Note about methodology: For this survey, each contributor was asked to rank the four mechanisms in order of preference and also indicate if any of the mechanisms should be eliminated from further consideration in the Initial Report. For each response, the following number of points were allocated to each mechanism: first choice = 4 points, second choice = 3 points, third choice = 2 points, fourth choice = 1 point. If a respondent stated that a mechanism should be eliminated from further consideration, it received zero points for that response. Cells with a value of zero are highlighted in yellow on the spreadsheet summarizing results.

sponse	Name	Туре	Mech 1	Mech 2	Mech 3	Mech 4	Elimination	Criteria
1 Jo	John Levine	Member	4	3	0	0	Please eliminate 3 and 4. External entity has no support.	experience with grant making, and desire not to spend even more time and money on this one-time accident than
							I know from experience that setting up a captive foundation would take	we already have
							another year, be very expensive, and leave ICANN with an expensive	
							useless appendage after we give the one-time auction money away.	
	Maureen Hilyard	Member	0	9	4	2	1) I would exclude total control by ICANN (Mechanism 1) as the	My choice focuses on the best interests of communities who would benefit most from the funds in order to achiev
							mechanism for the control, access and distribution of the funds gained	the mission of ICANN more effectively for end-users globally. While this may require some necessary allocation the
							from the auction of domains. I believe that ICANN Org's current financial	will enable ICANN Org to improve its technical reach to some of our underserved regions, there must be provision
							situation does not put it in the best position to be making decisions about	within the regulations of this committee, that constrain access by ICANN to a capped amount so that communities
							how best to use the funds for what I believed was initially to provide new	get more direct benefit from the funds that have been gained by the auction of domain names.
							growth and development opportunities for global Internet users. While	
							we as a committee have spent months on this, we are all witness to the	
							ICANN's increasing demands for volunteer support yet decreasing	
							opportunities to explore how they can more effectively carry out the	
							mission of ICANN within their communities, to ensure that its decisions	
							are better understood, and its mission outputs employed more	
							meaningfully and more effectively by global users of the Internet. Only by	
							having an impartial but appropriate outside mechanism at least sharing	
							the organisational and administrative roles, and that the guidelines are	
							clearly specified about an appropriate cap on what ICANN Org could	
							possible use for themselves, can I feel that there would be a more	
							egalitarian approach to the distribution of the funding.	
							egalitarian approach to the distribution of the funding.	
4	Elliot Noss	Member	4	'  3	0	0	yes. three and four as they are most likely to lead to high expenses,	the community has great expertise and a great spirit to help, we have been responsible for this gift (excess funds)
		1						being generated and we wish to see it put to the best use possible to help people and the Open Internet in the
		1					community.	context of the ICANN mission.
6	Jon Nevett	Member	0	<b>1</b> 4	0	3	eliminate mechanisms 1 & 3 ICANN shouldn't reinvent the wheel here.	Cost, efficiency, & effectiveness
	V	Marchae	_				4 4	ICANIN Internal and annual
	Kavouss Aresteh	Member	3	4	2	0	yes 4 too costly, too dependent	ICANN internal get experience and work toward to transit to mech.1 in future
11	Carolina Caeiro	Member	3	1 4	1 2	0	I am OK with removing mechanism 4. However, I believe mechanism 3	I would like to answer this question in light of my preferred choice. Mechanism 2 is my top choice because of the
		1					should be kept in the report for Barcelona to show the depth of our	expertise and reach that would come from ICANN's partnership with one or multiple external organizations. I thin
		1					debate. My feeling is that many would think, given the task at hand, that	this is a value added, and one that would best equip ICANN to deploy effective and efficient grant-making in the
							a Foundation is mechanism that would make sense, so showing the	short-run.
							challenges that option would pose is a means to help the community	Distilling these points into specific criteria, I would say:
							understand our final recommendation (which will likely be mechanism 1	- Mechanism's ability to pool needed expertise on grant-making
							or 2).	- Mechanism's ability to support quick and widespread deployment of grant opportunities
	Sébastien Bachollet	Member	4	3	0	C C	Yes 4 and 3	Cost of the mechanism
								Multistakeholder implication
								Fiduciary responsibility
								Possibility to close the mechanism when the money is totally distributed
								If we chose (it is not my fist choice) need to work with external organization(s), how we will select them?
13	Seun Ojedeji	Member	4	3	0	a	I support eliminating 4, because of its setup complexity including cost and	
							more so because this will create yet another recurring overhead which	Simplicity in setup and shutdown when funds run out
							can become unsustainable, especially when the funds run out. There is	2. Fulfilment of ICANN's oversight responsibility.
							also the administrative back and forth overhead involved since it's	3. Flexibility for instance, ability to achieve mechanism 2 exist in mechanism 1
							expected that ICANN leadership must exercise an oversight over the	4. Less overall overhead cost
							funds.	5. Continuity, visibility and sustainability of ICANN as an organisation
15	Alan Greenberg	Member	4	3	0	0	Eliminate 3 and 4. 3 will be expensive (\$ and other resources) and may	Minimize cost and complexity and maximize flexibility.
							not allow ICANN to be a funding applicant. 4 gives up too much control.	
17	Sylvia Cadena	Member	3	3 4	0	0	I will support the elimination of the mechanisms 3 and 4 proposed. These	I think it is important for ICANN to recognize its strengths and weaknesses and to choose mechanism #2 will give
							2 mechanisms will require at least another 12 to 18 months of work to	ICANN the opportunity to learn about grant management, due diligence and compliance through a partnership wit
							get established (if not longer) and the costs are quite unknown. It will be	DAF (for example the Tides Foundation) as many other medium size donor funds do.
							better to focus on the selection between mechanism #1 and #2.	
		1	1	1				
22	Stephan Deerhaake	Member	4	3	2	1	No	At the end of the day these funds are ICANN's funds, and the Organization's number one priority is to insure its
			<u></u>	<u> </u>				survival. Thus they need to have maximal control over the funds.
23	Marilyn Cade	Member	2	2 4	3	0	Yes, eliminate #4. This is long overdue to eliminate wasting time of both	Concerns about some of the analysis provided: The ICANN org retained external consultant has suggested that
	•	1		1			CCWG-AP members, ICANN staff and the external consultant retained and	options 2 and 3 are more time intensive than option 1. It not clear if this seems to indicate a preference. But, this
		1	1	1			funded by ICANN org.	seems to indicate a complete misunderstanding of ICANN processes, which is understandable as ICANN is indeed
		1					Rationale: Existing mechanisms have missions/purposes, and an existing	unique organization, with a strict need to adhere closely to its core mission and to respect its unique not for profi
		1					Board – it is not at all simple to ask such an entity to modify their	status.
		1		1			bylaws/processes to take on new processes that are defined and	
		1					prescribed by ICANN's mission/new criteria to their core	There are also concerns about Option 1. While questions about ICANN's need to adhere closely in its core missio
		1	1	1			functions/mission established by CCWG-AP/other ICANN	have been raised, the responses from the external consultant are not satisfactory so far. The consultant, staff a
		1					community/Board agreed criteria. The amount of oversight needed will	some CCWG – AP members also seem to equate creating the GDD and the PTI with how a grant making process
		1					be similar to Mechanism 1 and 2 and 3:however, is even more complex.	work within ICANN. In earlier comments, there were questions about such assumptions, and at least some also
		1					as commissioning an existing foundation or "fund" to assume such	strongly questioned the ability of Option 1 to achieve needed independence from ICANN and to protect ICANN fro
		1					functions could require extensive time for such an entity to seek to	external concerns of those who are not fully supportive of ICANN.
		1						external concerns of those who are not runy supportive of iteArity.
		1					modify its bylaws and processes. It is quite unclear how oversight of an	Deposited statements that ICANN Incurs how to correcte funds is not a fulsame recovery to have the statements
		1					existing foundation or "fund" could be undertaken. This has been	Repeated statements that ICANN knows how to segregate funds is not a fulsome response to how to establish a
		1					referenced earlier within the internal comment processes, and also by the	independent grant making and management process. It has been acknowledged that for Option One, new staff w
		1					external paid consultant. It is time to eliminate it and focus in on what	required skills/expertise would be required, and that they would then be dismissed once the fund
		1		1			might is feasible and practical within ICANN's larger challenges.	management/allocation concludes. The usual salaries for grant management is much less than what ICANN sta
		1						are paid, so bringing this internal to ICANN would result in significant additional costs and lead to creating an
		1	1	1				internal mechanism that would then need to be dissolved when the funds are fully awarded and grants are
		1						completed, thus will lead to the need to either create term limited approaches to hiring new expertise, or creating
		1	1	1				an exit strategy with external costs to pay for such staff to depart ICANN, often with termination costs, as is typic
		1	1	1				within ICANN.
		1						
		1	1	1				Co-mingling of purpose – to use existing staff part time – but compensate their time—also has to be carefully
Į.			1	ii.	1		1	considered given that the community was advised during the Budget Review process that existing staff are fully
								considered given that the community was advised during the budget review process that existing start are they

Mechanism 1 Summary: ranked as first choice = 6 responses, ranked as second choice = 3 responses, ranked as third choice = 1 responses, ranked as fourth choice = 2 responses, recommended eliminating = 2 responses Mechanism 2 Summary: ranked as first choice = 5 responses, ranked as second choice = 7 responses, ranked as first choice = 0 responses, recommended eliminating = 0 responses Mechanism 3 Summary: ranked as first choice = 1 response, ranked as third choice = 0 responses, ranked as first choice = 3 responses, recommended eliminating = 7 responses responses, ranked as first choice = 1 response, ranked as first choice = 1 response, ranked as third choice = 1 responses, ranked as first choice = 1 responses, recommended eliminating = 7 responses responses recommended eliminating = 7 responses responses recommended eliminating = 9 responses responses recommended eliminating = 9 responses recommended eliminating = 9 responses recommended eliminating = 9 responses responses recommended eliminating = 9 responses responses recommended eliminating = 9 responses recommended eliminatin