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Second Security, Stability, and Resiliency Review Team (SSR2)

Community Engagement Session @ ICANN66

3 November 2019



Security, Stability, and Resilience

SSR is one of 4 bylaw-mandated community reviews identified as key transparency and accountability safeguard post IANA transition

'The Board shall cause a periodic review of ICANN's execution of its commitment to enhance the operational stability, reliability, resiliency, security, and global interoperability of the systems and processes, both internal and external, that directly affect and/or are affected by the Internet's system of unique identifiers that ICANN coordinates ("SSR Review").' -- Section 4.6(c)

SSR Assessments may include:


1. security, operational stability and resiliency matters, both physical and network, relating to the coordination of the Internet's system of unique identifiers;
2. conformance with appropriate security contingency planning framework for the Internet's system of unique identifiers;
3. maintaining clear and globally interoperable security processes for those portions of the Internet's system of unique identifiers that ICANN coordinates.

SSR2 Review Team

RT Member	SO / AC Affiliation	Region
Alain Aina	ccNSO	AF
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Kerry-Ann Barrett	GAC	LAC
KC Claffy	SSAC	NA
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Jabhera Matogoro	ALAC	AF
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RT Member	SO / AC Affiliation	Region
Denise Michel (Vice-Chair)	GNSO	NA
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Review Process



See:

<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/strategic-engagement-2013-10-10-en>

SSR2 Recommendations are tied back to
the 2021-2025 ICANN Strategic Plan

Workstream Areas

1

Workstream 1:

SSR1 implementation and impact

2

Workstream 2:

Key security, stability, and resiliency issues within ICANN

3

Workstream 3:

Security, stability, and resilience of the DNS

4

Workstream 4:

Future challenges

Workstream 1

SSR1 Implementation & Impact

Review of SSR1 Recommendations

Covered by ICANN Bylaw 4.6(c) ...

- 28 SSR1 Recommendations evaluated
- 27 SSR1 recommendations still relevant
 - Most relevant recommendations are not fully implemented

ICANN org should continue its work to implement all relevant SSR1 Recommendations

- Complete the implementation of all relevant SSR1 recommendations. The SSR2 Review Team's observations of the status and the road to implement the recommendation will be detailed in the report (where the original guidance was not sufficiently measurable.)

Workstream 1

**SSR2 Recommendations Expanding on Original
SSR1 Recommendations**

Expanded SSR1 Recommendation 9

Information Security Management Systems and Security Certifications

- Establish a road map of industry standard security audits and certification activities that are being undertaken, including milestone dates for obtaining each certification and continuous improvement
- Put together a plan for certifications and training requirements for roles in the organization, track completion rates, provide reasoning for their choices, and document how the certifications fit into ICANN org's security and risk management strategies
- Provide reasoning for their choices, demonstrating how they fit into its security and risk management strategies
- Implement an Information Security Management System and undergo a third party audit and certification
- Be audited and certified along the lines of industry security standards, and assess certification options with commonly accepted international standards (e.g., ITIL, ISO 27001)

SSR Strategy and Framework

- Address security issues clearly, publicly, and promote security best practices across all contracted parties
- Work with the community to develop and continuously update an overarching SSR strategy and framework; capture SSR-related best practices in a consensus document; establish clear, measurable, and trackable objectives; implement the practices in contracts, agreements, and MOUs
- Implement coordinated vulnerability disclosure reporting
- Establish a clear communication plan for reports to the community, and produce regular (at least annual) and timely reports containing anonymous metrics of the vulnerability disclosure process

Budget Transparency and Budgeting SSR in new gTLDs

- Be more transparent with the budget for parts of ICANN org related to implementing the SSR Framework and performing SSR-related functions, including those associated with the introduction of new gTLDs

Risk Management

- Centralize and strategically coordinate ICANN's Risk Management Framework
- Clearly articulate their risk framework and strategically align the framework against the requirements and objectives of the organization, describe relevant measures of success, and how these are assessed

Workstream 2

Key SSR Issues within ICANN

Recommendations Areas for Workstream 2

Covered by ICANN Bylaw 4.6(c) (ii) A, 4.6(c) (ii) B as well as 4.6(c) (iii)

Topics covered include:

- C-Suite Security Position
- Security Risk Management
- Business Continuity Management
- Disaster Recovery Planning

C-Suite Security Position

- Create the position of, and then hire or appoint an individual responsible for both strategic and tactical security and risk management across the security domain of the organization and the global identifier system
 - position would fulfil the responsibilities of a chief security officer and chief information security officer
 - position should manage ICANN org's Security Function, oversee the interactions of security staff in all relevant areas, provide regular reports to the community
 - position should take part in all security-relevant contractual negotiations (e.g., supply chains for hardware and software and associated service level agreements) undertaken by ICANN org, feeding into all security-related contractual terms

Full text - C-Suite

The review team considers it necessary to have an officer at the C-Suite level to coordinate security and security risk activities and implement ICANN's strategic security objectives. ICANN should create the position of, and then hire or appoint an individual responsible for both strategic and tactical security and risk management across the security domain of the organization and the global identifier system. This position would fulfil the responsibilities of a Chief Security Officer (CSO) and Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) This position should manage ICANN org's Security Function and oversee the interactions of security staff in all relevant areas and provide regular reports to the community.

The Security Function should take part in all security-relevant contractual negotiations (e.g., supply chains for hardware and software and associated service level agreements) undertaken by ICANN org, feeding into all security-related contractual terms.

Security Risk Management

- Clearly articulate and strategically align the Security Risk Management Framework against the requirements and objectives of the organization, describe relevant measures of success, and how these are to be assessed
 - Adopt and implement ISO 31000 “Risk Management”, the ISO/IEC 27000 family “Information Security Management Systems”, and ISO 22301 Business Continuity Management, and validate with appropriate independent audits
 - Security risk matrix and registers should be created / updated and used to prioritize and guide the activities of the ICANN org. Findings should feed into BC/DR and the ISMS
 - ICANN should name or appoint a dedicated, responsible person in charge of security risk management
 - The report from the DNS Risk Framework Working Group and the 2016 Identifier Systems Security, Stability and Resiliency Framework for FY15-16 should be considered for the development of the Security Risk Management Framework

Full text - Security Risk Management

ICANN's Security Risk Management Framework should be clearly articulated, aligned strategically against the requirements and objectives of the organization, describe relevant measures of success, and how these are to be assessed. The foundation of this was described in detail in [SSR1 Recommendation 9 - Information Security Management Systems and Security Certifications](#). More specifically:

- ICANN org should adopt and implement ISO 31000 “Risk Management”, and validate and certify their implementation with appropriate independent audits. Risk management efforts should feed into Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans and Provisions.
- Security risk matrix and registers should be created / updated and used to prioritize and guide the activities of the ICANN org. ICANN org should report on updates of their methodology and updates to the risk matrix and register, e.g., by the Board Risk Committee. Findings should feed into BC/DR and the ISMS.
- To retain consistency and accountability, ICANN should name or appoint a dedicated, responsible person in charge of security risk management, e.g., reporting to the C-Suite Security role as described in the recommendation [“Security Position, C-Suite”](#)

Business Continuity Management

- Establish a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) for Public Technical Identifiers (PTI) operations (IANA functions)
 - o includes all relevant systems that contribute to the Security and Stability of the DNS and also Root Zone Management, in line with ISO 22301 “Business Continuity Management”
- Establish a BCP for the systems owned by, or under the purview of ICANN org, based on ISO 22301 “Business Continuity Management”
- Publish evidence (e.g., a summary of their BCP and Provisions)
- Engage an external auditor to verify compliance aspects of the implementation of the resulting BCP

Full text - Business Continuity Management

ICANN org should establish a Business Continuity plan for Public Technical Identifiers (PTI) operations (IANA functions) that includes all relevant systems that contribute to the Security and Stability of the DNS and also Root Zone Management, in line with ISO 22301 “Business Continuity Management”. It should be developed in close cooperation with RSSAC and the root server operators.

ICANN org should also establish a Business Continuity Plan for the systems owned by, or under the purview of ICANN org, based on ISO 22301 “Business Continuity Management”.

ICANN org should publish evidence, e.g., a summary of their Business Continuity Plans and Provisions. Doing so would improve transparency and trustworthiness beyond addressing ICANN’s strategic goals and objectives. An external auditor should be engaged to verify compliance aspects of the implementation of the resulting BC plans.

Disaster Recovery Planning

- Ensure that the DR plan for PTI operations (IANA functions) includes all relevant systems that contribute to the Security and Stability of the DNS and also includes Root Zone Management, and is in line with ISO 27031
- Establish a DR Plan for all the systems owned by, or under the purview of ICANN org, also in line with ISO 27031 “Guidelines for information and communication technology readiness for business continuity”
- Have a disaster recovery plan developed within twelve months of the ICANN Board’s adoption of these recommendations around establishing at least a third site for disaster recovery, specifically outside of the United States and its territories and the North American region, including a plan for implementation
- Publish evidence, e.g., a summary, of their overall disaster recovery plans and provisions
- Engage an external auditor to verify compliance aspects of the implementation of these DR plans

Full text: Disaster Recovery Planning

ICANN org should ensure that the DR plan for PTI operations (IANA functions) includes all relevant systems that contribute to the Security and Stability of the DNS and also includes Root Zone Management, and is in line with ISO 27031 “Guidelines for information and communication technology readiness for business continuity”. It should be developed in close cooperation with RSSAC and the root server operators. ICANN org should also establish a DR Plan for all the systems owned by, or under the purview of ICANN org, also in line with ISO 27031 “Guidelines for information and communication technology readiness for business continuity”.

ICANN org should have a disaster recovery plan developed within twelve months of the ICANN Board’s adoption of these recommendations around establishing at least a third site for disaster recovery, specifically outside of the United States and its territories and the North American region, including a plan for implementation.

ICANN org should publish evidence, e.g., a summary, of their overall disaster recovery plans and provisions t. Doing so would improve transparency and trustworthiness beyond addressing ICANN’s strategic goals and objectives. An external auditor should be engaged to verify compliance aspects of the implementation of these DR plans.

Workstream 3

Security, Stability, and Resilience of the DNS

Recommendations Areas for Workstream 3

Covered by ICANN Bylaw 4.6(c) (ii) A, 4.6(c) (ii) B, 4.6(c) (ii) C, and 4.6(c) (iii)

- Abuse and Compliance
 - Abuse Definitions & Reporting
 - DAAR
 - Policies, Agreements, Activities with Registrars and Registries
 - Contracts/Agreements
 - Incentivization
 - Abuse Report Portal
 - Compliance Function
- Abusive Naming
- Key Rollover
- Root Server Operations
- Root Zone Data and IANA Registries

Abuse and Compliance: Abuse Definitions & Reporting

- Undertake the following short-term and long-term actions to address the definition and application of DNS abuse; elicit feedback from the ICANN community
 - ICANN org and Board: implement the CCT Review and RDS (WHOIS) Review recommendations, and other security-related actions based on current, community vetted abuse definitions, without delay
 - ICANN Board: adopt the additional term and evolving external definition of “security threat”—a term used by the ICANN DAAR project, the GAC (in its Beijing Communique and for Spec 11), and the Convention on Cybercrime -- to use in conjunction with ICANN DNS Abuse definition
 - ICANN Board: entrust SSAC and PSWG to work with eCrime and abuse experts to evolve the definition of DNS Abuse, taking into account the processes and definitions outlined in the Convention on Cybercrime ETS No. 185
- Minimize ambiguous language and reach a universally acceptable agreement on abuse, SSR, and security threats in its contracts with contracted parties and implementation plans

Full Text - Abuse and Compliance: Abuse Definitions & Reporting

ICANN org and Board should undertake the following short-term and long-term actions to address the definition and application of DNS abuse and elicit feedback from the ICANN community:.

- ICANN org and Board should implement the CCT Review and RDS (WHOIS) Review recommendations, and other security-related actions based on current, community vetted abuse definitions, without delay.
- ICANN Board, in parallel, should adopt the additional term and evolving external definition of “security threat”—a term used by the ICANN DAAR project, the GAC (in its Beijing Communique and for Spec 11), and the Convention on Cybercrime -- to use in conjunction with ICANN DNS Abuse definition. The ICANN Board should entrust SSAC and PSWG to work with eCrime and abuse experts to evolve the definition of DNS Abuse, taking into account the processes and definitions outlined in the Convention on Cybercrime ETS No. 185.

ICANN should minimize ambiguous language and reach a universally acceptable agreement on abuse, SSR, and security threats in its contracts with contracted parties and implementation plans. Clear shared definitions will enable ICANN to better address the global, and evolving security and stability threats.

Abuse and Compliance: DAAR

- The ICANN Board and ICANN org: work with the gNSO, ccNSO, and ccTLDs to improve DAAR and incorporate ccTLD data tracking and reporting in DAAR and integrate pricing data into DAAR
- Identify entities with persistently very high abuse domain registrations
- Publish DAAR reports that identify registries and registrars that most contribute to abuse
- Publish reports that include machine-readable formats of the data, in addition to the graphical data in current reports

Full Text - Abuse and Compliance: DAAR

The ICANN Board and ICANN org should work with the gNSO, ccNSO and ccTLDs to improve DAAR and incorporate ccTLD data tracking and reporting in DAAR and integrate pricing data. Currently, DAAR lacks key indicators and data.

Specifically:

- ICANN should identify entities with persistently very high abuse domain registrations
- ICANN should publish DAAR reports that identify registries and registrars that most contribute to abuse
- ICANN should publish reports that include machine-readable formats of the data, in addition to the graphical data in current reports

Contracts and Agreements

- Incorporate measures to mitigate “DNS abuse” and “security threats” in agreements with contracted parties, including Registry Agreements (base and individual) and the RAA, as necessary contract obligations
- Make SSR requirements mandatory on contract or baseline agreement renewal
- Include SSR concerns and SSR2 recommendations in these negotiations
- Attract and collaborate with ccTLDs and the ccNSO to address DNS abuse and security threats in ccTLDs. Some ccTLDs are creating and using best practices, while others have domain portfolios with unacceptably high levels of abuse
- ICANN Board, community and staff: work with the ccNSO to advance data tracking and reporting, an assessment of DNS abuse and security threats in ccTLDs, and a ccNSO plan to support ccTLDs in further mitigating DNS abuse and security threats

Full text - Contracts and Agreements

ICANN org should incorporate measures to mitigate “DNS abuse” and “security threats” (per recommendation \$insert) in agreements with contracted parties, including Registry Agreements (base and individual) and the RAA, as necessary contract obligations. These changes should be demonstrably informed by the ICANN security function and the compliance team, particularly when it comes to enforcement gaps. This should include, as a priority, provisions that establish thresholds of abuse (e.g., 3% of all registrations) at which compliance inquiries are automatically triggered, with a higher threshold (e.g., 10% of all registrations) at which registrars and registries are presumed to be in default of their agreements. This approach also was underscored in the CCT Review (citation and quote!).

As current contracts cannot be changed except during negotiation periods, ICANN org should make SSR requirements mandatory on contract or baseline agreement renewal. A “pattern and practice” of abuse cause for contract termination (as in section 5.5.2.4 “TERM, TERMINATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION” of the 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement), to be introduced on renewal of contracted parties’ contracts and agreements.

As renegotiations are imminent due to RDAP and EPDP phase 1, ICANN org should include SSR concerns and SSR2 recommendations in these negotiations. Specifically, ICANN org should:

- ensure access for parties with legitimate purposes via contractual obligations and with rigorous compliance, rather than as a voluntary implementation.
- RDAP and registrant information access rate limiting practices by contracted parties are impediments to security threat mitigation and should be prohibited for ICANN Compliance and Security, for entities related to the DAAR project and for other reporting systems like DAAR, for security threat investigations, and for law enforcement.
- Establish and rigorously enforce uniform Centralized Zone Data Service requirements to ensure continuous access for these purposes.

ICANN org should attract and collaborate with ccTLDs and the ccNSO to address DNS abuse and security threats in ccTLDs. Some ccTLDs are creating and using best practices, while others have domain portfolios with unacceptably high levels of abuse. The ICANN Board, community and staff should work with the ccNSO to advance data tracking and reporting, an assessment of DNS abuse and security threats in ccTLDs, and a ccNSO plan to support ccTLDs in further mitigating DNS abuse and security threats.

Incentivization

- Create incentives for contracted parties to mitigate abuse and security threats; impose such changes unilaterally and immediately
- Incentivize the mitigation of abuse and security threats utilizing measures where take downs are performed within an appropriate period after registration (e.g., 30 days after the domain is registered)
- Institutionalize training and certifications for contracted parties and key stakeholders -- Registries, Registrars, Privacy/Proxy Service Providers, Internet Service Providers -- in areas identified by DAAR and other sources on common methods of abuse, and mitigation efforts

Full text - Incentivization

Create incentives for contracted parties to mitigate abuse and security threats. Historically, ICANN .org has rewarded contracted parties with fee reductions to incentivize certain business practices (e.g., domain tasting). The existing contract framework enables ICANN to impose such changes unilaterally and immediately.

ICANN org should (in addition to above) incentivize the mitigation of abuse and security threats utilizing measures where take downs are performed within an appropriate period after registration (e.g., 30 days after the domain is registered).

ICANN org should institutionalize training and certifications for contracted parties and key stakeholders -- Registries, Registrars, Privacy/Proxy Service Providers, Internet Service Providers -- in areas identified by DAAR and other sources on common methods of abuse, and mitigation efforts. Training should include as a starting point: Automatic tracking of complaint numbers and treatment of complaints; Quarterly/Yearly public reports on complaints, actions, etc.; and, analysis.

- Establish and maintain a central DNS Abuse complaint portal for all complaints that automatically directs all abuse reports to relevant parties
 - o It should be mandatory for all gTLDs; ccTLDs should be invited to join

Full text - Abuse Report Portal

ICANN org should establish and maintain a central DNS Abuse complaint portal for all complaints that automatically directs all abuse reports to relevant parties. The system would purely act as inflow, with only summary and metadata flowing upstream. It should be mandatory for all gTLDs; ccTLDs should be invited to join.

Compliance Function

- Ensure ICANN org's compliance activities are neutral and effective:
 - Have compliance activities audited externally, and hold them to a high standard
 - ICANN Board: empower the Compliance Office to react to complaints and require Compliance to initiate investigation and enforce contractual obligations against those aiding and abetting systemic abuse, as defined by the SLA
 - Default approach used by the Compliance Office should involve SLAs on enforcement and reporting, clear and efficient, processes, a fully informed complainant, measurable satisfaction, and maximum public disclosure

Full text - Compliance Function

ICANN org needs to substantially ensure its compliance activities are neutral and effective. Since ICANN derives most of its funding from registrars and registries, it should have compliance activities audited externally, and hold them to a high standard.

The ICANN Board should empower the Compliance Office to react to complaints and require Compliance to initiate investigation and enforce contractual obligations against those aiding and abetting systemic abuse, as defined by the SLA. This could include step by step authority for the escalation of enforcement measures and implementable actions that ICANN org can use in response to failure to remedy within specified timeframes.

The default approach used by the Compliance Office should involve SLAs on enforcement and reporting, clear and efficient, processes, a fully informed complainant, measurable satisfaction, and maximum public disclosure

Abusive Naming

- Build upon the current activities to investigate typical misleading naming, in cooperation with researchers and stakeholders, wherever applicable
- When misleading naming rises to the level of abusive naming, include this type of abuse in their DAAR reporting, and develop policies and mitigation best practices
- Measure the number of abusive naming complaints made at the portal and shared that information with the community in a form that allows independent third parties to analyze, mitigate, and prevent harm from use of such domain names
- The current "Guidelines for the Implementation of IDNs" should be updated to include a section on names containing trademarks, TLD-chaining and the use of (hard-to-spot) typos; contractually enforce "Guidelines for the Implementation of IDNs" for gTLDs and recommend that ccTLDs do the same; the guidelines should apply to IDNs and all other names to avoid pure ASCII domains to be abused due to being visually indistinguishable

Full text - Abusive Naming

- ICANN should build upon the current activities to investigate typical misleading naming, in cooperation with researchers and stakeholders, wherever applicable. When misleading naming rises to the level of abusive naming, ICANN should include this type of abuse in their DAAR reporting, and develop policies and mitigation best practices. Misleading naming includes, but is not limited to, "visually indistinguishable" names (comprising all character sets supported by the DNS and IDN, Unicode & ASCII), TLD-chaining (e.g., google.com.to), names containing trademarks, and the use of (hard to spot) typos. ICANN should measure the number of abusive naming complaints made at the portal and shared that information with the community in a form that allows independent third parties to analyze, mitigate, and prevent harm from use of such domain names.
- The current "Guidelines for the Implementation of IDNs" should be updated to include a section on names containing trademarks, TLD-chaining and the use of (hard-to-spot) typos. Furthermore, ICANN should contractually enforce "Guidelines for the Implementation of IDNs" for gTLDs and recommend that ccTLDs do the same; the guidelines should apply to IDNs and all other names to avoid pure ASCII domains to be abused due to being visually indistinguishable.
- This process should function as follows: If a requested name is recognized as suspicious (e.g., similar or visually indistinguishable from a registered trademark or well-known brand, a well-known name with a typo, chaining of TLDs, etc.), registration should be denied, tracked after registration, or otherwise addressed. There should be an appeals

- Complete the development of a suite for DNS regression testing
- Perform functional testing of different configurations and software versions

Full text - DNS Testbed

- ICANN org has already begun and should complete the development of a suite for DNS regression testing. ICANN org should ensure that capability to perform functional testing of different configurations and software versions is implemented and maintained. Timely completion and maintenance of this testbed will allow testing and research into resolver behavior, a crucial aspect for ensuring the integrity and availability of the DNS globally.

Key Rollover

- Establish a formal procedure, supported by a formal process modeling tool and language to specify the details of future key rollovers, including decision points, exception legs, full control-flow, etc.
 - Verification of the key rollover process should include posting the programmatic procedure (program, FSM, etc.) for public comment, and community feedback should be incorporated
 - Have empirically verifiable acceptance criteria at each stage, which should be fulfilled for the process to continue
 - Create a group of stakeholders involving relevant personnel (from ICANN org and/or the community) to periodically run table-top exercises that follow the Root KSK rollover process

Full text - Key Rollover

- ICANN org should establish a formal procedure, supported by a formal process modeling tool and language to specify the details of future key rollovers, including, decision points, exception legs, the full control-flow, etc. Verification of the key rollover process should include posting the programmatic procedure (program, FSM, etc.) for public comment, and community feedback should be incorporated. The process should have empirically verifiable acceptance criteria at each stage, which should be fulfilled for the process to continue. This process should be repeated at least as often as the rollover itself (i.e., the same periodicity) so that lessons learned can be used to adjust the process. To test these adjustments, ICANN org should create a group of stakeholders involving relevant personnel (from ICANN org and/or the community) to periodically run table-top exercises that follow the Root KSK rollover process.

Root Server Operations

- Develop baseline security best practices for root server operators and operations (in close cooperation with RSSAC and other relevant stakeholders)
 - o Include: change management, verification procedures, and sanity check procedures, and should also include hardening strategies of L-Root
- Develop relevant KPIs to measure these best practices and requirements, and ensure yearly reporting on how these KPIs are met by RSOs and other relevant parties including ICANN org
- Ensure that L-Root uses a vulnerability disclosure process, security reports and intelligence, and communicate to researchers and RSSAC wherever applicable

Full text - Root Server Operations

- In order to minimize the SSR risks associated with root server operation, ICANN org, in close cooperation with RSSAC and other relevant stakeholders, should develop baseline security best practices for root server operators and operations. These best practices include change management, verification procedures and sanity check procedures, and should also include hardening strategies of L-Root. ICANN org should also develop relevant KPIs to measure these best practices and requirements, and ensure yearly reporting on how these KPIs are met by RSOs and other relevant parties including ICANN org.
- ICANN org should ensure that L-Root uses a vulnerability disclosure process, security reports and intelligence, and communication with researchers and RSSAC advice or recommendations, wherever applicable.

Root Zone Data and IANA Registries

- Create a list of statistics and metrics for each type of unique identifier information, such as root-zone related service, IANA registries, and any gTLD service that ICANN org has authoritative purview over, that reflect the operational status (such as availability and responsiveness) of that service, and publish a directory of these services, data sets, and metrics on a single page on the icann.org web site, such as under the Open Data Platform
- Produce KPIs as summaries over both the previous year and longitudinally (to illustrate baseline behavior)
- Community feedback should be requested annually, considered, publicly summarized after each report, and should be incorporated into follow-on reports

Full text - Root Zone Data and IANA Registries

- For each type of unique identifier information, such as root-zone related service, IANA registries, and any gTLD service that ICANN org has authoritative purview over, ICANN org should create a list of statistics and metrics that reflect the operational status (such as availability and responsiveness) of that service, and publish a directory of these services, data sets, and metrics on a single page on the icann.org web site, such as under the Open Data Platform.
- KPIs should be produced as summaries over both the previous year and longitudinally (to illustrate baseline behavior). Community feedback should be requested annually, considered, publicly summarized after each report, and should be incorporated into follow-on reports. The data used to measure the results in these reports should be archived and made publicly available, along with any and all methodologies, to foster reproducibility. Currently, no such reporting exists, denying stakeholders the possibility to assess key SSR indicators over time.
- These KPI/services include but are not limited to:
 - the propagation delay of root zone changes to instances.
 - DNS Root zone (including DNSSEC, availability, integrity, abuse, etc.), so that its SSR aspects can be concisely and systematically measured and tracked
 - KPIs for known alternate root zones, deltas of zone contents data about of delegated Top-Level Domains (TLDs) in each of these roots
 - a set of measures that demonstrate the size, growth, and composition of the IANA registries, and also the global network availability of these registries
 - metrics that reflect the responsiveness of the CZDS service to the community's needs and intended use of this service

Workstream 4

Future Challenges

Recommendations Areas for Workstream 4

Covered by ICANN Bylaw 4.6(c) (iii)

- Cryptography
- Name Collision
- Privacy
- Research and Briefings
- DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)

- PTI should update the DPS to facilitate transition from one digital signature algorithm to another, including an anticipated transition from the RSA digital signature algorithm to ECDSA or to future post-quantum algorithms
- PTI should work with other root zone partners and the global community to develop a consensual plan for root DNSKEY algorithm rollover

Full text - Cryptography

- PTI should update the DPS to facilitate transition from one digital signature algorithm to another, including an anticipated transition from the RSA digital signature algorithm to ECDSA or to future post-quantum algorithms, which will create a more resilient DNS while providing the same or greater security.
- As root DNSKEY algorithm rollover is a very complex and sensitive process, PTI should work with other root zone partners and the global community to develop a consensus plan for root DNSKEY algorithm rollover, taking into consideration the lessons learned from the recent root KSK rollover.

Name Collision

- Produce findings that characterize the nature and frequency, and any relevant concerns, regarding the issue of name collisions
 - a solution be implemented before the next round of gTLDs be launched
- Support an independent study of name collisions through to its eventual completion, and adopt or account for the implementation or non-adoption of any resulting recommendations
 - Publish planned milestones and (with associated start/end dates) for these studies, and link to their results from the published plan
 - NCAP should be allowed to complete all three of its studies

Name Collision

- ICANN should produce findings that characterize the nature and incidence, and any relevant concerns, regarding the issue of name collisions. With the known instances of these attack vectors, the SSR2 review team feels the name collision problem is clear and present, and must be explored, diagnosed, and acted upon through careful study and action. Among the findings were that the last round of gTLDs quantifiably exacerbated this problem. We therefore recommend that a solution be implemented before the next round of gTLDs be launched.
- ICANN should support an independent study of name collisions through to its eventual completion, and adopt or account for the implementation or non-adoption of any resulting recommendations. By “independent,” SSR2 RT means that ICANN should ensure that the Security and Stability Advisory Committee’s (SSAC) Name Collision Analysis Project (NCAP) work party research and report evaluation team is free of any participants with a financial interest in TLD expansion. ICANN should publish planned milestones and (with associated start/end dates) for these studies, and link to their results from the published plan. Without an independent and sufficiently detailed report on this matter, some of ICANN org’s strategic goals will not be achievable. As a first step, NCAP must be allowed to complete all three of its studies.

Privacy

- Create specialized units within the contract compliance function that focuses and understands privacy requirements and principles (such as collection limitation, data qualification, purpose specification and security safeguards for disclosure) but can facilitate law enforcement needs under the WHOIS framework as it is amended and adopted by the community
- Monitor relevant and evolving privacy legislation (e.g., CCPA and legislation protecting personal identifiable information (PII)) and ensure that policies and procedures are aligned and in compliance privacy and the protection of personally identifiable information is ensured as required by relevant legislation and regulation
- Develop and keep up to date a policy for the protection of PII; communicate policy to all persons involved in the processing of personally identifiable information; implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect PII
- ICANN's DPO: be responsible for external DNS PII; provide guidance to managers and stakeholders regarding responsibilities and procedures, and monitor and report on relevant technical developments
- Conduct periodic audit of adherence to privacy policies implemented by registrars to ensure that they at a minimum have procedures in place to address privacy breaches

Full text - Privacy

The SSR review team notes that privacy and privacy legislation are both concerns affecting ICANN. Furthermore, the privacy impact of technologies like DOT (DNS over TLS) and DOH (DNS over HTTPS) should be monitored and regularly reported on going forward. The SSR review team also notes that ICANN's mission and mandate, as stated in ICANN's Bylaws, highlights the role of ICANN in the rdap and the need for adaptability when external regulations such as the EU GDPR is issued. ICANN's consensus policies and agreements with registry operators and registrars must therefore have clauses to reflect compliance with these while ensuring that the DNS is not fragmented because of the need to maintain/implement minimum requirements governing the collection, retention, escrow, transfer, and display of registration data, which includes contact information of the registrant, administrative, and technical contacts as well as technical information associated with a domain name. At the moment, ICANN does not appear to monitor privacy sufficiently, and this recommendation outlines a series of interrelated actions that can address this gap:

ICANN should create specialized units within the contract compliance function that focuses and understands privacy requirements and principles (such as collection limitation, data qualification, purpose specification and security safeguards for disclosure) but can facilitate law enforcement needs under the WHOIS framework as it is amended and adopted by the community.

ICANN should monitor relevant and evolving privacy legislation (e.g., CCPA and legislation protecting personal identifiable information (PII)) and ensure that policies and procedures are aligned and in compliance privacy and the protection of personally identifiable information is ensured as required by relevant legislation and regulation.

ICANN should develop and keep up to date a policy for the protection of personally identifiable information. The policy should be communicated to all persons involved in the processing of personally identifiable information. Technical and organizational measures to appropriately protect PII should be implemented.

ICANN's DPO should also be responsible for external DNS PII. The DPO should provide guidance to managers and stakeholders regarding responsibilities and procedures, and monitor and report on relevant technical developments.

ICANN org should conduct periodic audit of adherence to privacy policies implemented by registrars to ensure that they at a minimum have procedures in place to address privacy breaches.

Research and Briefings

- Track developments in the peer-reviewed research community, focusing on networking and security research conferences, including at least ACM CCS, ACM IMC, Usenix Security, CCR, SIGCOMM, IEEE S&P, APWG, M3AAWG, and publish to the ICANN community an action report about any publications that are relevant
 - Reports should include either recommendations or situational awareness for SSR-impacting changes to contracted parties and other ICANN community stakeholders

Full text - Research and Briefings

ICANN org should track developments in the peer-reviewed research community, focusing on networking and security research conferences, including at least ACM CCS, ACM IMC, Usenix Security, CCR, SIGCOMM, IEEE S&P, APWG, M3AAWG, and publish to the ICANN community an action report about any publications that are relevant. These reports should include either recommendations or situational awareness for SSR-impacting changes to contracted parties and other ICANN community stakeholders.

DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)

- DoH enables application vendors to choose the resolution infrastructure, thereby allowing the vendors per-application overrides of administrator or user choice of DNS resolution and selective enforcement of DNSSEC
- Commission investigation(s) into DoH adoption, and focus particular attention to the reduced resilience in the DNS ecosystem and security concerns from the DoH protocol enhancements
 - *This recommendation is still under active discussion within SSR2*

Wrap Up



Thank You and Questions

Visit our wiki at <https://community.icann.org/x/AE6AAw>
Email (publicly archived): input-to-ssr2@icann.org