

**ALAC STATEMENT ON DRAFT STATEMENT OF
ICANN'S ROLE AND REMIT IN SECURITY, STABILITY AND RESILIENCY
OF THE INTERNET'S UNIQUE IDENTIFIER SYSTEMS**

The ALAC applauds the initiative of the ICANN Security Team in proactively responding to the draft report of the Stability, Security and Resiliency of the DNS Review Team (SSR-RT) by developing this Statement. The 'Draft Statement of ICANN's Role and Remit in Security, Stability and Resiliency of the Internet's Unique Identifier Systems' (which will be referred to in this document as the 'Role and Remit Statement') commences at Section II of the document and appropriately draws from information contained in both the SSR-RT Report and the draft FY13 ICANN Security, Stability and Resiliency Framework.

While this document is currently intended to address the SSR-RT Recommendations 1 and 3, Recommendation 5 is very closely related to Recommendation 3 (see below), and the ALAC recommends that the Role and Remit Statement would usefully be expanded to address Recommendation 5 also. This could be easily done by adding a section to the document which describes the roles, responsibilities and relationships between: SSAC, RSSAC, TLG, IETF, and the ICANN Security Team.

SSR-RT Report Recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 1: ICANN should publish a single, clear and consistent statement of its SSR remit and limited technical mission. ICANN should elicit and gain public feedback in order to reach a consensus---based statement.

RECOMMENDATION 3: ICANN should document and clearly define the nature of the SSR relationships it has within the ICANN community in order to provide a single focal point for understanding the interdependencies between organizations.

RECOMMENDATION 5: ICANN should publish a document clearly outlining the roles and responsibilities for both the SSAC and RSSAC in order to clearly delineate the activities of the two groups. ICANN should seek consensus for this across both groups, recognising the history and circumstances of the formation of each. ICANN should consider appropriate resourcing for both groups, consistent with the demands placed upon them.

In relation to Recommendation 1, specific guidance has been sought on:

1. What does it mean "to coordinate at the overall level the global Internet's system of unique identifiers"?

The ALAC considers that this coordination role is appropriately described in the third paragraph of Section II beginning "To coordinate means ..."

2. What are the limits of that coordination role?

The ALAC considers that the limits of this coordination role are appropriately described in the sixth paragraph of Section II beginning “ICANN’s Technical Mission includes...”

3. What does it mean to ensure the security and stability of the global Internet's unique identifier systems?

The ALAC considers that the definitions of Security, Stability and Resiliency in the second paragraph of Section II provide appropriate descriptions of this meaning. In addition, some very useful conceptual work has been done by the Joint DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA-WG) to answer this question from a functional perspective. It identifies the following functions as elements in a Security Management Framework:

- Risk Assessment
- Risk Planning
- Standards, Tools and Techniques
- Audit and Compliance
- Education and Awareness
- Front-line Response

These functions all need to be undertaken to ‘ensure’ security and stability and a more detailed description of them would comprehensively answer the question posed.

In relation to Recommendation 3, specific guidance has been sought on:

...ICANN’s SSR relationships with others in the Internet ecosystem, including groups such as the root server operators, RIRs, Registrars, standards bodies, law enforcement, CERTs, and operational security communities such as the Conficker Working Group, MAAWG, etc.

The Security Management Framework developed by the DSSA-WG could well provide the means by which these SSR relationships could be mapped both functionally and organizationally. That work is still under development but should be available to be utilized by other groups within ICANN in the near future. In particular, it may be of value in supporting the future work of the Board DNS Risk Management Framework Working Group.