Comment Close
Date
Statement
Name 

Status

Assignee(s)

Call for
Comments Open
Call for
Comments
Close 
Vote OpenVote CloseDate of SubmissionStaff Contact and EmailStatement Number
 

CCWG-Accountability - Draft Proposal on Work Stream 1 Recommendations

ADOPTED 14Y, 0N, 0AAlan Greenberg  13:00 UTC

ALAC Monthly Teleconference - 2015.12.22

 

 

ALAC Monthly Teleconference - 2015.12.22

 
CCWG-Accountability Staff Support
AL-ALAC-ST-1215-04-00-EN

For information about this Public Comment, please click here 

 

FINAL VERSION TO BE SUBMITTED IF RATIFIED

Click here to download the PDF document below



FINAL DRAFT VERSION TO BE VOTED UPON BY THE ALAC

Final Formatted Version - December 21, 2015


FIRST DRAFT SUBMITTED

  File Modified
PDF File Draft Version 1 - December 13, 2015.pdf Dec 21, 2015 by Ariel Liang
PDF File Draft Version 2 - December 15, 2015.pdf Dec 21, 2015 by Ariel Liang
PDF File Draft Version 3 - December 19, 2015.pdf Dec 21, 2015 by Ariel Liang
PDF File Final Formatted Version - December 21, 2015.pdf Dec 22, 2015 by Ariel Liang
PDF File AL-ALAC-ST-1215-04-00-EN.pdf Dec 28, 2015 by Ariel Liang

 

 

  • No labels

3 Comments

  1. Comment from Tijani Ben Jemaa, 14 Dec 8:39 UTC 

    ==

    Alan,

     

    I support your draft, and would like to add more about the Human Rights issue.

     

    As you said the international law and conventions are only binding for governments who signed them. That’s why any other body that wants to comply to them should include them in its bylaw as ICANN do by including in its bylaws as core value of the incorporation that it must carry out its activities in accordance with applicable law and international law and conventions. What is the need of repeating in the bylaws the commitment to respect internationally recognized human rights? Are they not part of the applicable international law and conventions?

     

    Also, the CCWG legal advice told that upon termination of the NTIA Contract, there would be no significant impact on ICANN’s Human Rights obligations. So why this is needed?

     

    It is even more strange that despite the legal advice and the provision in the core values that ICANN must carry out its activities in accordance with applicable law and international law and conventions that include human rights, the proposal suggest to add an interim bylaw about human rights, knowing that the final language about the human rights issue will be worked out in work stream 2.

     

    My strong fear is that they want to regulate the content though this heavy insistence in putting more and more to intimidate us; you may see in the futur delegation of TLDs prevented because the applicant "doesn’t respect human rights" in the content carried by the TLD……. 

  2. Comments on the 1st Draft published on the ALAC@atlarge-lists.icann.org: http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/pipermail/alac/2015-December/thread.html 

    Comments on the 1st Draft published on the iana-issues@atlarge-lists.icann.org: http://atlarge-lists.icann.org/pipermail/iana-issues/2015-December/thread.html

  3. (comments relating to main proposal document)

     

    Dear Alan,

    I have finally managed to get through the whole proposal, plus 15 annexes plus 10 annexes - and have no idea whatsoever how one could read through all of these and form an opinion if they had not been knowledgeable of the recommendations prior to publishing.
    Different parts of the document read in different ways, with some passages that are particularly poor prose. There is a fair amount of repeating, sometimes complete, sometimes partial paragraphs. Although the final documents are actually quite impressive, sadly, it shows that this proposal was put together in a hurry.

    Now for my comments:

    * Paragraph 68:
    The CCWG-Accountability expects that disagreements between the ICANN community and the ICANN Board might arise from time to time. In an effort to prevent such disagreements from happening the CCWG is recommending that ICANN be required to engage with the community on any key decisions it is considering such as Budgets or changing Bylaws."

    My question --> ICANN or the ICANN Board should engage with the community?

    I gather that it should be the ICANN Board. There a several places where the ambiguity is apparent. I really hope that these will be picked up by the final professional proof-readers we are told will clean this up.

    * Paragraph 72 & 88:
    This mentions "approving the IANA Budget". This is different to "rejecting the IANA budget" (paragraph 144). *
    In any case, and with the relevant Paragraphs 149-154, The IANA Functions Budget is deemed to be rejected using Recommendation #2's escalation and enforcement processes.
    I find it absurd that the ICANN Community would have the power to veto a budget that is so important for the whole operation of the Internet, especially since starving IANA of funding for its development and requirements to provide Service Levels according to Service Level Agreements is a great way to make it miss its SLEs, thus potentially triggering a separation process. Step 1: refuse IANA budget increase; Step 2: blame IANA for missing its SLEs and initiate a separation process.

    * Paragraph 183:
    "The Interim Board will have the same powers and duties as the Board it replaces."

    It is important to mention in the same sentence, --> subject to the limits described in paragraph 184.
    Otherwise an interim Board could take major decisions that might affect ICANN significantly.
    Also: there is no mention of any kind of Due Diligence performed on potential Board members. So I do not know how they CCWG thinks SOs & ACs can appoint Board members at will, but the process takes several weeks - except of course if there are "shadow Board members" but that's probably out of the question...

    * Paragraph 237
    The CCWG-Accountability’s enhancements to the Independent Review Process ensure that the Independent Review Process will not be empowered to circumvent the bottom-up, multistakeholder-driven nature of ICANN’s processes.

    There are several places which mention curbs on the circumventing of the bottom-up, multistakeholder-driven nature of ICANN's processes. Could this be used to counter ALAC & GAC advice when policy is being made in the GNSO?

    Finally, I am alarmed by the fact that the current Bylaw changes proposed would take place before the implementation of ATRT2 recommendation 9.1:

    9.1. ICANN Bylaws Article XI should be amended to include the following language to mandate Board Response to Advisory Committee Formal Advice:
    The ICANN Board will respond in a timely manner to formal advice from all Advisory Committees, explaining what action it took and the rationale for doing so.

    With the current amendments to the Bylaws, the Board would need to obtain approval from the community for this Bylaw to be accepted prior to making the change. This was already hard fought during ATRT2 and I hope that the ALAC would not have to fight this again with the rest of the Community. I can see that with the current prejudice we've heard from members of the CCWG, we would probably need to fight for this *again*, all due to ICANN Staff being unable to complete the ATRT2 recommendation implementation, even thought the Board has already given its green light for ALL ATRT2 recommendations to be implemented?

    Kindest regards,

    Olivier
    (also sent to IANA Issues Mailing List)