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BRENDA BREWER:	Thank you, Russ. Good day, everyone. Welcome to SSR2 Plenary Call #74, on the 13th of June, 2019, at 14:00 UTC.
	Members joining the call today are Russ, Rahm, Jabhera, Laurin, Norm, KC, and [Kaveh]. We just had a phone number ending in 601. Could you identify your name, please.
NAVEED BIN RAIS:	Yeah. This is Naveed.
BRENDA BREWER:	Thank you, Naveed. And from the ICANN organization, we have Jennifer, Negar, Steve, Charla, and Brenda. Apologies today from Denise, Eric, and Alain.
	Today's call is being recorded. Please state your name before speaking for the record and kindly mute your audio when not speaking.
	Russ, I'd like to turn the call over to you. Thanks.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	It looks like Kerry-Ann joined after you did the team member roll call.
BRENDA BREWER:	Thank you.

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RUSS HOUSLEY: The first thing I'd like to do is talk about the technical writer. Very late last night, the leadership team received a bio of someone who ICANN is putting forward. We have not yet had a chance to go over that. I wanted you to know that we're moving rapidly to fill that position. I don't know if there's any other status that staff can offer.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Hi, Russ. No, I think you covered it with your update. Thanks.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. The leadership team is going to go over that bio by e-mail and hopefully will not have to wait until we can actually have a call. Laurin is on the call, but neither Denise nor Eric could make today's call, so we'll figure that out.

The next thing is we wanted to make sure that we had all the recommendations put together and time for the new tech writer to be on board. Jennifer, if you could put into the chat the Google Doc link, since most people can't click it on the screen.

Okay, great. I am not sure which ones are new since the call yesterday. I know that I've seen some e-mail discussions about some of them. I think we have to scroll down to Recommendation 19 before we see the first rewrite of one that was here before. Recommendation 19 appears after the suggestions … yeah. Can we display that on the Zoom? … Scroll down to Recommendation 19 if you can, please … Yeah, they're not in order … Down from wherever you are … There we go – oh, just a little … Okay. There was a rewrite of this since we were last together, I think.

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Now it looks like there was just a minor edit. Are there any concerns here?

Okay. Scrolling down to the next one, we had a discussion about this one last week in terms of what traffic volume the L-root should be able to handle. I don't see that that was addressed. I think the real question is whether we want to preserve 15_2 or whether we think that is the part about carrying the load of the whole root during DDoS attacks. If I remember right, KC was saying that we should remove that part. I don't remember who was advocating for it.

I'm not seeing any hands—

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Hi. This is Naveed. Can you—

KC CLAFFY: Sorry. This is KC. I put comments in the document, so I was hoping whoever owned that one would deal with it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I see the comments, but I don't see that anyone has addressed them. Does anyone want to advocate for keeping this phrase? Or maybe the best thing is just to delete it.

KC CLAFFY: Again, my concern was, do we have any evidence that ICANN is doing something wrong here? I didn't attend this meeting with ICANN, so I

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don't know, but do they not already have in place [something] to deal with DDoS attacks, and is the L-root not already hardened sufficiently for our expectations?

RUSS HOUSLEY: That was not the nature of the discussion. It was more, if everyone else is falling down, can L-root by the backstop. That was the nature of the discussion.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

NORM RITCHIE: I think that phrase around DDoS attacks should be deleted. Then read it. See if the recommendations don't make sense because the idea was, as you say, not to defend against DDoS attacks. It was to address the fact that there is no contracts with the group providers.

KC CLAFFY: Okay, but assuming there's no contracts, which there has never been, what's the threat model? If the threat model is DDoS attacks, then my contention is you can't harden L-root enough. If somebody's already taken out all the roots—

NORM RITCHIE: It's not about DDoS. Forget DDoS.

KC CLAFFY: Okay. So what is it about? What's the threat model?

NORM RITCHIE: The threat model is that the other roots, for whatever reasons, decide not to post the roots anymore.

KC CLAFFY: I think this is a not-coherent recommendation in that case. We have to establish the threat model in the recommendation and then make a recommendation that is consistent with mitigating against that threat model. If I were in charge of the roots and somebody said, "All the roots but one are gone," my way of dealing with that is not to harden L-root. It's to find another way to distribute the root zone.

NORM RITCHIE: Well, that's fine.

KC CLAFFY: Which is what ICANN is already pursuing. So, again, I think we need to be careful. If that's the threat model and ICANN is already pursuing other options like hyperlocal root, we need to say we encourage ICANN to continue to pursue these options. Or we need to have a conversation about what actually makes sense. But right now, I don't see a match between what we believe the threat model is and what this recommendation is trying to approve.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: I agree with KC here. It's not just, I think, the lack of threat model. It's just that the scenario is off. So I would also say let's just kick this one.

RUSS HOUSLEY: What I'm hearing is to keep the first paragraph and delete the second. Is that correct? Because I don't think anyone felt that L-root shouldn't be leading by example, which I think is what the first paragraph is about.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: This is Naveed. Can I say something, please? I've been waiting for long. Because I don't see the queue and I'm on the phone, actually. I can't access Zoom.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Please go ahead.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Actually, I remember that this hardening of L-root was one of the topics in the table. We must have therefore some reason because the table was a product of the L.A. meeting and I did not attend. So I am not sure why we included that. Unless we know and unless the people who were there can tell us why we thought that the hardening of L-root is needed, I don't think that we should ride the rail, like delete anything related to that because, if we have something important, we can't just remove it just because we don't find the reason of why it is there. So it has to be

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there for some reason in the table. We had to investigate it or whatever. I don't know who put that in that table, but I think it should be.

The other thing is I think the main thing that KC read in the previous meeting was that there was a phrase, like, "L-root is capable of handling all root traffic." I already deleted that "all root traffic" and we're just saying "root traffic." I'm not sure how to measure that. I'm not for deleting that, by the way, unless we know the reason. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Naveed, there's two places where hardening is discussed. I think we're only talking about deleting the second one. The first one talks about procedures that are shared with other root servers about how to harden the hardening strategies. We're talking about keeping that one but deleting the other one in the second paragraph.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: Okay. Yeah, I see what you're saying. The main thing I want to keep in the second one is basically the right communication with the SOs, ACs, and the researchers – what we say at the end of the paragraph. So if we can merge that to the first one, I think I had would have no objection to that.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Steve, go ahead.

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STEVE CONTE: Thanks, Russ. 15_2 sounds like it's in need of a large rewrite or at least a better understanding, so I'm going to not comment on that. For 15_1, I would recommend evaluating the use of the term "requirements" because that implies that there's an enforcement model. As mentioned previously on this call by KC and maybe some others, there are no contracts with the root server operators, so having requirements with that implied enforcement would be difficult to implement. I'm all for best practices and, as written in the recommendation, that should go through RSSAC and have close collaboration, but I'm concerned about the term "requirements." Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So, Steve, what you're suggesting is to develop baseline security best practices for root server operators and leave it at that.

STEVE CONTE: Yes, with the strengths of the wording of "close cooperation (or collaboration)" with RSSAC. That's—

RUSS HOUSLEY: Then I didn't mean to delete that other part. I just wanted to make sure that I understood what your suggestion was.

STEVE CONTE: Yes. That is [then]. Correct.

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NORM RITCHIE:	So I think I heard we're deleting 15_2, correct?
RUSS HOUSLEY:	No, we're trying to figure out how to keep the bottom part of it so that ICANN coordinates vulnerability, disclosure, processes, security reports, intelligence, and so on. That part.
	I'm not seeing any other hands, so, with those changes, are we happy with 15_2?
	Okay. I think we talked about 20, 21, 22, and 23 – the merger of those – last time. We had a concern about abusive naming. I think Steve Conte made a suggestion in the document that said maybe we can just get rid of the word "abuse" so that we can avoid the plethora of potential meanings for that. I'm not sure what word we would use instead. Perhaps "misleading naming"? Or something to that effect?
	Does anyone have a concern with that?
KC CLAFFY:	I think I also put a bunch of concerns in the document. We had a long discussion last week about that naming is not abusive in itself. It's the use of it. So I think we're not going to get much traction unless we're a lot more precise, citing things from others.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	KC, I don't see comments here from you on this recommendation.

KC CLAFFY: Hmm. I don't see them right there, either. Maybe I put them in an e-mail. I will go find or reconstruct them. Who owns this one?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'd have to go bring up another document to answer that.

KC CLAFFY: I made a comment then. It would in general help to have the name in this document for each recommendation so that I can go pursue private conversation if I need to to save time and make progress here.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'll take the action to go through and add a penholder to each of these.

KC CLAFFY: Thanks. So, again, the implication here is we're putting our responsibility on ICANN to decide what's misleading and what's visually indistinguishable. Presumably, there's a conversation that's already happening about that or has already happened in the context of IDNs and homoglyphs or whatever it is. We need to be aware of it and take it into account in this recommendation. This thing looks like it's not informed by conversations that have happened up until now.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It's asking that ICANN take measures to highlight and act upon those, not take on responsibility of defining what those mean.

KC CLAFFY: Right. So what definition does it use?

RUSS HOUSLEY: So you're just saying, can we provide a pointer here?

KC CLAFFY: If one exists, right. I think the problem will be that you don't have one. And then what?

NORM RITCHIE: Didn't the SSAC write a report on this?

KC CLAFFY: I'm sure they did at some point.

NORM RITCHIE: So that would be the pointer.

KC CLAFFY: I'm not sure they defined it.

NORM RITCHIE: Oh.

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KC CLAFFY: Someone has to go do that work.

RUSS HOUSLEY: But that sounds like a community thing, not an ICANN thing.

KC CLAFFY: I suspect the SSAC report is coming on the fact that the community thing has not worked.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Ah.

KC CLAFFY: If there was a community thing. I don't know. Steve might know more here in this space. We're skating to the edge of my recollection.

STEVE CONTE: I know that there's been conversation in the past, both internally and with the broader community, about the term "abuse" and "abusive" and stuff. There is not an agreeable landing place on what that means to every party. I know that John Crain, for instance, and his team want to keep that conversation going because that has strong implications on how both the organization and the community respond and move forward.

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KC CLAFFY:

The secondary issue, although it's more of a primary issue, is what does "act upon" mean? What exactly are you asking ICANN to do here? Stop the domain? Again, I want to emphasize that I don't even know what a misleading name is, unless it's in a certain context of how it's going to be used, because is apple.bank misleading? Or apple.pizza? This list looks like a rathole to me, and I think we have to be super precise about what will count for SSR3 as having implemented this recommendation. I have no idea, based on what's written here, what would count.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

I hope I'm not stopping anyone else from speaking. I also can't see the list. I think one of the issues here is that for some of these elements we reached out to various players and so on. I think the problem is that some of these definitions that we're looking for I'm not sure exist yet or have been developed to a point where they would reliable. So that's a problem.

At the same time, we have also seen and heard that this is a real issue. We do have to address it somehow, but as you say, KC, I'm not sure how we can write this recommendation without having these definitions at hand right now. My only idea is to essentially reach out again and see if there is something that we can use here.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Laurin, are you taking that action to do that literature search?

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LAURIN WEISSINGER: I will look into literature. I'll also get in touch with some people and see if there's something we can use.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. Until we have that information, I think that's all we can do with this one right now.

I think that we're at the bottom of the document. Were any new ones adding in the middle of the document since last week?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Russ, this is Kerry. I just amended the one that was left out. It would be above your recommendation. So, if you scroll up … keep going …

UNIDENTFIELD FEMALE: [I'm sorry]—

RUSS HOUSLEY: Which number is it?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I couldn't put a number because the numbers weren't sequential, so I just put it as a text right above this. It's on the page right after – keep going.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So this is the one with V-[inaudible]?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Yeah. I merged it as [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. So that's …

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: It's above this. Keep going.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Right above the suggestion—

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Right here. Uh-uh. Right here. So if you go up a little bit more, you'll – yeah. Right there. So I merged V1 to 3.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay. Can everyone take a minute to read this?

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: Just so everyone knows, their [project took] was to make it more positive, just to take it from the idea of capacity [strengthening] for registrar. It could be that that's the issue. So it was more to encourage ICANN to be more active in that regard rather than taking an enforcement hardline with it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm worried about "should consider." Does that mean this is [met] if the Board talks about it and it's minuted?

KERRY-ANNE BARRETT: We could make it stronger.

NAVEED BIN RAIS: I made a comment. If you can see that, please.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I'm not seeing any hands. Does that mean the rest of it people are happy with?

                          Kerry, I was hoping that you could add which part of the strategic plan this supports.

KERRY-ANN BARRETT: I'll look at it and I'll do it later today or tomorrow.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. All right. I'm not seeing any other new text. Did I miss any?

                          Okay. Norm, I'm going to call you on the carpet a little bit here. I know you've got a big chunk. You took a big action item coming out of Brussels. When do you think we'll be able to see some text for that?

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible] this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh, there is?

NORM RITCHIE: Yes.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Sorry.

NORM RITCHIE: I guess I probably put it in the wrong spot.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh, okay. So the text at the very, very bottom. So this should be Recommendation 36, right?

NORM RITCHIE: I'm not sure of the number. That's why I just stuck it at the bottom.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Okay.

NORM RITCHIE: In discussions with some others, we thought it was best to keep this at a fairly high level, at this point at least, because you can write a whole book on this.

RUSS HOUSLEY: I think high level is the right idea.

NORM RITCHIE: I tried to capture the salient points that we're talking about so that we, as a group, can decide if this is on the right track or if something should be modified or added or deleted.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Norm, could I ask you to do the same thing as I asked Kerry-Ann do in—

NORM RITICHIE: Yeah. [inaudible]

RUSS HOUSLEY: [inaudible] the strategic plan that this supports?

NORM RITCHIE: Already noted. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Thank you. Any comments on Norm's proposed text here?

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Not seeing any hands—

KC CLAFFY: I don't what "autonomous" means, and how does SSR3 know that it's autonomous, and how does something autonomous fit into ICANN's current bylaws?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, good point. Maybe "autonomous" is not the correct word here. The notion is that it has to be somewhat at arm's length in order to be effective.

KC CLAFFY: Actually, I think "autonomous" is the right word, but I just don't think it's possible in the current structure. So I don't think it can be used as a metric for the success of this recommendation. I think something else is going to have to be a metric, some other autonomous evaluation of whether it's being effective.

NORM RITCHIE: My view is, if it's autonomous, it will not be effective.

KC CLAFFY: Exactly. That's why I think "autonomous" is the right word. I think we're going to have to expect in this case the Board to come back with, "Okay, this is impossible," or, "We're going to punt this to a PDP that will take two years and then not generate something autonomous." So I think we

need to think a little bit more about how to write this in a way that there's accountability for it.

This needs a conversation. I don't have an answer here. I'm just trying to [red-team] it a little.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, I know. Got it.

I thought somebody would comment on the WHOIS point.

KC CLAFFY: You mean the private access to WHOIS?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. I'm advocating that this group has access to the WHOIS data.

KC CLAFFY: Right. I think there's a going to be a pushback on the claim that this would significantly reduce the requirement for others who have access because I think you have an interesting ecosystem now of many private companies at least believing – I don't know how to evaluate it – they do good when they have access to non-[political] WHOIS data. So you're saying that whole industry wouldn't need to exist anymore.

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NORM RITCHIE: What I'm saying is that, historically, a lot of different organizations have done abuse monitoring for the registries and registrars, and they used WHOIS to do that.

Now, WHOIS going away is fine, as long as somebody else picks up the ball to do the abuse monitoring and research. What's happened is that nobody has. I'm saying that this group could. There's [inaudible] [great], including my own organization. There'd be no need for the SDF anymore.

KC CLAFFY: Mm-hmm.

NORM RITCHIE: So I'd quite happily turn off the SDF if this other group was formed. I'd say, "Job achieved. Thank you."

KC CLAFFY: You have the accountability issue. Who's watching this organization? Who does this organization report to? Who makes sure that this organization is in fact operating with accurate data and validating our data and yada, yada, yada.

NORM RITCHIE: Good point.

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KC CLAFFY: I don't see a function that accomplishes this goal, so this looks like it could make it worse by saying that we've solved the problem but moving everything inside a black box that nobody else can evaluate, that is nobody's job to evaluate.

NORM RITCHIE: You're right. There has to be some type of oversight of this group.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah.

NORM RITCHIE: Good point.

KC CLAFFY: And I don't know that we get away with telling ICANN to go create that oversight or the community to create that oversight because they think they've done that in the current structure.

So I'm going to completely agree with the problem here, and even the idea that some sort of [center of] expertise would be a way to solve it. But it would need to be carefully architected and there needs to be some external form of oversight that isn't the industry itself, I guess. We just could add that text in here somehow and then, pending the existence of some other entity, we suggest that SSR2 should remain involved until we believe it's sufficiently autonomous or has sufficient oversight that it's satisfying the recommendation.

Again, it comes back to how does SSR3 know that this recommendation was, one, executed, and, two, met the intended results or whatever the wording is that we've had to evaluate for SSR1?

NORM RITCHIE: I'd like to write notes to myself here, if that's okay.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. I'll noodle on it, Norm, and we can also talk offline. This is, in my mind, one of the central problems here of everything else we're dealing with. So I think it's a super important recommendation.

NORM RITCHIE: I thoroughly and truly believe that this would be monumental and correcting things if we can pull it off.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah. There was—

RUSS HOUSLEY: And, Norm, you got really excited about this in Brussels, so I'm hoping you still have that excitement after all the research you did.

KC CLAFFY: Right. We all pointed at this 2010 document, where something like a cert was tried before. So we at least need to go prove that we've done our homework and say we understand this was tried in 2010 and we

understand this is why it failed or we don't understand or here's what we do understand but this needs to be tried again and here's why think it would be different now or what they should do differently to avoid what happened in 2010 that made it not take off. Now I totally have no idea what the right answer is to fill in all those gaps because I didn't do that research.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. In my checking on the DNS cert and talking to people about it, a lot of people thought it was [inaudible] at the time.

KC CLAFFY: I guarantee you this recommendation would become that also. So that's the challenge: how to keep it accountable.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. The whole idea is, like I said, that the people who do abuse analysis research and all that are few and far between. That's part of the problem. You need this small group that has legs to it so, if one person leaves, you don't lose all the knowledge.

KC CLAFFY: Well, another solution I might expect is, if it were the FTC doing it, creating a lot more of people that do domain abuse research. So have ICANN fund scholarships in this space or something.

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NORM RITCHIE: As long as the goals are changing—

KC CLAFFY: And then have a measurable ruler to judge it later, like ten new people. Or establish a certificate program in abuse research, like you have in CCIP or whatever.

NORM RITCHIE: I think that's good, but part of the problem is we need deep knowledge of abuse within the ICANN community/organization ecosystem. So, while I'm all in favor of working with research and educational institutions, they tend to be fleeting. So the money goes out, the report comes back in, and then people move on. I'm trying to think of a way of building up this expertise of dealing with abuse. That's what's in the ecosystem itself.

So right now, if you say, "What is abuse?" no one can even agree on what that means. It's crazy.

KC CLAFFY: Okay.

NORM RITCHIE: But I don't want to do this in such a way that you lose the baby with the bathwater. So, if we make this too large, that just falls off the edge of the planet, and then we're nowhere. We end up with zero. So [what

we're really looking for assistance for] is how do we phrase this in such a way that it gets accepted?

KC CLAFFY: And who is this organization hiring if there's so few people? What's the pipeline? And what would create the pipeline? Is that ICANN or industry funding? Because academia has apparently not created it for you.

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. We purposely did not put funding in at this point. Obviously there will be money involved in this. That has to come from somewhere. But I think we need to work on that.

KC CLAFFY: Yeah.

NORM RITCHIE: [inaudible]. Maybe some governments will step up and say, "Here's a [quack] of money."

KC CLAFFY: Sure. We're not recommendations in this document. But what we could do is make a recommendation that tries to achieve the goal of ICANN being transparent about the fact that it's not within its capability to establish this organization within some amount of time and to assert that publicly so that then others have the ability to look at it and say, "Okay, this isn't happening. We better go find another solution for this,"

for example – again, to bring it back to something where there's a measurable outcome, it moves the ball forward in understanding whether this can be fixed inside the current structure, and it alerts folks who might want to put funding into such a thing that there's their signal.

Just as a side comment, I don't know what the current status is on all of those CCT recommendations, but this one looks to me like the flavor of CCT recommendation that got punted by the Board into "This is for someone else to go figure out." CCT was super unhappy about the way that it was handled, as far as I'm understanding. So I just want to manage our expectations about the way a recommendation like this might get handled. Not that it's our job to anticipate all of that, but I think we shouldn't think about it.

NORM RITCHIE:　　　　　　I understand.

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RUSS HOUSLEY:　　　　　Steve Conte has his hand up. I just wanted you guys to finish before we move on. Steve?

STEVE CONTE:　　　　　　As mentioned before, we've tried this before and it was quite a painful experience. Yet it's a great idea. I'm wondering if maybe we're taking two steps instead of one step, and maybe the recommendation should

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be more about asking the questioning or convening a work party or whatever we want to call it to ask those questions to the broader community that you guys are struggling with right now about funding, about autonomy, about all that stuff.

In some ways – Norm, I'm using you as a poster child here – if we the organization can do this openly, transparently, and collaboratively – I think that's the key there – then hopefully there won't be the Empire building aspect or perception of it and more buy-in and ownership from the community as well to build.

So maybe the recommendation is more about, "Hey, go talk to the community or develop something that has some legs on it that maybe the community can embrace instead of saying, "This is what you guys should do. Go do it."" It's just my personal opinion on this in how to move that forward, so take it for what it's worth.

NORM RITCHIE: I agree that's probably a more palatable. The flipside of the concern on that is that [inaudible] has another project that drags on ten years. But it—

KC CLAFFY: Yeah, I agree. I think somebody would rather need to go review why the other one failed – why the cert failed – and why it wouldn't fail again. What would be different this time that will make it not fail again? I don't think we have to repeat the exercise if we can gather the lessons

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learned from the previous exercise. In fact, I would be super reluctant to recommend repeating the exercise.

NORM RICTCHIE: Yeah. The other one was not an abuse center. It was a DNS cert. Part of the criticism was the idea that there are certs [and] we didn't need one specific DNS. But this is not a cert. It is not specifically about DNS. It's about domain name abuse.

KC CLAFFY: I think that distinction is going to get lost on most people. It's sort of lost on me because, when I look at the bullets here – "This abuse center would da da da da da" – those all look to me like certain activities – never mind what you call it – in that they're operational. My recollection of why the cert failed was that not only is there a lot of other certs but ICANN shouldn't do mission creep into operational space. So, again, we're going to have to address that issue. Maybe that's the point that needs to be hashed out. Maybe why this needs to be some other third-party organization. I take Steve's point. This has been done before. It was painful. We need to minimize the repetition of that pain and maximize the utility of the exercise in our collective wisdom and then have it written down somewhere.

Maybe that's a piece of research or a piece of work that needs to be done by somebody. Maybe we need to go have ICANN fund somebody to go do that: a three-month exercise on digging down until all of that and writing up lessons learned.

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NORM RITCHIE: Yeah. I hope to use the upcoming ICANN meeting as an opportunity to socialize us with—

KC CLAFFY: That's a great idea. Fantastic idea.

NORM RITCHIE: And see what people think: that there's no appetite for this or everybody thinks, yes, there should be a process to get to this point, that that's fine as long as that point is reached. There will be people that say no right at the gate, and we need to listen to that as well. I do hope that at least some people say, "Great idea. Let's find a way of getting it done." I guess I want to get a sense for if there a will or appetite this within the ecosystem to have this happen.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Those hallway conversations seem really important. I look forward to hearing how you assimilate that and report that.

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NORM RITCHIE: Mm-hmm.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Any other discussion on this text?

I put some comments in, Norm, based on these discussions. Hopefully they will guide you going forward here.

NORM RITCHIE: Okay. I got too many windows. I'm just searching for it here again. What's the thing?

RUSS HOUSLEY: They're in the Google Doc. There'll be there in the margin there.

NORM RITCHIE: Got it. Okay, thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Okay. I think that brings us to the recap of the action items, Jennifer.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Great. Thanks, Russ. The action items I captured for today: the first one is for you, Russ, to add the names of the penholders to each of the recommendations in the Google Doc for ease of reference. Then Kerry-Anne and Norm are going to add references to this strategic plan to their draft recommendations. That's all I captured. Let me know if I missed anything. As usual, thanks.

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NORM RITCHIE:	Could I ask who's going to be at the upcoming ICANN meeting for our two-day get-together?
RUSS HOUSLEY:	We did a Doodle poll on that about which days different people would be there. Maybe Jennifer can post the results into the chat so everybody has them.
JENNIFER BRYCE:	I will certainly send them via the list because I don't have them immediately in front of me since we're wrapping up. I'll send that today.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	Great. Thank you.
JENNIFER BRYCE:	Thanks.
RUSS HOUSLEY:	All right. I think that's the end then. Thank you very much.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]