
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: This meeting is now being recorded.

BRENDA BREWER: Good day, everyone. Welcome to SSR2 Review Team Plenary Call #61 on the 21st of February, 2019 at 15:00 UTC. Attending the call today is Ram Krishna, Russ, Boban, Eric, Laurin, Matogoro, Norm. We have no observers at this time. From ICANN Org, we have Jennifer, Steve, [Nagar], and Brenda. Apologies from Kaveh.

Today's call is being recorded. I'd like to remind you to please state your name for the transcript. And Russ, I'll turn the call over to you. Thank you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Welcome. The first thing on the agenda is an update on what's going on with the face-to-face meeting in Brussels. I think Jennifer is going to handle that.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Thanks, Russ. Hi, everybody. So I believe that the Travel Team has sent welcome e-mails to the Review Team members today regarding the meeting in Brussels. This is the 17th to the 19th of May. If you have not received the e-mail, please let us know and we will work to figure out what has gone wrong. Otherwise, take a look at the e-mail. Please, as usual, go through it and fill out as quickly as possible. We're always here to answer any questions and I know that some of you may require Visas,

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so please let us know in advance if there is anything that we can do to help with that. But otherwise, I'm happy to report that you all should have received the e-mail. So happy to answer any questions.

The facility, the venue will be the ICANN Brussels office. We will update the calendar invite to include all the details for the exact location of that as well. So please look out for that. Thanks. Jennifer is finished.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. The next thing we're going to do is go through the SSR, sorry the DNS SSR. We have answers to a couple of our questions in this area and we also have, want to go through and find out if there's any information we should be getting from someone other than ICANN staff. So we're going to turn that over to Eric to walk through. He's already posted two links to Google Docs in the chat. Eric, go ahead.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Hey, can you guys hear me?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Yes. I hear you fine.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

All right, good. I had a problem with it. All right. So yeah, I put the two links in the chat like Russ said. Thanks, Russ.

And sort of, there's two documents that we kind of have [balanced] here. One was the work we did all as a group and that was we put

people's names by the things that they were going to work on and then we had it synthesized into the other link which has sort of got all the workstreams together.

So what I thought I'd try and do in real time is first start off. Does anybody have any comments or questions or sort of high-level things before we get started? I know that at least one person's had some, a few people had some back and forth about writing and delegation and dissemination so does anybody have anything they want to chat about before we get started?

And I'm not seeing anything.

Okay, then I'll jump right into it. So what I thought I'd do is I thought I'd go down. If you look at the second link I put in there, the second one is the original doc and in there, that's a whole bunch of annotations and some things that have back and forth. And so the very bottom of it, I put a dilemma there that has today's date and says "V2 text" which some brackets below it. I thought what I would do, subject to anybody's comments, is go to the first link that I pointed, the summary digest of all the things that were extracted. Go down those one at a time and as we discuss them, maybe put in any kind of blurb or whatever. So this will go really fast if there's no participation.

So if people don't have anything to say, there won't be much text that shows up and we'll wind up with a lot of time back on our hands at the end of the call. So fair warning. Anybody have any comments or questions about that or suggestions, course changes, suggestions?

Seeing nothing, I'll continue.

Okay, so in the workstream document, the first thing that is listed is universal resolvability. Can identifiers be uniquely resolved and consumed? And then it has name collisions, universal resolvability in the Internet of Things, IPv6 CGN complexity, etc. So I thought I would just post this into the V2 section and I'd like to hear anybody's thoughts or comments on that. And if need be, I can try and go through the document and see who the [stucky] was to lead this sub-text. I'm doing that while you all think about it.

So I believe ... Some of these are not a one-to-one mapping, so this one had a lot of names next to it. Well, there's name space abuse. Yeah, these are not a one-to-one mapping I think. Does anybody have any thoughts about name collisions?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So Eric, this is something ICANN, as a whole, is spending a huge amount of time on. A lot of people want to have this sorted before any next round, so one of the things I was hoping the team would come to consensus on is how far does that work have to go before the next round should happen. What do people think?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Not seeing any hands. I see Laurin is preparing to type. Laurin, go ahead.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Can you all hear me?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes.

LAURIN WEISSINGER: Okay, great. I'm using the app and it's being funky.

So I'm wondering about this right now as in what are the things we are thinking about doing or assessing in this space. So this is one of the ones where I'm a bit, okay, what can we reasonably do versus what might be necessary? So I'm currently a bit unsure what to do with this one, essentially, and I was wondering if anyone has kind of a position on that.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Thanks, Laurin. So yeah, so I think not seeing any hands, I'll sort of take my hat off for an answer to that one. I think one of the things that we could do that we probably should do is we should, as Russ kind of gave us our straw man for, what do we think should happen in this case, name collisions in particular, the investigation research or assessment of the situation in regards to what ICANN should do next? And so, like Russ said, NCAP aside is sort of the stated umbrella operation for doing something about name collisions.

There's any number of things we could do and I think probably being careful not to put something out that is in contrast or conflict with what NCAP has said is really important, but certainly, I think we can add our own perspective if there seems like there's a gap that should be filled for SSR. So I believe the first proposed study for NCAP was something along the lines of a literature search and summary, a survey piece, about what has gone on with name collision research. And certainly,

Russ's comments about dovetailing that back into the next round is probably the kind of thing that we could consider an SSR2 Review Team objective.

I think that kind of maybe answers some of what you're saying, Laurin. But also, it leaves the door open for we might want to make sure we think through what all the other things there are.

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Thanks, Eric. So this is exactly what I'm wondering about. Should we, before we write any questions here, have a look in that report? I mean, my immediate reaction to this, which is my usual immediate reaction to most things here is to kind of tracking, what data are available, what are the indicators, and so on, and so on. But [if] status already happened, I think it would make sense if we searched those out and before defining our own thing, have a look at what they did and see if we're happy with it or whatever.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So yeah. So Laurin, I think we all heard you but just so you know, that time when you were speaking was a lot softer than the first time. So if you stepped away from your mic, it may have played up.

But one of the challenges for us in that regard is that NCAP is, at best, in the start-up phase, maybe even before that. I think there was some discussion that it may not actually even go forward. So I'm not sure that we can actually wait for it. I suspect that as long as it's taken us to go forward, there's a reason to believe we might finish before they get

started. So it may wind up being incumbent upon us to do a lot of our own work on this.

So name collisions themselves, they have a presence in the academic literature. So we may wind up being able to actually front run what the NCAP itself does if it comes to fruition and so we may want to sort of also consider a first principles discussion. We think a name collision looks like this, we think it feels like it could be a concern because of that and these are the things that should be looked out for, and then hopefully that dovetails [again] with any kind of would-be NCAP work. Does that make sense?

LAURIN WEISSINGER:

Sounds good. So I wasn't quite clear on how far they are. Is it possible for us to figure out who is in charge of that on the NCAP side so we can reach out, see what's going on, where they stand, just to not duplicate work or anything like that? Do you think that would work?

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

So I believe we have at least one member of SSAC on the team, maybe even on the call right now. I'll have to switch back and see. Yeah, KC, can I tap you to share any thoughts on that as an SSAC person?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

KC, if you're talking, we're not hearing anything.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: It's possible that there's not much to say. So yeah, Russ, I see you pointed to our name collision mitigation from 2014. I'm not sure that that's the NCAP work. The NCAP is the SSAC work party that has some. I think it's a little bit outside their normal operation for SSAC, so I think there's a lot of figuring out happening right now with it.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, I understand that. I just was trying to find something that was still, was there and useful and maybe helps with definitions and such.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, okay. I will look for the link real quick for the NCAP stuff. I have it. Give me one second. Post it now.

So yeah, so the comment period closed about a year ago and I suspect they're probably going to have a briefing in Kobe but I'm not sure.

Steve has typed something. Multi-year project, overlap with the next SSR Review. Yeah, so this one we may have to sort of try to figure out how to sort of thread the needle because whether NCAP as it stands now is going to show up in one way or the other or when it's going to show up might be hard to predict and so we may want to put something in there that we feel like acknowledges something's going on and maybe states our perspective on what we hope it does.

Steve suggests that maybe we reach out to the NCAP leadership and that might be a good thing. I'm not sure exactly how [inaudible] structure. Does anyone have any thoughts on how we would reach out to NCAP leadership?

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, we can always just send mail to their staff support person, Dennis Chang, and ask him to connect us.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, yeah. No, totally. I just wondered. I was imagining we do the whole submit a question and wait for an answer kind of thing. I'm just not sure what kind of question we'd ask. But we could ask for a briefing, I suppose.

Okay, so I'll let this one sort of hang in the chamber for a little bit while we move on.

So universal resolvability and the Internet of Things is the next sub-topic.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And actually, the document that I posted the link to is about IoT and name collisions, and so they are kind of overlapped in that sense. It was actually on this topic that I found that document.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I looked at this framework a long time ago.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah. Well, it is a 2014 document.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, I thought this was the one that was talking about controlled interruption and stuff like that. I didn't realize they hit on IoT too much. But my recollection is very foggy on this one.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Well, that was its title.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: It was IT.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Oh, I misread it. My fault. That's what happens when you're searching too many things.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Google was trying to help you.

RUSS HOUSLEY: Yeah, exactly.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: So universal resolvability and the Internet of Things, I think I kind of vaguely remember this discussion topic from our face-to-face I think. So my recollection of it was something along the lines of how ... I do realize these two were coupled together so I remember the universal resolvability was things around, I thought it was more like universal acceptance. And so if someone has a different recollection, or certainly,

if there was a penholder who was listening, correct me if I'm wrong but for my money, I look at this and I think maybe it means universal acceptance and that probably wouldn't be an Internet of things issue. Universal acceptance would be more like IDNs and whatnot I think and rendering emojis as top-level domains and whatnot.

No one's going to take that [inaudible]? Okay. More coffee for everyone.

So anybody want to give a starting stab at that? My hope is to sort of do a path through whatever fragments we have here and try and turn them into text, so the more fragments I get from folks, the more this will look like what you want.

Okay. I'm going to break them out into two things and change this to what seems to make sense to me. Okay. You all are just leaving the pen squarely in my hand, so buyer, beware.

All right, so I'll move on to IPv6 CGN complexity. Query the role of ICANN on this. Okay. I assume that that query came from someone other than who suggested it.

So I'm going to take a stab at ... So IPv6, would that be the IANA allocation policies or would that be around some interaction with CGNs? How many people on the call know what a CGN is?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

I do.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Carrier Grade NAT. I'm just assuming since not everybody responded, some people probably don't. Whoa, I've totally fallen behind.

Okay, so Carrier Grade NAT. This is a transition technology that ... Well, the Carrier Grade NAT is just a NAT that a carrier can use but in large part, it's often used to sort of bridge IPv4 networks with IPv6 reachability. So one of the things that CGNs have become a big deal about, it's just one of the many things they can do and run into is that IPv4 addresses get mapped to IPv6 addresses and sometimes that means that an external observation can't map something directly to its origin IP. And some people have had concerns about mapping it back for lots of reasons. Other issues include scalability and the fact that it's an example of [inaudible] a NAT in the IP architecture.

Yeah, Russ, go ahead.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So it's also the fact that since the IPv4 address space is so much smaller than the IPv6 address space, the mapping keeps getting reassigned based on demand and so on. And so the ability to figure out who did something and where they were is even more complicated if the mapping keeps going, changing over time. And so like in the Comcast network, for example, v6 is used in all of the internal traffic. But when you want to go surf a v4 website, it gets mapped through a CGN.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yes, indeed. Very good explanation. Thanks, Russ. So before I roll forward, anybody have any comments, or questions, or thoughts, or even follow-up questions or anything about this?

Boban, go ahead please. Boban, if you're speaking, we can't hear you. Boban? Was that an accidental hand? Go ahead. Still not hearing you. Boban says his mic is not working.

RUSS HOUSLEY: We can confirm that.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Well, hold on a second while Boban is typing.

RUSS HOUSLEY: So I posted a link to a blog post from the Internet Society that says how IPv6 and CGN are helping cyber criminals hide in the bigger space.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Indeed. That is definitely good reading for anybody who is looking for something to read. Yes, Boban. Okay, so Boban brings up a good point. Boban asked what ICANN's role in the CGN context is and is there any relation. And Norm acknowledges that.

And you know, if I had to write this right now, I would have a hard time with that myself, so I'm wondering if anybody has any strong feelings about this. And Ram Krishna agrees.

RUSS HOUSLEY: It sounds like maybe we've trimmed this?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, I was going to say I'm going to put a strike through it. I know I'm kind of annotating v2, so whatever. But I'll leave that there so that somebody can circle back later and inform the team as to why it should stay, but as of right now, I am going to put a strike through it. Stricken.

Okay, love trimming. Okay, Boban, you're typing so we're going to hold on for one second while you finish. Okay, cool. All right. Sweet. So big fan of that.

All right, so now I'm going to move on to the next topic. I'm going to paste it and then read it so everyone can see what we're talking about. Number two, ICANN role in improving the security of unique identifiers which includes threat mitigation. So authoritative name servers. So we did not have a question on this. I see KC is typing. But while she types, okay, so authoritative name servers, ICANN's role in approving the security of unique identifiers.

So while KC is typing, I'll be looking for any hands on people who want to give a starting point on this. So as we wait, during [IO] ... Oh, here we go.

Adobe made me think the audio [inaudible]. Guess not. CGN should include a few sentences of our reasoning about why we didn't cover it. Okay. Fair comment. I will finish watching. Norm, go ahead while KC's typing. And Boban, your hand is still raised.

NORM RITCHIE: Sorry. [Inaudible] problems. I'm muting my mic. Yeah, I think on this one, we just had a great real life example of where improvements could be made in this. I think a lot of people are looking at what's happened with the DNS call [inaudible], where [inaudible] supposedly by state sponsored or state [inaudible]. I think a lot of people are going to be addressing this particular attack day at ICANN coming up, so we could do some research in this area. But I think we're going to actually get presentations on it at Kobe, which might really help us figure out how ICANN or have our recommendations for how ICANN can improve in this area.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay. Yeah, I think that's true and I definitely don't think we should feel the pen will get put down permanently before then. So should we put something in there now that is something we feel comfortable about, about authoritative name servers, like for example, ICANN runs some authoritative name servers? It's probably a much smaller scope than might have been envisioned for this and certainly, like you're pointing out, our scope could change when we hear briefings from [context] experts. So it would just be good to put something down now if we have any, or should we just put nothing now?

NORM RITCHIE: It's not just the group, but also [inaudible] place for registrars and registries [inaudible] done there, and certainly, the [inaudible].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: We're losing you, Norm. Sorry. Norm?

NORM RITCHIE: And there is embedded some other articles [inaudible].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I don't know about others, but I lost you after you finished saying controls in place for registrars and registries, and then it broke up and I couldn't understand you after that. Could you repeat?

NORM RITCHIE: Oh, I'm sorry. Yeah, so I was saying that it's not so much the root I'm thinking of here. It's what can be done with helping registries and registrars and end users, for that matter, in securing their DNS. And some of them are simple. It's two-factor authentication.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Got it. Okay. Excellent starting points. One second. Okay, sorry. And then jumping back to what KC was saying, there's going to be a lot of issues with identifying security and stability that are out of scope for ICANN because they require real regulation from governments. Criminals hiding behind CGN is one such thing. We should say we think so.

Okay. All right, so then I'm going to un-strike it and try and channel that. The best way to channel it is with the copy and paste. Okay, these will

be starting points that I'll try and synthesize in some way. And I'm sure I'll get stuff wrong, so hopefully I don't think anyone will mind beating me over the head when I get something sideways.

Okay. So before I move on, I see Boban is typing. I'll give you a second to catch up.

Actually Norm, so domain name registration data, registries, registrars and registrants is the next section below authoritative domain name servers, so maybe I'll just move your thoughts to ... Actually, these things will probably merge together so I'll just sort of keep them like this.

NORM RITCHIE: Okay, see you're equating authoritative domain name servers to the root by [inaudible].

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I'm sorry. I don't mean to. So where does it seem like I did that?

NORM RITCHIE: Because you said what I just mentioned was in the next bullet point, so I inferred that. So that's a wrong inference.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: I put it under domain name registration data, registries, registrars and registrants. That was the next sub-bullet. Does that make sense or no?

NORM RITCHIE: Yeah, never mind. All good.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Yeah, sorry. But good calling me out, definitely.

Okay. Does anybody else have an issue with Adobe? Boban says he's having issues. Maybe not.

Okay, so while the chat sort of comes ... Well, I'm always crystal clear, Steve. I'm always that way.

Okay, so as the crystal clear exemplar, the next one, IP addresses and autonomous system numbers employed by the global Internet routing system. So this one has got a paren that notes that we'll have to [inaudible] the exact role of ICANN, so I do think that this is an area we haven't talked about a lot and I would sort of even hazard to suggest that there isn't always a lot of discussion about ICANN's role in unique identifier space for numbers, but that certainly that's a part of the landscape. So it would be good for us to at least have a treatise that we thought about it, let alone if we have anything we'd like to delve into there.

So can I try and channel? Can I get you guys to channel any thoughts that you all have about what role in the number space we should sort of have comments? And if you leave it to me, then I'll figure something out. But I want to make sure I get other people's thoughts in here.

So just as sort of a primer with BGP, the global routing system, every entity in the global routing system, a node is basically an autonomous system number. Organizations can have one or many, but if they're going to be a unique, if they're going to be an identifiable routing entity in the global routing system, they have an autonomous system number. Those system numbers can announce sets of IP addresses that are grouped together in IP prefixes and those are also delegated from IANA to RIRs and then to some number of entities before organizations, and ultimately, users get a hold of using them.

So while before a user winds up getting a number, it may have gone through organizations other than ICANN that are down in the delegation tree. ICANN, and through its IANA PTI, serves as the root of these things, and so, most users may not see it, may not interact with it, but it's there.

So is there anything people think that we ought to put as a framing discussion point conversation, whether we just thought about it or certainly, if anybody sees any issues that we think are worth delving into?

I'm not seeing any feedback. Okay. All righty, so moving on.

Okay, I'm going to move the DNSSEC progress key rollover over now. Okay, sweetness. Okay, so now I have DNSSEC. Sorry, I can't let this go. DNSSEC progress key rollover.

Sorry, I'm catching up on chat.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Matogoro, you are now connected to the meeting.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Hi, Matogoro. So Laurin, you're not hearing what I'm saying. Are other people having trouble hearing me? Is anybody else having trouble hearing me?

RUSS HOUSLEY: I hear you fine.

BRENDA BREWER: I can hear you fine.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay. Laurin, it may be on your side, dude. Sorry. If you want to ping something that you know that I was unclear about, I'll go back.

Then Norm, abuse of numbers is much the same as abuse of names. I think that might be true, but there's a different sort of fan-out at the root of the numbers. In other words, RIRs and stuff play a large role with handing out numbers and IANA [inaudible] but we should figure out how to sort of thread that needle.

Naveed is not hearing me clearly.

Norm, totally agree with you. Norm says if we cover abuse of names, then we should also cover numbers. I agree. I think dovetailing to which pieces of those abuses fall within ICANN's umbrella will be trickier just

because of the delegation structure. So I'd probably be looking for some help with that. Do you have any thoughts or suggestions?

Yeah, okay. Well then, certainly think about it and fire out if you do. I'll try and put something in there that I think makes sense and maybe that'll help channel some sort of synergy around what to write there. But at the very least, I think we've got to sort of point out that we did think about it and even if we come away going, "Everything's great," then at least it sort of looks comprehensive. That's my two cents.

Okay, so DNSSEC progress key rollover. So I feel like there's a lot we could say here. So one of the things is ODI has a comment about exposing DNSSEC data so I think we should look into the status there and see if it's meeting what seems like it should meet.

There's certainly, even just recently, there's been some commentary about the KSK rollover. There's timing and there's analysis of what's happened, etc. Does anyone have any thoughts on what we might structure there? I mean, certainly, the first one has happened. There's discussion about what to do next and how often to do it, etc. All right, audio recovery, good. Russ, go ahead.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

So there's a whole mail list on host of ICANN on KSK rollover where they're getting, collecting lessons learned and trying to build a checklist for how to do it in the future, best practices. It's all good stuff so I think, really, we just need that to drive community consensus and get written down.

I know that throughout the first half of this year, they're having a bunch of workshop kind of sessions and at the next IETF in Prague, they are going to have a [BOFT], non-working group forming [BOFT] on this topic just to make sure that that part of the community has a voice and they're doing the same other places. I think they're doing the right things. It just needs to come to fruition.

ERIC OSTERWEIL:

Cool. That was great. Thank you. And I see the audio just cleared up so that's fantastic. And I see we're about 20 minutes out from the end of this. I just want to let everyone know if I disappear offline suddenly, it's because my laptop has died but I'll be able to chat with you on the phone. So that'll be one way that this might end suddenly.

Okay, that was ODI exposing data, Root KSK rollover, but this is DNSSEC in general, I think progress, key rollover. Also I'm just going to annotate. Progress, key rollover, I imagine looking at this since the title is DNSSEC and those are parenthetical, that that were just examples. Are there other things about DNSSEC that we want to put in there except for crypto because that had a whole separate that it was called out in?

So there was also a question that we had posted to ICANN Org, maybe it was two, about DSNS and I think that would be related here but not in their answers. So I'm not sure where that exists in the transcription. I'm looking real quick to see but I think it would probably fall under here. So there were – I'm going to pull up the e-mails real quick. So Jennifer sent something back out to us that NSDS record management. Question, what technologies are used to ensure integrity and authentication? And

then there was another question. What procedures are used to address SSR concerns when it comes to NSDS record management?

And I note that the responses were specific to the name space managed by ICANN for its organization, in other words, ICANN.org. And I guess when I looked at the questions that may have just not been worded the way I imagine, the questions, I thought were more aimed at generally speaking, for example, including registrars and registrants and how that data is managed. But the people who came up with the question are on the call.

So my question back to you is I don't know if you've had a chance to look at the e-mail responses that Jennifer sent out, but they basically describe what looks to be pretty good hygiene but only for ICANN Org so that might be more related to the ICANN SSR. If those questions were meant for the DNS SSR, I would imagine they involve more how do you make sure that the root and registrants, and the community in general, have the correct NS and DS records, the delegation information managed by ICANN?

So that was my presumption but I want to hear if that matches what other people were thinking, especially those who formed the questions in the first place.

Boban gives me a plus one. Okay, it's possible that that has some overlap with the above comment from Norm about controls in place for registrars and registry and end users, etc. So it could be that in writing this, I'll sort of backwards reference as related to ... I think it's probably a little bit different and so either there's a bigger point that's made that

includes both or it gets made again. Yeah, and so Boban points out it's the portfolio that made it. It's not just ICANN.org but yeah, so I think I would propose that those answers probably, hopefully, inform some write-up in the ICANN SSR workstream and it's possible that after writing out the text that's in the SSR document I'm looking at now, that it'll wind up resulting in more questions that go back, clarifications or whatnot. So unless anyone has any comments or thoughts, I'll move forward. Pausing a beat. Nada.

Okay, so I do think the DNSSEC is probably a bigger area. I'm not sure that off the top of my head, I can think of exactly what else we should put in here. I'll sort of make one more plea to the team to think, to sort of propose what other aspects of DNSSEC we would want to put into consideration and put some text around before I roll forward.

Okay. Homework for you all. I love giving out homework these days, so homework for you all. Think about what DNSSEC means to you and whether we should be worried about it. And with that homework in place, number four, domain name abuse mitigation as it affects SSR issues, and there's a note, more info on ICANN's specific roles needed.

Okay, so this one, I think probably has ... Boban says he's leaving. Take care. I'm just looking to see if this is ... Yeah, so this one I recall a lot of discussion on the team about so I think this one is necessarily going to need some input from other folks on the team that have some specific concerns on this regard. So domain name abuse mitigation as it affects SSR issues, I appreciate if anybody who has time in the system, concerns, etc., if you could sort of help start the writing now by infusing some ideas.

Bye, Boban.

Okay. Well, I know that there's a lot of discussion that happens at ICANN about this and I also think I probably know better than to use my own two cents to get this started, so I'm going to try and start a thread on this for the team. Actually, let me look and see who the [stuckies] for this were. [I'll go] both. Give me one second.

Name space abuse had several bullets underneath it that included transparency with respect to abuse, that had Denise, KC, JM, NR. I'm just going to use initials. It also had reactive or super active compliance, one-off complaints, response versus data-driven priorities. That was DM. It had leadership. It had LW, NR, DM AND KC. Give ICANN compliance a big stick to lead abuse remediation, [inaudible]. I may just want to have him take this text and start from there. In fact, that's what I'll do. I will take a pass at that using what we brainstormed together unless anybody has any attenuation, suggestion, course correction, etc.

Norm, go ahead.

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, on the discussion on this, I think we all know that the CCT Review also wrote quite a bit about this area and had some recommendations on it. So it would be best to look at that as well, incorporate and share where we agree. We can certainly highlight that we agree with this team. The report is large, so [inaudible] 300 pages or something.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay. Yeah, in fact, they were nice enough to even come and brief us so for sure. So those are good starting points.

RUSS HOUSLEY: And Norm already memorized the whole thing, right?

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Is that right, Norm? You've got it all committed in [soft stick]?

NORM RITCHIE: Oh, no.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: Okay. So I'll move forward. So number five sort of debunks my above presumption that universal acceptance [inaudible] was the same thing as universal acceptance because we have universal acceptance separately.

Can identifiers be consumed by clients, IDNs and new gTLDs? I'm going to just start typing and wait for anybody. Okay, so I see no hands. So I just penned some text real quick under universal acceptance, IDNs and new gTLDs. What has ICANN done to investigate publicized progress here? I think there are probably some SSAC documents that address this based on vague recollections. But as a straw man for a starting point, anybody have any thoughts or comments on that?

Okay, cool. Okay, so the next thing is platforms, approaches and status. Those are probably related to the above so I'll just move those up. Okay.

Some of these seem a little antiseptic to me, proactive measures, advisories, technical alerts. Anybody have any starting point for what that one means? I feel like ... Okay. Norm, go ahead.

NORM RITCHIE:

Yeah, I believe this was more around threat hunting and detection, and then disseminating [inaudible] information to the registries and registrars. That's my recollection of this.

ERIC OSTEREWEL:

Okay. Thank you very much for that, Norm. Okay, so I see we're within ten minutes of the end of the call. So I don't know if we should continue. We're about halfway through the list of re-synthesized issues and I think what I'm feeling from looking at this and talking is that I think we have more signal in the original text and it might make sense to sort of take what we've done here in the call in the above text in the first document and start to do a path through it. And I guess I'll put straw man text in there and I'll paint out some names who raised their hands bravely in our face-to-face and say, "The pen is yours now," or actually, I'll probably say something more structured like I'll excise pieces of text and send them off and say, "Can you please add your thoughts to this?" Sound good?

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Yes, very good. Okay, I want to remind the team that we sent out a job description yesterday for the technical writer that we hope to get on

board to support the team and the sooner that we seem to come to consensus on that, the sooner we can get that process moving.

I've seen comments from two team members already, so if you could get those done in the next couple days, that would be great. It's only one page or so, so it shouldn't take you long.

Okay, and with that, I think that moves us to these that are any other business part of the agenda. I'm not seeing any hands, so Jennifer, would you take us through the actions?

JENNIFER BRYCE:

Sure. I'll take you through the action which I recorded, which is for Eric to put the [inaudible] text together as he just mentioned for the DNS SSR workstream item discussed on the call and he's going to send those to the volunteers [inaudible] to those items for input. I don't have any other items, so let me know if I missed anything. Happy to add. Thanks.

RUSS HOUSLEY:

Okay. Well, and just remind people that in the pieces of ICANN SSR, DNS SSR and future challenges where we don't have any outstanding questions, we have a list of names for each of those pieces. Start working on the text so that we can, in the small team, so that we can then bring it to the larger team and find a home in the report.

So that's kind of a repeat of what we said at the end of the L.A. meeting.

Okay. If there's no any other business, then we're done. Thank you, Eric, for walking us through that, a good chunk of the outline there and hopefully we can get through the rest soon. Thank you.

ERIC OSTERWEIL: My pleasure. Thanks.

JENNIFER BRYCE: Thanks, everyone. Bye.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]