened that I don't know about.

KC CLAFFY: My suspicion is that people filling out the survey and that is exactly as you described. It's no longer the hottest topic. But I suspect this should be a little bit higher.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, Eric next.

EN

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I didn't want to get into sort of a debate. This is an enormously big deal. And the fact that we're focusing on things that are quite different in impedance like budget and compliance with this very technical thing is probably a function of how difficult this job is to put everything on the same page and prioritize them against each other. I would be happy to spend however long you would all like talking about why this is such a critical SSR issue. The key rollover procedure messed that up and it doesn't matter what security you've got anywhere that is built on DNS, it's all host. All of it. If someone could do something that compromises the root key or makes it difficult for you to learn your global trust anchor, any derived security is vulnerable or susceptible to problems at that point. And if you want to do something reckless, roll it over every three years, then you're going to inherit the wind when that goes sideways.

So, this is a really, really big deal and getting it right is really important. And if you want me to illustrate that, I'll say the last time there was an unexpected problem that was totally foreseeable and expected, we delayed everything for a year and decided it's too complicated and let's just do it anyway, which was just like, "Man, this screams let's think more carefully before we do this next time." What this one is saying is, "Let's do it, think more carefully." There's a lot of people in computer science that do formal process analysis. There's a lot of people going back decades that have done their PhDs on this stuff. There's entire fields of software engineering that do process modeling and vetting, and there are tools that could help us. So this one basically says, "This is one of the most critical things that ICANN has to manage." It absolutely is. The root KSKs is one of the most important things, and it's not

governed by a formal process for which there is science on how to do. So this one just says, "Let's do that." There's even a pointer to a canonical citation to this stuff in our draft report.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Denise?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, what Eric said.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Zarko and then Laurin?

ŽARKO KECIC: Just to add something in regard of that. Two years ago, it was a hot topic because we had problems then, and everything went smooth. We don't know why but everything went smooth. That's part of the problem that only 13% of results we are using actually validates DNSSEC.

But there is another thing why it is important, not only in further KSK rollover but if we have emergency KSK rollover, what we are going to do and how we are going to do. So it is very important and it might be higher.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Norm.

NORM RITCHIE:

I'll get back to the scales. I actually have a bit of a problem with urgency because I'm not sure how that falls into the mix. Importance is obviously very valuable but urgency is I'm not sure. If you take the urgency off the scale, it's still up there and the importance – like I said before, the lowest thing on this is 80 in importance. So I don't think anyone says it's not important. They're just saying it's probably not urgent now, which given what you just said, maybe this is still urgent to get acting on it rather than later.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

To the point where if we put anything in the table at all like 14, we're going to move this to the upper right.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

One of the aspects of the urgency is there's a comment period closing on the KSK roll, and that's at the end of this month, I believe. If not, it's surely thereafter. It's right around the corner which obviously this draft is not going to become a final report. But I mean, nevertheless, that's one way you could say this is urgent when you can actually put something into a process. Another time you could say it's urgent is that it's going to be then implemented later. I mean, there's urgency around when we say things, how we deliberate them. We're all going to go back to our regular lives after this and be informed by the work we've done here. So this discussion hopefully has moved the needle if someone has occasion to talk about the root KSK after this.

So I would say it's urgent in a lot of ways. I mean, like there's a problem that Laurin's faced when he tried to give us a framework to have this discussion is, what does it mean to be urgent? What does it all mean when you put it together? How do you compare apples and oranges? So it's difficult. But for me, largely because of what I do on my dollar day job, this is easily one of my top tier concerns – urgency and importance – personally.

RUSS HOUSLEY: KC?

KC CLAFFY: I should also say as the SSAC have, that SSAC does have a working group on the KSK roll and there's progress being made but I don't know the current status of that. I know it involves IANA sending a proposal to the working group for evaluation. I don't think there's formal modeling involved, but I think they're trying to address some of the recommendations that were in SAC63 and 73 that I pointed [Erika] yesterday. So I do think it's a little odd to have this recommendation in here without some reference and contextualization of how this relates to the recommendations that have already been given years ago in SAC63 and 73. If we combine that and then also I'll go find out from SSAC what's the current status of that thing and we make sure that we're not oblivious of what's going on there, which I'll take the action to do.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Laurin then Kerry.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I'm wondering can we move on? We have agreed this is more important. We want to push it up.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: We have to decide what the next action – KC will do some research but is it that you'll fix the text then? So Eric will fix the text. We'll get the current status to add to it and then rank it a little bit higher.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Thank you. Back to the next one I think.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. That would be 20. Root Server Operations. Minimize risks associated with root server operation, ICANN org, in close cooperation with RSSAC and other relevant stakeholders, should develop baseline security best practices and use of root kind as [inaudible] by example.

At the bottom of the urgency and importance cluster, that now includes number 19. No, I just noted because Steve put the green dot there. So this is now 19. I just mentioned it because I realized it's there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Naveed.

EN

NAVEED BIN RAIS: I just wanted to point out that I have revised this particular one yesterday so it will come up in discussion at some point. So based on the gap that we saw and based on RSSAC037, I have revised the rationale and the recommendation itself slightly.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: 21. Yes. Considered pretty important and quite urgent. This is the Root Zone Change Management. ICANN org has committed to increasing the level of security and responsiveness of the Root Zone Management System. Accelerate the implementation of new security measures. Public debate should be launched as soon as possible on changes regarding revisions to the policies thereof.

Are we happy with where this sits? I see no one complaining.

22. Root Zone Data and IANA Registries. It's in the cluster of not so important and not so urgent. Create statistics and metrics that reflect the operational status of each type of [inaudible] and find information and the registries, etc.

A note for those who weren't on the call that essentially we were told by staff that a lot of these are sitting behind I forgot which CDN. It doesn't matter. But essentially, they were saying that the stats for these will be largely the same because they're all hosted. They're the same thing. So they're same here. I see no disagreement. No hands.

Root Zone Data and IANA Registries, number 23. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you because recommendation is not complete. It is not considered very important and not very urgent.

24. Algorithm Rollover. Oh, go ahead.

NORM RITCHIE: Is this the CZDS, whatever it's called?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: It probably is. It just says, "Recommendation not complete" here.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It may be complete in the body of the text after I had done another pass at updating the table.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Are we okay with – we move on now. I'll come back to it later and search in the text so I can tell you what it is. Number 24 –

NORM RITCHIE: Wait, wait. This is the Root Zone Access.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: CZDS.

NORM RITCHIE: Yes. We actually talked about it yesterday how important that data was especially towards any abuse.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:	Norm, I would say let's look for the text. That's why I'm saying let's do the rest and then we look for the text because otherwise, I'll take forever finding it.
	Number 24 is Crypto: Algorithm Rollover. Update DPS to facilitate the transition to different signature algorithm. We see it as not that important and not that urgent.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Go ahead, Eric, then myself after.
ERIC OSTERWEIL:	I just went ahead and looked up in the body of text in the data. One is the CZDS like Norm has said and there's a lot of changes from yesterday. It looks like it was one of the main things we're talking about. So I don't know if that means you want to do it now or later, but I just want to point that out.
LAURIN WEISSINGER:	I think if there's a lot of changes and stuff like that, let's not do it now because we might want to resolve that first. It's my gut feel.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	So turning to the crypto one. My view is what we're asking is already partly underway and that's why I made it lower. But if we're ever going to roll the algorithm, the work we're asking for has to be done. So we just say start it now.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I see a little disagreement. Comments on this one or can I move on? Okay. 25 –

DENISE MICHEL: Wait. Was that an "agree" or not?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. 25. Measuring Name Collisions. Produce findings that characterize the nature and frequency of name collisions and resulting concerns. Implement a solution before the next round and have an independent study. We have this as one of the more urgent in the not-so-urgent cluster and it is pretty low in importance. Personal comment is it might be because there is quite a lot of stuff going on in that area and the question is, do we need to say it again?

I see no disagreement.

26. Up there in the important and urgent. Privacy impact of DoT and DoH. And essentially, it's all about think about privacy, how to address it, etc. We consider it pretty urgent and pretty important.

I see no complaints.

27. It is the third least urgent and maybe the fifth least important-ish. It's staying informed about policy debates. Go check out relevant research.

Are we okay with this being not so important and not so urgent? I just see nodding. Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: Don't say, "Not so important, not so urgent." In the context of –

LAURIN WEISSINGER: In comparison. Yeah. I'm always talking relative here.

DENISE MICHEL: In a grid of high importance things, it's not as high as others.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Right. Between getting a CISO and doing that, yes. Okay.

28. Implications of DoH. Essentially, investigate what's going on there. We say this is pretty urgent and pretty important. That's the comment probably because this is something pretty new and there's not much about it.

Any comments? Should this be moved? Should this change?

NORM RITCHIE: Should that be merged with 26? We're talking about privacy and SSR or no? Is this separate? No?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I mentioned there's overlap when I did my read-through, but it is focused on a different aspect. Also, 26 is already a recommendation the size of a little novel.

DENISE MICHEL: I see your point, Norm, and I'm kind of ambivalent if people want to merge things, but that's very different process is right there driving these two things which is I think what encouraged me to keep them separate. I'm open to –

NORM RITCHIE: Not a hill we'll die on.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

NORM RITCHIE: I did have a comment about this. I was kind of keeping track of what the themes were for each of these. So the upper right, there's two broad things. One is obviously abuse and compliance which applies to all hands, right? So that's ICANN Board, communities, the outside of ICANN as everybody. The other one is really a maturation of the security

system within ICANN org. And they're like two categories and everything falls in those.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I did a similar thing as Norm. These are the two key ones and I think then if we go for issues, there are two issues that run alongside. One of that is third party audit and certification. Have another set of eyes. And related to that in some ways is some of the metrics and DAAR-related recommendations, which is again about do something so that other people can check, signal to the world what you're doing. I feel – and this is going back to like my earliest comment this morning where I'm thinking, "We can frame our report around this." These are the two things we're talking about and then there's the orthogonal, which is – and this is how you get there and this is what you need to do to demonstrate you're doing these things.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, I agree with Norm and Laurin on this. I think making these two broad points, these themes and organizing it like that will make our report more approachable and make the bottom line messaging easier to understand.

Personally, I'd like to come back to the appropriate time and discuss a little bit more is the incentives and the CZDS, the zone which has some important connections with the operation of identifying and mitigating abuse, particularly with the loss of the WHOIS record, it becomes even more important and it continues to be very unstable. So I would want to have a more fulsome discussion about that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Can I suggest perhaps we take a little break so I can finish putting what we just discussed in a table and we can review it after?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I was about to comment that it is astounding that we had a break schedule for 10:30. It's 10:30. Laurin, it's amazing. So can we take 15 minutes? And please be back promptly.

[BREAK]

Welcome back. Heather sent some e-mail to the list that summarizes the changes. Can you project that? Heather, take us through it.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Hopefully, what's in this table will be very familiar to you. If it's not, we have some other problems that we might need to discuss. This is basically my notes against the conversation we just had throughout the urgency and immediacy placement. The number of the rows, the number of the recommendation, then actually the title of the recommendation, and then whether we agreed to its placement or whether we had some notes that we wanted to – discussion notes such as merge 7 and 5, merge 9 and 8, or budget too important not to mention. That stuff is noted there for our consideration. And just so you don't have to bounce too much back and forth, I also included a copy of the chart that Steve had just sent out with the new and improved location for recommendation 19. If you scroll down, that's roughly around row 32.

EN

RUSS HOUSLEY: Did she get it right?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Laurin, you took some side notes as well. Did I capture what you had?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: From what I can see, yes. I mean, my notes were mainly more procedural in nature than this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Make it so.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: There's two we noted that we wanted to discuss that needed some review because of the sheer amount of changes from yesterday. Okay, I thought that was going to be my suggestion to at least look at those two.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yesterday we went through and assigned some homework. We're stumbling on things in the document. Those things are all after the table. Long table. It's like pages and pages and pages of table.

Okay, I think the first place where we need to go is page 31. There's some new text at the bottom of page 31, top of 32. My quick reading, it

captures what we said yesterday. Any concerns there? Bottom of 31, top of 32.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay, for those changes, that was basically some of my editorial work back at the end of the year, rephrasing this to try and be a little bit more clear. I want to make sure that I did not change the intended meaning of the text.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, I'm not hearing anything. Moving on. Did we talk about the yellow text on 32 yesterday? I think we did.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I don't actually remember. This is like a homework assignment for Laurin to talk to Finance. Was that done? Is there anything that needs to change here?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Sorry for breaking the microphone. I slipped. We did e-mail them and we haven't heard [great].

JENNIFER BRYCE: Actually, I did reply to that, so they suggested that dialogue would be helpful to meet with them. So they're happy to do that.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Awesome, so I would say let's do that as quickly as possible, as in next week preferred.

DENISE MICHEL: We've had formal presentations and informal conversations with them multiple times. It's great if you can connect but I'm just suggesting to save time and get this draft report published for additional comments that we should move forward regardless of whether they're able to meet with you.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I was referring to let's see if we can schedule it as soon as possible. Obviously, if it's in a month's time then we can't.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So for the sake of the draft report going out to public comment, do I need to continue to track this as an action item?

RUSS HOUSLEY: No. On KC's comment on the document there, I think you need to say part of the team signed NDAs. Okay, we killed it.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Nobody in the room signed an NDA, right?

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's not true.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Backing up a little bit, you'll notice that the process and methodology sections in Work Streams 2, 3, and 4 have been proposed to be deleted. I deleted those bad boys. Now that said, I put in a consolidated one. KC and I reviewed it. KC actually undid some of our changes because as it turns out, some of the things that we noted may not have been done were done before the pause. So they did count as part of methodology so that is now –

KC CLAFFY: The point is we decided we should factor it out. It's not necessarily repetitive but what I thought would be more helpful, we'll just have one process or two as it turns out because definitely the review of SSR1 recommendations had its own process and then the rest of the work streams had another process that was close enough that we could just call it the same process. That's more or less it. We're putting process and methodology in like an appendix or an annex, right?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Right now it is more in the header or in the front matter in part of the guidance for future SSR Review Teams.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, but we said yesterday that we wanted to move that to the back.

DENISE MICHEL:
I think I would suggest that we just have a sentence that says, "Process methodology and recommendations are in Appendix, whatever. This is what this information is." Then take that out of the body.

RUSS HOUSLEY:
Just like we're doing with the definitions and the acronyms. We're pushing them to the back, but mentioning that they're at the front.

Okay, I think the next thing we need to talk about is on page 34. Kerri put some stuff in here yesterday.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT:
As part of the homework, what I tried to do was to just start off by just acknowledging that the review team knows that these two offices exist. But our biggest thing is that we think that there's a need for coordination between the two because the risk of them not communicating would fall through … that it could be not very good for the organization. But I faced a roadblock and I wanted to put it to the team to consider.

If you were the CTO or if you were the CIO reading this, would you believe that this review team is saying that you need a boss? So pretty much, would you read it and be opposed to this because you would feel as if you're being replaced? The issue I had with it is that I think it could come across to someone that we're saying we need ICANN to create a higher up person to know OCTO and the CIO to report to or we're saying to them that [dismantle] these two positions and create one position. So I didn't want that to come across that way. So my fear is someone

reading it could think that, and that's not our intent. Or something else needs to be put in there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Laurin then Denise.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: My personal feeling and gist of what we tried to do or what we wanted to achieve – and I might be wrong here – is that we say we need someone at that high level who is responsible for security and brings these concerns to the table, and maybe if we can underline that a bit more to say, "Look, there is some leeway how to do this, but you need someone at C-suite level to do it." This is what I felt.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So is it that we want to send in that says that this recommendation is not intended to do away with offices off? Like I think there needs to be some clarity on – we can't tell them how to do it but to say what we do not want as an end result. I'm just saying it has to be clear because it could be thrown off because persons who'll see that are offended by it. They're like, "Hey, that review team is trying to get rid of me."

LAURIN WEISSINGER: No, no.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I'm just trying to make sure that doesn't come across that way.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah, I would agree with putting something like that and then saying, "Look, this is not necessary."

RUSS HOUSLEY: Denise then KC.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, I would agree, Kerri. You have a couple of bullets on what the CTO does and what the CIO does. And you add a sentence that says the intention is not to replace these but rather to put a higher level C-suite executive. The language that starts on the bottom of page 34 I think does a reasonable job of saying you got a whole range of security issues, related issues that are decentralized need to be brought under one person overseeing it and having an executive level role that can look across all the strategic objectives, regulatory compliance, budgeting responsibilities of security and other organizational assets, and interact with both the Board and the community in this role. I think that's what we need to say. I think it's pretty clear.

RUSS HOUSLEY: KC?

KC CLAFFY: First, what's Heather doing with the text? Because I'm not comfortable with that sentence: "However, the review team is [from] the security as

an integral part of ICANN which is not [inaudible] specific attention it deserves." Because I don't know what security means there. That's too big of a word or too small of a word or something.

But I felt we had this long conversation yesterday – two minutes at least, I guess that should qualify as a long conversation – about identifying very clearly the problem that we're trying to solve with this recommendation. I don't believe we've done it yet, although I haven't read this whole text. Maybe we have but I think if we're very careful about identifying what problem we're trying to solve, that will remove the risk that somebody thinks they're having a boss. Because we have to say, "This is not the role that we understand to be whoever's role today and this is not that role. This is a role above it that we don't think is being met today."

Now, I did have a question for Steve because I'm wondering, did ICANN ever have what we are describing as that role? Somebody above who would coordinate across the internal and the external security issues?

STEVE CONTE: We have had multiple Chief Security Officer roles, but none of them to my knowledge – and there's a gap where I was working at ISOC for five years – none of them to my knowledge have ever been a C-suite position but I'm not entirely positive.

Norm is correcting me. Maybe Jeff Moss was a C-level but again I'm not [so sure].

KC CLAFFY: Anyway, who's got the pen on that text?

NORM RITCHIE: [Inaudible] was CSO. And then after that, Jeff Moss was CSO.

DENISE MICHEL: Either did what we're actually describing.

KC CLAFFY: So who owns the task of writing that? The problem that we're trying to solve is this. And then if you're still worried about the thing that you're worried about, Kerri, then we should have this conversation again. I'm happy to help try to identify it.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: So what problems are we trying to solve? Just so we can put it in a comment. But I see it as a lack of coordination. The action is to distribute it, and the other thing is a lack of representation of security. Let's go with a not so clear term at the C-suite level. Is there something else we want to address with this?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I remember yesterday when we talked about this, Kerry-Ann listed four things that she then couldn't remember? That's what we're trying to capture.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: My suggestion is I'm going to move the penultimate paragraphs to the beginning and then just acknowledge that while we do know that – so pretty much saying, "This is the problem, we acknowledge that these roles exist, however, we think there's still a gap." So I'll rephrase the thinking process of the paragraph. I'm saying I'm going to put that at the front, and then put the trunk about what exists in the middle, and then conclude that. There's still a gap. I'm just going to restructure.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sounds perfect. Naveed.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: What surprises me, actually, is that the C-suite is one of the highest rated importance and urgent thing that is rated by all of us, and still we are discussing and I'm not sure what to do with the recommendation. To me, if we include just a sentence that this CISO or CSO has to work with the CIO and CTO to do this, this, this, that would automatically and implicitly solve the problem of someone being insecure about having a new position. So we should include a sentence that they need to coordinate together to achieve a particular thing like that. Rather than saying explicitly that we are not intending to replace or something like that. That's my two cents.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, I'm not as nervous as you, Naveed, because I think we haven't changed the recommendation. We're just trying to make sure we're clear in its explanation.

DENISE MICHEL: I was asked to write text to provide more fulsome explanation and it seems to have disappeared. This is probably on my end, so I'm just adding it back in as a comment for you guys to look at and decide if it's useful.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Norm.

NORM RITCHIE: Do we want to mention anywhere in there something about the CSO would also have a budget to do things or is that just everyone understands that? The reason I say that because there are some cases where the CSO just becomes a figurehead, nothing more. And there is a history of ICANN of that happening before. So let's say explicitly he gets the budget.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Kerry, you're good with that?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: We're trying to … what happened to the text that's lost. So we're trying to find it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: About budget?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: To be as explicit statement about budget? Yes, that one.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. Okay, thank you.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It sounds like there's a little bit of work going on the C-suite thing. So I think we're done with that. The next question I had was in the rationale and findings for security risk management where it says, "To better understand the approaches and frameworks that have been adopted by ICANN org to handle security risks of the unique identifier," and I'm like, "The unique identifier? The one, the only unique identifier – should this be the unique identifier system? Should this be the DNS?" This seemed incomplete. This is domain-specific enough that … It's a term I don't necessarily completely understand, which is why I want you to tell me exactly what that phrase should be.

STEVE CONTE: Just to keep with the cadence of how ICANN views its management, the unique identifier systems, they don't manage all the unique identifiers. So something that the ICANN manage or like unique identifiers in which are within ICANN's purview or something like that, I would suggest.

DENISE MICHEL:	But we have an intro that notes that, in all cases, throughout this report, we're referring to things that are within ICANN's purview.

STEVE CONTE:	Okay, just trying to quell any future fires.

DENISE MICHEL:	Do you think we need to say it time and again for each recommendation?

STEVE CONTE:	Its just wrote that I've been drilled in to say things certain ways, so I'm just suggesting. That's all.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:	I don't think that's a big problem for this one. So if I say, "To handle the security risks of the unique identifier systems managed by ICANN org."
	My next question in this section is we had a nice long phrase about the ICANN staff. "The ICANN org staff and units responsible with security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS," and I wanted to know could that just be summarized as the OCTO-SSR? Does that need to be spelled out that way?

RUSS HOUSLEY:	OCTO-SSR is correct and much shorter.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Great.

STEVE CONTE: Sorry, just to pick nits again and run that. What about the IANA function that doesn't fall under OCTO-SSR and that would be surrounding some the SSR of the DNS?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, you don't get to be simple. The world is complex sometimes. Where's the next one you want to talk about, Heather?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah, I know. I'm not going to worry about the footnote right now. Back again to the question of, "To handle the security risks to the unique identifier," I'm assuming that you now match above the unique identifier systems managed by ICANN.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It seems fine. So there was a whole bunch of texts put in here just today?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Well, the next thing – and this is sort of an interesting meta comment for the document – is how many people are familiar with what passive voice is? We use it a lot in this document. It's not always bad. I mean, sometimes you do that. It is not always bad because sometimes you

want to really make sure the emphasis is on the action to be taken as opposed to who's taking the action.

KC CLAFFY: I would make a slight pedantic, a modification that if you want to make it clear that you don't want to make it clear who the subject is because you don't know, because that could be implemented by a number of people. But if you want to assign responsibility to a certain entity, I absolutely think it should be X should take responsibility for. And then you have the issue of making KPIs come into existence or something like how do you word the rest of it? But I really find very few places in this document where I would think passive voice would be a better way to go.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is something that I can just change if we have agreement that we want to change the tone of the document.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think at some point, we're going to just have to tell you make a pass through this document, make it sound like one person wrote it, and that that's going to lead to a bunch of editorial changes.

DENISE MICHEL: I agree. I think that just the one caveat here is then we all need to read through the report and be really clear that we've assigned it to the

proper entity as in ICANN Board action, ICANN org action, ICANN org and community.

KC CLAFFY: Like in SSAC, I say we have struggled for years by writing our recommendations not clearly, and then ICANN didn't know even who it was intended for. Then there's an issue of whether ICANN actually within its power to do it. But the problem is, I don't think Heather can do all that, make it sound as one person and figure out who the subject is of these things that are in passive voice because I couldn't when I tried to fix some of it. Yeah, Heather, go ahead.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah, but I really enjoy this little card. I can at least take care of the ones that are reasonably obvious and ask specific questions where I can. Alright, I'll make a note.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Kerry. KC, are you done?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Sorry, Russ. The thing about it though, as we do that pass to correct it, I was explaining to Heather the history. We went that route of writing that way because it was drilled in our head two years ago that we can't direct ICANN to – so I'm just trying to say I don't –

I'm only raising because we went completely the opposite way two years ago. We said, "We can't direct them to do it, so we have to be like it should, it could, you consider, etc." And then we're going to go back to being directive. And then we're going to have a whole debate about which one should be directed or not directed. So I'm just cautioned and just remember where we're coming from, why we ended up writing passively. It's not the preferred, but writing legislation for years.

DENISE MICHEL: We don't have the power to direct, but we do have the power to clearly recommend that a particular entity take action, which is, I think, where we've arrived at.

KC CLAFFY: What I heard from the comments on the call from the ICANN org was, sometimes we focus too much on the details of how something is going to be executed rather than what the outcome should be. And that's an orthogonal issue to passive versus active voice. That's all I'm saying.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So I've got my action, I'm going to change what seems reasonable, and then I will ask elsewhere.

NORM RITCHIE: Yes, so if you do the past to the whole document, which is a great amount of work, would you also be addressing the tone throughout as well, to make sure that it's consistent and neutral?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Now, that's an interesting challenge because as I'm reading the document, my thoughts on the tone, in terms of where it seems to be very neutral and where it seems to be angry, I've already had some side conversations, they do not match. It is perhaps pejorative, but it's also accurate. There's some areas that have a whole stinking lot of tension in there that if I was coming at this cold, I would just push back because I felt so attacked.

DENISE MICHEL: There's a lot of history here.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I know there's a lot of history. I'm not saying I don't understand why it's that way but you've got differences.

DENISE MICHEL: I'm not disagreeing. Take a pass at the tone. But at the same time, there are issues in abuse and KSK rollover that I think warrant clear, forceful, direct language because they are coming at the tail end of decades of conversations, recommendations, requests, feedback. So let's just be really clear about why we're doing it and what we're recommending and I agree the tone should be –

NORM RITCHIE: What I'm recommending – I appreciate your talent, Heather, you seem very talented at doing all this. So why don't we give her a shot of doing it?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Kerry.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Very minor but stupid point. Are we the SSR RT or are we referring to ourselves as a review team.

RUSS HOUSLEY: SSR RT.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Minor but I'm just wondering.

RUSS HOUSLEY: SSR2 RT.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Okay. Thanks.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think there was a past, I don't know, a month ago, that got most of them. But, of course, people are writing new text. It's just the others are just … Right, but they're just longer. That's all.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: If it doesn't get fixed, it's Heather's fault.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Ooh, we don't need fault here. Alright, Heather, where's the next one you want to talk about?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is probably directed more towards Boban. One of the bullet points say that the security risk matrix and registers should be created and updated. It didn't match in terms of plural. Is it actually one matrix, one whole security matrix and multiple registers? Should that be multiple matrices? Should this match?

BOBAN KRSIC: Just to repeat it. A risk register your amount of threats. They had a matrix and there were, I don't know, 2025 risks, the risk register. And that's it. And the recommendation is "Okay, you have to update it regularly. So, keep in mind, that your threats are up to date and that you have it in your register." But I don't know if there is only one matrix or more than one. We saw only one.

KC CLAFFY: You mean you saw one?

BOBAN KRSIC: Yes.

KC CLAFFY: You're saying if there's –

BOBAN KRSIC: A huge one.

KC CLAFFY: And you want them to keep it up to date. I mean, that one was okay, but they should just keep it up to date. And that's it?

BOBAN KRSIC: That's it.

KC CLAFFY: Then I guess it's one.

BOBAN KRSIC: Just coming back to the sentence. I think we can also write only security register or security risk register without matrix, so delete matrix because I don't see the benefit.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Security risk registers?

BOBAN KRSIC: Yes, or register. Not registers, register of security risks. Risks. Should be created, updated and used to prioritize. Maybe it's easier.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You have to do the same the next sentence. This is for the Board, right? Board level.

BOBAN KRSIC: Yes.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: And then does that make that example appropriate?

BOBAN KRSIC: Just delete it. Security risks. And the finding should [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: But here it says created. It already exists.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Should we say updated, or routinely updated, or annually updated?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Annually.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Frequently.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Regularly.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Really, this was all about whether it was plural or not. What's should next one, Heather?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Alright, we've reached the floating part of our show. I think the next thing to cover is at the top of page 37 and it's a very good question from KC, trying to parse that sentence, "ICANN more generally serves as a policymaking body, etc." What is that trying to say?

KC CLAFFY: It's just I can't even parse it. The last sense of the first paragraph on the display, "ICANN more generally serves as a policymaking body as if it were required make important decisions as related to the DNS, but seems less critical and urgent to restore." Some words have disappeared. I vote delete the whole sentence.

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LAURIN WEISSINGER: I think what we wanted to do about this is, is that we're saying like the policy creation process is something that needs to be restored at some point, but it's not that urgent.

KC CLAFFY: What do you mean? They don't have a policy creation process now?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: They do. There's the disaster recovery, right? Yes, I think this was a note. ICANN more generally is a policymaking body. Important decisions need to be made, but you don't have to restore it as quickly as the rest.

KC CLAFFY: Just take it out.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Just to explain. I would say yank it.

KC CLAFFY: That's right. The solution to everything I don't like is just cut it.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: 106 pages to go.

KC CLAFFY: Yes. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Next.

KC CLAFFY: Give me an hour.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Give you an hour?

KC CLAFFY: It'll be 30 pages.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay, KC made a bunch of other changes on page 37. Any objection to the changes that she's made?

KC CLAFFY: Good. I made 600 changes last night. Any objection? The report is 10 pages now.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Any objections to the changes made on page 37?

DENISE MICHEL :   I'm not entirely comfortable taking out the sentence about it, being standard, being crucial – and I'm happy to entertain other ways of

making this point, but I think it's an important point to make because ICANN specifically ignored the first SSR1 Review Team that said, "You need to do standards." And a lot of the problems that we saw at ICANN could have been solved or couldn't be solved if they actually go through the standard setting process. So I think it's important to make that point in some way. If you don't like that sentence, fine, but I think we need to make the overall point.

KC CLAFFY:　　　　　　　　　I just thought it was covered by the previous sentence.

RUSS HOUSLEY:　　　　　　　Right, but what's left is ISO standards are flexible and applicable to ICANN.

KC CLAFFY:　　　　　　　　　Well, let's put it in that sentence, whatever it is, because I don't think we need … Alright, I'll take the task of changing that sentence to make it stronger and less open to …

UNIDENTIFIED MALE:　　　　Make it accurate.

KC CLAFFY:　　　　　　　　　Yes, well, damn straight. My passive issue was above where it wasn't even clear to me how to fix it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: ISO standards are flexible.

NORM RITCHIE: I agree that there's some things that we have to stress, but I don't think we need to stress it repeatedly. So what I said before, but with this thing to be two broad categories that we're going after, I think that was in the executive summary, the preamble, saying there's two big things here that we think should be addressed. One applies to ICANN and applies to community, and that kind of makes the statement.

KC CLAFFY: Can we … give me a chance to fix this and move on?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Next, Heather. Go ahead, Zarko.

ŽARKO KECIC: I think this is important and we should explain why we insist that ICANN should implement standards, either ISO or some other standards. But we should explain why and what will be benefits of that. The last paragraph, it's trying to explain, but doesn't explain fully.

RUSS HOUSLEY: What do you want to see added there?

ŽARKO KECIC:	What benefits ICANN organization and global security and resilience will see from implementing standards?
NORM RITCHIE:	You and Boban have been through implementing these standards within your organization, right? So do you know what are the benefits? And can you say what they are?
ŽARKO KECIC:	Proposing to work on this and to add concrete examples.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Thank you. That's not what I got. If you could add those words, it would be great. Okay, Heather.
HEATHER FLANAGAN:	So KC is working on strengthening the standards. I don't hear any objections to the other changes. So, deal with that. I'm trying to figure out where her comment about 12-month timeline and others have no timeline.
KC CLAFFY:	Yes, one of the recommendations said 12 months, I thought, "Oh, geez. Now, all of a sudden in the middle of document putting a timeline on the recommendation, this sounds weird."

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HEATHER FLANAGAN: Got it.

KC CLAFFY: Inconsistent.

DENISE MICHEL: But we may want to come back and –

RUSS HOUSLEY: It was an attempt to be measurable. It was attempt to say this is something that needs to be done promptly.

DENISE MICHEL: Yes, and we may want to revisit our recommendations in terms of the timeframe. This should be done within a year, that should be done within six months. But also, of course, we will be revising our report after we consider public comments. We'll have another shot at this one.

ŽARKO KECIC: Yes, I just have a question in regard the disaster recovery systems. We're referring here to standard implementation. But on one of our meetings, I don't remember which one. We're talking about introducing a new disaster recovery site.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm sorry. It's the 12 months that she was talking about, to implement the third site.

ŽARKO KECIC: Yes. Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. It's there. It says outside the U.S. Okay, Heather.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Is there any objection at the bottom? Switching over to Naveed.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: The recommendation itself says that it should come up with a disaster recovery plan after the adoption from the word, but we need to keep in mind that there is a process even after that. There is an implementation committee and that gives an implementation plan. And after that, the recommendations can start having an output in a pipeline. So having 12 months after the adoption of the Board even does not seem to be realistic. So I'm not sure how this will be evaluated by SSR3 later.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, Heather, where's the next one you want to talk about?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I think the end result to that is, that we're coming back to the timing on all of the recommendations. So, cool. Anyone object to deleting that sentence? Doing so would improve transparency and trustworthiness,

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as being perhaps superfluous to the recommendation. This is at the bottom of page 38.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You might want to move it to findings, but other than that –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It's just a rephrasing. I don't think anyone –

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, of course. It's just a flow in. You're good at words.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: On Page 40, there seems to be disagreement about whether or not ICANN removed WHOIS access.

KC CLAFFY: But what we're saying here, I don't believe we can say that ICANN removed WHOIS access unless I'm misunderstanding what –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: We can add more words. ICANN Board passed the temporary spec, allowed registrars and registries to do X with WHOIS database.

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KC CLAFFY: WHOIS access was removed. Norm can probably be more precise here. Certainly, if we don't mention GDPR here at all, we're going to look a little dense, right? I mean, these people thought they were following the law, if you're talking about registries and registrars. Well, they did include before. They didn't do it before GDPR. Okay, wait, you have to speak up. I don't know what that means.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Basically, this was the implementation of the reaction to GDPR. And I think maybe our meta point is that the way in which compliance was implemented wound up with too much collateral damage. I mean, certainly it could have been done differently. And I think maybe we need to say that because ICANN took an action that we can all see.

DENISE MICHEL: That we said it's okay to [inaudible] about providing any access even for law enforcement, cybersecurity, consumer protection. I can take an action to expand that a little bit and revise it. Hey, Heather, can you note this part?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: The next question in this section was from KC about what is SSL cert administration? Is that an organization? Is that a function? What is that thing?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Same sentence, SSL certificate administration.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: It's because of DV certs. DV certs use domain validation to figure out if you're allowed to give a cert to somebody or not. They also look at WHOIS to see who owns it, but they can't look at WHOIS anymore. So now you've taken away from the SSL community the CA browsers. The CA is the ability to do the kinds of checks you need before they give certs, and certs becoming easier to give out because they can't do the check anymore.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Want us to footnote that?

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, there needs to be a few more words in the sentence or in a footnote.

                    No, readers aren't going to notice. I understand what you mean by the process doesn't have access. But it's not clear from –

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is just like five words. Like a domain cert, validates who owns the domain name, don't know who owns the domain because I can't pull …

                    Okay, on page 42, a bunch of stuff has been deleted, probably discussed elsewhere. This was mostly Denise, actually.

DENISE MICHEL:	Yes, I was following a request to have a clear delineation and organization between findings and recommended actions, so I think it's moved.
HEATHER FLANAGAN:	So towards the bottom of page 42, is there any objection to deleting the sentence about zone file data? This is why I'm making you go through this, by the way.
DENISE MICHEL:	Yes, I appreciate it. Unless I'm missing it and it was said elsewhere, but zone file data is used to identify new resolving domain names that may be used in cyber attacks, including those noted above. It's why this is such an important issue. So I think it needs to be articulated. And if you don't like the sentence, I'm happy to try and work on it.
HEATHER FLANAGAN:	KC, do you have an opinion? Because this was your deletion. Hang on, it just moved.
KC CLAFFY:	I'm just wondering why we need that sentence. It feels to me, it's already covered above, adversely impacts security threat mitigation.
DENISE MICHEL:	I think it needs to be really, really clear because that's a somewhat of a general statement, which is true. But to put a finer point on it, it's even

more important now – even more important now that WHOIS access has been pulled.

KC CLAFFY: So when we say including those noted above, what are we talking about? What's noted above? Above where?

I mean, again, the previous sentence to me explains it. And really, I would argue, zone file data does not tend to be used to identify new resolving domain names. The passive DNS stuff tends to be used to identify new resolving domain, but people actually doing [inaudible].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, people to have access to those passively [inaudible]

KC CLAFFY: Right. Zone file data just gives you the top level new and it doesn't give you hostnames.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, those can be targets that are being used. And in passive DNS, it lets you know what's being resolved. But if you can do CZDS, you know when it's actually there and present.

KC CLAFFY: I'm not saying it's not important, but the sentence above says access to this data already impairs security mitigations, investigations, and

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research. I just don't know why we need to be more specific in the next sentence. I'm not going to fall in this. If this is really important to people [leave it in].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I was going to say is that we could add, at the beginning of sentence, something like, "One concrete example is." I mean, because I think that's what the sentence is doing is it's saying like, "The ones above are stage setting, this is just a concrete example."

KC CLAFFY: But we need to say what including those noted above or remove that last clause, because I don't know what that part is referring to.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, we need to break in about 10 minutes. So let's keep going until we get to that point. Heather?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: At the bottom of page 43, KC asks a question with regards to six years later, ICANN has not required the implementation of this validity check. The question was, has ICANN explained why this wasn't done?

KC CLAFFY: We had this conversation within one of our many interviews with them. Or can Steve comment?

STEVE CONTE: I cannot comment. I don't have the details within the RAA.

DENISE MICHEL: Yes, I can. The Business Constituency had Cyrus in person at a meeting. I can get the date. And on the record and transcripts, he's indicated that the staff was working on it and had left.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Does that change the text?

NORM RITCHIE: Rather than saying six years later, why don't you just say "to date" or "as of"?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Then it's going to be … How many when we're done?

NORM RITCHIE: It was six years when we started this three years ago.

KC CLAFFY: An important point, I was rereading the CCT report last night and there's a phrase in there about six years ago, and it was completely wrong because that report wasn't published for three years after this was written and I thought, "Oh, not good."

STEVE CONTE: So we could just put the date that it would … No, not even "to date."
                            Say like, "Six years later," we're talking about 2014. You can say, "Since
                            2014, this hasn't happened."

RUSS HOUSLEY: So at the top of the next page, we have "Add stats on abuse," but I don't
                            see that KC added anything. Did I miss it?

KC CLAFFY: That's my action item.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh, so we're missing a plus assignment thing?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No, it's there. It's there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It is?

STEVE CONTE: Sorry. I'm looking back at your chain since 2013. That's exactly right. So
                            it's actually like, "As of the date of this report," basically.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [Inaudible].

STEVE CONTE: No, but I think someone just changed it back. It says since 2013 now.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So meta question, we have a lot of requests for citation, which are good things to have. Are all of those citations required before public comment?

DENISE MICHEL: My opinion is no. At the same time, I'm working on where I know where sites are or we can access them. It would be nice to have the resources we requested to get these citations. But absent that, I think we should do what we can, but we should know – personally, I don't think we should hold up the report for it. And in the draft when we publish it, we should just include parentheses, site to be added.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I can see we can do like a mix, where it's like, "Okay, we'll add more." But if we don't put anything, that will open us up to a lot of criticism and will make us very much attackable. I think we need to balance this. I don't think every single thing has to be there, but if there's nothing that will be like, "Okay, they have not a single thing in here." So we need a few.

RUSS HOUSLEY: All right, let's see if we can get two more before lunch.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: At the top of page 45, KC asks a question about adopting multifactor authentication was largely ignored. Shouldn't we explain why this isn't required?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I think Steve actually read to us an answer that made it clear, it wasn't ignored it was considered. But then the technical prowess of the involved parties was considered too low to run this.

STEVE CONTE: I was referring to the root zone management system. Just to clarify that.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay, sorry. Forget it. Forget everything I said.

KC CLAFFY: I think we all live, eat, and breathe it, so we understand how the dots connect, but I would like us something that connects the dots to why ICANN can't just require this. It has to go through the PDP, we don't know if this was on the – I mean, it can be known, to use passive voice, but I don't know if anyone in the room knows it because we haven't done the research to find out if this was in the PDP, and it just got ripped out of the contract drafts in the bilateral negotiations, or if this never even made it to the PDP and ICANN actually completely ignored

the recommendation. I don't know which of those is true. But I think that's an important distinction that should be in the report, if one could find out which one is true.

DENISE MICHEL: I don't disagree. I think we should ask staff to give us that answer. But I don't think we should wait for the answer to move forward with the draft report, so we can get comments.

KC CLAFFY: One last thing, maybe that applies to all the recommendations in the thing that needs to be cited here, which is the SSAC report that we're talking about. I don't know. Additional SSAC recommendations in the registry, that needs a cite because, as I say on my next comment, you need to be specific about which recommendations ICANN failed to act on it. And I don't know what else is in that comment. Has ICANN not already said that the … Can you expand the next one, Heather? Expand the bottom comment. It said that the registrars did not agree to these terms. I think we need to get to the underlying issue here, which is that ICANN does not have the ability to regulate the registry and registrars. And again, because there's two possible problems here, it's that ICANN is failing or it's that the whole model is failing.

DENISE MICHEL: KC, I think that statement is too sweeping that they don't. You can't make a blanket statement that ICANN doesn't have the authority to do this. And this is where it gets complicated. ICANN can issue processes

and implement, and requirements on registrars and registries at the process level. They can propose new implementation paths, in addition to opening up contract negotiations and changing the contract. Only some of which has to be blessed by the GNSO and some doesn't. And then, of course, there's also a PDP path as well. So there's many different paths to getting things done. And it is inaccurate to say, ICANN simply doesn't have the ability to do this. They have a lot more ability than they exercise and that's, I think, what we need to parse out.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. But [inaudible] is that this last statement that ICANN failed to act is also inaccurate. I do not know that ICANN failed to do anything at all. Does anyone know that for sure?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I do. I believe that this is something … maybe there's a meta lesson for us in the writing here as well, because I believe this is all in relation to the New gTLD Program. Up above, if you look several pages up, I believe all of these are under the heading of the New gTLD Program, in which case, you can actually legislate ahead of time. You have to be this high to play.

Right. But at that point, you can say we're not going to allow … For example, you have to deploy DNSSEC. I can't say that to an existing registry, but you can say that for the new gTLD because they put that in there. So I just want to add some context. Thinking about this broadly, generally, could you make people do MFA as registrars? Today, broadly, no, but maybe for the next round, you could say yes. Maybe that was

some text, everyone here already got that. But, for me, I had to actually back up and make sure I understood. These recommendations we're talking about now I think are all in regards to the New gTLD Program. Just in case that attenuates. Or maybe I'm –

DENISE MICHEL: Not for registrars. And that's where the complexity comes in because for the registrars, there's a Registrar Accreditation Agreement every registrar in the world has to comply with that. ICANN currently is in negotiations, the contract is open. They are negotiating specific language on RDAP. So it's happening right now. They could add to this negotiation, some of these elements we're talking about. That's a contract negotiation, that's language that could be proposed to be added to the contract. Like I said, many paths to this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: He assigned it to Jennifer.

NORM RITCHIE: I just want to clarify, when you're asking Steve, you're actually asking ICANN org to capture that and since the relative team. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. We have now reached lunch.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Wait one more question.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Because I know that some people have phone calls.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It's really fast. Does this work assignment to Steve/Jennifer also apply to they need to be specific about which recommendations ICANN failed to act on?

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, that's separate.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. That's what I wanted to know. Now, we can take lunch.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Lunch. Please be back in 45 minutes.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]