NCSG Structure

Announcement:

An ICANN Public Comment period is now open concerning the four new Stakeholder Group Petitions-Charters submitted to the Board on or before 6 March 2009. The close date for submitting comments has been extended to 15 April. To post comments, please click here or the link above and follow the instructions provided. Please note that comments entered in this NCSG Structure WIKI workspace will not be cross-posted to the ICANN Public Comments page.

Comments:

Note: Ken Bour relocated this comment, which seems to be appropriate in this section.

Request for information:

The cover letter for version 6 (not yet posted here) of the NCUC charter states:

We already have evidence from this; we note that none of the “new constituencies” currently being proposed for the Noncommercial Stakeholders actually represent newcomers to the ICANN space. All of them are existing members of NCUC or RALOs who wish to gain seats on the Council without having to win an election among a large number of other noncommercial entities and individuals.

I have asked for a current NCUC member list several times. Could such a list of currently actively NCUC participants be made public or provided to NCUC members such as myself? Could you identify what new members constitute the 40% recent increase in NCUC you mention later in the cover letter?

contributed by prestonc@lawgate.byu.edu on 2009-03-17 00:36:59 GMT

_*CyberSafety Constituency Response to Version 6,
NCUC-proposed NCSG Charter
16 Mar. 2009
Submitted by Ralph Yarro, Allan Smart, David Bailey, Cheryl Preston, Debra Peck, Marsali Hancock*_

Below are specific responses to statements made in summary of the NCUC proposal in the cover letter to version 6, 16 March 2009; From: Robin Gross, Chair, Noncommercial Users Constituency.
(The CSC Comments to the original NCUC letter are highlighted in bolded italics)

1. Essential Elements of the proposal:

1. Noncommercial stakeholders join the NCSG directly, and the NCSG keeps track of membership and administers voting for Council seats by the membership as a whole. Under the NCUC proposal, a 50.1% majority vote of NCSG members will elect the NCSG Chair (who also has tie breaking authority on the Policy Committee) and all six GNSO Councilors. The interests of 49.9% of the membership can thus be excluded from any representation on the GNSO Council.

2. The NCSG is administered by an annually elected Chair and a Policy Committee. The Policy Committee is composed of the 6 elected GNSO Councilors and one representative from each Constituency. _*The Policy Committee includes the majority-elected Chair and 6 Councilors. It will function effectively only when the number of constituencies is not too few or too many.
Too Few. With 8 or fewer constituencies, the PC may be composed of a Chair, 6 Councilors and one representative from a single constituency (for a total of 8), and thus the mere majority of members (who elected the 6 Councilors and Chair) could outvote everyone else on the PC. With 9 constituencies, it could be a tie, but the majority-elected Chair is the tie breaker.
Too Many. Things may function on a more balanced basis when more than 9 constituencies are formed, but at that point the number of persons on the PC is 17. Working with a committee of 17 or more persons is very cumbersome and ineffective. If, as was suggested by NCUC at the Mexico City meeting, dozens or hundreds of constituencies will form under this proposal, the PC will be paralyzed*_.

5. We have de-linked Constituency formation from Council seats so that NCSG participants do not have artificial incentives to fragment into competing groups, ensuring that a voting system, conducted through all members of the SG, will result in a better and diverse representation on the GNSO than any other model that strings the formation of a Constituency to a seat the Council, favoring corporatism over democracy. _*Having all elected positions determined by a bare majority does not broaden representation until there are enough participants so that no singular viewpoints can control a majority. In the meantime, potential new entrants will be discouraged with the possibilities for meaningful voice. The majority voting system proposed is identical to the one in place in the current NCUC. Efforts by newcomers to be involved in the NCSG Charter development process were summarily dismissed without meaningful discussion in that system. A majority vote system within a stakeholder group with such diverse viewpoints rewards finding “votes,” but does nothing to require discussion or actual participation by “voting” members. Additionally, since members may join up to three constituencies, the exact same group of people could theoretically form three constituencies with allegedly differing objectives, and put three people on the PC.
It would, however, be a vast improvement over the NCUC format to have the list of eligible voting members and numbers of votes allocated open to everyone in the stakeholder group. The votes should also be made public following elections to ensure accountability*_.
To protect the voice of minorities in the policy process, we require all NCSG representatives on the GNSO Council to vote in favor of the formation of a Working Group if it has the support of 1/3 of the constituencies or 1/5 of the whole membership. The ability to work together and submit a proposal to the GNSO is also available to the public, without membership in any GNSO stakeholder group. Any person or group can create its own project group and work themselves for months at any time. They can then submit a public proposal to ICANN or the GNSO. A working group formed under this charter has no special deference or significance requiring it to be taken any more seriously than a public proposal. Both can be equally ignored.

2. How our proposal addresses Principles and Goals of the GNSO Improvements process:

Principle 1: Visibility and Transparency.
When noncommercial stakeholders are fragmented into independent constituencies, each with their own mailing list, administrative structure and representatives, it is literally impossible for an ordinary noncommercial organization to keep track of them all. On the other hand a mailing list that includes all members of the stakeholder group, which hopefully will become at least dozens, will be ineffective. No one will read all posts. The individual groups will still need to create smaller communications organs to discuss who to place on the PC, what policies they support, what working groups they wish to form, etc. A stakeholder-wide mailing list is available under either proposal. Noncommercial stakeholders in one constituency would have no idea what is happening in other constituencies. That information will be available in the same way that NCSG stakeholders obtain information from other ICANN entities, such as the business users stakeholder group. The CyberSafety Charter proposal includes a mechanism for organizing meetings and discussion among various constituencies within NCSG.

Principle 2: Representativeness.
Our proposal enhances representation in several ways. First, by adopting a model of flexible and easy-to-form constituencies as subunits under the NCSG, we allow a far more diverse set of interests and coalitions to form. The ability to form loose and perhaps frivolous constituencies runs the risk of gaming to get a spot on the PC. The incentive will be to form multiple constituencies each with the minimal number of participants, 10 individuals or 3 organizations, each of whom may also be counted as a member of two other NCSG constituencies. Board approval of constituencies provides opportunity to ensure that the constituency is sufficiently broad and represents a significant category of non-commercial user interests. Most important, through unified voting for GNSO Council seats, our proposal ensures that whoever represents noncommercial stakeholders on the Council has support across all constituencies, not just a bare majority of a small subgroup of the SG. This proposal does not guarantee that Councilors have support “across all constituencies.” All that is required is a bare majority of the stakeholder group. A proposal to permit cumulative voting or to require a certain percentage of each constituency in support would perhaps make the voting system meaningful. But a mere majority does not necessarily require any outreach to the other 49%.

Principle 3: Consensus.
Once a constituency controls specific Council seats/votes, they have little incentive to seek support from other Council members for their views or their representatives. All councilors will have the incentive of reaching a consensus with others on the GNSO Council, the same as the representatives from other constituencies and stakeholder groups. Further, the CSC Charter provides guidelines to councilors in terms of fairly representing the full NCSG. We already have evidence from this; we note that none of the “new constituencies” currently being proposed for the Noncommercial Stakeholders actually represent newcomers to the ICANN space. All of them are existing members of NCUC or RALOs who wish to gain seats on the Council without having to win an election among a large number of other noncommercial entities and individuals. All those who attended the NCUC meeting in Cairo know that most of the new members are those who intend to be participants in the proposed CSC. The NCUC brags below in this letter of a recent 40% increase. Because we cannot obtain a member list it is difficult to determine with precision, but a substantial number of these are organizations and persons who became involved for the purpose of participating in the CSC and joined the NCUC in a (thwarted) attempt to be involved in developing a NCSG charter proposal through NCUC. The Fall 2008 NCUC elections raised approximately 23 votes. A 40% increase would be approximately 10 new members. At least 6 of these are new CSC participants introduced at the Cairo meeting. In addition, most of the others on the proposed CSC member list had no prior involvement with NCUC or a RALO prior to posting the Notice of Intent to Form the CSC Constituency. Our proposal understands that policy development in the new GNSO will not come from a Council acting as a legislator, but from consensus-based Working Groups. Working groups can make proposals to the GNSO, as can any public participant.

Principle 4: Flexibility and Adaptability.
The old constituency model is broken. It rigidly assigns Council seats and representation to categories of users that are constantly changing, categories that may overlap in numerous ways. Dividing the world up into mutually exclusive categories known as “constituencies” is always bound to exclude some people who don’t fit the categories, and at the same time over-represent entities who qualify for two or three of the categories. A group who does not fit in an existing constituency may petition to form a new one under a constituency model. In addition, the NCUC proposal permits one person or organization to participate in three constituencies and thus be over-represented.

3. Changes made to the previous (2/28/9) version of the proposal:

Dealing with “Threat” of Capture.

Nonetheless, in response to this perceived threat of capture, we have extended the minimum voting eligibility period for new Members to 90 days (Section 3.4.3). Such an adjustment should allow opportunity for countervailing interests to form, preventing the flooding of new members’ right before an election with the specific purpose of winning it, without any actual engagement of such members in the discussions and activities pertaining to the Stakeholders Group. Does the 90 days run from the Notice of Intent to form a new constituency, from filing the Petition and Charter for a new constituency, or from when the ICANN Board formally approves a petition to form a new constituency following the 30 day comment period currently running? How can the participants in the proposed CSC “join” a NCSG that has not formed? The measurement of 90 days could effectively preclude any new participants from voting until after the June ICANN meeting and after the existing and new councilors reach the end of their two year terms. A 90 day rule only favors existing participants; it does not foster new involvement.
The current constituency-based model actually aggravates problems of capture because it potentially institutionalizes special interests. Once a constituency has formed and been allocated seats, there is no reasonable mechanism to remove a constituency’s representatives from the Council, no matter how the broader membership base may change. As long as the Board maintains the right to approve constituencies, and the GNSO can be restructured (as is currently occurring), the reformation, compression or expansion of constituencies is available. We partially address this concern by now requiring final approval of Constituencies by the ICANN Board (Section 2.3.1). This provision is the same as the CSC proposed Charter.

Dealing with the demand for diversity in representation on the GNSO Council:

One approach suggested that an interim system in which each Constituency would be granted an automatic seat at the GNSO Council could be created as long as no more than six Constituencies exist within the NCSG structure. This suggestion not only fails to provide a long-term solution for the issue, it also creates artificial incentives for the formation of groups that have little concern for the wider range of the membership who the NCSG Council must serve. The NCUC proposal provides NO long-term solution. The proposal calls for administration by a Policy Committee populated with 6 Councilors, a Chair and a representative from each constituency. Once a dozen constituencies are formed, the PC will be too unwieldy to function. It also fails to provide a short-term solution. Until at least 9 constituencies are formed, the PC may be captured by a 50.1% majority. The outcome of an interim decision like that would encourage the election of NCSG Councilors who have little or no incentive to reach out to other views and constituencies that naturally constitute the non-commercial interest in ICANN. The NCUC proposed structure based on a unitary organization with majority voting is identical to the existing NCUC structure. Over the course of several years, this structure has not been effective in supporting meaningful inclusion of new and broader interests.

Other questions on NCUC proposal, version 6:

1. Is the Secretary-Treasurer who is involved in admitting new members in section 2.2.6 the same as the Secretary of the PC?

2. Why are constituency charter-drafting meetings required to be open to the general public under 2.3.1 3), given that the charter must also be submitted to the PC for ratification in 4)?

3. The end of section 2.0 of version 6 states: “Constituencies can exclude NCSG members who apply to join them based on an objective and nondiscriminatory application of their eligibility criteria.” A charter for a constituency can only be reviewed for compliance with the requirement for a sufficient number of participants and the non-inclusion of commercial interests. Thus, couldn’t “eligibility criteria” be drafted include any number of things that cannot be applied in an “objective and nondiscriminatory” manner? If all communications are open to all stakeholders, rather than by constituency, what is the necessity for excluding some participants in any constituency?

4. Will funds be allocated for the benefit of all of the stakeholders and constituencies? Or will each constituency be free to raise its own funds? Who shares in the NCSG membership fees and donations such as those received by NCUC in the past from the Public Interest Registry?

5. Section 3.3.2 d) provides that “upon the request of one or more NCSG GNSO Council Representatives, the PC may provide advice on how the NCSG GNSO Councilors should vote or what position to take on specific GNSO policy issues.” Does this mean that policy positions are developed by in the PC only if one of the 6 councilors requests advice?

6. Section 3.4.5 retains the language that, for purposes of regional representation on the Council, either mere citizenship or mere residence is sufficient. How does this reconcile with the recommendations that ICANN focus on a much deeper and more meaningful representation of regions that these two factors? (The report of the ICANN Geographic Representation Working Group is available at http://gnso.icann.org/drafts/icann-geographic-regions-26aug08.pdf .)

7. When an organization includes so many who travel internationally, host long conferences, and require translation, is a voting period of only one week under 3.5.4 sufficient?

8. Can you explain section 3.5.7, “policy positions that reach broad consensus within the NCSG Policy Committee are binding on the NCSG Councilors’ votes cast on the GNSO Council”? Does this mean that councilors are bound to a particular policy position if it is “broadly” accepted in the PC? What does “broad” consensus mean when the councilors themselves are the majority on PC? Does this provision override the ability of a councilor elected by a mere majority to vote with the interests of that majority? Does a “broad consensus” require more or less than a majority of members?

Allan Smart

contributed by guest@socialtext.net on 2009-03-17 21:12:41 GMT

After careful consideration of both the NCUC and the CSC proposed charter, I would like to weigh in with my support for the stakeholder group charter submitted by CSC. I have reviewed both charters in depth, including previous drafts of the current versions that have been submitted, as well as the explanatory letters accompanying the drafts. In addition, I have read through the ICANN materials outlining the goals for the GNSO improvements (available at http://www.icann.org/en/topics/policy/update-oct08-en.htm and http://gnso.icann.org/en/improvements/). It is vitally important to consider these guidelines in analyzing the two charters and their effect on both NCSG and GNSO operations. The CSC proposed charter is far superior in meeting these objectives.

The CSC proposed charter has a simple organization composed of constituencies and an Executive Committee formed by representatives of constituencies to engage in what little administration is necessary at the stakeholder group level. The goal is to bring in new participants and expand the range of representation in the GNSO. With the constituency as the primary unit of the NCSG, newcomers will have an opportunity to work at the GNSO level. There has to be a way to invite new ideas and discussion without the fear that that these discussions will be disposed of before they can surface out of the NCSG. As is, the NCUC proposal sends the clear message that any attempt at participation is futile unless you can gather a majority of all non-commercial participants – by definition this excludes minority voices from participation at the GNSO level.
The structure and voting provisions set forth in the NCUC proposed charter miss the mark on ICANN guidelines for the GNSO restructure. Although the NCUC charter has come a long way since initial drafts, it still maintains a merely majoritarian structure that could be used, at this nascent stage, to discourage newcomers with “disapproved” viewpoints from having meaningful involvement.
Further deterring participation by new members is the new provision added to the latest version of the NCUC proposed charter. It prevents new members from voting until they have been admitted to the unit for 90 days. The NCUC claims that this was added in response to perceived threats of capture. This seems disingenuous to me. This waiting period could effectively preclude any new participants from voting until after the June ICANN meeting and after the existing and new councilors reach the end of their two year terms.
The NCUC continually points to their provisions regarding working groups in an effort to show that they have tolerated and accommodated minority voices in their structure. However, anyone can form a group that works together to submit a public proposal to ICANN or the GNSO. A working group formed under this charter has no special deference or significance requiring it to be taken any more seriously than a public proposal.
Under the NCUC proposed charter, GNSO councilors from the non-commercial stakeholder group are bound by policy positions that reach “broad consensus” on the policy committee. This is (perhaps intentionally) vague. There is no definition of what “broad” means, which is particularly alarming when the councilors themselves are the majority on the policy committee.
The NCUC proposal permits individual representations from any three organizations of any size OR any ten individuals to form a constituency and put someone on the stakeholder group policy committee. And since people can be in three constituencies at the same time, any single group of three organizations could create three full constituencies. The NCUC proposed structure creates its own artificial incentives to create constituencies, and without any oversight other than counting to three and making sure no “commercial” users have snuck in by disguise.
The NCUC’s policy committee is totally unworkable. It will create either overrepresentation or impossibly unwieldy administration, depending on the number of constituencies (for a more detailed explanation and breakdown of the numbers, see the CSC’s response to version 6 of the NCUC proposed charter, available at ncsg structure). The CSC proposed charter provides a simple model that reduces administrative overhead. The charter seeks to allocate Council seats evenly to any constituency the Board sees fit to approve, and then extra seats, if any, through a consensus model before resorting to a more administratively involved voting system. This simplified model will allow to the NCSG to focus on more important policy matters, rather than administrative details.
These are the main reasons that I favor the CSC proposed charter over the NCUC proposal. (For more in depth discussion of the charter provisions, please refer to the CSC’s response to version 6 of the NCUC proposed charter, with which I concur, available at ncsg structure.)

Debra Peck, J.D.

contributed by debbypeck@gmail.com on 2009-03-19 18:38:17 GMT

—
Our INEGroup members objections to this petition to ICANN for such a
potential constituency are relitively simple but non-negotiable. They
are:
1.) No prequalifications for membership and avaliable openly to any
and all interested parties/stakeholders for membership.
2.) All members have a one person, one vote on any and all issues
and GNSO council membership and simple majority rules.
3.) All proposed solutions or issues must have a voted majority
approval before provided to whomever is elected by majority
one person one vote, as GNSO council representative.

contributed by guest@socialtext.net on 2009-03-23 23:18:26 GMT

Content

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Announcement:

Staff Materials re: SG Structure

NCUC Charter Proposals re: NCSG Structure

CyberSafety Charter Proposals re: NCSG Structure

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