
RUSS HOUSLEY: No, but you commented on it. You have a whole bunch of comments in this section. Either that or I...

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No, I think these comments are actually for the other section and they go this far. I don't think I have comments on this section.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Why don't we phrase it this way in case [off mic]?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Fair enough. Well, I talked with Laurin at lunch that the two... I think I had been commenting before lunch on the two sections that say "Recommendations, Policies and Agreements with Registrars" so it's back on page 51. I don't understand how these two recommendations are different. I mean, they both seem to be talking about changes in the contracts that have to do with mitigating abuse. I think all my comments are about those two sections.

And I did rewrite the part that I was asked to rewrite about [White] listing ICANN immediately and making a process for vetting other entities for waitlisting. And then the next bullet in that section was

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about CCDS. So it's... These two recommendations are a mess as far as I'm concerned.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. I want to be done too. I just think it's not clear to me what they're, how, what they're trying to do is different. They both seem to be about abuse. They both seem to be about the contracts of the registries. So maybe there is a distinction and I don't want to go and merge them unless, if I'm missing what the distinction is supposed to be.

NORM RITCHIE: I think, well, the attempt here at least... I get what you're saying about the contracts but there is also a proactive function in compliance that currently is not done. So can they actually initiate their own investigations independent of any abuse complaint? I think this is trying to address that. Well, contracts, agreements, they will enforce. That's their function. They have to enforce what's in the contracts and agreements. But for systemic abuse, there is no way of approaching that right now.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So look, before we publish this, the recommendation has to be followed by the recommendation. The word "recommendation", colon, and then

it should say “the recommendation is not...” It shouldn’t say “domain abuse activity reporting”. It should say “ICANN should do X.”

And so the next sentence maybe covers that in the case of domain, but in the case of the policies and agreements with registrars, and the contracts and agreements, both of those phrases are nouns and I don’t know what the verb is for the recommendation and how the verb is different in the top one and the bottom one.

We’re on page 51 because Russ is asking...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Inaudible] this is exactly what they’re asking for as it’s written right now. ICANN Org should incorporate contextual obligations [inaudible] and this is corrective.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: And how is that different from the recommendation right above? Initiate a process to adopt new policies to mitigate abuse.

DENISE MICHEL: The sentence above was just an introductory summary to the recommendations below I think is what the intention was. It may have gone through a few permutations and it may be confusing now. But it was simply a high-level summation of “Here’s the types of recommendations we’re laying out below” type of thing. So if it’s confusing...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Woah.

KC CLAFFY: It's completely different things though, to initiate a PDP and to go change contracts now. And are we trying to recommend both happen?

DENISE MICHEL: Maybe I'm looking in the wrong place.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: That's what I thought too.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Both of them are on the screen, right?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: There are two recommendations. Should they be one?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Which two recommendations are we referring to?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Do you have the GNSO [inaudible]?

KC CLAFFY: 12 and 13 in the table.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. I'm happy to take a shot at clarifying this. Some of the things that both contracted parties and ICANN compliance can and should be doing. There are things that don't require any changes to the policy development process and there are some things that may require a policy change and come under the purview of a GNSO PDP. And I think what I'm hearing is we need to be clear about the either sequential or parallel actions that are being recommended here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: In fact, you might want to swap the order so that it makes it clear that you start this and, oh, and do this forward-looking thing with the PDP.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. Well, we also make clear what we think is, in our view, requires a PDP or not but if we do say we need a PDP, we can't just say we have to have changes to RDAP and registry information because I don't know what changes we're saying need to be required, if any, and then the incentives for contracted parties is covered by another recommendation, establishment and performance metric framework doesn't say what the performance goal is that we need metrics for. So this just looks very hand-wavy.

Now if Denise says this was a metacomment about a set of recommendations, we could structure the report that way but it didn't come across to me that way reading it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: What Russ said, I think, is what's needed. The thing about it is that each time that there is any, from the report now we're asking ICANN to get in terms of DNS abuse, etc. and them having that metrics and all those information as they go along, and even the relationship they have with the registrars and type of complaints that they receive, that will fit into the recommendation below in terms of what may be required to change in the agreement in terms of how they manage the registrars and the relationship with the registrars and what's needed for compliance.

So reversing it, it's more that first, the recommendation that's below on contracts and agreements, I agree with Russ, should go above. But the idea of having the process below with the GNSO is that in order to, even if ICANN gets that information, they can't unilaterally change the agreements. It has to go through the GNSO process. So our idea of correlating the... Instead, this would have to be included as well, but that would also have to go through the process of...

KC CLAFFY: No.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No? They can just put it in?

KC CLAFFY: No. Yeah, the point I'm trying to...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: There's the sequencing. It has to be sequenced then because I think...

KC CLAFFY: There is a lot that can be done right now and a lot of what we're recommending does not require any policy activity.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: That should be clear.

KC CLAFFY: Some of it can be done by ICANN staff. For example, fee changes can be done by ICANN staff. Other things should be incorporated in closed door negotiations between staff and registrars on contract agreement changes to the RAA.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So the sequence in how we put the recommendations regarding that needs to be clear then.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah, even convinced that ICANN would agree that they could waitlist, that ICANN could require all registries and registrars to waitlist ICANN address space for rate limiting of RDAP data with no change to any contract or having any PDP. I don't know. It seems reasonable to me, but I don't know that it's...

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay, I just want to jump in real quick because we're cascading out of control.

KC CLAFFY: Don't [inaudible].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So that's another recommendation that is not one of these two, so now we've just brought three.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No, no, but wait. Let me finish. Listening to what Denise said at the beginning and reading while some of the discussion was happening and now the discussion's in a different place. But it looks to me like—and this is not my text so I'm not being proprietary about this—the first one is saying we should give teeth to registrars to be able to effectuate abuse mitigation. The second one is we should give them the incentive to want to do it.

To me, these look very cooperative. They look like, if I'm reading them correctly. The first one basically says you should be able to measurably improve the mitigation of DNS abuse. We want to give you these teeth because if there was some consternation that they couldn't do it before, this says give them the ability to do it. The one below it says "should incorporate obligations to mitigate DNS abuse", the incentive. "Now you can do it" and "now you have to do it" are two separate things. So that's how I read those two. I'm not sure if that was the intent. I'm not sure where are now. But I see the conversation's evolving, so we can evolve it however. I don't care. But that's how I read it.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Send it to me and I'll coordinate.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Is what Eric said the intent? Because when I read it, I thought otherwise. I thought that the current, the one that is now at the bottom was "take advantage of the things that are already there to improve the abuse situation" and the first, and the top one was "and start a policy process to create additional tools that could be done". That's how I interpreted it and I'm hearing others.

KC CLAFFY: I don't think I was taking it in a different direction, Eric. I guess I should have used the abuse that's in this paragraph. It is not obvious to me that ICANN would believe that it could take these actions without changes to the contracts that would require a PDP. That's all I'm saying.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I would just [agree] so [inaudible]. I'm literally...

KC CLAFFY: Okay. So if we do think that, if that is the premise of our recommending this, we need to say explicitly, "We believe these can be done without any change to the PDP and then ICANN staff can go back and say, 'No the can't and here's what our lawyer said,' or whatever."

DENISE MICHEL: Okay. The three of us will work on it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Can I just ask a favor though?

DENISE MICHEL: The four of us.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No, no, no. Don't need to, you don't have to include... No, the favor would ask that the logic, though, that KC has brought up that is needed still has to be done. So it's more than just tweaking the language.

DENISE MICHEL: No, I understand.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: It's doing the internal connections between the paragraphs above which you spoke about which is incentivization which is a part of [inaudible] policy changes or not.

DENISE MICHEL: No, it is not.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So it's to make sure that that sequencing is clear in terms of what needs to go through the process, what could be actioned immediately and what we're saying is the weakness that we're addressing because the sequencing that KC highlighted, I think it's valid.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So Denise, your first reaction was "No, it is not," then you said yes. So...

DENISE MICHEL: [I just need to think] so...

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: We don't have to change the contract or do a PDP to modulate the fees that they're charging particular registrars.

KC CLAFFY: Sorry, this whole thing is... We'll get to this in a later paragraph, but this whole thing is tied up as who decides what's abuse as Steve reminded us earlier. There are people at ICANN that don't believe there's consensus on this in the community. We may or may not believe there is or may or may not believe that it's important to get consensus before they start acting. And of course, we have this other mini elephant in the room which is that group of five companies issued that thing over the holidays saying we're all going to be really proactive about abuse and here's how we define abuse. And so there's another definition we have to use or reference or say why we're not using it and why what they're doing is not what we mean if it's not what we mean. And I don't even know if we have consensus in the room on that.

DENISE MICHEL: I don't think that the abuse, the voluntary abuse framework is an elephant in any room. It is a statement that some registrars and registries signed onto that said, "Look, we're good citizens. We're addressing specific types of abuse. Trust us. We don't need anymore oversight, obligations, contract language or incentives." They specifically left out a whole number of abuse factors that are not mentioned in that letter. Furthermore, this is a completely voluntary letter that is backed up with no metrics, no transparency, really no accountability at all. We

should set that aside and we should deal with what the contractual obligations, we should deal with the mission and objectives and bylaws.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: [inaudible] site that?

DENISE MICHEL: No. I don't.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Or are people going to say, "Oh look, we're already on it. We don't have to worry about this."

DENISE MICHEL: It is absolutely ridiculous to say that they're on it when we have laid out abuse and all the things that it covers.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. That's my view.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Assuming that they could even make the DAAR stuff public, my understanding is a lot of the DAAR feeds, that a lot of the abuse feeds

that feed into DAAR are basically black box proprietary, I don't know how this thing got on this blacklist algorithms into the extent the academics have done peer reviewed research on it that they don't know either. So there's going to be this, do you really want, where's the due process? Do you really want ICANN flagging a bunch of people, a bunch of registries for abuse, registries or registrars for abuse based on some black box, nonreproducible algorithm that nobody can independently analyze?

DENISE MICHEL:

That's the problem. That's the big elephant in the room here.

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

Yeah. I don't agree with that characterization of what DAAR is and I've done a lot of due diligence on this and going back since this SSR group started, it's, I'm pretty confident that I understand exactly what's going into this, what the restrictions are, what ICANN staff says the restrictions are and what can be done here. And happy to add more background if you think it's needed.

DENISE MICHEL:

Yeah. Well, I'll talk to you on the side. Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So the three of you are going to gather together and work on that. Okay, can we move to the next section?

Which of these comments led to the yellow text? I can't tell.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Kerry-Ann, we need to [clear this out].

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is highlighted many, many moons ago by Kerry-Ann who asked, who basically made a statement, "We need to consider that this aspect of the recommendation is inward-focused when we meet."

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I'm looking to see what I meant.

DENISE MICHEL: I don't know because it's just highlighted.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Come on, free stuff.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Two and a half months ago.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yeah, it's like it takes a while. It was last year. It's a whole year ago.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Thought we'd be done.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Okay, I can't remember why but if I read it again... I can't remember why I wrote that comment, but...

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: But she has another comment.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No, no, no. But just... No, but just reading it as it... I mean just reading the entire section as it is, it's not, it doesn't flow and it's not clear based on what we had above about empowering compliance through the contract. So if that was my concern, I don't know why I would say it's inward-focused [what I made].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I guess because you're trying to direct what they'll do internally.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Instead, I don't know because one of the things that we have here is that they should react to complaints and require compliance to initiate the investigation. They do that now. It does [inaudible]. Why would I use that term? You sure I wrote that? Somebody hacked my account.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: You wrote it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I think somebody hacked my account.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is, in part, connected to the CCT Review findings and recommendations. If you recall the [SEND AG] report, the high levels of systemic abuse coming out of just a small number of registries and registrars and ICANN's failure to address that decades plus, high levels of systemic abuse. And, in fact, that particular registry that they cited as the most, the highest levels of abuse systemically, ultimately went bankrupt and then again, instead of taking action on this extremely high levels of abuse in the portfolio, ICANN staff simply ported the portfolio over to key systems, I believe is the new registrar. So CCT Review also has a recommendation around tackling well documented systemic abuse and that ties into this recommendation.

KC CLAFFY: Instead of this WHOIS record for this specific domain name is wrong or this specific domain name is involved in a phishing attack. Instead of compliance dealing with one domain name, compliance needs, in this case, well-documented case, needed to deal with the whole entity, the whole contracted party and the over 80% of abusive domains in its portfolio. And that didn't happen and that's part of what this recommendation in the abuse sub-group was trying to get to.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: All right, so maybe I flagged it because I wanted us to discuss it. With that said, if we read the entire, the recommendation in its entirety, the first sentence has nothing to do with the second sentence. I remember when we were in Quebec—that must have just been a mental flag—I probably didn't finish my thought. But...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Inaudible] this paragraph or...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: The first sentence. No, right there. This section. It starts off by identifying the issue we spoke about when, at the last face-to-face when we were saying that there needed to be neutrality because there was an internal conflict—that was probably—there was an internal conflict with ICANN because the same persons that they're asking to regulate or to have compliance against, it's the same persons they're getting funding from. So it was that kind of relationship. The second part of the recommendation is unrelated altogether. So it was like we had all of this under one section. The second part speaks to empowering the compliance unit to be more reactionary to complaints and not sedentary regarding it. The two sentences are unrelated and they're all on the section that says compliance function. So it was just to decide we need to address the issue that we identified about the internal conflict. And then listen, we had fixed it but right now it doesn't...

[DENISE MICHEL]: Well, I thought—Norm, remind me here—I thought we had then agreed to a strong and regular auditing of compliance. Did we lose that somehow in the various versions of the drafts?

NORM RITCHIE: It was here somewhere.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I made a comment on that.

DENISE MICHEL: So I think it just may be a matter of cutting it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Probably deleting that part.

DENISE MICHEL: Cutting and pasting and text getting moved around is why it doesn't, perhaps it doesn't make, doesn't quite flow as it used to.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I was wondering exactly the same thing. If it is somewhere else, we could probably nuke that first paragraph in this section because there is no flow between that first paragraph and the second.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, I think we [off mic].

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Have [that man] strike it. So let's just strike the first sentence [if you want].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I want to make sure it's somewhere else first though.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, we should find it. Think we should find it right now?

DENISE MICHEL: We could just add a note to find on it [and update].

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I think this needs to be moved up to where we have the contract provision, where we speak to we have an entire rationale that says that compliance says that they're narrow, that they interpret their role as narrow when we had that discussion with KC. This recommendation is what we were putting in to address that concern in terms of the narrowness of their scope and us believing that they do have the bandwidth to do it. So I think it's more, it should move up closer to that rationale. And I stand alone right here because we spoke about like

above, you remember when KC was pointing out that we had it as a...
We said it was narrow. They interpret their function narrowly.

DENISE MICHEL: I have a note to...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So this is more closely-related to that point as well.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

STEVE CONTE: I just want to note that Danko had a comment too and we should, if not already taken into consideration with that conversation, we should probably take this note as well into consideration. Thank you.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: It's the same point.

STEVE CONTE: Yeah. Okay. I just wanted to bring that...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Sorry if I'm dwelling on the point but it brings a thought to mind. Why would we say that the Board needs to empower them if above we said

that they already have the authority to do it but they choose not to?
Why does the Board need to empower them? I'm just wondering...

DENISE MICHEL: Well, I think you answered your own question in terms of why the abuse sub-group had this.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yeah [inaudible].

DENISE MICHEL: They had to do it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: [Inaudible]

DENISE MICHEL: They're not doing it. Presumably, if the ICANN Board turns around and orders them to do it, that might make them do it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So maybe that's the [inaudible]. Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: And I think that was a simple logic...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: That was the... I was trying to think if there was...

DENISE MICHEL: [Inaudible] following.

RUSS HOUSLEY: If I recall, the discussion with Jamie said that they could only act upon abuse complaints. So if there was, let's say there's 1,000 abuse incidents but only five have actually received a complaint, they can only act on those five.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Which is not true actually because ICANN compliance also has in the past and can act on results of audits, for example, that aren't complaints. They are targeted audits that ICANN does of registrars and registries, the results of which then is acted upon by ICANN compliance. So that's a fact.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: That could be, but I distinctly remember that conversation because I was quite surprised by it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So this is curious. It goes back to the point where we said that they have unlimited scope in how they interpret their role and function, and then this would be the fix. Yeah.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [Inaudible] You're right.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: All those [off mic].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I actually think that paragraph works, so...

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Let's have a time index on the current [off mic].

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Sorry to [off mic]. I think we're on [off mic]. Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So this is Laurin? The recommendation must improve. I think this was your [homework]. Yeah. Okay.

Sorry, I meant to be on the mic.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: It does include it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Russ, you added it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, Laurin did.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No, you did.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Eric, was this the one I had?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [Off mic] you did it wrong.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: And that's that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The wrong Google Doc? How could that happen?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I don't know.

RUSS HOUSLEY: All right. Does anyone have concerns here or is this homework done?
Go ahead, Naveed.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: This is rather regarding the compliance function. I just wanted to know if we are differentiating between type of compliance, like compliance only, we are targeting with the Spec 2 SLAs or with respect to the policies, security policies within the organization that is only related to ICANN Org. So are we distinguishing between them or we are just treating it as a generic. But generic won't fit to all situations.

RUSS HOUSLEY: My understanding is compliance is about compliance to the contract.
Right? That's what I think the group does.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: Then where to fit with the compliance of the security-related policies and procedures within the organization? Is that part of our mandate or not? Kind of the security policies, procedures, that is only related to ICANN Org.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Up to this point, I don't think we've had a recommendation around that. Denise and Kerry, are those old tents or new ones?

DENISE MICHEL: Old.

NORM RITCHIE: So I'm still trying to understand the purpose of this abuses being in section. I get it. I understand what you're saying. I just don't... It doesn't... There's no recommendation. There's no nothing.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: There is a recommendation on it. I'm not sure where it is in the text but it does exist. Is it maybe further down? Yes, yes, yes, yes. Norm, there we go, page 55.

NORM RITCHIE: I just needed to scroll. Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I think Danko's asking for a cite to that document. I don't think he's asking anything more than that. Denise, go ahead.

DENISE MICHEL: So if... I had a particular additional concern about that. I think... Is that related to this? Never mind. I think it's another section. Sorry, I'm trying to track. I haven't... This relates to another section. Never mind.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So there's an extra S in indistinguishable. Get rid of the S at the front.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: That was distinguishable. Yes, okay.

NORM RITCHIE: Fair. All right. So I'm trying to read this as quick as I can. So just tell me though. Are you saying that ICANN should look into misleading a naming before it's reported anywhere? So practice.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. We're saying scan at the front at registration time.

NORM RITCHIE: Oh. I like that. That was good.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: There will be a list coming out this year, right? Yes, 2020 and there's already concern, right, that this could be abuse because if you have a list of stuff that looks similar, that's useful. So the idea is if this list is also used to kind of flag stuff that that is weird, that could be extremely helpful against that specific strategy.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So this is proactive. So I'm all [inaudible] with that.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: And it also clarifies, right, this doesn't mean that stuff is getting blocked. This is about flagging up and monitoring.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Zarko.

ZARKO KECIC: I agree that we should think about abuser naming, but I don't know how it should work in practice. I really don't see practical use of this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Are you saying we should delete this recommendation? Or what are you saying?

DENISE MICHEL: So why would we not provide this, these sort of findings and recommendations and it's the responsibility of the staff to coordinate with whoever they need to coordinate with and come back with a proposed implementation plan? I mean why would we need to solve implementation at the front end? I think that's what I'm thinking.

ZARKO KECIC: I am not asking for us to solve but to find out is this doable or not.

DENISE MICHEL: Sure. I think some people on the team can tell you.

ZARKO KECIC: [Inaudible] here. I am here. It is not doable with us.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [34:55] I know some registrars who are offering such a service, yes. So if you were just a domain that they check some sources. And they provide you a bunch of similar domain names. Yes, so maybe it could be a way how to work. But I know there are truth and procedures at the registrars who are offering this as a service. If you want, I say I had a trademark and I would like to register similar domains to this rate or to this and then they offer you a bunch of, I don't know if you want thousands of domains here in this [inaudible] for TLDs or you can register it. So there are truth at the market.

ZARKO KECIC: It's up to Facebook and Google to register thousands of domains.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes. Yes, it should.

ZARKO KECIC: To protect their brand.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yeah, but you ask, okay, if there... I said only yeah, there are tools [inaudible]. And you can find it if you want to.

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, but we should discuss those tools. That's what I am saying.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So I'm not sure if I actually talk because I'm not tracking where the conversation's at right now. Let me just make a couple observations. There are places where this behavior is supported and there's places where this behavior is decried. And they're not compatible with each other but there are examples of them in our industry right now and so if nothing else, this recommendation is a touchpoint to say maybe we should have a homogenous holistic understanding of when this is good and when this is bad.

TMCH, the Trademark Clearinghouse, that's to make sure that I can't get a domain name that has Apple in it up at the TLD level. It's a recognition that some names need to be barred from me to be able to go after. There's registered use domain names for the TLDs, strings that can never become a top-level domain. But then, like you said, there's spinners that registrars and registries produce so that it's like, oh, that name is taken but here's a name that looks almost exactly like it and you can have a dozen of those.

So it's sort of like, yeah, I think it would be really good to have. We can attenuate what the recommendation says, but I think it would be useful to say, "These are concerns. Here's where you might want to go."

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. So you mentioned spinners which is interesting because the registrars actually generate the spinning list for you. So if you type in Paypal.com, it says taken, but try these ones. So that's kind of an odd situation because they're going to say we're recommending those domains and you're telling us to block them at the same time.

But I do get this. Zarko, I go back to the point that you made saying you can't do this. It's not going to be 100%. The idea is that you could curtail phishing. You're not going to prevent phishing. You're not going to stop it. But to put up and raise the bar a bit more is really what this is trying to do.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: You could use the spinner to help you find [off mic]. [Inaudible] spinner.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So it would be easy to add a few words that says while we know it won't completely prevent it, we want to raise the bar or something.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. This is what this whole thing is about.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Kerry?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Making sure the technical conversation was finished. It's a non-technical observation.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is just...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: They're back off. This thing is so technical.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: It's ones and zeros.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Ones and zeros [inaudible]. The last sentence of, it's really minor but it stands out. What do you mean by there should be an appeals process with human oversight?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic]

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: You want to make it automated? So you want to say it should be a non-automated appeals process?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So I may be bringing confirmation bias into reading this, but my reading of this is we should propose something that works at scale. So it's got an automated component but it's going to make mistakes which means we need to include the fact that at some point, someone can say, "Hey, I should or shouldn't be allowed to do what I was just allowed to or barred from doing." It just fixes it.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So can we put that this system, this process could be automated but should have some element of checks and balances?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Should be automated.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Something like that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Should be.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: But that last sentence should be human oversight isn't very clear. There's always a human oversight.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. You see at the bottom, it says that.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: But not could be automated, should be automated. The process won't work unless it's automated.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: That's what I'm complaining about, saying that it should have human oversight is not very clear. Are we saying that while the process can be automated, it should have checks and balances? I'm just saying it just was very ambiguous.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: We're all in agreement. Absolutely. It should basically, it should say directly that this should be automated to scale and for other reasons but that there needs to be some human.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you, Heather.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I think that takes us down to [off mic].

RUSS HOUSLEY: So Kerry, your tent's up.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So okay. Just making sure. All right, let's move to the next section please. Test bed. I don't see any comments. Okay. Key Rollover.

So there's that at-at link part that's always bothered me. Go ahead, Steve.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: This is one of those... The whole rationale section is one of those things where I went excavating for material.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Excavating?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: What would you call diving through all these different Google Doc folders to try and find a thing? There you go. I was having an anthropological moment to try and find the rationale and findings that might be appropriate. Whether this is still good text, the team needs to review that.

DENISE MICHEL: You just need links. [off mic] last week.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Mine's in the comments. I responded to your comment with my comment.

DENISE MICHEL: Sure, or maybe.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: It's not just links. I mean is this correct? Did I pull the right thing? Is that what you want to have in your report?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Just before we jump down to Key Rollover, I do want to note that there is a comment for DNS test bed at the very bottom, that yellow slash that says Zarko and Laurin proposed text. So I don't know if you guys want to close that out or not.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So to answer your question, Heather, I think the link you found is fine. I offered an alternative link or an additional link but it's not necessary. I think either of those provide enough context. That's my two cents on the link, the at-at link.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The link, link repeated last week, is that, that Google Doc is the pointer to that?

DENISE MICHEL: No, no.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No. Okay, I got confused.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: The Google Doc is...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: KC said that we should link to the IMC paper and I thought about that but this is just providing background and that was providing findings. But I think it would be fine to do either or both. I pointed at a more, I thought canonical citation on ICANN's site about what the Key Rollover talks about. But I don't think it matters. I think it'd be fine and it wouldn't be a bad idea to put the IMC paper in there somewhere. But that one basically said there were problems and people should watch more carefully and I didn't know that I could see clearly where that would fit in our recommendation. But I'm happy to put it in. I think it's a good idea.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, can you...

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I'll put a link to it in.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's what I was going to ask. Can we roll down please? So my memory, if the discussion last week is the ICANN staff wanted to know why the formal steps were necessary as opposed to just text. Do we

want to add... The recommendation proposes a formal model? So do we want to, in the findings, put a sentence about why? That's all I'm asking.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: We probably should. So is there currently a homework assignment there? And if not...

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's yours.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, okay. So I should just do it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, moving on. Yeah, there's the formal process part. Okay, so the root server operations part, we also got a comment that was we can develop best practices but we can't make the root servers use them, which we all knew, but maybe we just need to say that best practices can't be followed if they're not written down.

I'm not sure what just happened.

[DENISE MICHEL]: It's all my fault. I unmuted. Control-Z.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I'm going to assume that the other changes that were made in the formal procedures for Key Rollover are okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic]

RUSS HOUSLEY: What does that yellow sentence mean?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: This looks like it was a comment.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. It looks like it was a comment, not belongs in the...

LAURIN WEISSINGER: [off mic] Yeah, I think this was Eric's note or something.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Well, again...

RUSS HOUSLEY: There's more to evaluate?

[HEATHER FLANAGAN]: This was old material that Eric wasn't paying attention to that he might have written.

[DENISE MICHEL]: If only Eric would pay attention.

RUSS HOUSLEY: If only Eric would fix it.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Sorry.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: We're on page 57 under Root Server Operations and there's a second paragraph, there's a text [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: That says before we're done, I hope we get to do this. So I think that's a further discussion of what the ICANN Board is still in evaluate and consider phase. I think that was in. We're hoping we'll hear from them before we get done. But maybe that part needs to go away too. I'm not sure.

ALAIN AINA: I think this thing needs to go away because if you look at it, it's easy, plan 20, 21. [Inaudible] it's clear that the implementation of the new root servers, governor's model has been accepted as part of it. So I don't think we need to remove the ICANN Board is still in their [inaudible] to consider phase. I think we will pass all these things now, so...

RUSS HOUSLEY: So Heather, would you just delete that to the end? To the end. Well, leave the footnote. Yeah. Steve?

STEVE CONTE: Thank you. Looking at the rationale and findings of this versus the recommendation, is there a direct correlation between invoking 3738 and the rationale? And it's the BCP for root ops operations in the recommendation, which isn't necessarily tied to 3738 happening.

So in the rationale and findings... It's okay. I don't know if I was said it good, word.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Each word I understood.

STEVE CONTE: So in parallel... Oh, you want them to actually make sense? Okay. So in the rationale and findings, paragraph two, there's talk about RSSAC 3738.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes.

STEVE CONTE: Okay, and there's talk about defining it as the proposed governance model and blah, blah blah. And then we go down to the next page under the recommendation and it's just saying that ICANN in conjunction and close to work with RSSAC and other relevant stakeholders should have ABCP around root server management. Is there... I'm not seeing a direct correlation between 3738 and the BCP. The BCP could happen regardless of 3738.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

STEVE CONTE: Sorry?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

STEVE CONTE: Yes.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: So I'm not sure. Maybe what we want to say is that 37 and 38 provides us a roadmap towards having kind of a best practices for root server operations but they are not enough and they are... I'm not sure if they're adopted yet, so we need to rephrase this. But they can still be in the findings of this recommendation. I think we need to enhance and extend this text further.

ZARKO KECIC: I believe there is a new working group on root server management and governance.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [Say it] [inaudible].

ZARKO KECIC: So I don't think that we'll have [soon].

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [As a] working group, yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Comment? Put it in the doc.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Sure, and if there's a new working group on this, is this guidance to the working group or is it still to ICANN Org? And if... I'm still not clear as to whether we're taking out in the root server operations, are we taking out the paragraph that points to 37 and 38? Or not? If we are, that seems like a very brief and not terribly informative rationale.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead, Naveed.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: So what I think is that we need to make a relation, as I said, between 37, 38 and what we are recommending. For example, we are recommending that these best practices include chain management, verification procedures and sanity check procedures, etc. So what we need to see is whether 37 and 38 provide already those. If not, then at the end of that paragraph, we mentioned that although 37 and 38 are there, but we need to enhance them with the extra procedures, such as these. And that would provide a relation between the findings and the actual recommendation.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: I can, but I have to...

RUSS HOUSLEY: Would you, please?

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: But I have to check and read 37 again to see whether it provides that. I'll do that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think you'll see that it falls short of a BCP.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah. Sure.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Okay. Thank you for taking that homework. Anything else on root zone management? Eric, you have a comment on the screen. Is it resolved?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I don't... Yeah, we could ignore my comment if... Yeah, we can ignore my comment.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm sure that wasn't a global, right?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No, you could do it globally. [off mic]

RUSS HOUSLEY: No.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: All right, at the risk of making a lot of enemies here. So we're asking for a great deal of disclosure here I think. Maybe I read it too fast or not. But we're asking to be... We're asking to have a lot of security issues and postures exposed publicly and reported which is not necessarily bad. But you could imagine why someone would be a little adverse to just saying a lot more than you have to. And I'm not saying that they don't have to say it. But I just wanted us as a team to say, do we really want to ask them to have to say all of this publicly and disclose it as a matter of course? And if we feel like, yes, we really want them to do it, that's fine. Just, I know a number of our recommendations have grown by accretion so I thought this was worth just taking a look at and see if we need to keep. But I'm cool either way.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so you're saying the first paragraph's fine. You're questioning the second paragraph? I'm just trying to understand what part.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So ICANN has relevant KPIs to measure it, etc. And then we say yearly reporting on how these KPIs are met by the root server operations, the RSOs. And I'm probably guilty of writing any number of pieces of this text so it's not like I'm trying to indict anyone. This could all be me. But we may or may not want to put ICANN in a position to have to do that. And ICANN Org should ensure that the IMRS uses vulnerability disclosure process, security reports and intelligence and communication with researchers and RSSAC advice recommendations wherever applicable.

It sounds kind of diffuse, so you could probably get away with it in a lot of ways, at which point I'm not sure why we want to recommend it. Or we're making them do something that they may have chosen not to do, in which case, I'm not sure we want to make sure we really want it before we ask them to do it. So it's either, it's not a big deal to do this or we're not actually making them do anything. In either case, we might save ourselves the head room in the document.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Security reports could be internal but...

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: Yeah. It's not explicit so yeah. For example, they can have a yearly report but it does not have to be public, for example.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I'm still confused. Keep it or no?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I was about to ask the same question.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I have a question for Eric. I'm just reading this and I don't see anything saying it's going to be a public disclosure.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Vulnerability disclosure process.

NORM RITCHIE: But it doesn't mean...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: You're right. It doesn't necessarily mean it. But I mean, would we then want a recommendation to say, "Here's something you should do internally? Don't bother. We'll never be able to verify it"? Which is fine. I'm not trying to be pedantic. I just think we should actually make it clear whether we're...

NORM RITCHIE: What if you just added the words after the disclosure process and in brackets say "not necessarily public"?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: That's fine. Yeah, I think that was similar to what Naveed said. So yeah. I personally just wanted to point this out, so that sounds fine to me.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, I'm not seeing any other tent cards, so I think...

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No, but we do have... Laurin also had a comment on this thing which said, "Activities are ongoing here. Ask Terri or John because this might be low priority."

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes. He said that was resolved.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: All right.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: That was also one that was migrated from the [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, Kerry.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I can't see. Look this way. When you directly, you don't see the red.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I can see red just fine.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Stop it. So I'm looking at it again, and as where we find in the report, this is correlated to all the points we've made above about utilizing research and all the information from DAAR to be able to improve their security and their planning and putting in risk, etc. So should this be moved closer? I know we have workstreams. I get that. I haven't forgotten the workstream element. But I'm just thinking when somebody's reading it, they now have to say, "Oh crap, this is related to this. No, this is related to that. No, this is related to that." But it's all spread. But because these are very specific, nice to do but will improve significantly mitigating risks, and it's spread throughout the document, I'm just thinking if I had to implement as the [CSO] or whatever it might be to implement it, it would be so scattered that I'll start doing something and, "Oh crap, they've asked me to use this. Oh crap, they've asked me to use that," and it's... So I'm just saying is there any way we can think through and maybe it's a logistical thing for the document? [Inaudible] sense.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: If there are tight correlations from one recommendation to another, we already have several examples in here where we say this relates to [foo] and we have links throughout the doc.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So can we do that with this one?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I would be happy to, but I don't always know where those links are.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: It's just that this one stood out to me because it's also asking for incorporation of this as a part of the—what do we have it as?—security reports and intelligence and communication with researchers, which we use above with the DAAR thing and RSSAC. So I'm just saying there should be a flag somewhere.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We did that dependency chart in Montreal. Is that what you need to decide what goes near what?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: [Inaudible]. I just want to say not dependency but a correlation as well. Dependency is... To distinguish, like what is, you know.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right. We did the dependencies. We didn't do the related to. Okay. So moving to the root zone change management, right? Sorry. I didn't see it. Go ahead.

STEVE CONTE: Looking at this paragraph under the security best practices, there seems to be two things here and one is building best practices for the root server operators and operations and then it goes on to saying that that same document should include hardening strategies specific to IMRS, to L-root. Should that be coupled and have two separate documents? Because I don't think any RSO is really going to give a hoot about ICANN's hardening strategy about its own root server.

It's saying do best practices for, that RSOs could adopt and then go into granular detail about ICANN strategy.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: New paragraph after.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And there, we want to say "I think that hardening strategy should be documented for the... Yes, exactly. Should document. Yep. I think that's what was meant. Is that not correct?

I remember that we had a discussion that L-root should lead by example and this is an example, I think, of what we're asking. Go ahead, Naveed.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: Again, I don't find the rationale in the previous pretext about hardening the L-root and all those things. There is a disconnection and I remember. I'm not sure if something we missed while voting the documents because I remember we had some text on this hardening of

L-root as an example now. So I shall try to investigate that one as well along with what we decided earlier.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. Eric?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Just maybe somewhat not related but sort of related to what Naveed just brought up, there was a couple other things, I think we were at some point we were going to circle back on that fell off the document I think. We were doing a bunch of stuff with our face-to-face in L.A. many, many moons ago and some of those elements, I'm not sure if they're in here. So I wonder if we have time in our schedule at some point to actually be sure we haven't lost some valuable work that the team has done in years past.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So when Heather says that she pulled stuff from a doc, it's almost always from that L.A. meeting that she's talking about. So I hope that we haven't lost it. But I think we will need to do that as probably homework after we have what's in front of us. But I agree, that we don't want to have lost any of that stuff and that is what we have done to try and make sure to this point, that we hadn't. Anything else on root server? Okay, next section please.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So yeah, if I can chime in, it was all replaced but I had a whole lot of questions in that text and Zarko took a pass at revising it. So we need to look at the new text and come to consensus as to whether this is what we want in the doc.

RUSS HOUSLEY: What does the last part of your comment mean? You would like to see the implementation of lighter security measures? Tighter security measures. So you're saying that's where you want to go or you're saying that we need to write more text on that?

ZARKO KECIC: No. My suggestion is not to write text, just to look at text and make that clear. But my suggestion is since development of new system is going for a couple of years and we still don't know when it is going to be implemented and some parts because they're not enough information that can be found on new systems except a couple presentations done by Kim Davies. And there are two parts: change of policies and change of security measures. And I believe that new system can be implemented in two parts to do security measures and then change policies to whatever process, PDP or just change some stuff by ICANN.

RAO NAVEED BIN RAIS: So I just wanted to know if when we say that there is no known security and stability issues currently with RZMS, but we are still asking it to be more stiffer and have more procedures involved, so would it be beneficial to highlight what could be a potential threat that could

happen with that just to make a better rationale of the recommendation that comes later?

ZARKO KECIC: I don't think that's a good idea to put vulnerabilities in public document.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Not exactly [off mic].

ZARKO KECIC: Yeah, but it is sad that it is clear text and clear text exchange of e-mails, then we are not sure who is receiving and who is responding on those e-mails. There is no signature on e-mails. Another thing is login on the portal is just username and password, no multifactor authentication and stuff like that. So everything we mentioned here is something that ICANN and PTI are thinking of implementing in a new system, but it just takes too long.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Steve?

STEVE CONTE: I had a conversation with Kim not too long ago about the IANA items within the review and one of them was about multifactor authentication. And so if it's okay, I'd like to read his response that he e-mailed to me about that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sure. Go ahead.

STEVE CONTE: And I note that MFA is not listed in the recommendation portion of this, but it is in the findings and rationale. But I'll still read on this.

Kim's response on this to me was, "MFA should be opt-in only and signing e-mails should be best effort. The concern with mandatory MFA is I, Kim, believes that most TLDs will be incapable of using it, and therefore, we will be forced to reject many requests and otherwise fall back to a less secure modes of operation anyway. My concern with signing is for it to be comprehensive, we need to build that into many different pieces of software that generates e-mails from IANA.org. Further, I think the e-mail signing ask is probably based on a misunderstanding that we convey sensitive information via e-mail that signing from our side would improve the security of." He had mentioned... Done reading that.

He had mentioned that much, if not all, of the actions that take place now, take place through the portal of the RZMS and not through e-mail communications. And he's afraid, just to paraphrase that a little bit too, that the amount of times that an operator uses the portal on some TLDs is very small and very limited, like years between activities on that. And a concern that using MFA, some of those keys or tokens could be lost over time or over the passing of that role to other people and stuff. So please take that into consideration when you talk about this recommendation.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. I question whether this whole thing should be in our report or not. It's probably something that's better handled outside of it, directly with Kim because you don't want to make public that we think the authentication should be better, and here's why, because you're just saying, "Hit us here." So I question whether we should have this in the report at all.

RUSS HOUSLEY: At the same time, I think calling for multifactor authentication is not a large reach, and the fact that he thinks a bunch of TLDs can't do it is really scary.

DENISE MICHEL: I agree with that last point. I had the exact same thought. So a question to you, Norm. Another option would be to just state, take this text out, replace it with "We have made recommendations on this general topic directly to IANA staff" and then pull that and just send it directly off list in an e-mail to Kim.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So you're advocating removing this whole section.

DENISE MICHEL: No, not removing it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: That's what he advocated.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Exactly what Denise says.

DENISE MICHEL: They said. So it would be replaced with "Note: We have provided a confidential recommendation on X, directly to the IANA staff," and then we take this language...

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: In the interest of.

DENISE MICHEL: In the interest of. And then we take this language and we e-mail it directly to Kim at IANA. And make a note that this is an off-the-record...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes, but what we can do is we can put public [inaudible]. I'm serious. We do a PDP [sig] or an [S1] [sig] and stick it in there.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It could just be "We'll release the key on such and such a date."

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I would think just a signature and then you'd have to prove [inaudible]. But you're right. Let's encrypt it. Get the encrypted text and [inaudible] in there. It's like [off mic].

RUSS HOUSLEY: And then "the key will be released on".

ERIC OSTERWEIL: What could possibly...

RUSS HOUSLEY: What could possibly go wrong? Exactly. Oh and by the way, if you go look at our Google Docs, it's there.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I was going to say Google already knows all this because we're using their Docs.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Norm? Could you take the homework to write the text that's actually going to go in the document?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. As Denise said, [off mic].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, good. Type it.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [Inaudible] for the record. [off mic]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sorry, Kerry-Ann. Free stuff.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Sorry. Before I spoke, she wanted to say something. She was waving.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So I wrote down what Denise said and I put, at the top of root zone change management. Is that what you want and does that mean everything else then gets deleted except for that one line? Both findings and recommendation?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, now you have to make a new Google Doc with the new stuff that we're going to send.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Too soon, dude. Can I face the pointer to that lost Google Doc [inaudible]?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Where? I'm not seeing it.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: What page number are you on?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I see. Does that work for everybody?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: It does for me, but I had one question.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: So in our Review Team report, we put no rationale but we just put a statement that we made a recommendation about this topic. Why is this topic important to us and so relevant that we had to make a secret recommendation? If I was John Public, I was like, "What? Who gives you that authority without any rational or logic?" Like should we identify in the text that we see a risk in this, and as a result, because of how risky it is to have it out publicly. So probably put a statement that says that out of an abundance of caution, we've discovered this during our investigation and as a result, we believe it was prudent not to include a public statement about it but to send this recommendation. And do we have the authority to submit recommendations in that manner? Or should it just be removed from the report altogether and an e-mail be

sent from the Chairs and Co-Chairs saying that during our investigation, this was discovered. We could not include it in our report. As a result, we are flagging this to you and the Board. Back to me having it and putting that statement is to know. I could be being harsh, but I'm just being John Public.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But if we send it to the Board, don't they have to make it public?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I'm just asking. What is the best methodology?

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. The Board can redact things for various reasons from public reporting. Also, of course, there's an IANA advisory group, right? PTI or something, and perhaps we should send it to them as well.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I'm not suggesting that. It's either the header removed from the report all together, and as Chairs and Co-Chairs, you undertake with the trust of the team that this would be submitted. But to put it in and have that redaction of a statement, it doesn't help John Public. But he'll still want to know what [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: No. I think it's going to draw flame. That's what I was...

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, Denise then Eric.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I like Kerry-Ann's suggestion for what it's worth, and I'm mostly not kidding about putting something in that says we've issued this. And by the time we publish the report, I hope we could have transmitted what we want to transmit so we can provide some "we've already sent this" kind of language in. I just think it sort of... If we actually have something important to say, then we should actually do it and if we actually have something important to say, it's important to say why we did it. So I like what Kerry-Ann said personally.

BOBAN KRSIC: I need some clarification on that.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Where'd the thing go?

BOBAN KRSIC: I don't know. Here it is. So I am trying to figure out what is confidential in this recommendation. So I have the problem. I don't understand it. What concrete is really confidential here? Because there are issues.

There are [sinceres]. Everybody knows it so there is nothing special where we said, "Okay, here is a vulnerability and I don't know what, so we are recommending here. We need the authorization and access [inaudible] and that's it." And keep it in mind when you implement the new portal or did I miss something? Maybe.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So what you have been looking at is all the rational and findings that's the recommendation right here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Implement authorization. Implement authentication. That's all it says.

BOBAN KRSIC: And maybe we can add "in a timely manner" or something like that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It says as soon as possible.

BOBAN KRSIC: Yeah, so [inaudible] then.

STEVE CONTE: I think the confusion, and that's what I was trying to note before I read Kim's note on this is that in the rationale findings, there's a whole bunch of shoulds and so maybe the language of the rationale and findings can

be reflected and changed to reflect the current or the proposed recommendation out of this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Before Zarko's changes.

STEVE CONTE: That was there before?

RUSS HOUSLEY: No, what you're saying.

STEVE CONTE: Was before and then he expanded that. Okay. So we have to couple them one way or the other then.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Eric?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Recognize PDP implementation under [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Your flag's up. Do you not have anything to say?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No. You guys are off the hook.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We're off the hook. All right, so I'm sure Heather's going, "What do they want me to do?"

HEATHER FLANAGAN: [Inaudible] away from the computer.

RUSS HOUSLEY: She's like, "I'm not typing." Because we have two very different perceptions about whether the recommendation for doing authentication and authorization highlights that they're not doing adequate authentication and authentication, and we've just said that on the recording which is going to get posted. So isn't the cat out of the bag?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Maybe we should [talk] [off mic].

ZARKO KECIC: No. What we are saying is, we are not saying that it is insecure, but since we are talking about such important system for Internet functioning, we believe that it should be [inaudible] and make more secure. So that's it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Norm, you have represented the other end of the spectrum. So please.

NORM RITCHIE: What Zarko just said is good if it was phrased that way. My concern was really that, it's really about hacking, so any hackers out there, you're basically saying, "Here. Here's a weak spot. So hit here." This report will be read by hackers. So we just got to be cognizant of that. So the way you phrased it though, I think was quite well.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Can you read it now and make sure that that is reflected in the text, and if not, type? Naveed?

RAO NAVEED BIN RAID: So are we going to remove all this discussion from the manuscripts later, the transcripts that we add and all that? So pretty much, we have read all the text here and so I personally, I don't see any reason of not putting it here because there is no exact vulnerability that we are pointing out. Authentication, authorization, it's done everywhere. So saying that you need to do more is not a potential threat in any way. So...

ERIC OSTEREWEL: All right, I lied. I'm not done. I think whether we do that here with this text or not, I think this is a useful exercise. I think there are things that we've gone off the record for and if they've been lost, we're going to wind up pulling them back in. So at that point, it'll be useful to have

built this muscle memory because I think there are things that, at least, in the remainder of this team's lifetime we're going to talk about because we're talked about them before where we're going to want to be off the record and we may want to write about them. And if, at that point, we can use this mechanism, I think that will be helpful. Otherwise, we'll just have to have this discussion then. So I do think it's useful to have the discussion.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I'm getting the impression that most people want to include it in the report.

[LAURIN WEISSINGER]: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic]

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I do [off mic]. I'll work on some [off mic].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Please look. Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Exactly. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'll work with Zarko.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. Okay. Now we're going to talk about formal KPIs.

KC CLAFFY: I guess my comment would be I just want to make sure it's written in a way that the next Review Team knows that it's done. And I'm trying to argue to get rid of as much passive voice in this report as possible, so I think we mean ICANN should produce these KPIs. And ICANN should request community feedback. Who do we intend to be doing all this?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So this is exactly the thing that we've been talking about with Steve most recently a couple times, like what's the best way? I mean, you know how metrics are. I can propose a set of metrics that I think are

great and you can find them awful and we can both be right. It's like so we could tell ICANN what a set of metrics are to be in. That wouldn't make us wrong in the fact that they didn't want to do it. And so I think this is written, this is sort of borrowed and evolved from some of my own text, so some of it comes from me. And part of it's to not be directive. On the other hand, if someone wants help doing metrics, then we, as a team could decide if we wanted to help them. But that's the trick, right? We want you to measure stuff and we want you to do it in a systematic way, like for example, with metrics. But do you want us to propose the metrics? We could. So that's where this text comes from.

KC CLAFFY:

I think we need to propose the... We're going to say... If we say the goal, which is at the bottom here—and maybe we should put it at the top because to the extent that ICANN's going to want to know what's the outcome so that we know if we're headed toward it—the outcome is stakeholders should be able to assess key SSR indicators over time. That seems to [inaudible] outcome.

What do we mean by an SSR indicator? I think that's, there's a lot buried in there. And so I guess we sort of give some examples up above and maybe that's fine. But when we say "DNS root zone including DNSSEC," I don't quite know what that means. Does that mean whether it's implemented? Availability, that means of the root zone, I assume. Integrity, that means is the root zone, the root zone. And then abuse, elephant in the room, right?

And then who's going to be doing the concise and systematically measured and track? Is the metric of success that SSR3 is going to use that somebody, it doesn't matter who, but somebody was able to do concise and systematic measurement and tracking of these aspects. I mean, if that is the metric of success, we should put that in there. We should say, that should be the outcome.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So just to be pedantic, I mean, if I were to, for example, take a snapshot of the root zone every single time there was a change and archive it and make it available to you, and ICANN knew that I had been doing that, then they would have checked this off the list by doing nothing at all except making sure I was doing it and you could get it from me.

KC CLAFFY: You are Verisign then?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No. Me, just... I'm the... Woah. I'd like the record to reflect that I do not represent Verisign in any way.

KC CLAFFY: No. I know, but who's going to give me a snapshot of the root zone?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No, that's my point is that it's written in a way it doesn't have to be ICANN doing it. But we could say ICANN must be the steward of this

data but then that's a little more constraining. Right now, all it says is it's your responsibility to make sure that this is ability. And maybe it's written too diffusely. But it's in order to not be too directive. So it's like we're in this catch-22 where of course it would be nice to be...

KC CLAFFY: I want to err on the side of being too directive and then have ICANN push back and say that's too directive.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay.

KC CLAFFY: Because we had to evaluate SSR2 and those were way too diffuse. So until... SSR1. Flash [inaudible]. So in which case, but again, I guess the higher level issue is what is it? What do we mean by SSR indicators? And if we mean... Yeah, [inaudible]. I guess we mean availability of the root zone as an SSR indicator. That's certainly reasonable.

The second one down, I guess I didn't make a comment on but I'm reluctant to assign ICANN a bunch of work about monitoring alternative roots.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Didn't we talk about having that in the [inaudible] from?

KC CLAFFY: We did, I think but somehow it's in this one separately.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think that's where it says lead discussion, that we're having this discussion.

KC CLAFFY: Well, no. My yellow, I was commenting on the yellow highlighted text in that comment. I didn't even get to this one because I thought we had ripped a whole recommendation out that talked about this. But it wasn't in KPI. It was in some other alternate root recommendation that we removed.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yes, we took that whole thing off.

KC CLAFFY: So maybe we should take out this bullet too. Maybe that would be [inaudible]. The rest, I think I'm okay with.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Does anyone have a concern deleting that bullet?

KC CLAFFY: What do you think? Eric, are you okay?

RUSS HOUSLEY: The next one down. The alt routes.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: It's okay. It's [inaudible]. It doesn't have to be [that].

KC CLAFFY: Well.

RUSS HOUSLEY: KPIs for known alternate routes is what we're talking about.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I thought we were talking about the one that's about to get...

KC CLAFFY: No, I'm talking about... Yeah, I am talking about...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: The one that's about to get yanked, right? Is that the one you're talking about?

KC CLAFFY: Yeah.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: The one that's about to get yanked...

KC CLAFFY: I knew you cared about this. It's just a matter of...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No, I think it really has to be done and honestly, I think it should be. In a perfect world, it should be the steward of the area that's to be tracked that should be responsible for making sure it's tracked. But that's in the universe, a perfect world, all that sort of ideological stuff aside, I just want to one more time say that I would propose that some of the things—maybe not this, but other things—we could suggest are worthy of commission. Like for example, KC, you said a second ago, you'd rather err on the side of being directive. If, for example, we were going to propose a set of metrics to describe the DNS root, it would take longer than these two days to do a good job. We're not going to do it right here in this text. I mean, it's going to take a while.

KC CLAFFY: But [hasn't] not the case of RSSAC 37, RSSAC 102 did something like this though?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah. We'd have to take a look and see what we thought of it and ultimately our opinion is no better than their opinion. It'd just be a bunch of like minds that might disagree. I mean, my point is it's work, just like every measurement study. They don't definitively say something usually. So my only point is that the need for this to be done is one thing. How it would be done is another. Who would do it would

be another. ICANN could commission a study or they could use members of their OCTO. It's up to them. I'm still okay with yanking it if that's what the team wants. I'm just pointing out that there are other things in here besides let's put some text down right now to describe something that would take longer to do properly.

DENISE MICHEL: I prefer to keep the second bullets highlighted in, and revisit this after our draft report if we get... It would be good to get comments on this and see what some community members may think about it.

KC CLAFFY: No, I don't think we're moving the second bullets on the table. I think we're moving the third bullet is on the table. The one that's about alternate roots.

DENISE MICHEL: He was talking about the second bullet.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right. You two have been talking past each other for 10 minutes.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [Off mic] more specifically.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I thought we got rid of that one too.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: Well, we're okay with the alternate root.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We got rid of the recommendation but not the measuring for some reason.

KC CLAFFY: All right, let's leave it. It's fine. Taken.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No, I think we're all in agreement now. We're removing the third bullet, KPIs known for alternate root zones. That's the one we're removing and I think...

DENISE MICHEL: But I think RSSAC 002 measurements of the root server system already covers a lot of the stuff. I'd like to know what Eric finds inadequate about that.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I didn't say I found it inadequate.

DENISE MICHEL: Okay.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [off mic] review it and they might come up with different opinions about it.

[DENISE MICHEL]: There is no obligation or tracking of SSAC reports and most of them, frankly, are ignored, not implemented. So I think there's that whole issue.

[HEATHER FLANAGAN]: Okay. I'll make some changes to this if I think it's appropriate. Otherwise, let's move on. Call it done.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Hit delete on the mauve text or whatever that is. Heather?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. If you're sure. Like that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm sure.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I do have one more question. In the... KC and I were talking about the use of passive voice throughout the document. There is various reasons for that and I pointed out that I wasn't necessarily going to be able to fix them because I didn't always know who, if anyone, was being targeted, such as KPIs should be produced by who? Who's supposed to produce these?

KC CLAFFY: Right. Exactly. That's my... But Eric is saying we don't care who produces it but...

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah, Eric is saying it could be anybody.

KC CLAFFY: I think what we do mean is that ICANN should cause to happen that these things be produced. So in that, I don't care whether ICANN's commissioning another study or ICANN's doing it itself. To me, that is ICANN is producing.

RUSS HOUSLEY: ICANN Org.

KC CLAFFY: ICANN Org. Sorry, yes. And I think we should be clear that we don't mean the registries are supposed to go off and do it or that RSSAC is supposed to go off and do it, that ICANN is on the hook to do this because SSAC in, I guess, previous SSR2, SSR1 has said registries should go do this rather than ICANN should make registries go do this or whatnot. So, sorry.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Right. So if you say ICANN Org must cause this to happen, then that puts the responsibility on them without forcing them how to implement it. Yeah, so cause... Yeah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So KC is going to try and improve the words. Are we ready for the next section? This is going... We haven't got to Workstream 4 yet.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: We're close though.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, next section, please.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, but do keep in mind the last... Probably half this document almost is SSR1.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Which we haven't got to yet.

DENISE MICHEL: It's all... It's... My understanding was that you all never wanted to look at that section again. So if that's not your recommendations per se, that's your findings about SSR1 where you had explicit SSR2 additions to that, that was covered...

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Previously.

DENISE MICHEL: Up.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, data access. And then KC tried to rewrite it and did a pointer somewhere. [@KC], attempt to rewrite.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I remember this. We worked on this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So what I hear Laurin saying is his you can mark as resolved.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Not until that sentence is done.

RUSS HOUSLEY: The one marked November 2nd.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yes.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I think this is bigger.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: I think you just ended after requestors.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think Heather is talking about that [inaudible] right there.

KC CLAFFY: We need data. [off mic] this is working [off mic].

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Well, there's citations. There's been lots of correspondence, lots of reports, lots of ICANN compliance. Yeah.

KC CLAFFY: I think we have. I just, it needs to be in here.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Could you flag that?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Heather, what sentence are you worried about? That's been sorted. Okay. So I think those two can be accepted. Assigned to Denise. What part was assigned to Denise?

DENISE MICHEL: [Inaudible] citations for complaints.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh, okay. Fine. Another observer.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm going to set a record.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Two in one day. Okay.

DENISE MICHEL: I have just a quick question then.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Go ahead.

DENISE MICHEL: And KC, you had replaced with implement the four recommendations in SSAC 97. So SSAC 97 is over two years old. Steve, can you shine any light on why, after well over two years, SSAC 97 for recommendations have not been implemented regarding the CCDS? Do you know anything about that?

STEVE CONTE: I do not. I'd have to refer back to the ARR system that we have to find out the status of it and I don't have it off the top of my head.

KC CLAFFY: Eric, back on the KSK stuff. How do we know that latency... Not KSK, or KPIs. How do we know that latency to each of the letters is not well understood? I was under the impression the roots were all publishing data about this.

[DENISE MICHEL]: I know.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I guess I don't know that it is well understood, but it's easier to prove the converse so what... First of all, I'm not sure where you are in the document.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, I'm jumping back. All right.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, but I moved on so I don't know where we were before.

KC CLAFFY: Okay, fine. I'll...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: But I mean, if you want, we can sit down and figure out some time. But yeah, I think ensuring that this data is available is important. I'm not sure if that's the rub because, again, I'm not looking at the same text right now.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: KC, where are you?

KC CLAFFY: I'm in the 56.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic]

KC CLAFFY: It's just totally disconnected. It's talking about the modeling process and then it's talking about KPIs. It doesn't make sense.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

KC CLAFFY: Yeah.

STEVE CONTE: While we're all looking for page 56, can I, Denise, just respond to your inquiry just now? We looked at the AAR system of things that OCTO was touching and since it's a CCDS, it's not an OCTO item so I don't have an update on you, for you for that SSAC report. But if you'd like, we can capture that and bring it back to GDD who that is assigned to. Okay.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: See, I don't know why you think the [off mic] at all. The [off mic] actually says when the zone is transmitted from the RZM to each of the instances or how could you measure [off mic]. But it was observed that some of the instances were having trouble during the KSK rollout depending on where different instances in cachements, not letters, instances.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So [off mic].

KC CLAFFY: Well my comment is this all looks like stuff that RSSAC 02 said that was going to be measured five years ago so why don't we just say implement SSAC 02 and have it be done at that?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I don't know RSSAC 02 to know what that covers.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. Can you go look?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: [I've been].

HEATHER FLANAGAN: KC, again there seems to be a meta issue here since this keeps coming up of referring back to old SSAC reports and RSSAC reports that have not been implemented [inaudible].

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, that's fine. But I think the more we can say this was said five years ago and you still haven't done it, if indeed that's the case, the better. And that's not what we're doing here. We're not even referencing this.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: No, I completely agree with you.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: The meta point I was making is there seems to be a systemic issue here.

KC CLAFFY: Absolutely.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Of not implementing the carefully researched and agreed upon reports and advice that are going from expert committees into the ICANN Board.

KC CLAFFY: Yep. Yep. But then that needs to be said as a comment. Like that's not... But then it needs to be backed up and I don't even know that this hasn't been implemented. I don't know and Eric doesn't seem to know either. So what are we saying here? We are not the experts that need to write this sentence, I guess.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

KC CLAFFY: Was RSSAC 02 done? That would be helpful. How much of RSSAC 02 was implemented?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Let me capture that.

KC CLAFFY: Thanks. That's a good point, Denise.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Actually, can we turn that into a question? Thank you. Can we go back to page 61? It means turned over to Heather.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Okay. So we are again at a section where I pulled materials from an older document, whether we want to continue to use this text. One other point I want to raise, so we've talked in the past and KC and I talked about it a little bit at lunch, whether or not the process and methodology sections should be merged. Part of the challenge with that is the SSR1 section has a very specific, discrete and untouchable process and methodology section, and then there's the other three.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: That's fine.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So we can either, we have three options, I think. Option one is to update each of the individual process and methodology sections in Workstreams 2, 3 and 4. Option two is to delete all process and

methodology sections as not useful. Or option three is to create a process and methodology section that applies to Workstreams 2, 3 and 4. I don't have a preference, but we should probably do something about this and I think Denise was next.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Denise then Laurin.

DENISE MICHEL: Go ahead, Laurin. I cede the floor to you and will comment after.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Thank you, Denise. Please let's not touch the SSR1 stuff.

DENISE MICHEL: I said that one is untouchable.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Just saying. Just saying.

DENISE MICHEL: I'm specifically talking about 2, 3 and 4.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. 2, 3 and 4, I think we can just do one because it's all pretty similar and that's it. Or we just yank it completely but then it's kind of weird because then we have SSR1 but nothing else.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. I think a streamlined process and methodology for the non-SSR1 section of the report is fine. I think we should keep it somewhere and I'm, again, happy to have lots of different annexes and end notes to streamline the readability and impact of what we're actually recommending.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. I think the appendix idea is good because it's not relevant to most readers. But might be, there might...

RUSS HOUSLEY: Actually, I think it will help SSR3 as well. So putting the how we went about it at the end in an appendix is fine and each of the workstream sections can just point to that appendix. Done.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: So noting I am not touching the text if I can at all avoid it for SSR1 methodology, do you want that section to also go to the appendix?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I would prefer that because I think it gets in the way of the point. But I think combining the workstream 2, 3 and 4 into one methodology

where you have the, where, like what's on the screen where you have the bullets, you'll have a set of those bullets for each of the workstreams. Workstream 2 did blah, blah, blah. Workstream 3 did blah, blah blah, and so on. But the rest of it's essentially the same.

Okay. Heather, did you have another point?

HEATHER FLANAGAN:

I don't know if, given how much is going to be rewritten, I'm not sure it's critical. Some of the old text included a statement that "In addition to commonly identified challenges, the stability and resilience of the DNS may face among other challenges under the workstream as related to ICANN SSR and DNS SSR may be identified," and for one thing, that's really hard to parse. And for another thing, since this was written so long ago, my question was, was anything else identified that we want to mention here?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

But I think if you combine them, that just actually evaporates into a set of three bullets. I mean three sets of bullets, one per workstream. Thank you.

All right. Next section, please. Wow, a whole section with no comments and no homework. That was awesome. All right, name collisions. Scott, you had the assignment here.

[KC CLAFFY]: Was there any rationale behind this recommendation? Anything [off mic] can be done?

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah. So the issue is that ICANN has extensive documentation out online on name collisions and FAQs and how to deal with this. We know that it's still an issue, but the education out there is there and so I'm wondering do we... Is this valid? It is a valid concern but if somebody wants to go put a .LOCAL domain on their local DNS resolver, sure, it's going to cause issues, right? So nothing's going to stop people from being stupid or ignorant.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic]

SCOTT MCCORMICK: Yeah. So rationale and findings, yes, it happens. But the fact of the matter is ICANN has really done its due diligence on the education piece of letting the community know that, hey, there are these issues. They can't force somebody's hand on it. Thoughts?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. I don't entirely agree. I agree that there is an education component which has generally been done, but I think the... what this recommendation speaks to is the rush to new gTLD rollouts with the incomplete process and rules around name collisions and new gTLDs.

And then in addition, there is the more systemic name collision issues for which there is no identified process or responsibility to address.

For example, well over two years ago, it was reported that anyone can register a domain name that starts with [blank] for security reasons. Norm, I'm not saying what blank is. For example, blank.CO.UK and because of bugs in the most commonly used e-mail clients in the world, it allows then an attacker to receive credentials from the user's e-mail which then causes a whole host of vulnerabilities. This impacts potentially, well, not every TLD. There are some restricted ones. But almost every TLD in the world, there's absolutely no reporting process. I know because I personally tried to report it and get a response from multiple ICANN staff as well as SSAC and no obvious way of fixing it, which is something that should be addressed by ICANN. So I think yes, there's been education information sharing. There's still quite a ways to go on what the process and rules are for fixing both specific name collisions as they relate to the rules involved in new gTLDs as well as more systemic issues that arise.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So I'd also then put reporting into that. Correct?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Yeah. [inaudible]

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: KC, do you have any visibility into where SSAC is on the name collision work? I don't know if you're involved in that.

KC CLAFFY: Very little. I'm not involved [off mic]. Very little. I know they hired someone. They hired someone for that Phase 1 which feels like Phase 0 to me. Yeah.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Denise, would you mind working on this one?

KC CLAFFY: I can go ask if people want to know. I can go look for an update.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I mean, I'm convinced. I still think you can't solve stupid. So but again, if it's a reporting issue, like Denise brought up, anybody can be stupid and go register a "blank.whatever" right? So that is their own stupidity. And again, it's also a vector for attack. There's nothing going to stop that. But the reporting side of it, absolutely, I completely agree with.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so could you come up with text there?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah. Denise and I will work together on it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. Is Danko just asking for a site to be added?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I think Danko is suggesting that Study 1 is the citation, which I don't think it is for that. Study 1 is basically a literature search to kick off. There's other studies that come after that would probably be more substantive.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, the findings should certainly reference NCAP.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes, and the report [off mic].

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Yes. [off mic] study?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No, NCAP might commission a study. NCAP is [off mic].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so Scott, I think your homework includes making sure that the text cites NCAP right?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Got it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. No, that the findings text that hasn't been written yet.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Ah.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, scroll down please. Kerry, does your December 10th thing, has that already been resolved or is there more?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No, it was just... I just provided the link where the original information was found. And the reason I had provided the link was just to refresh everyone as well that a lot of the information related to this came from the interview questions and some of the questions and answers we sent to staff and got responses. So it would be critical to... That would be the source of some of the content. So in short, once Heather is satisfied, yes it's resolved.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So Heather has to copy that into a footnote. That's all you're saying.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: No.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: The document is pretty confusing.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Poof. Okay, scrolling down please. And that changed text is what...
Thank you.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: One thing I have to go back and check out, because I think I've only gotten some answers recently is there was a lot of the policy pages in turn have a footnote that say there is basically a temporary specification that impacts stuff on that page but it doesn't say which stuff. So there has been an open question when we're linking to those pages, is that still the correct link or not?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. I think I replied in some point too.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: This was in several places.

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah, and so the 2013 RAA is the definitive agreement contract for registrars. A temporary specification can also, in conjunction, be cited. It is a... It was approved by the Board but it has not been implemented yet. So that's the story. So you could cite and the temporary spec only relates to the WHOIS data. So you could cite RAA and the temp spec, both.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Heather, you're happy?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: Ecstatic.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You sounded it. Okay, scrolling down. Assigned to Kerry. Kerry left, but are your...

LAURIN WEISSINGER: She knows when to leave.

DENISE MICHEL: Well, I did. That has a question [inaudible]. I still don't know the answer to it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So we'll wait until she comes back but maybe we can get the next section done and then come back to this one because the next one's

KC's hot button. Down, down, down, down, down. Research prefix.
There we go.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: [off mic] three recommendations.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Exactly. We're close. Please stay with us. Is there anything to change here or are we happy?

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: What page are we on? Oh, I see [inaudible].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so we're happy with this as it is? I agree. I think we'll deal with that.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I think it's possible that what we may want to do, and we can maybe work with our friends like Steve or someone like that to basically, a separate companion, especially [a doc] or something like that where it's like per, like just on an as-needed basis, like for example, start with this one, a recommendation. We could say, "Here's a strawman, how you could do it," or "Here's N strawmen of how you could do it," and they could have low lifts or high lifts and I don't know if those wind up being part of the ultimate report or not. But we could sort of feel out where is it too directive and where is it not directive enough or suggestive

enough because like I said before one simple way to do this is the TPC chairs or the organizing chairs, they may already have this for a lot of the conferences just so they can present these materials. They might be happy to either come or just send it to an ICANN meeting and then OCTO is the sort of curator that could be done without even doing much work, maybe if that was palatable.

STEVE CONTE:

Yeah, I was going to actually bring that point back up that you had mentioned that this morning and I think that's a valid point and trying to balance whether I should, whether that's suggested that that go into the language or that's just one of those engineered solutions that could be one to pass out and that might be a good dialogue for the implementation discussions going forward on that. So I acknowledge what you said this morning and took that to heart.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

KC?

KC CLAFFY:

I don't think that would quite do it though because what I'm really looking for is somebody with an ICANN mindset to go look through. Or at least what I was looking for, I mean, other people had this recommendation in mind too. But I'm thinking of somebody who can go look for things that are explicitly relevant to DNS stakeholders. So if I were at ICANN, I would implement this by going to put a research fellow on it and scan through IMC, sitcom, look for the words registry,

registrar, DNS and just scan through the abstract. Is anything in here probably going to be relevant? If so, go look at the conclusion. Look at recommendations. Maybe even read the paper, but not necessarily to see if there's things relevant here and then do a blog entry on the ICANN website about, "Hey, here's what's happening in the research community that is relevant." And also make sure internal ICANN people understand about that, like there was a paper five or ten years ago on the effects of registrar level intervention on abuse. Like what can registrars do to really improve abuse? That's a paper that everybody at ICANN should know about and lots of people in the stakeholder community should know about too. ICANN probably does know about that but this would be a way to make sure that that information is going from the peer reviewed community to the people who are actually operationally responsible for this stuff.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Eric?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Yes, I think those are points well made and I think there's a spectrum of things that are more and less useful and I think it's a really good point. In fact, if, for example, given a set of options and those being more impactful but a heavier lift maybe or something like that, someone could say I want something closer to the effect of what KC just said. But I don't want to divert one of our staff members to have to do it. You could say, "Could you put a funding model in place so a grad student somewhere could get a little bit of money to do that?" Just whatever.

There's a handful of different things creative people could come up with and it doesn't even have to be us that do them all just to kick off the discussions if that's helpful. Because as it stands, as the text stands now, my first read would be exactly what KC just said. If it were just me, I'd be like, well then I guess I get someone who knows what the relevant points are to go look at these things, read the papers and then present on them in the group every week until I go and present them at ICANN. But that's a very academic perspective about doing this kind of stuff. So yeah, I think we could help.

KC CLAFFY: Why does Heather keep assigning [inaudible]?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Because you keep talking.

KC CLAFFY: [Inaudible] efficient of you. I'm [inaudible], Heather.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, back up please to the previous one because...

HEATHER FLANAGAN: We figured it out. Don't back up.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You sorted it out.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: We're done.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Cool. HTTP. DOH.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Sorry, just before we leave that one.

KC CLAFFY: Good job and this one [inaudible] researchers have and get it back in the hands...

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Eric, tell us what you did to the DOH section.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: It hasn't changed much for a little while, but maybe you're asking me to go over it for the first time for some folks or what were you thinking?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I don't know. I saw that you had the...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Had the pen?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Last change, I think.

HEATHER FLANAGAN: You did a bunch of stuff in November. [inaudible] question the January [off mic].

RUSS HOUSLEY: Who added all that blue text? Was that not you?

HEATHER FLANAGAN: That was Eric. And then Laurin had some comments.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I tried to follow-up on some of the things that I think Heather was pointing me at. I suspect some of it's that. And yeah, I'm not sure what to say, Russ. Sorry.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Could you scroll down a little bit, please? See, this is all Eric and Heather.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: And Zarko.

ZARKO KECIC: I was speaking. They were writing. Everything is there but I don't like language used because I don't think that people outside this group or people who aren't directly involved in DOH will understand what we are trying to say so I would work on rewriting this. And Eric, do you agree?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Sure.

ZARKO KECIC: Okay.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: But I don't know what you want, so maybe you should take a whack at it because I don't think it's perfect but I don't know what you want.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Zarko, will you do that tonight?

ZARKO KECIC: First drink [inaudible]?

RUSS HOUSLEY: You'll probably get it done better if you do.

ZARKO KECIC: That's what I'm saying.

UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: [off mic]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay, so we're late for the break. Can we come back in 15 minutes? And when we do, we're going to talk about the survey results.

So that's my goal. I hope we could do that. Although I recall from Montreal, we were not all on the same page. The hope is that the survey results that Laurin's about to share, we'll find out, will highlight where we have agreement and can focus the discussion.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay. So while we're waiting for my e-mail to arrive so that you can have something on screen, we can, I can tell you from just, if you look at it quickly, it is very apparent that we have a number of key concerns that we believe are extremely important. This is—and I'll just go through—Recommendation 16 which deals with compliance, Recommendation 12 which is agreements of contracted parties, so again, has to do with compliance anti-abuse. The mitigation matters for DNS abuse and security threats are also rated extremely highly in importance as well as the position of higher appoint CSO, CISO, whatever we want to call it.

The roadmap of industry standard security audits and certification is something we agree on is very important as well as disaster recovery and business continuity. Then essentially, we also kind of, so this is already kind of less, kind of central according to what I can see, but the

security risk management is another one where we kind of agree that this is extremely important. Okay, so these are like the top ones for importance.

In terms of urgency, let me scroll down. In terms of urgency, there is a larger spread because it's not 50 to 100 but 0 to 100. Here we believe the most urgent thing is the CISO/CSO. The second, so this is Recommendation 6, second most urgent is incorporate measures to mitigate DNS abuse. Third most urgent is Recommendation 12, new policies and agreements with contracted parties to stop, decrease DNS abuse.

Then follows, again, business continuity and disaster recovery in terms of urgency. DNS abuse definitions, Recommendation 10. Urgency is also considered high for DNS over HTTPS. Root management already bit of a drop is regarded as urgent as well as improvements to DAAR. We then have a somewhat urgent security risk management and compliance activities being neutral and effective. This is Recommendation 16. So these are the kind of top runners in terms of urgency and importance. Jennifer, do we have the slides?

[JENNIFER]: [off mic] come here because I had a problem [saving] [off mic].

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I'm sure it's possible somehow, but let's...

[JENNIFER]: Is it a PDF?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: It is a PDF. Okay. So is everyone happy if I just run through recommendation by number now that I kind of gave you the top performers?

So SSR1, we gave it an 86.21. So again, 50 is important. 100 is extremely important. So it's an 86, and you can see, by the way, the scale kind of changes to 75, 80, 85, 90, and this is kind of to... It kind of shows you in which group it is, right? So the real red is the extremely important group and then it kind of goes down. So the little arrow helps you kind of see in which group it is.

So that one, we gave it an 86, so let's just say importance, group two. I think this is what I'll name it. And in terms of the urgency, it's a 73, so not too urgent. Industry standardization, it's a 92. That's extremely high and in terms of urgency...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Laurin, do you have interference metrics at all, something to say how much noise [inaudible]?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes, it exists. That makes it...

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I'm wondering what the average... If the average was bang-on versus [inaudible].

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. Look, Eric, I do have that and it's here in the document. It's just then I have to report four different measures per recommendation.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I know, just [inaudible] just what the numbers mean.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yes. I can tell you that, sorry I forgot that. I can tell you that the standard deviation tends to be low at top. So where we agree that something is important or urgent, we see smaller variation. Variation increases at the bottom. I can't share my screen, I think, so I can't... At least not at the same time.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Not at the same time.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: What you could do is you could block, like for example, with just a rank order of all the importances and then at the same time for each of those data points, what was the variance. And that way, with one graph, we could see everything and then we could say who is the best performer of the [recommendation].

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. This was the plan. People were not giving me data until today. I planned to do this yesterday and essentially, I got the last response at 2:00 P.M. today.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Do you want to [inaudible]?

ZARKO KECIC: Before the drink or after?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Yeah. So it's just... I'm sorry. I cannot plop things that I don't have.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: No. Yeah, Laurin. No, it's very nice. Thanks for doing all this and it's great. I don't think we're saying how come you didn't do it right. It's more just maybe we should give you more time. It doesn't have to be right now, right?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: If I had some time, I could do this far more nicely, obviously.

RUSS HOUSLEY: How much do you need?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Half an hour, hour, I guess. My brain's a bit mush, but yeah. Can we do something else first? Then I can try to push it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, so let's push this to tomorrow morning.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: It might not need to be until tomorrow morning.

RUSS HOUSLEY: No. Let's push it 'til tomorrow morning.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So a bunch of people took writing assignments, like almost everybody. So I'm thinking that the best thing to do is take an hour, hour and a half now, get that done before dinner so that we have the raw material we need to go through the document tomorrow. Denise, yes?

DENISE MICHEL: Yeah. I also just wanted to note there are some things that have gotten lost between our L.A. meeting where we identified things we wanted to make recommendations on and the subsequent report. So Eric is

sending around a link to one of the Google Docs. There's a lot of Google Docs that staff had put up there and for some reason, some of the issues that we had agreed to address in L.A. weren't carried over. [Abero], I think is one. Network segmentation is another. But it would be good for people to click on that link and look at that doc in particular and then when we have time, Russ, discuss if there's anything additional we want to add in for the draft.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right. So I did not actually get a homework assignment. So I will do that. But I have not yet received that from Eric. Eric, did you hit send yet?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: You did? Okay. So I'll do that while the people who have writing assignments are doing that. Anyone else who doesn't have an assignment should do the same. Okay, let's get some work done then. Okay, and Laurin, will you be able to do that and your homework?

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Probably not but I can see what I can do.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. I think we're done for the day and we can stop the recording then.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]